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Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003), writer of fiction, literary critic, political journalist and thinker, is one 
of the most influential figures in twentieth-century literature and thought.  The relationship between 
art and technology is a largely unexplored aspect of Blanchot’s writing; this thesis examines his 
engagement with the question of techne in criticism and fiction over a fifty-year period and 
demonstrates that he is far from subscribing to the technophobia of probably the most influential 
thinker of technology, Martin Heidegger.  It is argued that writing for Blanchot is a mode of techne 
which destabilises the opposition between nature and culture, or nature and technology, or nature and 
history, and provides a means of thinking other than the anthropos.  The chronological approach of 
this thesis stresses how a thinking of writing as techne radicalises over time and indicates the enduring 
influence of Blanchot.   
The first chapter considers the treatment of the division, often taken for granted by critics, 
between literary and everyday language; focussing on Blanchot’s reading of Mallarmé in essays 
dating from 1940 to 1952, this chapter reveals a shift in his thinking of literature from autonomy to 
radical non-essentiality.  The second chapter examines Blanchot’s critical engagement with Heidegger 
in essays written in 1953 and shows how we might reconcile Blanchot’s work with ecological 
thought.  A third chapter focuses on the discussion of modern technologies in essays from the 1950s 
and 1960s and the coincidental emergence of the non-concept of the neuter in literature and criticism; 
it listens to various apocalyptic tones in work from this period to reveal a continuity between the 
experience of the technological and of the imaginary.  The final chapter explores how ‘technique’ is 
everywhere implied once the term disappears from Blanchot’s idiom; it argues that fragmentary 












‘En quelque sorte, j’ai toujours eu une certaine passion politique.  La chose publique me provoque 
souvent.’1  These words, written in a letter to Roger Laporte in 1984, show that Blanchot, contrary to 
rumour or reputation, was no isolated hermit but someone deeply immersed in the events and debates 
of his time.  A newspaper article from 1996 describing Blanchot’s protest when Bruno Roy, director 
of Fata Morgana, refused to withdraw a text by founder of the New Right Alain de Benoist from the 
publishing house’s catalogue perpetuates the view of Blanchot as, ‘depuis de nombreuses années à 
l’écart de la vie publique, sortant difficilement de sa réserve; ses rares interventions sont donc très 
remarquées.’2  But his regular pre-war journalism from 1932 to 1940, his resistance to Nazi 
Occupation and the Vichy regime during the Second World War, which culminated in a near-death 
experience before a firing squad in June 1944 (recounted fifty years later in L’Instant de ma mort), his 
anti-Gaullism, his opposition to the Algerian war, his involvement in the events of May 1968 and his 
sustained interest in international affairs, particularly concerning Russia,3 attest to a political 
                                                          
1 Maurice Blanchot, letter to Roger Laporte [22 December 1984], in Maurice Blanchot: passion politique, lettre-
récit de 1984 suivie d’une lettre de Dionys Mascolo, by Jean-Luc Nancy (Paris: Galilée, 2011), p. 62.  This letter 
was initially intended to be published in the abortive Cahiers de l’Herne that Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe were due to edit in 1984/5. 
2 Nicholas Weill, ‘Maurice Blanchot et le débat sur la “nouvelle droite”’, Le Monde, 15 November 1996, p. 28.  
See also Laurent Perez, ‘Maurice Blanchot: la rhétorique du déni’ [review of L’Autre Blanchot, by Michel 
Surya], Artpress, 422 (May 2015), 76.  Perez writes of Blanchot: ‘Son ultime “retrait” — dont il n’est pas 
interdit de supposer qu’il répond autant aux premières découvertes sur son passé qu’à l’échec de mai 68 —, 
s’il prend bien vite la forme d’une conversion inconditionnelle à un “judaïsme imaginaire”, s’effectue en effet 
d’abord sur le mode de l’amertume et de la dépression.’ 
3 This is noted by the editor of the volume of correspondence between Blanchot and Vadim Kozovoï; see Denis 
Aucouturier, ‘Introduction’, in Lettres à Vadim Kozovoï, by Maurice Blanchot, ed. by Denis Aucouturier 
(Houilles: Manucius, 2009), p. 9. 
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engagement that runs counter to the myth of the solitary writer.4  Nevertheless, ‘[l]a chose publique’ 
better encompasses the broader scope of Blanchot’s interest than ‘politics’ in the limited sense of the 
word.   
For much of the 1930s and 1940s Blanchot was employed as journalist and book reviewer: 
writing for periodicals about anything topical he acquired an ingrained habit of responding 
immediately to everyday events and new publications.  This habit would persist throughout his career 
and continued to shape essays published in later volumes such as L’Entretien infini [1969] and 
L’Amitié [1971].  ‘Le Tout Dernier Mot’, an essay on Kafka’s correspondence with Felice Bauer, was 
simultaneously the very last word on Kafka’s life, the very last word by Blanchot on Kafka, and the 
very last piece Blanchot published in the Nouvelle Revue française in 1968; and all this by virtue of 
the fact that the volume of correspondence had just appeared in German and Blanchot was responding 
directly to it, while also reflecting on longer-lasting issues of his own.5  Similarly, almost all 
references in La Communauté inavouable [1983] are to texts that had only just appeared by Derrida, 
Duras, Enriquez, Kofman, Nancy and the Rilke-Pasternak-Tsvetayeva letters.6  Finally, two essays by 
Blanchot concerned with nuclear weapons, ‘Entretien sur un changement d’époque’ [April 1960] and 
‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’ [March 1964], appeared a month or so after the first nuclear weapons test by 
the French on 13 February 1960 in Reggane, a district in Algeria, and after these weapons became 
available for use in January 1964.7  This demonstrates how essential it is to view everything that 
                                                          
4 Blanchot makes this point himself in Pour l’amitié (Paris: Fourbis, 1996) (first publ. in À la recherche d’un 
communisme de pensée, by Dionys Mascolo (Paris: Fourbis, 1993), pp. 5-16).  For biographical details see 
Christophe Bident, Maurice Blanchot: partenaire invisible (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1998).   
5 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Le Tout Dernier Mot’, La Nouvelle Revue française, 185 (May 1968), 780-808.  This was 
later published in Maurice Blanchot, L’Amitié (Paris: Gallimard 1971), pp. 300-25; and in Maurice Blanchot, De 
Kafka à Kafka, Idées, 453 (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), pp. 219-48. 
6 Maurice Blanchot, La Communauté inavouable (Paris: Minuit, 1983).  Texts cited include: Jacques Derrida, 
D’un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie (February 1983); Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘La Communauté 
désœuvrée’ (published in Aléa, February 1983); Marguerite Duras, La Maladie de la mort (in bookshops at the 
beginning of January 1983); Eugène Enriquez, De la horde à l’État: essai de psychanalyse du lien social 
(February 1983); the French translation of the three-handed volume of correspondence between Rilke, 
Pasternak and Tsvetaeva (February 1983); and Sarah Kofman, Comment s’en sortir (January 1983). 
7 See, for instance, ‘Le Général de Gaulle: hourra pour la France’, Le Monde, 15 February 1960; ‘Un décret 
confie officiellement au président de la République la responsabilité d'engager la force de frappe’, Le Monde, 
21 January 1964.   
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Blanchot writes within a very specific intellectual and historical context, a methodology which 
informs the chronological and contextual approach of this thesis.  
One of the most important thinkers Blanchot engages with is Martin Heidegger, whose 
influence on French philosophy cannot be underestimated: his ideas have left their mark on Derrida, 
Foucault, Lacan, Levinas, Lyotard and Stiegler, among others.  Blanchot is certainly a name to 
include on this list.  Introduced to Heidegger’s work in 1927 or 1928 by his close friend Emmanuel 
Levinas, he describes the experience of reading Sein und Zeit for the first time as ‘un véritable choc 
intellectuel’.8  Accessing Heidegger’s work as it was published in German meant that Blanchot could 
respond immediately to texts whose translation into French was often delayed: ‘Die Frage nach der 
Technik’ [1953] appeared in Essais et conférences [1958] five years after its initial publication; 
Holzwege [1950], the volume containing ‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’ and ‘Wozu Dichter?’, did 
not appear in French until 1962; and Sein und Zeit [1927] was not translated in its entirety until 1986.9   
A number of translations of sections of Heidegger’s texts have been found in Blanchot’s 
personal archive.  They were never intended for publication so one may speculate that Blanchot found 
translation a means of exploring how Heidegger’s idiom might work in another language, of testing 
that it is possible to think in languages other than German and Greek, or of verifying that he had 
understood the German texts.  The following, probably incomplete, list demonstrates the sustained 
significance of Heidegger for Blanchot, if this was still in doubt, and provides useful confirmation that 
Blanchot had read, at the very least, the following texts, given here in the order that they appear in the 
Gesamtausgabe: Sein und Zeit; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik; Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins 
Dichtung; essays collected in Holzwege: ‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’, ‘Wozu Dichter?’, 
‘Nietzsches Wort: “Gott ist tot”’, ‘Die Zeit des Weltbildes’, ‘Der Spruch des Anaximander’; essays 
collected in Vorträge und Aufsätze: ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, ‘Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?’, 
‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’, ‘Das Ding’, ‘Moira’, ‘Logos’, ‘Aletheia’, ‘Dichterisch wohnet der 
                                                          
8 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Penser l’apocalypse’ [letter to Catherine David, 10 November 1987], in Écrits politiques: 
1953-1993, ed. by Éric Hoppenot (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), pp. 225-32 (p. 231) (first publ. in Le Nouvel 
Observateur, 22 January 1988, pp. 77-79). 
9 Martin Heidegger, Essais et conférences, trans. by André Préau (Paris: Gallimard, 1958); Chemins qui ne 
mènent nulle part, trans. by Wolfgang Brokmeier, ed. by François Fédier (Paris: Gallimard, 1962); Être et temps, 
trans. by François Vezin (Paris: Gallimard, 1986).   
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Mensch’, ‘Überwindung der Metaphysik’, ‘Wissenschaft und Besinnung’; Was heiβt Denken?; essays 
collected in Wegmarken: ‘Vom Wesen der Wahrheit’, ‘Zur Seinsfrage’ (with its original title ‘Über 
die Linie’ in Blanchot’s notes); Der Satz vom Grund; essays collected in Identität und Differenz: ‘Der 
Satz der Identität’, ‘Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik’; essays collected in 
Unterwegs zur Sprache:  ‘Die Sprache’, ‘Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache’, ‘Das Wesen der 
Sprache’, ‘Das Wort’, ‘Der Weg zur Sprache’; essays collected in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens: 
‘Hebel – der Hausfreund’, ‘Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit’; Einführung in die Metaphysik.10  
Translation is of no small significance to Blanchot who will later vehemently rebuke Heidegger for 
putting his philosophical language in the service of National Socialism: ‘Cela du moins, rappelle à 
quel niveau d’abord se situe notre responsabilité de “philosophe”: au niveau de son langage.’11   
Blanchot’s engagement with Heidegger is clearly extensive and sustained.  Many 
recognisably Blanchotian motifs develop from his reading of Heidegger: an interest in Hölderlin and 
therefore the relationship between poetry and philosophy; the question of death and dying; the 
relationship between the artwork and truth; and more generally a desire to extricate thinking from 
metaphysics.  In a 1938 review of Jean-Paul Sartre’s La Nausée, he responds to the philosophical 
dimension of the novel; implied here is the recognition of a reader familiar with phenomenology 
whose project is similar to his as yet unfinished Thomas l’obscur: ‘Il porte le roman là où il n’y a plus 
d’incidents, plus d’intrigues, plus de personnes particulières, dans ce site où l’esprit ne se soutient 
qu’en se berçant de notions philosophiques, comme l’existence et l’être.’12  A later review from 1945 
of Sartre’s Les Chemins de la liberté will recognise in this series of novels not the purity of thought 
                                                          
10 List of titles made available by Éric Hoppenot in private correspondence with Leslie Hill.  The translation of 
‘Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch’ [L’Homme habite en poète] is included in Blanchot, ed. by Éric Hoppenot and 
Dominique Rabaté, Cahiers de l’Herne, 107 (Paris: Herne, 2014), pp. 34-37. 
11 Blanchot, ‘Le Cours du monde’, in Écrits politiques, pp. 119-23 (p. 123).   
12 Maurice Blanchot, ‘L’Ébauche d’un roman’, Aux écoutes, 30 July 1938, p. 31.  Leslie Hill speculates that 
Blanchot attended Husserl’s lectures in Strasbourg in 1929 in Maurice Blanchot and Fragmentary Writing: A 
Change of Epoch (London: Continuum, 2012), p. 95 n. 111.  Sartre, on the other hand, did not attend the 
lectures given by Husserl earlier that year at the Sorbonne and, prior to a meeting with Raymond Aron in 1933, 
had not studied the work of the German philosopher.  Simone de Beauvoir remarks that Sartre’s enthusiasm 
for Husserl was sparked after this meeting: ‘Aron le convainquit que la phénoménologie répondait exactement 
à ses préoccupations: dépasser l’opposition de l’idéalisme et du réalisme, affirmer à la fois la souveraineté de 
la conscience et la présence du monde, tel qu’il se donne à nous.’  After reading Levinas’ book on Husserl, 
Sartre was prompted to follow in the footsteps of Aron and spent a year studying phenomenology at the 
French Institute in Berlin.  See Simone de Beauvoir, La Force de l’âge (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), pp. 141-42. 
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but a consciousness haunted and overwhelmed by things, signalling a distinctive shift in Blanchot’s 
engagement with phenomenology.13   
In his weekly column for the Journal des débats between April 1941 and August 1944 
Blanchot makes frequent references to the Heideggerian notion of a founding poetic language, 
distinguished from secondary instrumental language, but avoids mentioning the name Heidegger 
during the Occupation.  The only explicit reference to Heidegger in this period appears in 1942 in an 
essay on Camus: 
 
De Husserl à Heidegger, de Kierkegaard à Jaspers et à Chestov, [Camus] distingue toute une 
famille d’esprits dont l’influence sur notre temps est évidente et qui tous ont fait apparaître 
quelque visage de la réflexion absurde.  Il serait trop peu de dire que ces philosophes ont barré 
la route à la raison; ce n’est pas seulement l’univers raisonnable qu’ils ont changé en ruines; ils 
ont pris pour domaine ces ruines mêmes, pour patrie l’exil et, dans la contradiction, le 
paradoxe, le vide, l’angoisse, ils ont engagé la réalité de l’homme dans une aventure où elle ne 
peut se trouver que comme énigme et comme question.14 
 
Heidegger is important for Blanchot in these early years because of his engagement with Hölderlin, 
the official German war poet celebrated on the centenary of his death in 1943.  Interest in Hölderlin 
was a delicate issue during the Occupation and this explains why Blanchot chooses to avoid naming 
Heidegger other than via Camus.15  The event of poetry in Heidegger’s account precedes world, time, 
                                                          
13 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Le Roman de Jean-Paul Sartre’, in La Condition critique: articles 1945-1998, ed. by 
Christophe Bident (Paris: Gallimard, 2010), pp. 27-30 (p. 29) (first publ. in Paysage Dimanche, 21 October 1945, 
p. 5).   
14 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Le Mythe de Sisyphe’, in Faux pas (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), pp. 65-71 (pp. 67-68) (first 
publ. in Journal des débats, 25 November 1942, p. 3). 
15 A commemorative volume containing, among other articles, Heidegger’s first essay on Hölderlin was 
published for the Institut Allemand in Paris in 1943: Friedrich Hölderlin, en commémoration du centenaire de sa 
mort le 7 juin 1843, ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister and Hans Fegers on behalf of the Institut allemand (Paris: 
Sorlot, 1943).  The ‘Avant-propos’ describes how German soldiers carried copies of Hölderlin’s poetry onto the 
battlefield and an essay by Kurt Hildebrandt entitled ‘L’Esprit allemand et l’esprit européen’ (pp. 85-108), 
which is a commentary on Hölderlin’s ‘Archipelagus’, ends with the words: ‘En dépit de toutes les destructions, 
c’est à nous que s’applique l’espoir consolateur de voir surgir, si le génie survit, une civilisation encore plus 
grande et plus belle que celle dont nous chérissons tant les restes.  Mais c’est surtout à nous qu’incombe la 
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history, and in this sense marks the limit of philosophy.  Dichtung cannot be conceptualised without 
being eclipsed; a Heideggerian reading of a poem by Hölderlin cannot come to any conclusions in the 
manner of representational thought and it is this necessity of eschewing all metalanguage which is 
apparent in the ‘bizarre stylistic innovations’ of Heidegger’s work according to Timothy Clark.16  
Blanchot largely adheres to Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin in essays before 1946 and, even in later 
years when there is a marked distance from Heideggerian thought, the quarrel between poetry and 
philosophy is a motif that runs throughout his work, leading Gerald Bruns to argue that poetry for 
Blanchot is the resistance of language to our projects and systems, or the refusal of philosophy.17   
Heidegger’s name crops up in several essays collected in La Part du feu [1949] that were 
originally published between 1945 and 1948, around the time that his association with National 
Socialism was under scrutiny in the pages of Les Temps modernes;18 but this is not to say that this was 
Blanchot fervently adhering to fundamental ontology.  These essays reveal the early displacement of 
Heidegger’s thought in Blanchot’s writing.  His most visible departure from a view of poetry as 
foundation, to which he had previously more or less subscribed, occurs in ‘La Parole “sacrée” de 
Hölderlin’ [1946].  Here Blanchot criticises Heidegger’s etymological approach to Hölderlin’s poetry 
as well as his neglect of the flight and rhythm of this poetic language; but more importantly, he 
problematizes the relation between poetry and being: ‘Interroger Hölderlin, c’est interroger une 
existence poétique si forte que, son essence une fois dévoilée, elle a pu faire elle-même la preuve 
qu’elle était impossibilité et se prolonger dans le néant et dans le vide, sans cesser de s’accomplir.’19   
Poetic existence is aporetic because it enables that which necessarily precedes it; Blanchot reveals the 
                                                          
grande mission d’achever la guerre et de réaliser l’ordre européen dans le noble bonheur d’une telle action 
créatrice, c’est-à-dire dans le sens du poème de Hölderlin’ (p. 108). 
16 Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot: Sources of Derrida’s Notion and Practice of Literature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 41. 
17 Gerald L. Bruns, Maurice Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosophy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1997).  
18 On the reception of Heidegger in France, see Dominique Janicaud, Heidegger en France, 2 vols (Paris: Albin 
Michel, 2001); and Tom Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism and Being 
(London: Routledge, 1995). 
19 Maurice Blanchot, ‘La Parole “sacrée” de Hölderlin’, in La Part du feu, 6th edn (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), pp. 
118-36 (p. 121) (first publ. in Critique, 7 (December 1946), 579-96).   
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impossible foundations of poetry in a displacement of Heidegger’s thought that continues throughout 
the late 1940s and 1950s.20   
This displacement comes to the fore in the treatment of the question of death and dying: 
compare Blanchot on Rilke in 1943 with Blanchot on Baudelaire in 1947.  Anxiety, according to 
Heidegger in Being and Time, is the mood experienced in the face of nothingness: a moment of 
meaningless confusion when specific entities and their meanings seem irrelevant and life appears 
futile.  Through anxiety we face up to our own mortality and achieve a being-toward-death which is 
an authentic existence.21  The failing of Malte Laurids Brigge according to Blanchot in 1943, 
following Heidegger, is to have fled from such anxiety and to have sought refuge in the meaning 
conveyed by instrumental language:  
 
C’est là le sort de Malte Laurids Brigge: au moment de s’enfoncer dans l’aventure irréparable, 
il doit se défendre et survivre; il repousse le temps de l’explication qui rend toutes choses 
vaines, il écarte les mots qui se dénouent et les significations qui se défont et il dit, souhaits 
pleins de tendresse humaine, mais qui éternisent sa vie et l’empêchent d’aimer sa mort: 
‘J’aimerais tant demeurer parmi les significations qui me sont devenues chères!’22 
 
Four years later, in a review of Sartre’s monograph Baudelaire [1947], achieving authentic existence 
via an angst-ridden confrontation with mortality is no longer possible: 
 
‘L’être-pour-la-mort’ de Heidegger, loin de caractériser la possibilité authentique, ne 
représenterait donc pour Baudelaire qu’une imposture de plus.  Nous n’avons pas devant nous 
la mort, mais l’existence qui, si loin que j’avance, est toujours devant et, si bas que je 
                                                          
20 See Leslie Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 77-91. 
21 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
[1962] 1988), pp. 228-35, 304-11; Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976- ), II: Sein 
und Zeit (1977), 244-53, 345-54.  Simon Critchley provides a reading of anxiety according to Blanchot in ‘De 
l’angoisse au langage’, the essay which opens Faux pas, in Very Little... Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, 
Literature (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 35-41.  
22 Blanchot, ‘Rilke’, in Faux pas, pp. 59-64 (p. 64) (first publ. in Journal des débats, 10 March 1943, p. 3).  
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m’enfonce, est toujours plus bas et, si irréellement que je m’affirme (par exemple dans l’art), 
infeste cette irréalité d’une absence de réalité qui est encore l’existence.23 
 
Death becomes the limitless experience of finitude, the elusive inevitable or unattainable certainty, in 
this modification of Heidegger’s thought.  The ontological status of the poetic saying which provides 
the foundation for Being is undermined by this view of impossible death.  Also challenged in the 
background is the Sartrean idea that literature can be a vehicle for authentic bonne foi and the 
possibility of a committed literature.   
Sartre defines the human being in terms of freedom: human consciousness in L’Être et le 
néant is considered independent of its surroundings and the human is wholly free; the implication is 
that freedom entails a responsibility to choose and authentic choice accepts this responsibility.  For 
Sartre, to write is to name and unveil the world and to project an image of being in the world; the 
writer is therefore committed to the extent of being conscious of involvement in the world.  The writer 
is also under the moral imperative to disclose a reality to the reader in which the individual is a 
historically-situated being who is committed to a quest for authentic freedom.  Mauvaise foi is a 
denial of human freedom through self-deception and inauthenticity.24  But for Blanchot literature can 
never be authentic since it is by definition mauvaise foi: 
 
le roman n’a rien à craindre d’une thèse, à condition que la thèse accepte de n’être rien sans le 
roman.  Car le roman a sa morale propre, qui est l’ambiguïté et l’équivoque.  Il a sa réalité 
propre, qui est le pouvoir de découvrir le monde dans l’irréel et l’imaginaire.  Et, enfin, il a sa 
vérité, qui l’oblige à ne rien affirmer sans chercher à le reprendre et à ne rien faire réussir sans 
                                                          
23 Blanchot, ‘L’Échec de Baudelaire’, in La Part du feu, pp. 137-56 (p. 153) (first publ. in L’Arche, 24 (February 
1947), 80-91; 25 (March 1947), 97-107).   
24 See Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Être et le néant: essai d’ontologie phénoménologique (Paris: Gallimard, 1943); and Les 
Chemins de la liberté, 3 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1945-1949), I: L’Âge de la raison, II: Le Sursis (1945), III: La Mort 
dans l’âme.   
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en préparer l’échec, de sorte que toute thèse qui dans un roman triomphe, cesse aussitôt d’être 
vraie.25 
 
In a distortion of Sartre’s account of morality, freedom and existence, Blanchot argues that the ‘truth’ 
of the work cannot correspond to any worldly truth or political project.  Writing reveals the imaginary 
rather than the world and the writer cannot therefore be committed because he or she is not involved 
in the world as such.  The worldly action of literature, the possibility of an engaged literature such as 
that described by Sartre, is undermined.  The work is revolutionary in itself and, thanks to the 
worklessness of the neuter, this extends beyond its borders; but this never begins in the real world of 
work, objects and political parties.  The only commitment can be to writing for Blanchot.  The 
important emphasis is that ‘literature’ or art is not a putting into work of truth as Sartre and Heidegger 
would argue.   
The stress shifts from this moment onwards in Blanchot’s writing from grounding and unity 
to rootlessness and dispersion through the development of the non-concept of the neuter and later a 
fragmentary idiom which seeks to respond to what lies beyond the limits of this existence.  By 1956, 
Levinas perceives a decisive split from Heidegger: ‘Blanchot ne prête-t-il pas à l’art la fonction de 
déraciner l’univers heideggérien?’26  This critique of Heidegger is so powerful because it emerges 
from within the parameters of his thought: the notion that in language beings are founded and Being 
takes hold of us is displaced by a mode of writing associated with anonymity and rootlessness.  
Dominique Janicaud, in his comprehensive study of the reception of Heidegger in France, confirms 
the crucial and unbridgeable gap between the neuter and Sein: ‘anonyme, sans raison, sans visage, 
sans valeur définitive, le Neutre se dérobe à tout enracinement, à toute réappropriation, fût-elle celle 
d’un événement originaire.’27  The world is undone by the worklessness of the neuter rather than 
                                                          
25 Blanchot, ‘Les Romans de Sartre’, in La Part du feu, pp. 195-211 (pp. 210-11) (first publ. in L’Arche, 10 
(October 1945), 121-34).  See also the thinly veiled critique of Sartre in Blanchot’s review of Jean Pouillon’s Le 
Temps et le roman, ‘Le Roman, œuvre de mauvaise foi’, in La Condition critique, pp. 100-15 (first publ. in Les 
Temps modernes, 19 (April 1947), 1304-17).   
26 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Le Regard du poète’, in Sur Maurice Blanchot (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1975), pp. 9-
26 (p. 25) (first publ. in Monde Nouveau, 98 (1956), 6-19).   
27 Janicaud, I, 206.  
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produced in an act of poetic foundation.  Marlène Zarader’s misreading of the neuter as the 
ontological soil for phenomena unexplained by Heideggerian ontology — night, outside, 
impersonality — stresses the action of the neuter as a lived experience compatible with 
phenomenology.28  But the neuter is first and foremost the force of the imaginary, not something 
experienced in the world by an independent consciousness with the freedom to choose, but a limit-
experience which challenges world from a position irreducible to world.  
Blanchot’s intellectual engagement with the contemporary world is often overshadowed by 
the polemics surrounding his politics.  There are many diverse views of Blanchot’s politics prior to 
the outbreak of the Second World War.  Jeffrey Mehlman in 1980 claimed to have discovered 
Blanchot’s ‘anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, and pro-terrorist’ past and argued for the centrality of the 
1930s journalism to any understanding of Blanchot.29  Christophe Bident, Leslie Hill and Kevin Hart 
have each argued that Blanchot’s antidemocratic, anticommunist, anti-League of Nations, nationalist 
stance in the 1930s never translates into anti-Semitism or fascism: ‘On the far right wing though he 
surely was, at no time was Blanchot attracted to fascism.  His nonconformism was absolute.’30  More 
recently Jean-Luc Nancy and Michel Surya have challenged Blanchot’s later work in light of his 
earlier politics, questioning both the meaning and the extent of what Blanchot, in the letter to Laporte, 
calls ‘une sorte de conversion’31 and consequently how far he broke with his earlier views.   
Surya sees this conversion in purely religious terms, arguing that the shift from extreme right 
to extreme left is an inversion of the same thought and that if there is a ‘conversion’ it comes later in 
Blanchot’s work, following the ‘failure’ of May 1968, as he moves from politics to Levinasian ethics 
and an idealised or theorised Judaism.  He seems to read Blanchot through a Sartrean lens, arguing 
that the ideal is the writer as part of a mass movement: May 1968 was the fusion of the popular will of 
                                                          
28 Marlène Zarader, L’Être et le neutre: à partir de Maurice Blanchot (Lagrasse: Verdier, 2001), p. 183. 
29 See Jeffrey Mehlman, ‘Blanchot at Combat: Of Literature and Terror’, MLN, 95: 4 (May 1980), 808-29; 
Legacies of Anti-Semitism in France (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983); and Genealogies of the 
Text: Literature, Psychoanalysis, and Politics in Modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
30 Kevin Hart, ‘Foreword: The Friendship of the No’, in Political Writings, by Maurice Blanchot, trans. by Zakir 
Paul (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), pp. xi-xxx (p. xiii).  See also Bident, Maurice Blanchot: 
partenaire invisible, pp. 110-13; and Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, pp. 21-44.   
31 Blanchot, letter to Roger Laporte, in Maurice Blanchot: passion politique, by Nancy, p. 61.  
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the people and the intellectual.32  Surya is scathing about Blanchot’s political writings from the 1930s, 
accusing him of fascism and anti-Semitism which persist beyond the ‘conversion’.  He draws broad 
comparisons between Blanchot and Heidegger and demands that Blanchot’s criticism of the German 
philosopher, after he became aware of the extent of his adherence to National Socialism in 1962, must 
be applied in turn to Blanchot himself: ‘c’est longtemps que Blanchot a été ce que Heidegger fut aussi 
au même moment (un temps long, sans aucun doute, mais dont tout le monde dispute de la longueur); 
et c’est aussi longtemps que l’un et l’autre le dissimulèrent (autant que chacun le put, Heidegger 
moins que Blanchot) ou ne le reconnurent pas (ou pas sans réticence ni atténuation).’33  The 
comparison between the two seems unjustifiable, given that Blanchot was not employed by the Nazi 
state, that he never supported any regime and that Surya provides little, if any, compelling evidence of 
anti-Semitism.  
Nancy differs from Surya in that he sees this conversion within the bounds of Catholicism, 
whose influence, it is claimed, is discernible in early texts and throughout Blanchot’s work.34  
Focussing largely on Blanchot’s response to his ‘La Communauté désœuvrée’, he argues that La 
Communauté inavouable is addressed to Levinas to contest the idea that the relation to the other is 
defined purely by ethical responsibility; this relation can also be one of passion or one in which the 
other disappears into the absolute elsewhere or in which the other is only recognisable as other: 
Duras’ woman as she is discussed in La Communauté inavouable is, according to Nancy, comparable 
to Christ.35  
                                                          
32 See the radio interview led by Alain Finkielkraut with Surya and Nancy, ‘Politiques de Maurice Blanchot’, 
Répliques, France Culture, 23 May 2015 <https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/repliques/politiques-de-
maurice-blanchot> [accessed: 7 February 2017].  Surya is referring to Blanchot’s Les Intellectuels en question: 
ébauche d’une réflexion (Paris: Fourbis, 1996; Tours: Farrago, 2000) (first publ. in Le Débat, 29 (March 1984), 3-
24).  
33 Michel Surya, L’Autre Blanchot: l’écriture de jour, l’écriture de nuit (Paris: Gallimard, 2015), p. 24.  The first 
two sections of this text first appeared in Les Politiques de Maurice Blanchot: 1930-1993, ed. by Michel Surya, 
Revue Lignes, 43 (Paris: Lignes, 2014), pp. 9-62.  Other articles in this volume also address Blanchot’s political 
writings of the 1930s; each of them accuses Blanchot of fascism: François Brémondy, ‘Enquête historique et 
réflexions critiques sur l’itinéraire poltiique de Maurice Blanchot’ (pp. 63-121); David Uhrig, ‘Blanchot, du 
“non-conformisme” au maréchalisme’ (pp. 122-39); and David Amar, ‘D’une politique impossible’ (pp. 140-52).   
34 Nancy begins to develop this argument in Maurice Blanchot: passion politique, pp. 35-40. 
35 Jean-Luc Nancy, La Communauté désavouée (Paris: Galilée, 2014), pp. 106-12.  
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In that letter to Laporte Blanchot writes that this ‘sort of conversion’ was hastened by the 
sharing of the writing of the day and the writing of the night.36  Nancy and Surya misunderstand this 
sort of conversion when they think it in religious terms.  The conversion, transformation, 
metamorphosis, slippage involves a shift from the world of work and objects toward literature and the 
unreal, prompted by the experience of writing his first novel Thomas l’obscur.  The ‘conversion’ is 
ambiguous because Blanchot wants to signal a more fluid and incessant, because unachievable, 
transformation for which the term ‘metamorphosis’ might be more appropriate.  He writes in the 
review of the first two volumes of Sartre’s Les Chemins de la liberté in 1945: 
 
Il est indéniable que l’art de Sartre atteint son plus grand pouvoir lorsqu’il décrit 
l’engloutissement des consciences par les choses qui les hantent et les débordent.  Le monde 
qu’il sent est celui d’une métamorphose, et cette métamorphose n’est pas un simple 
changement de forme, ni la transformation d’un être en un autre être, fût-ce d’un homme en une 
vermine; elle va plus loin, elle est irrémédiable, car c’est la conscience elle-même qui se 
matérialise, c’est la pensée qui se fige en une substance gluante, sans contour, sans apparence, 
un dehors triste et vague que nous ne pouvons saisir et qui, pourtant, comme tel, continue 
désespérément à penser.37 
 
Surya suggests that this cannot be deemed a true conversion because it is not a sudden, brutal break 
from the past,38 but the point is that the writing of the day is implicated in the writing of the night in 
an unachievable metamorphosis.  In an essay on Rilke from 1953, what Blanchot might understand by 
conversion is further clarified: ‘“Veuille la métamorphose”, “Wolle die Wandlung”.  Il ne faut pas 
rester, mais passer.  “Nulle part il n’est demeurer.”  “Bleiben ist nirgends.”  “Ce qui s’enferme dans le 
fait de demeurer déjà est pétrifié.”  Vivre, c’est toujours déjà prendre congé, être congédié et 
                                                          
36 Blanchot, letter to Roger Laporte, in Maurice Blanchot: passion politique, by Nancy, p. 61.   
37 Blanchot, ‘Le Roman de Jean-Paul Sartre’, in La Condition critique, p. 29.   
38 Surya, L’Autre Blanchot, pp. 50-56. 
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congédier ce qui est.’39  Nancy might read the German ‘Wandlung’ as transubstantiation; but the 
setting of Rilke’s original German alongside its French translation allows Blanchot to clarify that 
‘Wandlung’ is here to be understood in terms of metamorphosis while also revealing the differences 
within language.  Is this a command to will metamorphosis or the assertion that metamorphosis wills?  
Is remaining nowhere or is there nowhere to remain?  If living is to take leave, to be dismissed and to 
dismiss what is, then we are left with only amorphous forms which are simultaneously active subject, 
passive subject and object of this absence.  This echoes the sort of metamorphosis described by 




The question of technology is the major question of modern times: modern technology in various 
guises enabled the Holocaust,40 drove the Cold War through the development of nuclear weapons (and 
to a lesser extent the space race), is changing the nature of warfare through the use of unmanned 
drones, allows governments unprecedented access to our personal information through mass data 
collection, and continues to cause rapid climate change in an age recently labelled the Anthropocene 
(to list only a handful of the most pressing issues).41  Heidegger has been described as the single most 
influential twentieth-century philosopher of technology,42 for whom modern technology threatens to 
transform everything into a calculable resource to be exploited and art is the saving power which will 
provide the foundation for a new beginning.  ‘Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst | Das Rettende auch’ 
[Where however there is danger, grows | Too that which saves].43  This famous quotation from 
                                                          
39 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, Folios essais, 89 (Paris: Gallimard, 
[1955] 1988), pp. 151-209 (p. 181) (first publ. in Critique, 71 (April 1953), 291-304; 72 (May 1953), 387-99). 
40 Heidegger does not quite see it like this, since the Holocaust as such is notoriously never addressed in his 
thinking. 
41 See, for instance, Damian Carrington, ‘The Anthropocene Epoch: Scientists Declare Dawn of Human-
Influenced Age’, Guardian, 29 August 2016 
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/aug/29/declare-anthropocene-epoch-experts-urge-
geological-congress-human-impact-earth> [accessed 18 January 2017]. 
42 Arthur Bradley, Originary Technicity: The Theory of Technology from Marx to Derrida (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), p. 17. 
43 Friedrich Hölderlin, ‘Patmos’, in Poems and Fragments, trans. by Michael Hamburger (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 462-77 (pp. 462-63), translation modified. 
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Hölderlin leads Heidegger to conclude that where technology rules, so too techne as art has a chance 
and a role to counteract it. 
The essence of technology, Heidegger famously argues, is nothing technological and modern 
technology should be distinguished from its Greek root techne: the latter is a bringing-forth which 
allows Being to come into unconcealment, while modern technology is a challenging-forth which 
transforms everything, including Being, into standing reserve or resource (technology is a 
continuation of metaphysics by other means).  The will that wills everything as standing reserve wills 
sheer power.  The world no longer appears as mysterious in modernity when everything, including the 
human, is revealed as ordered and calculable resource to be exploited.  The danger is that we will 
have lost our openness to Being and to the possibility of historical transformation and it is for this 
reason that Heidegger turns to poetry as the saying through which we can once again think Being.  
Techne is a mode of poiesis, writes Heidegger, and the essence of art is poetry because it is in 
language that beings are founded and Being takes hold of us.44  The reduction of nature to an object 
for metaphysical calculating rationality was perhaps the reason why, in the aftermath of the Second 
World War and despite his politics, so many readers in France considered Heidegger to be the crucial 
contemporary thinker.  Though Blanchot was profoundly influenced by this claim, explaining in part 
his interest in Heidegger’s Hölderlin, he did not subscribe to it wholeheartedly or even at all: his 
engagement with Martin Heidegger was close and detailed but also tense and adversarial.   
Tom Rockmore, in his study of the reception of Heidegger in French philosophy, forcefully 
argues that one must take a contextualist approach to his philosophy, which should not be isolated 
from his politics.45  Blanchot revealed in a letter published in Le Nouvel Observateur in 1988 that he 
only became aware of the extent of Heidegger’s politics in 1962.46  Public discussion of these 
revelations is delayed until the publication of L’Entretien infini in 1969, where he adds a lengthy 
                                                          
44 See Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, trans. by William Lovitt, in Basic Writings, ed. 
by David Farrell Krell, rev. edn (London: Routledge, 1993) pp. 311-41; ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, in 
Gesamtausgabe, VII: Vorträge und Aufsätze (2000), 7-36. 
45 Rockmore, pp. xiii-xv. 
46 Blanchot, ‘Penser l’apocalypse’, in Écrits politiques, p. 231.  There is evidence for this in the preparatory 
notes for the Revue internationale dating from this time; see Blanchot, ‘Le Cours du monde’, in Écrits 
politiques, pp. 122-23. 
 15 
 
footnote to an essay written some eleven years earlier, apropos of Heidegger’s two volumes on 
Nietzsche which had been published in German in 1961: ‘destiné à recommander un vote décisif en 
faveur du national-socialisme, [Heidegger] a mis au service de Hitler le langage même et l’écriture 
même par lesquels, en un grand moment de l’histoire de la pensée, nous avions été invités à 
l’interrogation désignée comme la plus haute, celle qui pouvait nous venir de l’Être et du Temps.’47  
He makes a similar point in the letter from 1988: 
 
Discours aussi effrayants par leur forme que par leur contenu, car c’est la même écriture et le 
langage même par lesquels, en un grand moment de la pensée, nous avions été invités à 
l’interrogation la plus haute, celle qui pouvait nous venir de l’être et du temps, que Heidegger 
retrouvait pour appeler à voter en faveur de Hitler, pour justifier la rupture de l’Allemagne 
nazie s’éloignant de la Société des nations ou pour faire l’éloge de Schlageter.  Oui, le même 
langage sacré, peut-être un peu plus grossier, un peu plus emphatique, mais qui désormais se 
fera entendre jusque dans les commentaires sur Hölderlin et altérera ceux-ci, mais pour d’autres 
raisons encore.48 
 
The same philosophical system used to interrogate being, history and the poetry of Hölderlin was 
employed by Heidegger in support of Hitler and the Nazi party.  Surya and others have read this as a 
guilty admission, on Blanchot’s part, of his own compromised past; but Blanchot never committed his 
language to any political party, nor is there any concrete evidence of anti-Semitism.  He was, as 
Bident, Hill and Hart have noted, radically nonconformist as opposed to fascist.   
The recent publication of the Schwarze Hefte has reignited debates surrounding Heidegger’s 
politics.  According to their editor Peter Trawny, these notebooks demonstrate that even at a time 
when Heidegger was particularly critical of National Socialism a specific anti-Semitism was emerging 
                                                          
47 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Nietzsche, aujourd’hui’, in L’Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), pp. 201-15 (p. 210 n. 
1) (first publ., without this footnote, in La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 68 (August 1958), 284-95).   
48 Blanchot, ‘Penser l’apocalypse’, in Écrits politiques, p. 231.  Blanchot also comments on Heidegger’s politics 
in Les Intellectuels en question, pp. 9-11; and ‘N’oubliez pas!’, in Écrits politiques, pp. 237-45 (first publ. in 
L’Arche, 373 (May 1988), 68-71). 
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in his thought inscribed in the history of Being.  Heidegger is critical of National Socialism for its 
ideology in these notebooks, but still perceives it as the necessary last form of Western metaphysics, 
the fulfilment of metaphysics which could enable the other beginning.  Trawny writes: ‘Certes, 
Heidegger ne voulait pas la guerre.  Mais quand elle fut là, il l’a tenue pour un pas inévitable à 
accomplir sur le chemin du “dépassement de la métaphysique”.’49  Heidegger perceives modernity as 
a threat to German rootedness and Jewish people belong to this threat in their uprooted, mathematical, 
technicized state; they have forgotten what only the German people can remember: Being.   
Nancy has suggested that Blanchot in the 1930s shares with Catholicism a hatred of 
modernity which is a symptom of malaise in and of civilisation: ‘si la démocratie n’est que l’habillage 
à peine politique — gestionnaire — de la modernité comme attente perpétuelle et aveugle d’un 
lendemain dont on n’attend que l’indéfini même (plus de fins toujours multipliées, plus de valeurs 
toujours plus marchandes, bref: technique et capitale), alors la démocratie s’avère incapable de 
l’“extrême”.’50  Such criticism invariably invites comparisons between Blanchot and Heidegger.  The 
former explains in 1984, when trying to understand the appeal of fascism in Europe in the 1930s, that 
democracy seemed bloodless in the years following the Great War: ‘La démocratie est comme usée, 
elle ne rayonne plus, elle est la médiocrité quotidienne dont les difficultés économiques, créées par la 
guerre, mettent en évidence les faiblesses désastreuses.’51  In his political writings of the 1930s 
Blanchot saw France weakened by bad government and failing democracy and called for a spiritual, 
national revolution.  There is such a plea at the end of a review from 1932 of Daniel-Rops’ Le Monde 
sans âme, where Blanchot also clarifies that the fault with the modern decadent world does not lie 
with the machine: we see the machine as characteristic of our time and we deem it responsible for all 
progress, wonder and disorder, but it is vain to think that the machine is the cause of our ruin.  What is 
much more menacing, writes Blanchot following Daniel-Rops, is that the materialism responsible for 
our current disarray is nothing new.52   
                                                          
49 Peter Trawny, Heidegger et l’antisémitisme: sur les ‘Cahiers noirs’, trans. by Julia Christ and Jean-Claude 
Monod (Paris: Seuil, 2014), p. 154. 
50 Nancy, Maurice Blanchot: passion politique, p. 40. 
51 Blanchot, Les Intellectuels en question, p. 47. 
52 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Le Monde sans âme’, La Revue Française, n.s., 3 (August 1932), 460-70 (p. 464). 
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Blanchot is critical of Daniel-Rops for not having recognised the importance of Soviet Russia 
in his study: ‘A un monde sans âme, la Russie soviétique, en faisant appel aux instincts les plus 
matérialistes de l’homme, s’est proposé de rendre un simulacre de spiritualité.  L’entreprise n’est pas 
sans intérêt.’53  Both capitalism and communism offer material happiness, according to Blanchot, but 
the latter promises it universally so that it becomes a sort of faith lacking in spiritualism.  We must see 
in this imitation of the spiritual the principle of an incalculable disorder: ‘Le communisme exige de 
l’homme, en face des choses et pour la poursuite de valeurs infiniments relatives, la même attitude 
absolue qui se conçoit hors de tout hasard et de tout accident, par l’attrait de ce que l’esprit offre de 
plus pur.’54  The association of the machine with order, precision and uniformity aligns the 
technological with the possibility of the genuine revolution that denies the incalculable disorder of 
materialism perpetuated by Marxism and Stalinism. 
 
Ce qui est redoutable dans la machine, c’est donc sa perfection même, la rigueur de l’ordre 
matériel auquel elle se prête et où ne subsiste aucun défaut.  Mais on hésite à la condamner, 
parce qu’elle exclut l’à peu près et l’inexact, qu’elle n’a pas de faiblesse, qu’enfin elle ne laisse 
point subsister de désordre dont l’esprit puisse espérer profiter pour s’en rendre maître.55 
 
Christophe Bident has noted the ordered manner of Blanchot’s writing style in this essay: ‘Les 
périodes sont ordonnées, les adjectifs équilibrés, l’exophore et l’anaphore classiquement dosées, avec 
une pointe retenue de lyrisme culminant dans un alexandrin parfaitement anapestique.’56  The style of 
this essay echoes his resistance to Stalinism and the suggestion, although never explicitly formulated, 
is that the machine also bears the traits of this resistance.  This is a striking rejection of any attempt to 
blame the machine for the troubles of modern times; it is evidence that, from a very early stage in his 
career as journalist, Blanchot did not condemn modernity or mechanisation, as Nancy suggests, and 
                                                          
53 Ibid., p. 465. 
54 Ibid., p. 468.  
55 Ibid., p. 464. 
56 Bident, Maurice Blanchot: partenaire invisible, p. 62.  
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saw in it the potential for change.  Blanchot is thus very far from Heidegger’s condemnation of 
modern technology, associated with Judaism, as the final phase of Western metaphysics.  
Blanchot is not often seen as a thinker of technology and this is a largely unexplored aspect of 
his work; much of his engagement with Heidegger does, however, turn on the relationship between art 
and technology and there is evidence that his thought influenced Bernard Stiegler.57  The question of 
literature or writing is for Blanchot a question of techne or technology, but one related to the 
impossibility of dying rather than fundamental ontology.  In 1953, the year that Heidegger published 
‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Blanchot claimed that writing was one technique among 
others and, in another essay, returned to Heidegger’s critique of Rilke from 1946 which contains one 
of the most explicit early denunciations of the ruinous effects of modern technology.58  In this year the 
Nouvelle Revue française was relaunched as La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française and Blanchot was 
able, as regular contributor, to confidently set out his own critical stall and, while still being a topical 
book reviewer, reach beyond the immediate present to broaden the scope of his essays.  This year 
therefore marks a moment when Blanchot begins to articulate his ideas concerning literature more 
confidently and at which point he seems to be closely engaging with a philosophy of technology.  
Arthur Bradley argues that Heidegger presupposes that our technological condition must remain 
thinkable from some implied pre-technological vantage point.59  This thesis will show that the 
technical is always already implied in Blanchot’s conception of language.  
 
 
                                                          
57 See Calum Watt, ‘The Uses of Maurice Blanchot in Bernard Stiegler’s Technics and Time’, Paragraph, 39: 3 
(2016), 305-18.  Ian James briefly notes that writing for Blanchot is one mode of technique amongst others and 
asks what other forms of technique, technicity, art or technology might ‘allow the totality of community to be 
both affirmed and at the same time maintained as absence or as absent essence?’  He argues that this 
question takes on greater urgency if Bernard Stiegler is correct and we are passing from an epoch of the 
experience of history shaped by writing to an epoch shaped by numerical and digital communications 
technologies.  See Ian James ‘The Narrow Margin’, in Blanchot Romantique: A Collection of Essays, ed. by John 
McKeane and Hannes Opelz (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 263-74 (pp. 273-74).  Michael Holland argues that 
for Blanchot the question of technology [technique], to be distinguished from the question posed by the atom 
bomb, is a question of language in Avant dire: essais sur Blanchot (Paris: Herman, 2015), pp. 297-306.  So far, 
this is the extent of critical engagement with the question of technology in Blanchot. 
58 See Maurice Blanchot, ‘La Bête de Lascaux’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue Française, 4 (April 1953), 684-93 (p. 
684); and ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 151-209. 




This thesis does not endeavour to provide an exhaustive account of Blanchot’s critical work or 
narratives; it instead examines discrete moments when there is a shift in his thought in which a 
thinking of technology is implied.  The analysis of techne offered by Heidegger shows that the 
relationship between art and the utilitarian warrants further scrutiny.  The first chapter of this thesis 
traces the division between poetic and everyday language in work by Stéphane Mallarmé, the Jena 
Romantics, the Russian Formalists, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, who, despite their vastly 
different concerns, all remain committed to a dual state of language, before considering the treatment 
of this division by Blanchot in essays on Mallarmé dating from 1940 to 1952.  Blanchot initially 
commits to a distinction between the poetic and the everyday, but there is evidence of a shift from as 
early as 1941, which becomes more pronounced by 1946, with implications for his reading of 
Heidegger and Husserl.  The conversion of which Blanchot writes in the letter to Roger Laporte is 
something like the phenomenological reduction, a bracketing off of world, rather than an exchange of 
one set of religious beliefs for another, but not one that provides ontological foundation or rediscovers 
the transcendental ego.  This chapter demonstrates the radical non-essentiality of literature, associated 
with ambiguity and rootlessness, once the limits of art are challenged. 
Chapter Two considers Blanchot’s engagement with Heidegger in the early 1950s, in 
particular his response to the reading of Rilke in ‘Wozu Dichter?’ [1946].  Heideggerian thought, 
although displaced by Blanchot from the mid-1940s onwards, remains a fundamental starting point 
from which to understand the impossibility of dying and the neuter.  As has been noted, ‘Wozu 
Dichter?’ contains one of the earliest denunciations of technology by Heidegger; Blanchot chooses 
not to respond to this dimension of the essay, but rejects the possibility of the redemptive turn away 
from metaphysics so closely associated with technological dominance.  Through a comparison of their 
readings of Rilke, this chapter demonstrates that Blanchot engages with the Heideggerian concept of 
world in order to reveal its cracks.  The appearance of animals in Thomas l’obscur and L’Arrêt de 
mort signals the disruption of the hierarchy established by Heidegger between human, animal and 
stone; meanwhile, the motif of unruly hands in essays and fiction from this time reveals a disobedient 
technology which challenges the limit of the human.  This chapter reconciles Blanchot’s writing with 
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ecological thought and demonstrates that in work from this period the technical is found to be always 
already inhabiting the natural. 
Chapter Three considers essays from the 1950s and 1960s with an explicit focus on ‘la 
technique’, tracing the development of a thinking of technology in the years following the publication 
in German of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ and at a time of political upheaval and 
sweeping social change in France, thanks in part to developing technologies.  In 1953 Blanchot states 
that the impersonal knowledge of writing is linked to ‘la technique’ in all of its forms.  Later 
discussion of radio, cinema, nuclear weapons, spaceflight and the printing press should be considered 
in light of this statement.  At stake here is the question of whether we can hear in modern technology 
something other than the foretelling of the end of history or world; this chapter distances Blanchot 
from the technophobia of Heidegger, who in 1966 confessed that ‘only a God can save us now’.  The 
relationship between writing and modern technology, particular the role of the non-concept of the 
neuter, is examined to explore how we may hear in all forms of techne something new and 
unexpected.  The chapter culminates in a reading of Le Dernier Homme informed by Blanchot’s 
reading of Kafka; it demonstrates that writing for Blanchot cannot be enclosed within anthropocentric 
or anthropological mastery, which it challenges in the name of the other to which it gives voice.   
The final chapter focuses on the development of a fragmentary writing from 1958 onwards 
and the role a thinking of technology plays in this.  Between 1965 and 1980 there is no mention of the 
term ‘technique’ in Blanchot’s writing; this chapter shows that rather than a condemnation of 
technology the suppression of the term reveals that technology is everywhere implied.  Fragmentary 
writing, it will be argued, is a sort of powerless power which is a mode of resistance to techniques of 
what Michel Foucault called disciplinary power; it is a wayward inorganic proliferation which 
outplays the human.  This chapter considers the role an affirmative refusal plays in resistance and in 
the undoing of the subject, and the various forms this refusal takes in Blanchot’s work, from stag 
beetle to mounds of rubble.  Throughout this thesis the stress is placed on the development of a 
thinking of technology which shifts over time.  The conclusion considers the relevance of Blanchot in 
the twenty first century, how he has set the agenda for thinkers such as Bernard Stiegler, and how we 







Blanchot and Mallarmé: Le double état de la parole 
 
As we have seen, Greek techne refers to both what is understood today by technology and what we 
call art, poetry, or literature.  Any division imposed between art and the utilitarian implies that there is 
a language unlike artistic, poetic, or literary expression that follows a contrasting logic, economy, or 
convention and falls into the same category as modern technology.  Some literary critics or theorists 
take it for granted that literature is distinguishable from the language employed in everyday life.  
Ordinary language is commonly considered the norm and defined as that sort of verbal or written 
instrument that communicates information clearly and logically, privileging content over form or 
stressing referent over sign.  Examples may include dictionaries, encyclopaedia, telephone books, car 
manuals, journalism.  Artistic, poetic, or literary language, in contrast, is often treated as an 
estrangement of ordinary language that privileges sign over referent or that is preoccupied with form 
over content.  As Heidegger shows in his analysis of the essence of technology, the relationship 
between art and the utilitarian warrants further scrutiny.  Such questioning has consequences for our 
definition of literature and the distinction we perceive between the literary and the everyday.  What is 
literature?  This question is one that has underscored much, if not the whole, of modern literary theory 
and it is one, this chapter will show, to which Maurice Blanchot brings a distinctive and decisive 
inflection of his own.   
Blanchot is often seen to have committed to a double state of language in his earlier work.  
The misconception that Blanchot was a solitary hermit contributes to the idea that he is a writer 
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committed to a version of literary autonomy.1  This may be the case in the late 1930s, but this chapter 
will demonstrate that as early as 1941 there is evidence of a shift in Blanchot’s thought and that by 
1952 the division between the two modes of language is unsustainable: ‘Cette distinction est elle-
même brutale, pourtant difficile à saisir, car, à ce qu’il distingue si absolument, Mallarmé donne la 
même substance, rencontre, pour le définir, le même mot, qui est le silence.’2  It is too simple, 
Blanchot writes in this essay from 1952, to claim that art is the reversal of the utilitarian movement 
from object to image: ‘on ne s’élève jamais du “monde” à l’art [...], mais l’on va toujours de l’art vers 
ce qui paraît être les apparences neutralisées du monde — et qui, en réalité, n’apparaît tel que sous le 
regard domestiqué qui est généralement le nôtre, ce regard du spectateur insuffisant, rivé au monde 
des fins et tout au plus capable d’aller du monde au tableau.’3  The relationship between art and the 
utilitarian becomes one of slippage rather than opposition by 1952.    
This chapter will present the conceptual history of what Stéphane Mallarmé termed ‘le double 
état de la parole’, outlining significant interpretations of the distinction between poetic and everyday 
language by Mallarmé, the Jena Romantics, the Russian Formalists, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul 
Sartre, before considering a selection of Blanchot’s essays from the 1940s with a focus on Mallarmé 
and this division within language.  There is near-unanimity amongst those named above that a double 
state of language exists, which, given their vastly different concerns ranging from the philosophical 
pursuit of truth to the scientific analysis of language and the promotion of a committed literature, is 
perhaps surprising.  This chapter will show that this division of language begins to disintegrate for 
Blanchot as early as 1941, as the autonomous status of literature and the foundational view of art in 
modernity collapse.  It is very clear from Heidegger’s early lectures on Hölderlin, delivered in 1934, 
that the opposition between Dichtung and ordinary language maps onto the difference between the 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, the opening remarks of Hadrien Buclin, Maurice Blanchot ou l’autonomie littéraire 
(Lausanne: Antipodes, 2011), pp. 9-16.  The question as to whether Blanchot continues to commit to a clear 
distinction between poetic and ordinary language has provoked much discussion among critics; of those who 
argue that he does so, in addition to Buclin, I will be referring to: Mark Hewson, Blanchot and Literary Criticism 
(London: Continuum, 2011); Antoine Compagnon, La Démon de la théorie: littérature et sens commun (Paris: 
Seuil, 1998); and Yun Sun Limet, Maurice Blanchot critique: essai (Paris: La Différence, 2010). 
2 Blanchot, ‘L’Expérience de Mallarmé’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 37-52 (p. 38) (first publ. as ‘Mallarmé et 
l’expérience littéraire’, Critique, 62 (July 1952) 579-91).   
3 Blanchot, ‘L’Expérience de Mallarmé’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 50-51. 
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authentic and the inauthentic as it is articulated in Being and Time.4  The shift in emphasis or 
understanding in Blanchot therefore has significant implications for his relationship with 
Heideggerian fundamental ontology and the possibility or impossibility of an ‘authentic’ relation to 
death and dying.   
 
‘Le double état de la parole’ 
 At the end of the nineteenth century Mallarmé, prompted by the crisis of poetry represented by free 
verse and the prose poem, famously identifies a difference between essential and immediate language: 
put simply, the former is characterised by a necessity that shields it from the contingency of the 
everyday.  Poetry was no longer restricted to verse following the advent of the prose poem and so the 
traditional formal distinction was undermined.  Mallarmé therefore sought to find more essential 
characteristics to distinguish between the two.  The extent to which he perceives an uncomplicated 
distinction between essential and immediate language is, however, up for debate: ‘Un désir indéniable 
à mon temps est de séparer comme en vue d’attributions différentes le double état de la parole, brut ou 
immédiat ici, là essentiel.’5  This view is seemingly attributed to the Symbolist poets of his time and 
the use of ‘comme’ renders this statement somewhat hypothetical; Blanchot will later pick up on this 
hesitancy.   
In ‘Crise de vers’ Mallarmé demonstrates that free verse has unsettled traditional expectations 
of poetry and that the effects of this new form are the fragmentation of language and a violent rupture 
within language.  This ‘crisis’ within poetry may be seen as symptomatic of the broader crisis of 
modernity; it is akin to a revolution, but one much more subtle than that of 1789: ‘on assiste, comme 
finale d’un siècle, pas ainsi que ce fut dans le dernier, à des bouleversements; mais, hors de la place 
publique, à une inquiétude du voile dans le temple avec des plis significatifs et un peu sa déchirure.’6  
This revolution will not take place on the streets but in literature, which has become a temple, 
                                                          
4 See, for instance, Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymns ‘Germania’ and ‘The Rhine’, trans. by William McNeill 
and Julia Ireland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), pp. 59-58; Gesamtausgabe, XXXIX: Hölderlins 
Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und ‘Der Rhein’ (1980), 62-65.   
5 Stéphane Mallarmé, ‘Crise de vers’, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by Bertrand Marchal, 2 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 
1998-2003), II, 204-13 (p. 212).   
6 Ibid., pp. 204-05. 
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inheriting a quasi-holy function following the failure of religion.  In a godless world and in the 
aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, this was a time of crisis but also a time of hope for Mallarmé, 
who believed that literature could fill the void left by modernity with its own idea: ‘À quoi bon la 
merveille de transposer un fait de nature en sa presque disparition vibratoire selon le jeu de la parole, 
cependant; si ce n’est pour qu’en émane, sans la gêne d’un proche ou concret rappel, la notion pure.’7  
Literature will not replace like for like; it will not provide man with a concept by which to understand 
the world as would be the case in immediate language.  Instead literature will provide man with an 
indeterminate idea, one which is difficult to grasp, sets itself apart from the world and is based in the 
non-realistic: ‘la notion pure’.   
Replacing what had been lost in modernity required a structure that would unite the 
fragmentary in a time of transition and crisis.  Roger Pearson stresses Mallarmé’s desire throughout 
his work to ‘lay a verbal pattern over the void of a godless universe’.8  Free verse is evidently not as 
free as some of Mallarmé’s contemporaries may have wished it to be:  
 
Similitude entre les vers, et vieilles proportions, une régularité durera parce que l’acte poétique 
consiste à voir soudain qu’une idée se fractionne en un nombre de motifs égaux par valeur et à 
les grouper; ils riment: pour sceau extérieur, leur commune mesure qu’apparente le coup final. 
Au traitement, si intéressant, par la versification subi, de repos et d’interrègne, gît, 
moins que dans nos circonstances mentales vierges, la crise.9 
 
Mallarmé, in the above extract and throughout ‘Crise de vers’, points to the benefits of this form but 
also to its limitations, arguing that free verse is descended from other more structured and traditional 
forms of poetry.10  The underlying structure that persists in free verse unifies the fragmented idea and 
                                                          
7 Ibid., p. 213. 
8 Roger Pearson, Mallarmé and Circumstance: The Translation of Silence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), p. 8. 
9 Mallarmé, ‘Crise de vers’, in Œuvres complètes, II, 209. 
10 Rosemary Lloyd presents the correspondence between Mallarmé and his peers on these issues and their 




gives the poem orderliness.  This structure and basis in the non-realistic are characteristics of the 
modern myth as deployed by writers such as James Joyce in Ulysses, T. S. Eliot in The Waste Land 
and Guillaume Apollinaire in ‘Zone’.  Myth provides ahistorical order when there is no order and 
when history has failed, a state observed by Stephen Dedalus: ‘history [...] is a nightmare from which 
I am trying to awake.’11   
 The pure idea which sets essential language apart from ordinary language is a meticulously 
structured linguistic construction without reference to the world of things.  ‘Je dis: une fleur! et, hors 
de l’oubli où ma voix relègue aucun contour, en tant que quelque chose d’autre que les calices sus, 
musicalement se lève, idée même et suave, l’absente de tous bouquets.’12  Mallarmé is not referring to 
a particular flower or a knowable bunch of flowers; this idea is detached from the primroses, tulips, or 
daffodils and all the associations with, for instance, springtime that might be evoked in the day-to-day 
usage of the word by a musicality, a system of references between words that exist in isolation of the 
world of objects.  Roger Pearson notes how in the French word ‘fleur’ there is an echo of ‘l’heure’ 
and ‘leurre’, and so the idea that arises musically from this word might include temporality and 
unreliability rather than a flower’s traditional value as a symbol of transient beauty associated with the 
object in the world.13  It is the syntax of poetry, its rigorous construction, even in free verse, that 
renders the most utilitarian words rich and strange: ‘Au contraire d’une fonction de numéraire facile et 
représentatif, comme le traite d’abord la foule, le dire, avant tout, rêve et chant, retrouve chez le 
Poëte, par nécessité constitutive d’un art consacré aux fictions, sa virtualité.’14   
While some may argue that Mallarmé’s reference to ‘la foule’ here and elsewhere in this 
essay introduces a political dimension that demonstrates disdain for common vulgar mass society, it 
should be noted that the masses to whom Mallarmé refers are most likely the nouveau-riche middle 
class who deal with numbers and currency (‘une fonction de numéraire facile et représentatif’) rather 
                                                          
11 James Joyce, Ulysses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 34.  An unsigned typescript of a work 
entitled Le Mythe d’Ulysse has recently been found in the archive held by Blanchot’s niece.  The authors of the 
catalogue advertising this 47-page typescript for sale write that it seems to be the thematic mould or fictional 
origin of what would become Blanchot’s first novel Thomas l’obscur. 
12 Mallarmé, ‘Crise de vers’, in Œuvres complètes, II, 213.  
13 Roger Pearson, Stéphane Mallarmé (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), pp. 141-42. 
14 Mallarmé, ‘Crise de vers’, in Œuvres complètes, II, 213. 
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than the illiterate working class.  His politics were anarchistic rather than aristocratic: ‘Je ne sais pas 
d’autre bombe, qu’un livre.’15  He gave the work of art a political effectiveness but in doing so 
distanced the work from the real, rendering it not useful.  He writes elsewhere that the poet will, 
‘Donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu’.16   There is hope for Mallarmé that poetry will be the 
vehicle for revolution.   
In the extract quoted above, Mallarmé recognises that the language of the poet is 
characterised by a necessity which sets it apart from the real (‘par nécessité constitutive d’un art 
consacré aux fictions’).  The struggle between necessity and contingency is a central concern of the 
modern novel and this is perhaps why Blanchot will later use Mallarmé as a reference point when 
reading Melville, Joyce and Lautréamont.  This struggle is famously played out in Un Coup de dés, an 
extraordinary work that resists scrutiny and interpretation.  Here Mallarmé includes the image of a 
shipwreck hanging over an abyss and the motif of metaphysical gaming as he paints a picture of 
contingency and risk which the mind tries to control by finding pattern and purpose in this experience.  
Malcolm Bowie describes this as ‘a splendidly organised and overspilling portrait of contingency’.  
He continues: ‘The “impossible” chance-abolishing thought is present as a permanent temptation to 
which minds are subject and, in the final, culminating pages, as the only hope worth retaining amid 
chaos and dissolution.’17  This poem reveals that thought necessitates chance and so the divide in 
language between order and chaos, mind and world, necessity and contingency, the essential and the 
immediate, does not appear quite so impermeable.  This might be said to be reflected more broadly in 
Mallarmé’s work which, according to Pearson, tested the boundaries between poetry and narrative 
prose, as well as traditional genres such as lyric and drama: his ‘lifelong exploration of the 
possibilities of prose had led him to devise a new form of writing which occupies a confident “mi-
                                                          
15 Mallarmé, ‘Sur l’explosion à la chambre des députés’, in Œuvres complètes, II, 660.  Blanchot, loosely 
quoting Mallarmé in 1978 (‘Il n’est d’explosion qu’un livre’), relates the book as explosion to a fragmentary 
writing which contests everything, including itself.  The explosion simultaneously unveils and destroys; it is the 
book to come which never arrives: ‘[le livre] s’indique comme sa propre violence d’exclusion, le refus fulgurant 
du plausible: le dehors en son devenir d’éclat.’  Maurice Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre (Paris: Gallimard, 
1980), pp. 190-91 (this extract first publ. in Misère de la littérature, by Mathieu Bénézet and others (Paris: 
Christian Bourgois, 1978), pp. 9-12). 
16 Mallarmé, ‘Hommage [à Edgar Allan Poe]’, in Œuvres complètes, I, 98. 
17 Malcolm Bowie, Mallarmé and the Art of Being Difficult (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 
133, 128.  
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lieu” between verse and journalism.’18  The divide between the essential and the immediate is not as 
clear-cut as it may first appear for Mallarmé and this chapter will reveal how this similarly manifests 
itself in Blanchot’s literary criticism.   
Mallarmé was not the first to have perceived a division within language.  At the end of the 
eighteenth century the question ‘What is literature?’ preoccupied the Jena Romantics, who moved 
away from a classicist understanding of literature as representation toward an understanding of the 
literary work as self-expression.  Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy set the agenda for a 
discussion of early Romanticism, for which there is no homogenous body of theory, limiting their 
analysis to the group involved with the six issues of the Athenaeum journal published between 1798 
and 1800 in the university town of Jena.  This group included August Wilhelm Schlegel, Friedrich 
Schlegel, Friedrich Schleiermacher and Novalis.  In their study, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy state 
that, ‘du romantisme, et comme le romantisme, date la littérature comme son infinie mise en cause et 
la position perpétuelle de sa propre question.’19  From this moment onwards literature, no longer 
subservient to reality or norms, concerned only with its own self-expression or production, is absolute 
and infinite.  
There are three hallmarks of Jena Romanticism according to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy.  
The first is the fragment, which is the embodiment of the absolute and the search for infinity: ‘La 
totalité fragmentaire, conformément à ce qu’il faudrait plutôt se risquer à nommer la logique du 
hérisson, ne peut être située en aucun point: elle est simultanément dans le tout et dans chaque partie.  
Chaque fragment vaut par lui-même et pour ce dont il se détache. […] Les fragments sont au fragment 
ses définitions, et c’est ce qui installe sa totalité comme pluralité, et son achèvement comme 
inachèvement de son infinité.’  Second, the Jena Romantics stress the inclusiveness of literature; 
consequently, their writing is characterised by a mixture of genres and the distinction between 
thought, philosophy and literature is subsumed under the more inclusive grasp of literature in general.  
The novel for the Jena Romantics, insofar as it potentially included all other genres, is the absolute 
                                                          
18 Pearson, Mallarmé and Circumstance, pp. 27-41 (pp. 31-32). 
19 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Absolu littéraire: théorie de la littérature du romantisme 
allemand (Paris: Seuil, 1978), p. 266.  
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manifestation of literature in general.  Finally, literature has become the embodiment of the human 
subject which is infinite and absolute because, like the fragment, turned on itself like a hedgehog: 
‘sous ce rapport, il n’y a donc pas non plus le moindre écart entre romantisme et idéalisme.  
Cependant, la vie impliquée ici est la vie belle et l’organisme où elle a lieu et qu’elle anime […] est, 
essentiellement, l’œuvre d’art.  Et bien entendu, cela change tout — ou presque tout.’20  The point is 
that the subject of early German Romanticism differs from the Kantian subject because it is conscious 
of itself.      
Blanchot undoubtedly shares many of these concerns and the account of the Jena Romantics 
offered by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy owes much to his essay from 1964 entitled ‘L’Athenaeum’.21  
The association by some critics of Blanchot with literary autonomy derives in part from the view that 
he is wedded to the intransitive poetic language espoused by the Romantics.  This chapter, while not 
focussing on his engagement with Romanticism in particular, will demonstrate that direct parallels 
drawn between Blanchot and early German Romanticism are unfounded because, among other 
reasons, Blanchot becomes increasingly sceptical of the possibility that such autonomy can be 
achieved and of the role of the human subject in this creative process. 
More recently, the distinction between literary language and so-called ordinary or 
instrumental language was first articulated in a scientific manner by the Russian Formalists, whose 
influence on modern literary theory, especially in France, is difficult to overestimate.  This school of 
thought emerged in the mid-1910s and is marked by the desire to move away from the metaphysical 
aspirations of Russian Symbolism and free the study of verse from religious and philosophical 
tendencies.22  Writing at a time when Western culture was going through a crisis of belief — loss of 
faith in the face of the rationalism of science and philosophy, with the development of technology and 
in the aftermath of the First World War — literature was called upon to replace what had been lost 
with its own concept.  Mallarmé had already attempted to lay his own pattern over the godless void 
exposed in modernity; the work of the Russian Formalists might be considered a kind of systematising 
                                                          
20 Ibid., pp. 64, 276-77, 49. 
21 Blanchot, ‘L’Athenaeum’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 515-27 (first publ. in La Nouvelle Revue française, 140 
(August 1964), 301-13).  There is a more detailed discussion of this essay in Chapter Four. 
22 Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History — Doctrine, 4th edn (The Hague: Mouton, 1980), pp. 70-73. 
 29 
 
of Mallarmé’s experience of language.  Literature renews our perception of the world through 
linguistic dislocation for these theorists, who were the first to identify the concept of literarity (the 
property which makes a text a work of literature) and express the independence of the poetic word in 
a scientific manner.  Through the development of this meta-language, Russian Formalism paved the 
way for modern literary theory as it is practised today, spreading beyond the Russian border thanks to 
the migration of the influential Roman Jakobson to Prague, where he founded the Prague Linguistic 
Circle from which Structuralism later developed, and subsequently America.  His work was purveyed 
in France by Tzvetan Todorov, Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes.23  While Blanchot was most likely 
unaware of the Russian Formalists in the 1940s, their thinking of the autonomy of the literary word is 
fundamental to the conceptual history from which he is working and continued to impact literary 
theory, especially in the figure of Valéry, later in the twentieth century.   
The work of Roman Jakobson spans the period of transition from the Russian Formalism of 
the 1920s and ’30s to the Structuralism of the 1950s and ’60s.  The subject of literary scholarship, 
according to Jakobson in 1921, is not literature in its totality but what constitutes literary or poetic 
writing as having an end in itself and following distinctive rules and procedures: literariness.  
Jakobson later wrote in 1933 that the function of poetry is to highlight that the sign is not identical 
with its referent; this is important, he argued, because without an awareness of this inadequacy the 
connection between sign and object becomes automatized and our perception of reality withers away.  
For Jakobson, the problem lies not between subject and object but sign and referent.24  The 
‘literariness’ that in 1921 he deemed ought to be the subject of literary scholarship was to be located 
in the way the poet uses his or her medium and so, Victor Erlich writes, ‘the task of locating the 
differentia of imaginative literature became fundamentally a matter of delimiting “poetic speech” 
from other modes of discourse.’25   
                                                          
23 See Théorie de la littérature: textes des formalistes russes, ed. by Tzvetan Todorov (Paris: Seuil, 1965); Julia 
Kristeva, La Révolution du langage poétique (Paris: Seuil, 1974); and Roland Barthes, ‘Écrivains et écrivants’, in 
Œuvres complètes, ed. by Éric Marty, 5 vols (Paris: Seuil, 2002), II: 1962-1967, 403-10.  Blanchot shares the 
reference to Mallarmé with Kristeva and Barthes. 
24 Erlich, pp. 171-91. 
25 Ibid., p. 181.  
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While Jakobson distinguishes between poetic and other forms of language, he refrains from 
stating that poetic language ceases to be a form of communication.  What he terms the ‘poetic 
function’ is not restricted to poetry, but simply operates best in this medium: ‘La fonction poétique 
n’est pas la seule fonction de l’art du langage, elle en est seulement la fonction dominante, 
déterminante, cependant que dans les autres activités verbales elle ne joue qu’une rôle subsidiaire, 
accessoire.  Cette fonction, qui met en évidence le côté palpable des signes, approfondit par là même 
la dichotomie fondamentale des signes et des objets.’26  The ‘poetic function’ may intensify the 
division between sign and referent, but it equally remains a form of communication comprised of six 
elements — sender, context, message, channel, code, receiver — like the other five ‘functions’ of 
language identified by Jakobson: ‘toute conduite verbale est orientée vers un but, mais les objectifs 
varient — ce problème, de la conformité entre les moyens employés et l’effet visé, préoccupe de plus 
en plus les chercheurs qui travaillent dans les différents domaines de la communication verbale.’27  
Put simply, the poetic function is one of six functions of language all of which aim to convey 
information.  What distinguishes the poetic from other functions is the stress on the ‘message’ 
component, which is not the referent but the word itself.  Jakobson therefore offers a scientific 
consideration of ‘literariness’ which refrains from identifying a clear rupture between poetic and other 
forms of language. 
This focus on the sign was a key feature of Formalist readings of avant-garde poems.  For 
instance, Jakobson’s 1962 essay on Baudelaire’s ‘Les Chats’, co-authored with Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
is a linguistic interpretation of the poem where the sign is autonomous: 
 
La maison, circonscrivant les chats dans le premier quatrain, s’abolit dans le premier tercet où 
règnent les solitudes désertiques, véritable maison à l’envers des chats-sphinx.  A son tour, 
cette ‘non-maison’ fait place à la multitude cosmique des chats (ceux-ci, comme tous les 
personnages du sonnet, sont traités comme des pluralia tantum).  Ils deviennent, si l’on peut 
                                                          
26 Roman Jakobson, ‘Linguistique et poétique’, in Essais de linguistique générale, trans. by Nicolas Ruwet, 
Arguments, 14 (Paris: Minuit, 1963), pp. 209-48 (p. 218). 
27 Ibid., p. 211. 
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dire, la maison de la non-maison, puisqu’ils renferment, dans leurs prunelles, le sable des 
déserts et la lumière des étoiles.28 
 
Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss take the sign as liberated from the referent in poetic language: ‘les chats’, 
the subject of Baudelaire’s poem, refers not to the animals as it would do in everyday language, but 
has a meaning developed independently of this referent over the course of the poem: ‘la maison de la 
non-maison’.  This 1962 essay is relevant to this study of Blanchot writing in the 1940s because it 
marks the development of a meta-language — a theoretical language which treats language itself as an 
object — and the foundation, by Jakobson and others, of literary theory in the form of Structuralism.   
The main tenets of Russian Formalism were therefore an emphasis on the literary work, rather 
than the external circumstances surrounding its creation, and an insistence on the autonomy of literary 
scholarship.  The scientific ambitions of Russian Formalism and its close relation to avant-garde 
practices of literature distinguished this school from others; but the appeal to science did not always 
prove unanimous.  Blanchot, like others, including several contemporaries, was sceptical of an 
approach which attempted to develop a theory of literature and later questioned if there was any 
difference between writing and theoretical writing, and therefore the possibility of a meta-language.  
The back cover of L’Espace littéraire indicates that Blanchot’s text owes as much to literature in its 
own right as it does to saying something about literature; to write about writing is to experience the 
same ‘descent’ as any other writer: 
 
Le livre de Maurice Blanchot n’est pas seulement un essai d’élucidation de la création littéraire 
et artistique, mais encore une recherche précise de ce qui est en jeu pour l’homme 
d’aujourd’hui, par le fait que ‘quelque chose comme l’art ou la littérature existe’: descente vers 
la profondeur, approche de l’obscurité, expérience de la solitude et de la mort.29 
                                                          
28 Roman Jakobson and Claude Lévi-Strauss, ‘“Les Chats” de Charles Baudelaire’, in Questions de poétique, by 
Roman Jakobson, ed. by Tzvetan Todorov (Paris: Seuil, 1973), pp. 401-19 (p. 413).  
29 Texte de présentation, L’Espace littéraire.  The quotation included in the blurb is taken from an essay in 
L’Espace littéraire, but it is also a paraphrase of Heidegger.  The author of this blurb is not indicated; while the 




Blanchot’s refusal of a meta-linguistic hierarchy in 1955 is clear; however, his departure from a view 
of language similar to that of the Russian Formalists, one which aligned itself with the avant-garde 
and identified a hierarchy within language, has its roots in essays written more than a decade earlier to 
be examined later in this chapter.  
The assertion that there is a dual state of language is not limited to literary theory.  Martin 
Heidegger, for whom the poetry of Hölderlin offers the possibility of salvation in modernity and who 
greatly influenced what Blanchot had to say about language throughout his career, identifies a clear 
division between instrumental language and poetic saying: 
 
To speak language is totally different from employing language.  Common speech merely 
employs language.  This relation to language is just what constitutes its commonness.  But 
because thought and, in a different way poesy [Dichten], do not employ terms [Wörter] but 
speak words [die Worte], therefore we are compelled, as soon as we set out upon a way of 
thought, to give specific attention to what the word says [das Sagen des Wortes].30 
 
Instrumental language is associated with the technical domination characteristic of modernity which 
increasingly renders the world a calculable resource to be exploited.  The version of truth offered in 
common speech, truth as correspondence between language and world, is derivative because it takes 
the world for granted.  The work of art, on the other hand, gives truth as aletheia, a mode of revealing 
that brings beings forth in a manner that does not objectify.  Poetry is privileged because it offers the 
human the possibility of turning away from the metaphysical era.  Some critics have noted the 
proximity of Heideggerian Dichtung and the version of literature elaborated by the German 
                                                          
comments made in the final paragraph cast some doubt over this: ‘il n’existe peut-être pas de méditation aussi 
rigoureuse, aussi riche, sur les conduites créatrices dans toute l’histoire de la critique.’ 
30 Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. by J. Glenn Grey (New York: Perennial Library, [1976] 
2004), p. 128; Gesamtausgabe, VIII: Was heiβt Denken? (2002), 133.  
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Romantics, as both understand poetry in terms of its relation to the creative processes that brought it 
forth.31   
The last name to mention in this overview of interpretations of the dual status of language is 
Jean-Paul Sartre, who would soon be an important, if often implicit, interlocutor for Blanchot, as the 
latter’s contributions to Sartre’s Les Temps modernes (notably on the topic of bad faith) duly 
indicate.32  In the years following the Liberation, Sartre draws a clear line between the function of 
poetry and prose.  He writes that the only thing that the poet and the writer of prose have in common 
is the movement of the hand tracing letters on the page.33   
 
Coulée dans le mot, absorbée par sa sonorité ou par son aspect visuel, épaissie, dégradée, [la 
signification] est chose, elle aussi, incréée, éternelle; pour le poète, le langage est une structure 
du monde extérieur.  Le parleur est en situation dans le langage, investi par les mots; ce sont les 
prolongements de ses sens, ses pinces, ses antennes, ses lunettes; il les manœuvre du dedans, il 
les sent comme son corps, il est entouré d’un corps verbal dont il prend à peine conscience et 
qui étend son action sur le monde.  Le poète est hors du langage, il voit les mots à l’envers, 
comme s’il n’appartenait pas à la condition humaine et que, venant vers les hommes, il 
rencontrât d’abord la parole comme une barrière.34 
 
For Sartre, the writer of prose is committed to the extent of being lucidly conscious of his or her 
involvement in the world and has a duty to reveal to the reader a reality in which the individual is 
historically-situated and committed to the pursuit of authentic freedom.  Poetry, in contrast, is 
compared to painting, sculpture and music and the poet is the person who refuses to use language as 
instrument.  The poet experiences language from without as thing.  The speaker, or writer of prose, is 
within language, here conceived as a sort of prosthesis forming an extension of his or her body and 
                                                          
31 See, for instance, Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary 
Theory (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 164-92. 
32 See, for instance, Blanchot, ‘Le Roman, œuvre de mauvaise foi’, in La Condition critique, pp. 100-15. 
33 Jean-Paul Sartre, Qu’est-ce que la littérature? (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), p. 25. 
34 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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senses.  Words are not objects but designations of objects for the writer of prose; they are tools which 
name the world with a view to effecting change.  The realisation that the human being has the 
freedom, within their particular social and historical situation, to choose what they will become leads 
Sartre to argue that those who take refuge behind determinism of any sort are acting in bad faith.35 
 These writers and thinkers share a concern with literature or poetry as a response to 
modernity, be this in the form of salvation from the technical domination characteristic of the era, as a 
means of renewing our perception of the world, or as the vehicle for revolution.  Literature or poetry 
is legitimated in modernity as a sort of aesthetic religion; existing autonomously it reveals a truth 
when it becomes aware of itself.  Blanchot briefly shares and then diverges from these concerns.  That 
something like literature exists and can be neatly distinguished from everyday uses of language is 
questioned by Blanchot from the mid-1940s.  Writing in Les Temps modernes in 1952, he considers 
the sort of art that would be a reversal of the world in modernity: 
 
L’art est cette passion subjective qui ne veut plus avoir de part au monde.  Ici, dans le monde, 
règne la subordination à des fins, la mesure, le sérieux, l’ordre, — ici la science, la technique, 
l’État, — ici la signification, la certitude des valeurs, l’Idéal du Bien et du Vrai.  L’art est ‘le 
monde renversé’: l’insubordination, la démesure, la frivolité, l’ignorance, le mal, le non-sens, 
tout cela lui appartient, domaine étendu.36 
 
Direct insubordination to the modern world is not, as some have understood it, what Blanchot 
understands by art.37  Art set in opposition to technology, science and State only further supports 
worldly powers.  Blanchot continues: 
 
                                                          
35 See Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Existentialisme est un humanisme (Paris: Nagel, [1946] 1968). 
36 Blanchot, ‘La Littérature et l’expérience originelle’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 277-333 (p. 287) (first publ. as 
‘L’Art, la littérature et l’expérience originelle’, Les Temps modernes, 79 (May 1952), 1921-51; 80 (June 1952), 
2195-212). 
37 ‘Just so, insubordination is the form that Blanchot’s modernism takes.’  This is Gerald Bruns’ response to this 
extract in a review of Blanchot and Literary Criticism, by Mark Hewson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 
(February 2012) <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/blanchot-and-literary-criticism/> [accessed 3 May 2017].  Buclin 
also argues that autonomy preserves the authority of literature over the world (p. 106).   
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L’artiste qui croit s’opposer souverainement aux valeurs et protéger en soi, par son art, la 
source de la toute-puissante négation, ne se soumet pas moins au destin général que l’artiste qui 
fait ‘œuvre utile’, — peut-être davantage encore.  Il est déjà frappant qu’il ne puisse définir l’art 
qu’à partir du monde.  Il est le monde renversé.  Mais ce renversement n’est aussi rien de plus 
que le moyen ‘rusé’ dont le monde se sert pour se rendre plus stable et plus réel.38 
 
Art made aware of itself sees its own deception rather than any truth, because it suspends the world of 
familiar assumptions and offers the other of any world.   
 
Literary Autonomy 
Working as literary critic for the pro-Vichy Journal des débats between 1941 and 1944, Blanchot was 
not at liberty to comment directly on the war or the state of occupied France and the Vichy regime.  In 
stark contrast to material written up to 1937, literature was the sole focus of essays written for the 
Journal des débats during the Occupation.  These essays nevertheless reveal a writer and literary 
critic profoundly changed by the events of the late 1930s and the end of the Third Republic.  Blanchot 
later wrote to Roger Laporte that he was present for the surrender of the Assemblée nationale which 
marked the illegal end of the Third Republic: ‘Ma décision fut alors immédiatement prise.  C’était le 
refus.  Refus naturellement face à l’occupant, mais refus non moins obstiné à l’égard de Vichy qui 
représentait à mes yeux ce qu’il y avait de plus dégradant.’39  He goes on to explain that his life at this 
time was divided into writing of the day and writing of the night: a dichotomy was imposed between 
journalism and literature (he completed his first novel Thomas l’obscur in May 1940 and Aminadab 
was published in 1942) and so the latter was, at the start of the 1940s, a refusal of world. 
This is not to say that there is a sudden and total shift in his position at the end of the 1930s.  
One of his earliest essays for the Journal des débats, ‘La France et la civilisation contemporaine’, 
provides evidence of a residual nationalism and a continued emphasis on spiritualism and order with 
                                                          
38 Blanchot, ‘La Littérature et l’expérience originelle’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 288.  This is also a rebuttal of 
Sartre’s committed literature.   
39 Blanchot, letter to Roger Laporte, in Maurice Blanchot: passion politique, by Nancy, p. 59.  
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its roots in his political articles of the 1930s.  The task of the artist, writes Blanchot, is something akin 
to the creation of a world: everything depends on an internal order, a network of necessities that are 
all submitted to the force of invention.  This is a universe where men obey the law of poetic order.40  
This other world or universe exists autonomously beyond the boundaries of the everyday where 
Blanchot works as journalist and it is achieved primarily in French literature.  The French language is 
the language of poetic expression and Mallarmé is the French poet par excellence who purifies 
language of all but its essential traits: ‘Quand on songe à l’auteur du Coup de dés, on se dit que 
l’orgueil littéraire, si caractéristique de notre esprit, est un phénomène dont on n’a pas à rougir, 
puisqu’il y a dans notre littérature quelques textes qui ont demandé et dans une certaine mesure réussi 
à tenir la place de la création universelle.’41   
For Blanchot in 1941, the name Mallarmé represents poetic perfection.  His first article to 
appear after a yearlong hiatus in April 1941 signals the mastery associated with this name: ‘un homme 
qui dans une complète et obscure solitude sut dominer le monde par l’exercice pur d’un pouvoir 
d’expression absolu.’42  And an article later that year responding to the publication of Henri Mondor’s 
La Vie de Mallarmé praises Mondor for presenting an intellectual biography of Mallarmé, the poet 
whose vision distanced his life from world and exposed him to the greatest (poetic) dangers: ‘Et 
[Mallarmé] est surtout le seul qui ait éveillé cette profonde assemblée nocturne, non pas par une 
ivresse et une fascination verbales, mais par un arrangement méthodique de mots, par une intelligence 
toute particulière des mouvements et des rythmes, par un acte intellectuel pur, capable de tout créer en 
n’exprimant presque rien.’43  Other writers may come close, but Mallarmé is the name Blanchot 
employs to signal the most glorious creative ambition that achieves the independence of poetry from 
world.  The art of Lautréamont, for instance, is described in the same year as striking down all work 
                                                          
40 Maurice Blanchot, ‘La France et la civilisation contemporaine’, in Chroniques littéraires du Journal des 
débats: avril 1941 – août 1944, ed. by Christophe Bident (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), pp. 28-33 (p. 32) (first publ. 
in Journal des débats, 26-27 May 1941, p. 3). 
41 Blanchot, ‘La France et la civilisation contemporaine’, in Chroniques littéraires, p. 33. 
42 Blanchot, [‘Les peuples meurtris…’], in Chroniques littéraires, pp. 11-15 (p. 14) (first publ. in Journal des 
débats, 16 April 1941, p. 3). 
43 Blanchot, ‘Le Silence de Mallarmé’, in Faux pas, pp. 117-25 (p. 120) (first publ. as two essays: ‘La Biographie 
connaît le génie et ignore l’homme’, Journal des débats, 23 April 1941, p. 3; ‘Le Silence de Mallarmé’, Journal 
des débats, 1 April 1942, p. 3). 
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content with the imitation of reality; we are in the presence of a world that no usual experience allows 
us to approach.  For the first time in the French novel, ‘la recherche des métaphores aboutit à la 
production de métamorphoses dont l’étrangeté s’explique par la destruction de toute image de 
passage, de tout intermédiaire, par le saut brusque de la pensée ou du sentiment le plus simple dans 
une réalité stupéfiante qui en est le lointain aboutissement.’44  The greatest merit of Lautréamont is the 
distinct division between the real and the non-real; his project is similar to that of Mallarmé, but the 
language employed by Blanchot in this review is never quite as superlative.  
The struggle between the everyday and the poetic also defines Herman Melville’s Moby Dick 
according to a review from the same year of Jean Giono’s French translation.  This review lays bare 
what Blanchot understands by myth and how writers such as Melville, Mallarmé and Lautréamont 
achieve the mythic.  The structure of the novel — its perpetual abstract digressions that interrupt and 
distract the reader from the story — and its basis in the non-realistic — a world of tempests and foam 
rather than solid visible objects — ensure its status as myth; in all his early criticism the reference to 
‘myth’ is a coded rejection of literary realism.  This is a struggle, Blanchot argues, not against the 
whale but against the everyday world which is destined to succumb to mythic force: 
 
Parfois, ses officiers essayent de le retenir sur la pente où tous se sentent glisser; ils lui disent: 
arrêtons-nous, revenons en arrière, mettons fin à cette croisière insensée, et goûtons le repos et 
les plaisirs de la terre; mais, naturellement, personne ne croit à ces paroles de la vie banale.  
Achab n’est plus que le témoin d’un ordre invisible où il subit les commandements d’une chose 
sans nom, insondable, surnaturelle, du terrible roi sans remords dont il est le misérable et 
tragique serviteur dans la lutte même qu’il croit lui livrer.45 
 
The officers on board speak of earthly pleasures but this world is disappearing from beneath their feet 
as, alongside their captain, they are delivered to another invisible place.  The comparison is made to 
                                                          
44 Blanchot, ‘Lautréamont’, in Faux Pas, pp. 197-202 (p. 201) (first publ. in Revue française des idées et des 
œuvres, 1 (April 1940), 67-72).  
45 Blanchot, ‘Le Secret de Melville’, in Faux pas, pp. 273-77 (p. 276) (first publ. in Journal des débats, 1-2 
September 1941, p. 3). 
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Les Chants de Maldoror where language says everything in place of the world, attracting the reader, 
akin to these sailors, into its wake and obliging total obedience.46  Moby Dick therefore enacts a 
struggle between the literary and the everyday and the name of Mallarmé, cited at the beginning of the 
essay, overshadows this literary project.   
Blanchot is committing himself in these essays from 1941 on Mallarmé, Melville and 
Lautréamont to a version of literary autonomy which is vastly different from that conceived by the 
Russian Formalists and Sartre.  The overview of literary theory earlier in this chapter revealed that 
literary autonomy can take on various guises.  In Blanchot’s reading of Moby Dick there is no close 
analysis of language or privileging of sign over referent in the scientific style of the Russian 
Formalists, nor does he set the novelist apart from the poet by identifying different approaches to 
language as Sartre will do after the Liberation.  This version of literary autonomy is distinctly 
Mallarméan, which is to say characterised by a structure and basis in unreality that is not confined to 
poetry or prose.   
 
Il semble en effet que ce qui fait de Moby Dick un des grands livres de la littérature universelle, 
c’est qu’il cherche à être un livre total, exprimant non seulement une expérience humaine 
complète mais se donnant comme l’équivalent écrit de l’univers.  C’est, d’une certaine manière, 
un de ces livres qui aident à comprendre l’ambition suprême de Mallarmé lorsqu’il voulait 
‘élever une page à la puissance du ciel étoilé’.  L’impression de défi, lancé à la réalité du 
monde par ces œuvres orgueilleuses, ne vient naturellement pas de leurs dimensions.  On 
éprouve la même impression devant les contes d’Edgar Poe que devant Ulysse de Joyce, devant 
les sonnets de Gérard de Nerval que devant Maldoror de Lautréamont.  Il s’agit d’un mode 
d’écrire qui essaye de rendre au mot création, par une prétention vertigineuse, le sens qu’il peut 
avoir dans l’expression, la création du monde.  C’est une tentative pour attirer dans la trame de 
l’ouvrage, grâce à un emploi rigoureux des valeurs littéraires, les puissances inconcevables dont 
nous nous rapprochons par l’intermédiaire des mythes.47 
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A line is traced from the Romantics — Poe and Nerval — to the Modernists — Joyce — in this 
extract; at the heart of this literary genealogy is Stéphane Mallarmé whose work acts as a passage 
between the two movements and exemplifies the defiance toward reality and the structured unity 
which lends these other works their mythic quality.  The work may be fragmented, as is the nature of 
the artwork in modernity, but a union in the non-realistic endures thanks to this overarching structure: 
‘L’attention est soulevée et détournée de son objet par l’irruption d’anecdotes interminables au-dessus 
desquelles surgit de temps en temps, comme un nuage, la réminiscence d’un dessein éternel.’48  
 It is clear that Blanchot’s interpretation of literary autonomy is largely informed by his 
reading of Mallarmé; this discussion of the distinction between the literary and the everyday will be 
centred on those essays with a focus on the poet: ‘La Poésie de Mallarmé est-elle obscure?’ [1942], 
‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’ [1943], ‘Le Mythe de Mallarmé’ [1946], ‘La Littérature et le droit à la 
mort’ [1947/8] and ‘L’Expérience de Mallarmé’ [1952].  Writing in 1941, three months after the chief 
editorship of the once independent Nouvelle Revue française (NRF) had been transferred from Jean 
Paulhan to Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, we can speculate that Blanchot sought to shield the literary 
domain from collaboration.  The circumstances in which Blanchot promotes literary autonomy during 
the war are very different to those in which Sartre was writing directly after the Liberation and these 
changing political circumstances provide some explanation for the considerable shift in Blanchot’s 
thought during this decade, which is not to say that he moved from literary autonomy to a committed 
literature, but that this led him to question the very possibility of literature.49    
                                                          
48 Ibid., p. 277. 
49 Buclin charts the rise of the Comité national des écrivains (CNE) — founded in June 1943 and strengthened 
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because implicated in Vichy, became associated with literary autonomy, advocates of which were equally 
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called for a committed literature (pp. 17-32).  The call for literary autonomy was not, however, the prerogative 
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‘autonomy’ was Jean Paulhan, the pre- and post-war editor of the NRF, founding member of the CNE and of 
Les Lettres françaises, a member of the Resistance, and a close associate of Maurice Blanchot.   
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Antoine Compagnon views Blanchot as a theorist who never strayed from an autonomous 
view of literature: ‘selon la tradition moderne et la théorie littéraire, la référence est une illusion, et la 
littérature ne parle pas d’autre chose que de la littérature.  Mallarmé l’annonçait: “Parler n’a trait à la 
réalité des choses que commercialement: en littérature, cela se contente d’y faire une allusion ou de 
distraire leur qualité qu’incorporera quelque idée”.  Puis Blanchot enfonça le clou.’50  While it is 
reasonable to argue that Blanchot was committed to this view up to 1941, the presentation of Blanchot 
as a theorist who maintained this uncompromising stance throughout his career disregards the 
subtleties of the writer’s conception of literature from this point onwards.  Compagnon is not the only 
critic to simplify Blanchot’s poetics with such a broad generalisation.  Mark Hewson dedicates a 
chapter of his study of Blanchot to the Mallarmé essays — from those collected in Faux pas to ‘Le 
Mythe de Mallarmé’ and ‘L’Expérience de Mallarmé’— and claims that, although his style may 
differ, there is a sustained analysis of language that distinguishes between the poetic and the 
everyday.51  This chapter will show that by the 1950s it is impossible to view Blanchot as a critic and 
writer who sustains a view of literary autonomy and a clear divide in language.  In this decade, when 
literary theory in the form of Structuralism began to emerge from Russian Formalism, the conceptual 
ground alters for Blanchot, the distinction is less easily grasped and a meta-linguistic hierarchy 
becomes impossible. 
A shift in Blanchot’s conception of literature begins as early as 1941 in a review of Jean 
Paulhan’s Les Fleurs de Tarbes.  Paulhan writes that since the French Revolution linguistic 
commonplaces have been treated as a threat to original thought and purged from poetic expression.  
This attitude is named the Terror and is associated with Romanticism because, as well as the link to 
the French Revolution, it abandons accepted literary forms of expression in search of a more 
authentic, original expressiveness.  The Terror is a belief in the purity of thought and a mistrust of 
language.  Rhetoric, in contrast, is the classical view of the relationship between language and thought 
that held that commonplaces were a necessary part of all communication and that prioritised language 
over thought.  In his study Paulhan reveals the futility of the Terrorists’ project, demonstrating their 
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preoccupation with their own language even as they seek to affirm the precedence of thought.  
Through the metaphor of the garden in Tarbes — where visitors prohibited from taking flowers from 
the garden find ways around this interdiction by claiming to have brought their own flowers in — 
Paulhan questions how we are to tell whether authors intended their words to be read as 
commonplaces or as original thoughts.  His solution is to turn back to Rhetoric, arguing that we must 
submit to the authority of commonplaces if we are to free ourselves from such a preoccupation with 
language — visitors to the garden are now forbidden from entering without carrying flowers.52   
Blanchot demonstrates how Terror flips to Rhetoric and vice versa as both try to express 
authentic thought; literature cannot be deemed Terror or Rhetoric with any certainty, as the two share 
a common goal.  The Rhetoricians aim to express thought in a manner that does not draw attention to 
discourse, writes Blanchot, so that the words vanish as they are pronounced.  The Terrorists, he 
continues, aim to express original thought by chasing from language all that could make it resemble 
everyday language; they seek to express themselves in a language that is not an instrument of 
expression and where expression does not bring along the wear and tear and ambiguity of banal life.  
‘La mission de l’écrivain, dans les deux cas, est donc de faire connaître une pensée authentique — 
secret ou vérité — qu’une attention trop grande aux mots, surtout aux mots usés de tous les jours, ne 
saurait que mettre en péril.’53   
While heavily paradoxical, Paulhan’s account of literary language is nonetheless controllable; 
the ambiguity at the heart of the relationship is resolved as the writer seeks mastery of words by 
accepting commonplaces.54  Blanchot’s move in his review is to radicalise this account to reveal that 
literature escapes everything that one can say about it.  He draws attention to the closing lines of 
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Paulhan’s study: ‘Mettons enfin que je n’ai rien dit.’55  This is not a throwaway remark to be ignored 
because it reveals, according to Blanchot, the secret of Paulhan’s text, which is the impossibility of 
saying anything about literature.  Terror rejects all commonplaces in the search for authentic 
expression, but any such expression, once expressed, becomes a commonplace like any other: ‘Il 
suffit de concevoir que les vrais lieux communs sont des paroles déchirées par l’éclair et que les 
rigueurs des lois fondent le monde absolu de l’expression hors duquel le hasard n’est que sommeil.56   
Jeffrey Mehlman reads this essay as an ‘encoded farewell to plans for French fascism’ — in 
his view this is evidence of a withdrawal of literature from political engagement.57  Gerald Bruns 
considers this ‘politics of refusal’ in slightly different terms: this is less a renunciation of violence 
than a relocation of it within the ongoing currents of Blanchot’s thinking; terror, violence and anti-
rationalism remain basic features of Blanchot’s poetics.  Working from Zeev Sternhell’s 
understanding of fascism as an ideological revolt against modernity that had substantial appeal in 
France in the 1930s, Bruns situates Blanchot within this tradition, without labelling him a fascist as 
such.58  Blanchot is a ‘last Romantic’, perhaps someone ‘who has just never been modern’.59  
Elsewhere in this study, quoting the following passage from 1964 up to ‘[...] c’est rendre possible une 
parole non transitive qui n’a pas pour tâche de dire les choses’, Bruns claims that Jena Romanticism is 
the tradition in which Blanchot would most likely situate himself.60 
 
On peut bien dire que, dans ces textes, nous trouvons exprimées l’essence non romantique du 
romantisme et toutes les principales questions que la nuit du langage va contribuer à produire 
au jour: qu’écrire, c’est faire œuvre de la parole, mais que cette œuvre est désœuvrement; que 
parler poétiquement, c’est rendre possible une parole non transitive qui n’a pas pour tâche de 
dire les choses (de disparaître dans ce qu’elle signifie), mais de (se) dire en (se) laissant dire, 
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sans toutefois faire d’elle-même le nouvel objet de ce langage sans objet (si la poésie est 
simplement la parole qui prétend exprimer l’essence de la parole et de la poésie, on retourne, à 
peine plus subtilement, à l’emploi du langage transitif — difficulté majeure par laquelle on en 
viendra à cerner, à l’intérieur du langage littéraire, l’étrange lacune qui est sa propre différence 
et comme sa nuit, nuit quelque peu terrifiante, analogue à celle que Hegel crut voir en regardant 
dans les yeux des hommes).61 
 
The omission by Bruns of the concluding lines of this passage produces a distorted reading of 
Blanchot as a writer for whom literature is characterised by self-reflexive autonomy.  In the lines that 
follow, Blanchot shows that transitive and intransitive language are one and the same once they adopt 
a fundamental teleology, such as the expression of authentic thought, and this exposure to the lacuna 
at the heart of literary language, the nothing of which Paulhan writes, turns writing endlessly 
outwards.  This is night not as Hegel understood it — the pre-subjective and impersonal basis for self-
conscious subjectivity and historical time: ‘C’est cette nuit qu’on aperçoit lorsqu’on regarde un 
homme dans les yeux: [on plonge alors ses regards] en une nuit qui devient terrible (furchtbar); c’est 
la nuit du monde qui se présente (hängt entgegen) [alors] à nous’62 — but that other night which is 
irreducible to the day/night binary because it puts history and world in parentheses.63  The aporetic 
logic is Mallarméan: necessity necessitates chance, depriving literature of any secure and stable 
foundation.  Rather than a coded farewell to fascism or a revolt against modernity, the early review of 
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Blanchot writes that Paulhan’s Copernican revolution is to reverse the primacy of thought over 
language so that thought turns around language, ‘pour retrouver sa nature authentique’.64  The term 
‘authentic’ and the relationship between thought and language outlined here echoes the conversation 
enacted by Heidegger between philosophy and poetry in his reading of Hölderlin.  Robert Savage 
writes that for Heidegger philosophy has failed to recognise poetry as a partner of equal standing, 
seeing in it at best an inferior version of itself or at worst an indulgence in private feelings.  
‘Heidegger’s task, as he understands it, is to put an end to this regrettable state of affairs by drawing 
philosophy into conversation with poetry, thereby causing it to metamorphose into something else, 
what he variously calls “incipient”, “poetic”, or “original”.’65  At the end of his review, Blanchot 
paraphrases Paulhan who proposes something similar: if false and arbitrary, impure and conventional, 
consciousness is submitted to the rules of rhetoric, ‘[l]a pensée redeviendra pure, contact vierge et 
innocent, non point à l’écart des mots mais dans l’intimité de la parole, par l’opération des clichés, 
seuls capables de la reprendre aux anamorphoses de la réflexion.’66  Blanchot’s engagement with 
Heidegger on Hölderlin will, from the late 1930s onwards, significantly inform his reading of 
Mallarmé and others.    
 In ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, a lecture delivered in 1936 and published in French 
translation in 1937, Heidegger considers why Hölderlin describes poesy [Dichten] on separate 
occasions as the most innocent of all occupations but also the most dangerous of goods.  ‘Indeed, the 
pursuit of poetry often looks like little more than play.  Without responsibility [Ungebunden], it 
invents a world of images; lost in thought, it remains within an imaginary realm.’67  Poesy is innocent 
because detached from world.  This is, however, a view which overlooks the essence of poetry 
according to Heidegger.  The task of language is to reveal the human world of time and history and so 
                                                          
64 Blanchot, ‘Comment la littérature est-elle possible?’, in Faux pas, pp. 99-100. 
65 Robert Savage, Hölderlin after the Catastrophe: Heidegger, Adorno, Brecht (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 
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66 Blanchot, ‘Comment la littérature est-elle possible?’, in Faux pas, p. 101. 
67 Martin Heidegger, ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, in Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, trans. by Keith 
Hoeller (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000), pp. 51-65 (p. 53); Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung’, in 
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it is, as Hölderlin famously writes, poetically that man dwells on the earth.68  Poetry is the originary 
event when the ontological ground is laid for the disclosure of beings and when language gives us the 
horizon against which we appear as beings-in-the-world.  Language therefore serves comprehension 
only because poetry is foundational: ‘a naming of being and of the essence of all things — not just 
any saying, but that whereby everything first steps out into the open, which we then discuss and talk 
about in everyday language.  Hence poetry never takes language as a material at its disposal 
[vorhandenen Werkstoff]; rather, poetry itself first makes language possible.’69   
Large sections of Blanchot’s 1942 review of Charles Mauron’s study of Mallarmé are heavily 
indebted to ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’.  There is a clear divide between the poetic and the 
everyday in this essay, as Blanchot criticises Mauron for a biographical approach which neglects the 
language of Mallarmé’s poetry; the poetic recalls language to its essence and is not to be thought as 
simply a tool for the expression of ideas.  ‘[La signification poétique] est non seulement ce qui dépend 
essentiellement du langage, mais ce qui rappelle le langage à son essence et l’empêche de se 
confondre avec ses buts.’70  Edits made to this review for its publication in Faux pas demonstrate that 
Blanchot continued to engage closely with, and to clarify his own critical stance in relation to, 
Heidegger: ‘[Les phénoménologues diraient / On pourrait dire] que la signification poétique se 
rapporte à l’existence, qu’elle est compréhension [d’une situation / de la situation de l’homme], 
qu’elle [a une valeur existentielle / met en cause ce qu’il est].’71  The first alternative given in each set 
of square brackets is replaced with the second when the essay is published one year later in Faux pas.  
                                                          
68 ‘Ist unbekannt Gott?  Ist er offenbar wie der Himmel? dieses glaub’ ich eher.  Des Menschen Maaβ ist’s.  Voll 
Verdienst, doch dichterish, wohnet der Mensch auf dieser Erde.  Doch reiner ist nicht der Schatten der Nacht 
mit den Sternen, wenn ich so sagen könnte, als der Mensch, der heiβet ein Bild der Gottheit.’  Friedrich 
Hölderlin, ‘In lieblicher Bläue…’ [In lovely blueness…] in German and English translation in Poems and 
Fragments, pp. 600-05 (p. 600), my emphasis. 
69 Heidegger, ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, in Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 60; Gesamtausgabe, 
IV, 43. 
70 Blanchot, ‘La Poésie de Mallarmé est-elle obscure?’, in Faux pas, p. 128 (first publ. in Journal des débats, 24 
February 1942, p. 3 <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k510265t/f3.item> [accessed 26 May 2017]). 
71 Blanchot, ‘La Poésie de Mallarmé est-elle obscure?’, in Journal des débats; and in Faux pas, p. 129.  Other 
small edits to the essay stress the primacy of poetry over instrumental language: in 1943 poetry no longer tries 
to flee discursive reason in order to give verse another mode of being; reason now tries to elucidate verse in 
order to give it another form (Faux pas, p. 128, my emphasis).  
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Blanchot seems more willing to associate this interpretation of poetic meaning with his own critical 
position by 1943, when he also clarifies the small print of Heideggerian Dichtung. 
The account of language outlined one year later in ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’ is largely 
unchanged, remaining committed to the Heideggerian view of poetry as foundation:  
 
Le langage est ce qui fonde la réalité humaine et l’univers.  L’homme qui se révèle dans un 
dialogue où il trouve son événement fondamental, le monde qui se met en paroles par un acte 
qui est sa profonde origine, expriment la nature et la dignité du langage.  L’erreur est de croire 
que le langage soit un instrument dont l’homme dispose pour agir ou pour se manifester dans le 
monde; le langage, en réalité, dispose de l’homme en ce qu’il lui garantit l’existence du monde 
et son existence dans le monde. Nommer les dieux, faire que l’univers devienne discours, cela 
seul fonde le dialogue authentique qu’est la réalité humaine et cela aussi fournit la trame de ce 
discours, sa brillante et mystérieuse figure, sa forme et sa constellation, loin des vocables et des 
règles en usage dans la vie pratique.72 
 
The use of the expression ‘la réalité humaine’ — the controversial French translation of Dasein 
introduced by Henry Corbin in the 1930s — demonstrates that Blanchot is reading Mallarmé through 
the lens of Heidegger on Hölderlin.73  One noticeable divergence from the account of language 
offered by Heidegger is the broader definition of literature which does not exclude prose: the focus of 
the essay is a letter by Mallarmé in which there is, ‘une conception si profonde du langage, une vue 
tellement étendue de la vocation des mots, une explication si universelle de la littérature que nul genre 
de création ne peut s’en trouver exclu.’74  The writer of prose is similarly obliged to maintain the 
                                                          
72 Blanchot, ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’, in Faux pas, pp. 189-96 (p. 191) (first publ. in Journal des débats, 27 
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73 See Martin Heidegger, ‘Hölderlin et l’essence de la poésie’, trans. by Henry Corbin, in L’Approche de 
Hölderlin, trans. by Henry Corbin and others, Collection Tel, 269 (Paris: Gallimard, [1963] 1973), pp. 39-61.  
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74 Blanchot, ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’, in Faux pas, p. 190. 
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linguistic hierarchy and the necessity of the artwork in modernity.  Blanchot references Novalis, 
Hölderlin and Joyce as examples of this struggle; but one could also cite Flaubert and Gide, for whom 
it was an unavoidable aporia. 
Myth, the motif which dominates Blanchot’s discussion of Moby Dick, remains a central 
concern of this essay because it is one way of resolving the struggle between necessity and 
contingency.  In the opening paragraphs Blanchot quotes from a letter in which Mallarmé discusses a 
structured and calculated book shielded from the everyday that fulfils the duty of the poet by 
providing an Orphic explanation of the earth.75  The only meaning such an act of foundation, bound 
up in the rigorous and necessary structure of prose, can have in everyday language is that it exists in 
isolation.76  The task of the novelist, as it is laid out in this essay, is to found a world by granting the 
text its own law and containing the text within itself so that it does not lapse into the hazardous 
everyday, perceived as a constant threat to the strict limits of the novel: ‘Tout lui sera aisé, s’il veut 
bien rompre avec la plupart de ses habitudes et accepter un instant d’aller, avec Mallarmé, jusqu’aux 
principes du langage.’77  Nonetheless, we saw in the analysis of Paulhan’s Les Fleurs de Tarbes that 
any founding law cannot belong to the text itself.78  In this essay from 1943, chance plays a larger role 
in our encounter with Mallarmé than it had done one year earlier in ‘La Poésie de Mallarmé est-elle 
obscure?’ — Blanchot writes that we are reminded by chance of the letter written by the poet; that we 
arbitrarily think of the art of the novel; and that asking the novelist the meaning of his or her work is 
an accident — so that the task of the novelist echoes the task of Paulhan.  Having established that the 
Mallarméan poet aims for an incorruptible work devoid of all impure or inauthentic form and 
                                                          
75 Ibid., p. 189.  Ian Maclachlan clarifies that for Blanchot the ‘descent of Orpheus, by analogy with the literary 
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questioned why this model of perfection should be accessible only to the poet, Blanchot writes: ‘Le 
romancier qui réfléchit sur l’œuvre qu’il a à composer, se trouve immédiatement aux prises avec des 
problèmes si graves et si épuisants qu’ils ne peuvent que lui sembler impossibles.  Cette impossibilité 
doit être l’âme secrète de son travail.  Elle lui apporte les exigences auxquelles il se peut qu’il 
succombe, mais qui, dans sa défaite même, le rendent conscient de ce qu’il désire.’79   
Writing ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’ soon after the publication of Thomas l’obscur and 
Aminadab, the essay can be read as a reflection on Blanchot’s own novelistic practice.80  In the 
opening pages of Thomas l’obscur the main character Thomas is portrayed swimming in the sea and 
struggling to come to terms with his alienation from himself as he is cast into a strange world 
separated from the real, the everyday and his own body: 
 
Puis il s’aperçut que ses membres, soit à cause de la fatigue, soit pour une raison inconnue, lui 
donnaient la même sensation d’étrangeté que l’eau dans laquelle ils roulaient.  Chaque fois 
qu’il réfléchissait sur la manière dont ses mains disparaissaient puis reparaissaient dans un état 
d’indifférence totale à l’égard de l’avenir, avec une sorte d’irréalité dont il n’avait pas le droit 
de prendre conscience, il était tout prêt à croire qu’il éprouverait bien des difficultés 
impossibles à prévoir pour se tirer d’affaire.  Il ne se découragea pas; le sentiment du danger 
était même tout à fait écarté du malaise que lui causait cette situation.  Qu’avait-il à craindre?  
Mais son cas n’en était pas meilleur, car bien qu’il pût se maintenir indéfiniment dans l’eau ou 
dans cet élément bizarre qui en avait pris la place, il y avait quelque chose d’insupportable à 
nager ainsi à l’aventure avec un corps qui lui servait uniquement — il s’en rendait compte 
maintenant — à penser qu’il nageait.81 
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Thomas exists in this other world marked by its unreality and foreignness; the water is a strange 
element where he swims only in his imagination.  In this other world Thomas is pure consciousness, 
his own body is alien to him and seems to melt into the surrounding water or whatever strange 
element — the language of Blanchot’s writing perhaps — has replaced that water.  His ability to 
remain in this state indefinitely and the fact that his hands are totally indifferent to the future suggests 
a suspension of time which is indicative of the phenomenological epoché.  Edmund Husserl sought to 
break with unfounded but deep-rooted assumptions about the structure and meaning of experience.  
He did this by placing the world within parentheses, by taking nothing for granted, not even the 
existence or non-existence of the world presupposed in metaphysics, and by progressing from the 
certainty of the transcendental phenomenological Ego to establish certainties via a rigorous scientific 
method which worked from the intuited-real and not the mathematical-ideal, an error of the sciences 
since Galileo according to Husserl.82  The stress on certainty found in Husserl is not, however, 
reflected in the passage from Thomas l’obscur quoted above, where the narrator hangs above a watery 
abyss and comments that there is something unbearable about this state in which he is estranged from 
himself.   
Thirty two years later, in Le Pas au-delà, Blanchot reflects on the process of writing his first 
novel (he quotes the opening lines of Thomas l’obscur: ‘il — la mer’).  In the first of two fragments 
which focus on the experience of writing, he refers to this first inscription as ‘cette puissance 
d’arrachement, de destruction ou de changement’.  Literature is here an uprooting force and what 
results is disunity and fragmentation rather than any unified structure.  The second fragment continues 
this reflection on the process of writing:  
 
  Écrire comme question d’écrire, question qui porte l’écriture qui porte la question, ne te 
permet plus ce rapport à l’être — entendu d’abord comme tradition, ordre, certitude, vérité, 
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toute forme d’enracinement — que tu as reçu un jour du passé du monde, domaine que tu étais 
appelé à gérer afin d’en fortifier ton ‘Moi’, bien que celui-ci fût comme fissuré, dès le jour où le 
ciel s’ouvrit sur son vide. 
J’essaierai en vain de me le représenter, celui que je n’étais pas et qui, sans le vouloir, 
commençait d’écrire,  écrivant (et alors le sachant) de telle manière que par là le pur produit de 
ne rien faire s’introduisait dans le monde et dans son monde.  Cela se passait ‘la nuit’.  Le jour, 
il y avait les actes du jour, les paroles quotidiennes, l’écriture quotidienne, des affirmations, des 
valeurs, des habitudes, rien qui comptât et pourtant quelque chose qu’il fallait confusément 
nommer la vie.  La certitude qu’en écrivant il mettait précisément entre parenthèses cette 
certitude, y compris la certitude de lui-même comme sujet d’écrire, le conduisit lentement, 
cependant aussitôt, dans un espace vide dont le vide (le zéro barré, héraldique) n’empêchait 
nullement les tours et les détours d’un cheminement très long.83 
 
Blanchot pushes the logic behind the phenomenological epoché to the limit in this fragment, as 
brackets open onto brackets, which open onto further brackets, in a movement that endlessly 
undermines the possibility of certitude.  In suspending the everyday world in this way the writer 
becomes unfamiliar to him- or herself and so the certainty of the night, the certainty that he or she 
writes, is undone.  The words of Blanchot writing in 1952, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
seem significant: we are insufficient spectators; bound to the world of tasks and ends we move from 
art to the world ‘neutralised’ or suspended (and we are significantly more capable of moving from 
world to tableau).  The same workless logic evident in the early review of Paulhan which interrogates 
the distinction between Terror and Rhetoric here undoes the possibility of writing.  Foundation gives 
way to suspension in the development of Blanchot’s thought over this period, which is not to say that 
the stress returns to pure consciousness, because the subject who writes is effaced in this process.   
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Literature as Deception 
In ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, Heidegger warns that language can be deceptive because it 
deals in both the essential and the inessential.  Language may express the essential, but it also 
preserves beings as such in the work and so equally expresses the common or the everyday.  
Heidegger argues that this dual occupation of language means that an essential word can seem 
unessential and vice-versa: 
 
The word as word never offers any immediate guarantee as to whether it is an essential word or 
a deception [Blendwerk].  On the contrary — an essential word, in its simplicity, often looks 
like an inessential one.  And on the other hand, what shows itself in its finery in the appearance 
of the essential is often merely something recited and repeated by rote.  Thus language must 
constantly place itself into the illusion which it engenders by itself, and so endanger what is 
most its own, genuine utterance.84 
 
In the first edit to ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’ Blanchot notes the risk posed by language as it is 
identified by Heidegger, adding a lengthy paragraph toward the start of the essay in which he 
highlights the potential for such deception: ‘Simplicité et clarté dont l’innocence finit par ressembler à 
un piège.  On ne sait que penser de cette main qui offre, comme en passant, la clé de toute création.  
On se demande si elle ne retire pas ce qu’elle donne, en donnant dans sa réserve infiniment plus 
qu’elle ne promet.’85  Blanchot agrees with Heidegger: the essential literary word can act as a trap 
because it can appear simple, clear and innocent when it is in fact concerned with the founding of all 
being.  Later in the 1940s, Blanchot will accuse literature of deception because it claims to offer up 
some truth but does not engage in work in the world and so cannot respond to worldly criteria.  The 
epigraph to Le Très-Haut, published in 1948, says as much: ‘Je suis un piège pour vous.  J’aurai beau 
tout vous dire; plus je serai loyal, plus je vous tromperai: c’est ma franchise qui vous attrapera.’  ‘Je 
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vous supplie de le comprendre, tout ce qui vous vient de moi n’est pour vous que mensonge, parce 
que je suis la vérité.’86  The trap set by language in 1943 will become innate trickery by the end of the 
decade, rendering any hierarchy between the literary and the everyday impossible for Blanchot.   
 A second paragraph added to ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’ for its publication in Faux pas 
indicates how Blanchot will turn to this view of literature as ‘imposture’.  In this addition, the 
consequences of the literary trap are articulated as it threatens to cause a slippage between the 
essential and the inessential, or between Being and beings: 
 
Le poème, comme tout ouvrage de l’esprit, ne peut que dénoncer le péril que le langage 
représente pour l’homme; c’est le danger des dangers; c’est l’éclair qui lui révèle, au risque de 
l’aveugler et de le foudroyer, qu’il est perdu dans la banalité des mots usuels, dans la 
communauté de la langue sociale, dans la quiétude des métaphores apprivoisées.  Le langage 
essentiel brille soudain au cœur de la nue, et son éclat attaque, consume, dévore le langage 
historique qui est compromis, mais non remplacé.87 
 
The phrase ‘c’est le danger des dangers’ is borrowed from Heidegger’s essay on Hölderlin: 
 
[Language] is the danger of all dangers because it first creates the possibility of a danger.  
Danger is the threat that beings pose to being itself.  But it is only by virtue of language at all 
that man is exposed to something manifest: beings which press upon him and inflame him in 
his existence [Dasein], or nonbeings which deceive and disappoint him.  Language first creates 
the manifest place of this threat to being, and the confusion and thus the possibility even of the 
loss of being, that is — danger.88 
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According to Heidegger, the ‘danger of all dangers’ is the slippage in ontological difference, the 
slippage from Being to beings, and the subsequent forgetting or loss of Being which is characteristic 
of modernity.  Like Heidegger, Blanchot recognises that the essential may lie in the simplest of 
phrases; he writes that it is the task of the novelist (and of the poet) to ensure that the essential does 
not lapse into the banal by maintaining this ontological hierarchy.  This task seems achievable for 
Blanchot writing in 1943, but only a few years later in 1946, with the realisation that literature will 
always deceive and never give up any truth, this hierarchy becomes unstable and impossible to 
maintain.  There are implications for the possibility of an authentic relation to death and dying (and 
Blanchot’s engagement with Heidegger) which are manifest by 1946: ‘le poète, comme tout homme 
qui parle et qui écrit, meurt toujours avant d’avoir atteint le silence et c’est pourquoi, toujours, sa mort 
nous apparaît prématurée, mensonge qui couronne un édifice de mensonges.’89   
The inherent danger of the literary work is clear in the Prière d’insérer of the original 1943 
edition of Faux pas.  The task of the critic is fraught with difficulties as he or she attempts to expose 
the secret of the work (what Heidegger calls ‘das Verborgenste’) without falling foul of the literary 
trap: 
 
Chaque livre, un peu important, cache un secret qui le rend supérieur à ce qu’il peut être.  C’est 
vers ce secret que le critique se dirige et c’est de lui qu’il s’éloigne, entraîné par le devoir de 
faire connaître à des lecteurs les ouvrages qui paraissent.  Aussi sa marche est-elle piétinement 
et lourdeur.  Et si elle se rapproche quelquefois du but, ce n’est que par un faux pas.90 
 
The critic may appear to approach the essential concealed in the work, but this is never truly the case; 
he or she is bound by his or her duty to communicate the appearance of new works to the public, to 
articulate these useful facts in everyday language, and so the possibility of a meta-language becomes 
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increasingly complicated by the contradictory aims of this task.  An essay from 1944 develops this 
point further when Blanchot, reviewing Paulhan’s study of Félix Fénéon, claims that criticism is even 
more out of reach than the novel or poetry.  It is, Blanchot writes, not at all certain that criticism 
exists; a discussion then proceeds from a consideration of the double state of language.  Literature 
protests the abuse of words in daily language by destroying discourse, ruining practical words to 
render them useless.  In literature, language is the victim of a sort of sacrifice; the writer hopes that 
this destruction will raise banal language to the status of the sacred.  Blanchot argues that the critic 
should be no different in his or her treatment of language and that his or her status as critic should be 
perpetually in doubt.  Paulhan is, after all, able to identify only one ‘critic’ from the last one hundred 
years!  ‘Le critique habituel est un souverain qui échappe à l’immolation, prétend exercer l’autorité 
sans l’expier et se veut maître d’un royaume dont il dispose sans risque.  Aussi n’y a-t-il guère de 
souverain plus misérable et, pour n’avoir pas refusé d’être quelque chose, plus près de n’être rien.’91  
There is a secret or mystery within criticism which requires that the critic’s language and status as 
critic is contested.  The critic should not deal in understandable simplifications, but must work within 
the same destructive medium as the poet or novelist.92 
The difficulties facing the literary critic are the focus in 1946 of ‘Le Mythe de Mallarmé’, 
which critiques Paul Valéry’s reading of Mallarmé.  Valéry had benefitted from a close relationship 
with Mallarmé in his later years and became known as the main purveyor of the poet’s work.  
Following Mallarmé’s death he aspired to build on his understanding of poetic language and 
attempted to rearticulate his views in a more lucid and logical manner.  What transpires is a depiction 
of Mallarmé as master of language: ‘Mallarmé a compris le langage comme s’il l’eût inventé.  Cet 
écrivain si obscur a compris l’instrument de compréhension et de coordination au point de substituer 
au désir et au dessein naïfs et toujours particuliers des auteurs, l’ambition extraordinaire de concevoir 
                                                          
91 Blanchot, ‘Le Mystère de la critique’, in Chroniques littéraires, pp. 533-36 (p. 536) (first publ. in Journal des 
débats, 6 January 1944, p. 3). 
92 Roger Laporte notes that Blanchot never ceased to ponder the problem of how to ‘approach the obscure, 
allow the obscure to approach, but without making the same mistake as Orpheus?’  Roger Laporte, ‘Maurice 
Blanchot Today’, trans. by Ian Maclachlan, in Maurice Blanchot: The Demand of Writing, ed. by Carolyn Bailey 
Gill (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 25-33 (p. 32).   
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et de dominer le système entier de l’expression verbale.’93  In Valéry’s account, Mallarmé has 
displayed conscious mastery over the entire system of verbal expression and poetic language is an 
instrument to be manipulated by this master.  Valéry sought to build on the work of his predecessor by 
transforming what some took to be an obscure and fragmented account of the poetic into a clear and 
unified doctrine, one which simplified the distinction between the poetic and the everyday to a 
distinction between poetry and prose, likened respectively to dancing and walking, or two forms of 
language that follow different rules: 
 
Prose et poésie se servent des mêmes mots, de la même syntaxe, des mêmes formes et des 
mêmes sons ou timbres, mais autrement coordonnés et autrement excités.  La prose et la poésie 
se distinguent donc par la différence de certaines liaisons et associations qui se font et se défont 
dans notre organisme psychique et nerveux, cependant que les éléments de ces modes de 
fonctionnement sont identiques.  C’est pourquoi il faut se garder de raisonner de la poésie 
comme on fait de la prose.94 
 
The tone of this extract demonstrates the rational approach adopted by Valéry, who writes in a manner 
comparable to Jakobson’s analysis of Baudelaire’s ‘Les Chats’, stating elsewhere: ‘Le principe 
essentiel de la mécanique poétique — c’est-à-dire des conditions de production de l’état poétique par 
la parole — est à mes yeux cet échange harmonique entre l’expression et l’impression.’95  While the 
Mallarméan poets ‘proclamèrent très haut le sortilège bu’, Valéry’s poet is engaged in ‘la mécanique 
poétique’, ‘conditions de production’ and an ‘échange harmonique’. 
 Blanchot will object to Valéry’s interpretation of Mallarmé for several reasons.  Firstly, the 
attempt to expand on Mallarmé’s conception of language, transforming the poet’s view into a clearly 
articulated doctrine, is incompatible with this fragmentary and enigmatic thought: ‘Le manque de 
cohérence des textes, un souci tout autre que logique, l’éclat de certaines formules qui n’expliquent 
                                                          
93 Paul Valéry, ‘Je disais quelquefois à Stéphane Mallarmé’, in Œuvres, ed. by Jean Hytier, 2 vols (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1957-1960), I, 644-60 (p. 658). 
94 Valéry, ‘Poésie et pensée abstraite’, in Œuvres, I, 1314-39 (p. 1331). 
95 Ibid., p. 1332. 
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pas mais qui montrent, rendent les méditations de Mallarmé peu réductibles à l’unité et à la simplicité 
d’une doctrine.’96  Valery erases the remarkable in Mallarmé through clarification.  Secondly, the 
view that poetic language is an instrument that can be mastered by a conscious subject disregards the 
original founding role of language which precedes human existence, as well as the experience of 
dispossession documented by Mallarmé as the condition of writing the poetic.  It seems that Valéry 
has fallen into the trap identified by Blanchot in ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’, looking to clarify 
Mallarmé he has allowed the simple essential word to lapse into the banal.   
The reduction of the distinction between poetic and everyday language to the distinction 
between poetry and prose is also denied by Blanchot, who argued in ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’ that 
the novelist faces the same task as the poet and maintains that view here: ‘le langage essentiel qui 
n’exclut pas la prose [...] est poésie et suppose le vers.’97  Blanchot provides a more nuanced account 
of language where the distinction between essential and everyday language is no longer black and 
white; indeed, he seems to distance himself from this position: ‘Mallarmé croit à l’existence de deux 
langages, l’un essentiel, l’autre brut et immédiat.  C’est là une certitude qu’assurera Valéry et qui 
depuis nous est devenue très familière.  Pourquoi?  Cela est moins évident.’98  It is Mallarmé who 
believes in the existence of two languages, as Blanchot questions why this distinction should be so 
obvious.  While ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’ is replete with statements regarding perfection, 
necessity, purity and a silent absolute to which the text must aspire, in this later essay what is essential 
is hazier, clouded by irregularities and with more intricate boundaries:  
 
nous voici à nouveau en contact avec la réalité mais une réalité plus évasive, qui se présente et 
s’évapore, qui s’entend et s’évanouit, faite de réminiscences, d’allusions, de sorte que si d’un 
côté elle est abolie, de l’autre elle réapparaît dans sa forme la plus sensible, comme une suite de 
nuances fugitives et instables, au lieu même du sens abstrait dont elle prétend combler le vide.99 
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The ‘reality’ founded by essential language is unstable — the rigid structure and solid foundations of 
Mallarmé’s text have disappeared — and unachievable.  Blanchot portrays an author working toward 
this goal: ‘Toutes les recherches de Mallarmé tendent à trouver une limite où s’esquisserait, par le 
moyen de termes pourtant fixes et orientés vers des faits et des choses, une perspective de parenthèses 
s’ouvrant les unes dans les autres à l’infini et se soustrayant sans cesse à elles-mêmes.’100  While 
differences remain between the essential and the everyday, and also between poetry and prose, the 
two forms are not dialectically opposed to one another; the poetic is instead presented as the 
radicalisation of the everyday. 
 The focus in ‘Le Mythe de Mallarmé’ on the void created by poetic language underscores 
how the poetic is a more extreme form of everyday language.  While everyday language destroys the 
world by reducing it to an abstraction, poetic language goes one step further and destroys this 
abstraction by the sensual tracing of the word: 
 
On aperçoit maintenant autour de quel point dangereux tournent les réflexions de Mallarmé.  
D’abord, le langage tient dans une contradiction: d’une manière générale, il est ce qui détruit le 
monde pour le faire renaître à l’état de sens, de valeurs signifiées; mais, sous sa forme créatrice, 
il se fixe sur le seul aspect négatif de sa tâche et devient pouvoir pur de contestation et de 
transfiguration.  Cela est possible dans la mesure où, prenant une valeur sensible, il devient lui-
même une chose, un corps, une puissance incarnée.  Présence réelle et affirmation matérielle du 
langage lui donnent pouvoir de suspendre et de congédier le monde.101 
 
The emphasis in ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’ was on a structured world founded by the poetic; here 
the stress is on the epochal suspension and dismissal of the world, creating a void and an unreality 
deprived of solid foundation, resulting in the instability remarked upon earlier: ‘une réalité plus 
évasive’.  In order to create such absence, poetic language calls out to a form of presence which 
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denies the intuition of being, or of anything other than words themselves.  The danger of a slippage 
between the essential and the inessential is clearly stated: ‘la sensualité du langage ici l’emporte et le 
mot rêve de s’unir aux objets dont il a le poids, la couleur, l’aspect lourd et dormant.’102  Poetic 
language threatens to reunite itself with beings as it oscillates between presence and absence; clearly 
demarcated opposites break down in this shifting in-between state where what matters is neither 
image nor thing, but this restless movement of becoming.   
The opening paragraph of this essay considers how we know more about Mallarmé now, 
following the publications of Henri Mondor, than ever before.103  Blanchot contemplates whether such 
knowledge detracts from the mystery surrounding this genius and argues that the movement of history 
no longer allows us to share his faith in art as a sort of aesthetic religion: ‘Seule, la pure violence de 
cette passion nous retient et étonne encore.’104  We are far from a historical view of literature as a 
response to modernity; what matters in Mallarmé is literature as the epochal suspension of world: 
 
[Le langage] est une sorte de conscience sans sujet qui, séparée de l’être, est détachement, 
contestation, pouvoir infini de créer le vide et de se situer dans un manque.  Mais c’est aussi 
une conscience incarnée, séduite à la forme matérielle des mots, à leur sonorité, à leur vie et 
donnant à croire que cette réalité nous ouvre on ne sait quelle voie vers le fond obscur des 
choses.  Peut-être est-ce là une imposture.  Mais peut-être cette supercherie est-elle la vérité de 
toute chose écrite.105  
 
                                                          
102 Ibid., p. 45. 
103 See Henri Mondor, Vie de Mallarmé (Paris: Gallimard, 1946).  
104 Blanchot, ‘Le Mythe de Mallarmé, in La Part du feu, p. 35. 
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The first aspect of literary language described here is informed by the phenomenological epoché; it 
remains impersonal and separated from the world.  The second is the material form that literature 
requires in order to create this void.  It is this presence which deceives us, leads us to believe that the 
literary will give up a truth when in fact it only deals in creating a void and does not work in the 
world.  The traditional way of seeing the work of art as giving truth is therefore undermined; any 
essence or subjective truth is lacking in this language detached from Being.  The epochal view of the 
world presented to us by literature, in which the world is constituted rather than constitutive, implies 
that there is something beyond world which literature cannot include: ‘Mais “là-haut” ne nous 
concerne pas’.106  The literary becomes an experience of its own limits and the relationship between 
the literary and the everyday appears unstable as dialectical opposites are undermined and any sort of 
truth becomes inaccessible in literature. 
 
‘Mais quand y a-t-il la littérature?’ 
Blanchot and Valéry share the view of literature as poiesis, or as making.  In an earlier essay Blanchot 
remarks that Valéry is interested in poetics as the study of the mind of the author, ‘en tant qu’il fait 
quelque chose, dans la mesure où il s’exprime, dans une œuvre et dans la création de cette œuvre.’107  
Their disagreement hinges on the outcome of this making.  Valéry considers the essential principle of 
poetics to be ‘cet échange harmonique entre l’expression et l’impression’.  Blanchot writes that what 
literature creates is an emptiness and Valéry is at fault for attempting to fill this void with sensibility: 
‘A n’en pas douter, c’est ce que Valéry appelle un sentiment, une pensée à l’état naissant ou, plus 
exactement, ni pensée ni sentiment, mais une naissance, une éclosion, une intention qui se cherche, 
une signification qui s’indique, un sens encore suspendu, dont nous tenons que l’ébauche vide.’108  
Valéry is seduced by the material form of words identified by Blanchot as only one aspect of poetic 
language. 
                                                          
106 Blanchot, ‘Le Mythe de Mallarmé’, in La Part du feu, p. 47. 
107 Blanchot, ‘La Poétique’, in Faux pas, pp. 136-142 (p. 137) (first publ. in Journal des débats, 5 August 1942, p. 
3). 
108 Blanchot, ‘Le Mythe de Mallarmé’, in La Part du feu, p. 47. 
 60 
 
One year later, Blanchot’s seminal essay ‘La Littérature et le droit à la mort’ similarly 
portrays the relationship between the poetic and the everyday as one marked by instability.  In this 
essay there is little discussion of a divide within language; literature eludes a single definition and 
characteristics that may once have been associated with everyday language are now related to one of 
the ‘pentes’ or ‘versants’ of literature identified by Blanchot: 
 
D’un certain point de vue, la littérature est partagée entre deux versants.  Elle est tournée vers le 
mouvement de négation par lequel les choses sont séparées d’elles-mêmes et détruites pour être 
connues, assujetties, communiquées. […] 
Mais il y a un second versant.  La littérature est alors le souci de la réalité des choses, 
de leur existence inconnue, libre et silencieuse; elle est leur innocence et leur présence interdite, 
l’être qui se cabre devant la révélation, le défi de ce qui ne veut pas se produire au dehors.109 
 
The everyday language of communication and literary realism is located on the first slope, the 
movement of negation by which we destroy things in order to communicate an idea in the world.  In 
the same way that the poetic is the everyday radicalised in ‘Le Mythe de Mallarmé’, the second slope 
of literature destroys such abstractions to make way for this unknown existence which oscillates 
between presence and absence.  The focus has shifted from an opposition between the necessity of the 
poetic and the contingency of the everyday to the ambiguity common to all language: ‘ce double sens 
initial, qui est au fond de toute parole’.110 
 As has been noted by critics, many of the ideas posited by Blanchot in ‘La Littérature et le 
droit à la mort’ originate from his reading of Hegel.111   The first section of the essay, originally 
published in November 1947 as ‘Le Règne animal de l'esprit’, takes its title from one of the sections 
                                                          
109 Maurice Blanchot, ‘La Littérature et le droit à la mort’, in La Part du feu, pp. 305-45 (p. 332) (first publ. as 
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of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes: ‘Das geistige Tierreich und der Betrug oder die Sache 
selbst’.  It is often assumed that Blanchot’s reading of Hegel was largely influenced by Alexandre 
Kojève’s Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, also published in 1947.112  Blanchot does indeed 
subscribe to Kojève’s view that Hegel’s philosophy is a philosophy of death with little qualification; 
although it is the focus on the inactive literary intellectual which particularly interests Blanchot.  
Kojève, interpreting Hegel, states that it is only by working in the everyday world that man realises 
himself objectively as man.113 
 
L’Intellectuel, n’agissant pas (donc ne se créant pas), ne peut s’intéresser qu’à ce qui est en lui, 
c’est-à-dire à sa ‘nature’ innée.  Elle est humaine, parce qu’il vit en société, a été ‘éduqué’ 
(gebildet) par l’action créatrice des autres.  En parlant de sa ‘nature’ il parlera donc de 
l’Homme.  Mais ce qu’il en dira sera faux, car il ne comprendra pas que ‘l’être vrai de l’homme 
est son action’.114  
 
By not engaging in work in the everyday world the intellectual fails to negate and to transcend himself 
and remains a ‘natural being’ cut off from society.  Any attempt by the intellectual to pit his ideal 
universe against the world is therefore deception, fraud, ‘imposture’.  Blanchot agrees in ‘La 
Littérature et le droit à la mort’ that literature is ‘imposture’, but such fraudulence is what makes it so 
interesting: ‘que la littérature un instant coïncide avec rien, et immédiatement elle est tout, le tout 
commence d’exister: grande merveille.’115 
 This view of literature as ‘imposture’ contradicts the account of literature offered by Sartre, 
who argued that the writer can have an engaged relationship with the world. In 1947 Sartre stated 
unequivocally: ‘Parler, c’est agir’.116  For Sartre, literature is engagement in the world because 
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speaking inevitably changes the world through the process of naming and thus revealing.  Blanchot 
and Sartre both take from Hegel the principle that all action is negation; however, unlike Blanchot, 
Sartre does not distinguish between the negativity of literature and the negativity of work in the world.  
Blanchot disagrees: literature is not the gradual mediated transformation of the world over a period of 
time as Sartre claims it is; rather, it is the immediate negation of the world in its totality which results 
in the unreal, or the epochal suspension of the world.  For this reason literature is ‘imposture’ and it 
cannot correspond to worldly criteria: ‘Du côté de la tâche qu’est le monde, la littérature est 
maintenant regardée plutôt comme une gêne que comme une aide sérieuse’.117  Literature is what 
Sartre would deem bad faith; although for Blanchot what distinguishes all literature is the 
impossibility of avoiding such ‘imposture’: ‘On comprend la méfiance qu’inspirent aux hommes 
engagés dans un parti, ayant pris parti, les écrivains qui partagent leur vue; car ces derniers ont 
également pris parti pour la littérature, et la littérature, par son mouvement, nie en fin de compte la 
substance de ce qu’elle représente.  C’est là sa loi et sa vérité.  Si elle y renonce pour s’attacher 
définitivement à une vérité extérieure, alors elle cesse d’être littérature et l’écrivain qui prétend l’être 
encore, entre dans un autre aspect de la mauvaise foi.’118 
Blanchot and Sartre share the reference to ambiguity.  For Sartre the poetic attitude considers 
words as things rather than signs; the treatment of the word as sign in prose ensures that words can be 
manipulated, mastered and used to act in the world: ‘Car l’ambiguïté du signe implique qu’on puisse à 
son gré le traverser comme une vitre et poursuivre à travers lui la chose signifiée ou tourner son 
regard vers sa réalité et le considérer comme objet.’119  Ambiguity is a way of raising questions in the 
audience’s mind about good and bad courses of action, thereby prompting a dialectical understanding 
of action in the real world. 120  For Blanchot, on the other hand, ambiguity is not restricted to prose but 
is a characteristic of all language:  
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 63 
 
La littérature est le langage qui se fait ambiguïté.  La langue courante n’est pas nécessairement 
claire, elle ne dit pas toujours ce qu’elle dit, le malentendu est aussi une de ses voies.  Cela est 
inévitable, on ne parle qu’en faisant du mot un monstre à deux faces, réalité qui est présence 
matérielle et sens qui est absence idéale.  Mais la langue courante limite l’équivoque.  Elle 
enferme solidement l’absence dans une présence, elle met un terme à l’entente, au mouvement 
indéfini de la compréhension; l’entente est limitée, mais le malentendu aussi est limité.  Dans la 
littérature, l’ambiguïté est comme livrée à ses excès par les facilités qu’elle trouve et épuisée 
par l’étendue des abus qu’elle peut commettre.121 
 
A considerable conceptual shift has taken place for Blanchot over the course of the 1940s.  In ‘Le 
Secret de Melville’ [1941] the poet turned aside from the everyday to found another world; the 
everyday was undoubtedly seen as the norm and the literary was the abnormal journey.  By 1949 what 
is normal has been inverted; literary ambiguity is excessive, more inclusive than the limited ambiguity 
of the everyday, and so literary language becomes the norm.  Moreover, the literary cannot have a 
solid opposing relationship with the everyday now that ambiguity is everywhere and so literature is 
marked by instability. 
Given with language is the possibility of suspending familiar assumptions — Husserl’s 
project was to describe the familiar horizon — and so the epochal worldview of literature, because 
more inclusive, is treated as the norm by Blanchot in essays on Mallarmé published after the end of 
the war: ‘L’irréalité commence avec le tout.  L’imaginaire n’est pas une étrange région située par-delà 
le monde, il est le monde même, mais le monde comme ensemble, comme tout.  C’est pourquoi, il 
n’est pas dans le monde, car il est le monde, saisi et réalisé dans son ensemble par la négation globale 
de toutes les réalités particulières qui s’y trouvent’.122  Literary language negates the world in an 
instant and in its entirety; literature stands neither within world nor beyond it, but at its very limit, 
preceding and constituting worldly limits.  While the ambiguity of Sartre is contained within a 
horizon, within the world in which man can act, Blanchot’s ambiguity reflects a state that is prior to 
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the world and to the possibility of any horizon.  Blanchot looks to Levinas and the force of the il y a 
(citing De l’existence à l’existant) to name this state: ‘ce courant anonyme et impersonnel de l’être qui 
précède tout être, l’être qui au sein de la disparition est déjà présent, qui au fond de l’anéantissement 
retourne encore à l’être, l’être comme la fatalité de l’être, le néant comme existence: quand il n’y a 
rien, il y a de l’être.’123  The il y a stands outside history, time, world and the dialectic posited by 
Hegel and supported by Kojève.  It is the lack of foundation from which all beings and things 
originate, comparable to what Bataille, using an anti-philosophical paradox, had previously referred to 
as ‘négativité sans emploi’.124  Literature is a power without foundation as the work of art simulates 
being while providing only the absence of being; ‘ce double sens initial qui est au fond de toute 
parole’ instigates an oscillation between presence and absence at the origin of the work which results 
in what Blanchot in L’Espace littéraire and elsewhere will call ‘désœuvrement’.  Any truth seemingly 
offered by the work is a trap: literature deceives first and foremost. 
 When the conceptual ground has shifted to such an extent that literature is the norm, we move 
from art to world and not vice-versa, as Ahab did for Blanchot in 1941 aboard his ship.  The 
beginnings of this shift were evident in ‘Mallarmé et l’art du roman’, when Blanchot declared, in 
agreement with Heidegger, that the poetic precedes and founds the world and is constitutive of human 
existence and experience.  The danger highlighted in this essay of a slippage in the ontological 
hierarchy between Being and beings has inevitably been played out: no essence or subjective truth is 
available in poetic language which is now only imposture.  
By ‘L’Expérience de Mallarmé’ [1952], the double state of language is untenable for 
Blanchot; what remains is a view of literature as uncertainty, aiming for absence but always attached 
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to some form of presence and governed by an oscillating logic of worklessness.  Blanchot writes that 
silence defines both states of language according to Mallarmé.  Crude, raw or natural language 
negates the reality of things; this is language involved in the world of tasks and ends or language as 
pure exchange in which words disappear into their usage.  The language of thought has more in 
common with the everyday than we may first assume; aiming for the pure idea it also returns us to the 
world of tasks.125  Blanchot explains that ‘essential’ language is the unreal become language, or the 
epochal suspension of world; but words here, like in their everyday usage, retain their capacity to 
disappear.   
 
Écrire ne consiste jamais à perfectionner le langage qui a cours, à le rendre plus pur.  Écrire 
commence seulement quand écrire est l’approche de ce point où rien ne se révèle, où, au sein de 
la dissimulation, parler n’est encore que l’ombre de la parole, langage qui n’est encore que son 
image, langage imaginaire et langage de l’imaginaire, celui que personne ne parle, murmure de 
l’incessant et de l’interminable auquel il faut imposer silence, si l’on veut, enfin, se faire 
entendre.126 
 
The work of art may appear to silence the world in a way that everyday language does not, but it only 
pretends to split itself from all presence and being.  Yun Sun Limet identifies a continuity and 
coherence in Blanchot’s reflection on language from the 1930s to the 1980s in which there is a 
continued distinction between the literary and the everyday.  Limet argues that Blanchot thinks silence 
as double throughout his career: a sort of literary silence which speaks while imposing a different sort 
of silence on the noise of the everyday world, ensuring the limits of literature.127  The idea that there is 
a more profound silence, to be distinguished from the trivial ‘keeping quiet’ of the everyday is bluntly 
dismissed by Blanchot in ‘L’Expérience de Mallarmé’, who remarks that there is nothing to 
distinguish between ‘la nullité silencieuse de la parole courante’ and the ‘silence accompli du poème’.  
                                                          
125 Blanchot, L’Expérience de Mallarmé’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 38-43 
126 Ibid., pp. 51-52.   
127 Limet, pp. 49-60, 118. 
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Silence, as that capacity of words to disappear, is attained neither in ‘common’ nor ‘essential’ 
language and unworks any linguistic hierarchy.  The impoverished language of which Blanchot writes 
above, which can never be silenced, is the only proof we have of the literary and looks more like the 
banal.  Emmanuel Levinas writes of this murmuring in 1956: ‘Le langage poétique qui a écarté le 
monde laisse réapparaître le murmure incessant de cet éloignement, comme une nuit se manifestant 
dans la nuit.  Ce n’est pas l’impersonnel de l’éternité, mais l’incessant, l’interminable, recommençant 
sous la négation qu’on puisse en tenter.’128   
 Mallarmé remains an important reference for Blanchot from the 1950s onwards, but the name 
is now associated with the question of the absence of the work and fragmentation rather than any 
dichotomy between the poetic and the everyday. This is not to say that Blanchot denies a double state 
of language, but that he refuses any dividing line between two opposing forms: 
 
Par une division violente, Mallarmé a séparé le langage en deux formes presque sans rapport, 
l’une la langue brute, l’autre le langage essentiel.  Voilà peut-être le vrai bilinguisme.  
L’écrivain est en chemin vers une parole qui n’est jamais déjà donnée; parlant, attendant de 
parler.  Ce cheminement, il l’accomplit en se rapprochant toujours davantage de la langue qui 
lui est historiquement destinée, proximité qui cependant met en cause et parfois gravement son 
appartenance à toute langue natale.129 
 
The division of language which neatly delimited the poetic and the everyday, poetry and prose, was 
violent, forced and unsustainable.  The two forms of language do not stand in a stable opposing 
relationship to one another; both exist in perpetual flux as they shift and overlap without any binding 
or separating relationship.  This is true bilingualism for Blanchot.  The crisis that Mallarmé sought to 
negotiate in Crise de vers comes back to haunt Blanchot in 1984: ‘[La poésie], épuisant toute 
définition, m’engage (non pas dans mon seul esprit, mais dans ma vie — écriture — esprit) vers une 
                                                          
128 Levinas, ‘Le Regard du poète’, in Sur Maurice Blanchot, p. 16. 
129 Blanchot, [‘Par une division violente…’], in L’Amitié, p. 171. 
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crise définitive, à cause de l’indéfini qu’elle provoque incessamment.’130  Mallarmé reached out to the 
distinction between the poetic and the everyday when the boundary between poetry and prose became 
confused; Blanchot recognises that this crisis cannot be resolved as all boundaries within language — 
between poetry and prose, the essential and the everyday, fiction and criticism — are indeterminable 
because constantly shifting. 
Jacques Derrida echoes this view in ‘La Double séance’ [1969], where he challenges the 
longstanding metaphysical and philosophical idea that art is subordinate to truth.  He begins by citing, 
or asking: ‘qu’est-ce que la littérature’?  In relation to Mallarmé’s Mimique, he states that literature is 
no longer subject to the metaphysical criteria of truth as agreement or of truth as aletheia or 
unforgetting.  Heidegger argues that traditional correspondence theories of truth are derivative; they 
are reliant on truth as unconcealing which is more original and shown in art.  Derrida writes that both 
versions of truth are destroyed in Mimique and shows that they are not as radically opposed as they 
may first appear.131  He questions the dogmatic assumption that art is based on truth and challenges 
the view that literature obeys the rules of mimesis: 
 
Nous sommes devant une mimique qui n’imite rien, devant, si l’on peut dire, un double qui ne 
redouble aucun simple, que rien ne prévient, rien qui ne soit en tous cas déjà un double.  
Aucune référence simple.  C’est pourquoi l’opération du mime fait allusion, mais allusion à 
rien, allusion sans briser la glace, sans au-delà du miroir. […] Dans ce speculum sans réalité, 
dans ce miroir de miroir, il y a bien une différence, une dyade, puisqu’il y a mime et fantôme.  
Mais c’est une différence sans référence, ou plutôt une référence sans référent, sans unité 
première ou dernière, fantôme qui n’est le fantôme d’aucune chair, errant, sans passé, sans 
mort, sans naissance ni présence.132 
 
                                                          
130 Blanchot, ‘La Parole ascendante ou sommes-nous encore dignes de la poésie?’, in La Condition critique, pp. 
381-390 (p. 381) (first publ. in Hors de la colline, by Vadim Kozovoï, (Paris: Hermann, 1984), pp. 119-27. 
131 Jacques Derrida, ‘La Double séance’, in La Dissémination (Paris: Seuil, 1972), pp. 215-347 (p. 219). 
132 Ibid., p. 234. 
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In literature we are faced with an imitator without imitated, sign without referent, where ambiguity or 
doubleness is never secondary but always primary.  Literature does not obey any dialectic and, as the 
referent has never been and will never be present, the reference is within an open system in which 
differences infinitely proliferate.  The opposition between sign and referent which was central to the 
theories proposed by Russian Formalism and Structuralism no longer applies.  In ‘La Double séance’ 
there is a direct rebuttal of where to begin with literary theory.  Summing up Mallarmé’s Mimique, 
Derrida writes: 
 
La littérature s’annule dans son illimitation.  Ce court-traité de la littérature, s’il voulait-dire 
quelque chose, ce dont nous avons maintenant quelque raison de douter, énoncerait d’abord  
qu’il n’y a pas — ou à peine, si peu — de littérature; qu’en tous cas il n’y a pas d’essence de la 
littérature, de vérité de la littérature, d’être-littéraire de la littérature.133 
 
When there is no essence, truth, or literariness of literature, all language is becoming literary and what 
is literature is determined only by context.  There is nothing to distinguish between literature and what 
lies outside of literature according to Derrida, echoing the words of Blanchot in 1946: ‘Toutes les 
recherches de Mallarmé tendent à trouver une limite où s’esquisserait, par le moyen de termes 
pourtant fixes et orientés vers des faits et des choses, une perspective de parenthèses s’ouvrant les 
unes dans les autres à l’infini et se soustrayant sans cesse à elles-mêmes.’134  Brackets open up 
infinitely onto further brackets as the author works toward an unattainable goal.   
We saw at the start of this chapter that the division between art and the utilitarian is upheld by 
writers and thinkers from the Jena Romantics to Jean-Paul Sartre; at a time of faithlessness literature 
is legitimated, in various ways, as a sort of aesthetic religion when it is shown to give up some truth.  
Blanchot demonstrates how the opposition between literature and the everyday, or between poetry and 
prose, is unstable and cannot be policed: the authoritative self-referential distinction which meant that 
literature was characterised by myth and necessity in 1943 is impossible by the 1950s; literature 
                                                          
133 Ibid., pp. 252-53. 
134 Blanchot, ‘Le Mythe de Mallarmé’, in La Part du feu, p. 40. 
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cannot be defined in contradistinction to everyday language, to the real, to chance, now that it has 
become an unanswerable question in which such differences infinitely proliferate.  During this period 
it becomes a question for Blanchot of when one starts thinking about literature, or of how to police the 
boundaries between literature and politics.  Autonomy can take on various guises depending on the 
circumstances and the sort espoused by Blanchot at the beginning of the 1940s, when the text gives 
itself its own law, is very different from the autonomy from political appropriation supported in 1945, 
with the admission that literature is not action in the world but only ever ‘imposture’.  When the limits 
of literature are challenged, as they were for Blanchot during the Occupation and in the years 
following the Liberation, the radical non-essentiality of art and literature is exposed: ‘ce travail 
profond de la littérature qui cherche à s’affirmer dans son essence en ruinant les distinctions et les 
limites.’135  This is why the question of literature is also the question of techne, that Greek term 
encompassing technology and art.  Derrida states in De la grammatologie [1967] that writing 
functions according to the logic of the supplement, that indication of abundance which is also proof of 
a deficiency, a lack, an absence — an originary prosthesis that unworks the opposition between nature 
and culture, or nature and technology.136  Blanchot’s account of literature in essays from 1946 
onwards shows that he is in agreement: literature is nothing essential.  In the place of literature there is 
only doubt, uncertainty, a question: ‘la littérature est une puissance telle qu’elle ne tient compte de 
rien.  Mais quand y a-t-il littérature?’137
                                                          
135 Blanchot, ‘La Littérature et l’expérience originelle’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 292 n. 1. 
136 See Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: Minuit 1967). 
137 Blanchot, ‘Laissez-moi vous répondre brièvement...’, in La Condition critique, p. 465 (first publ. in La Règle 







An Inhuman Interruption 
 
From the outset of his career as a journalist and literary critic, having been introduced to Being and 
Time by his friend Emmanuel Levinas in the late 1920s while studying in Strasbourg, Blanchot was 
reading Heidegger in the original German.  The previous chapter demonstrated the debt owed to 
Heidegger in essays such as ‘La Poésie de Mallarmé est-elle obscure?’ and ‘Mallarmé et l’art du 
roman’, and that from the mid-1940s onwards, as early as the publication of Faux pas in 1943, there is 
increasing distance between Heidegger and Blanchot, as the latter undermines the possibility of a 
linguistic hierarchy between poetic saying and instrumental language and concurrently an authentic 
relation to death and dying.  Nonetheless, the philosophy of Heidegger remains a fundamental starting 
point from which to understand aspects of Blanchot’s later writing concerning, for instance, death and 
the neuter, as well as his reading of poets such as Mallarmé, Hölderlin and Rilke.  
Allusions to Heidegger in Blanchot’s essays of the early 1940s often go unreferenced, but 
their significance should not be overlooked.  Blanchot develops an understanding of poetic language 
in this period that incorporates the Heideggerian view of poetry as foundation, truth as a mode of 
revealing, and language as the house of Being.  The influence of Heidegger, particularly his 1936 
lecture ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, is clearest in those three essays on Mallarmé, originally 
written for the Journal des débats and later reworked for publication in Faux pas, in which the 
conception of poetic language presented is so close to that articulated by Heidegger that Blanchot is 
able to lift phrases directly from the former’s lecture and apply them in turn to his reading of 
Mallarmé.  Blanchot implicitly revisits Heidegger on Hölderlin in these essays on Mallarmé because 
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the German philosopher has become, ‘the thinker most deeply and purposefully engaged in 
articulating philosophically the question of the foundational nature of language in general and poetic 
language in particular, and in challenging the inherited presuppositions of aesthetic theory as such’,1 
which is also to say that Heidegger’s turning was not simply a matter of philosophical interest for 
Blanchot, but was clearly linked to his own early career as a novelist.  In this chapter we will see that 
Blanchot engages critically with Heidegger in essays written in 1953, the year that Heidegger 
published ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ and when Blanchot became a regular contributor to 
La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, exploring how Heidegger relates such ideas to death, 
technology and the privileging of the human over the animal, and how these broader concerns are 
adopted, rejected or displaced in Blanchot’s writing.   
This chapter will examine how Blanchot engages with the Heideggerian concept of world in 
order precisely to show its cracks, insofar as what writing does for Blanchot is to suspend what 
constitutes world.  In Being and Time, world refers to the familiar environment in which Dasein 
dwells; it is ‘a system of purposes and meanings that organises our activities and our identity, and 
within which entities can make sense to us’.2  Worldliness is the privilege of Dasein; nonhuman 
entities can be described as belonging to or within the world, but they are never in the world.  The 
phenomenology of Being-in-the-world appears to open up the possibility of originary technicity, 
because the instrument or the tool [das Zeug] is the means by which Dasein’s fundamentally 
ontological mode of existence is disclosed to it.3  In later Heidegger, world becomes more explicitly 
historical and no longer refers to beings as a whole.  Richard Polt, with some reservation, compares 
the relation between world and earth, to be discussed later in this chapter, to the tension between 
culture and nature: culture arises from nature and tries to understand that from which it arises, but 
                                                          
1 Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, p. 79. 
2 Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (London: UCL Press, 1999), p. 54. 
3 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 91-107; Gesamtausgabe, II, 85-102.  For an overview of Heideggerian world, 
see Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 245-48; and Polt, pp. 49-55, 136-40.   
For a discussion of equipmentality in Being and Time which summarises charges of anthropocentrism, the 
idealisation of technology, and technophobia, see Bradley, pp. 75-81.  
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nature, or earth, tends to reassert itself in its mysterious power, affirming the limits of our 
understanding.4   
Heidegger has been accused of reducing or excluding technics from thought, of giving 
residual ontological priority to physis over techne, of presiding over a naturalisation of technology 
rather than a technicisation of nature.5  By comparing the treatment of the poet and prose writer 
Rainer Maria Rilke by Heidegger in 1946 and Blanchot in 1953, in particular his conception of the 
Open, a limitless region beyond metaphysical representation in which life and death are unified and to 
which the animal has privileged access, this chapter will reveal a work compatible with ecological 
thought, not because Blanchot romanticises nature and condemns the effects of technology, but 
because the technical is found to be always already inhabiting the natural.  The aporetic relation 
between nature and culture, or nature and technology, or nature and history, means that, while being 
opposed, they are also mutually implicated in one another, so that the one is always already 
contaminated with the other. 
 
The History of Being 
It is usually assumed that there is a shift in Heidegger’s thought after the publication of Being and 
Time in 1927, signalling his abandonment of fundamental ontology for the history of being 
[Seinsgeschichte].  In this turning [Kehre], the stress shifts from the analytic of Dasein, which was the 
focus of Being and Time, to a thinking of Being where art and language loom large.  As the English 
translator of his essays on Hölderlin notes, poetry is mentioned only twice in Being and Time.6  A 
reading of Hölderlin therefore plays an important role in this turning, as Heidegger delivered a series 
of lectures in the mid-1930s, not long after his resignation as rector at the University of Freiberg in 
                                                          
4 Polt, pp. 137-38.   
5 See Bradley, pp. 68-93.  Derrida argues that Heidegger privileges the human and presupposes a thought free 
from technics (see, for instance, Jacques Derrida ‘De l’esprit’, in Heidegger et la question (Paris: Flammarion, 
1990), pp. 9-143).  Stiegler argues that the account of the tool given by Heidegger reduces technics to a 
supplemental role (see, for instance, Bernard Stiegler, La Technique et le temps, 3 vols (Paris: Galilée, 1994-
2001), I: La Faute d’Épiméthée, 31).   
6 Keith Hoeller, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, by Heidegger, p. 11. 
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1934, which is to say that the turning has political, as well as philosophical, significance.  In these 
essays on Hölderlin, Heidegger repeatedly affirms the view of poetry as the foundation of Being: 
 
The poet names the gods and names all things with respect to what they are.  This naming does 
not merely come about when something already previously known is furnished with a name; 
rather, by speaking the essential word, the poet’s naming first nominates the beings [das 
Seiende] as what they are.  Thus they become known as beings.  Poetry is the founding of being 
in the word [Dichtung ist worthafte Stiftung des Seins].7  
 
Dichtung is difficult to translate accurately in English; in German it refers to poetry in the sense of 
lines of verse, but can also be translated as fiction, literature, or the works of an author.  The term 
therefore refers to a broader artistic category not fully encapsulated by ‘poetry’ in its normal usage.  
This reversal of the traditional hierarchy between ordinary language and poetic language, with its 
roots in German Romanticism, renders Dichtung the origin of beings and so poetry, as a broad 
fictional and artistic category, becomes the mode through which a people can access its common 
origin: Being.  The focus on the ability of the poet to reveal Being through language is characteristic 
of Heidegger’s writing after the so-called turn. 
In later work, Heidegger therefore understands Being as essentially historial.  In ‘The Origin 
of the Work of Art’, an essay which, although first published in 1950, was drafted in the 1930s and so 
belongs to the same period as ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, he writes: ‘The artwork opens 
up, in its own way, the being of beings.  This opening up, i.e., unconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, 
happens in the work.  In the artwork, the truth of beings has set itself to work.  Art is the setting-itself-
to-work of truth.’8  Heidegger is here referring to a fundamental mode of revealing that is prior to 
                                                          
7 Heidegger, ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, in Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 59; Gesamtausgabe, 
IV, 41.  The English translation is working from the fifth edition of the essay as it appears in the 
Gesamtausgabe.  ‘Thus they become known as beings’ is a later addition to the essay and would not have 
been included in the first edition read by Blanchot.  
8 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. by Julian Young and 
Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1-56 (p. 19); ‘Der Ursprung des 
Kunstwerkes’, in Gesamtausgabe, V: Holzwege (1977), 1-74 (p. 25). 
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objective truth and more primal or original than mere correspondence between thing and idea.  The 
work of art is where truth happens; it is where beings are brought into unconcealment in the Open — 
the clearing which allows beings to stand revealed in time — while the work withdraws into its 
inexhaustible materials — the sculptor’s stone, the painter’s paint, or the poet’s words.  The Open will 
figure prominently later in this chapter as divergent readings of this region as it appears in the work of 
Rainer Maria Rilke — on the one hand as a false Open that is simply an inversion of the traditional 
metaphysical view, on the other hand as a mystical moment of confrontation with the outside, a fusion 
between the inner world of feeling and the outer world of animals — highlight the displacement of 
thought which occurs between Heidegger and Blanchot.   
Truth comes to pass in the artwork in the strife between what Heidegger calls ‘earth’ and 
‘world’.  We noted that in Being and Time world refers to the familiar environment in which Dasein 
dwells.  In this later essay, world can similarly not be objectivised and is only available to the human; 
but there is also an historical and collective dimension to world, which Polt summarises as expressing 
‘a particular community’s way of understanding itself at a particular juncture in history.’9  Heidegger 
writes: ‘The stone is world-less.  Similarly, plants and animals have no world; they belong, rather, to 
the hidden throng of an environment [Umgebung] into which they have been put.  The peasant 
woman, by contrast, possesses a world, since she stays in the openness of beings.  In its reliability, 
equipment imparts to this world a necessity and proximity of its own.  By the opening of a world, all 
things gain their lingering and hastening, their distance and proximity, their breadth and their limits.’10  
World is what gives meaning to everything that we do as a historical people in ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’.    
Equipment is said to ‘impart to this world a necessity and proximity of its own’ because it is 
through equipment that we access world.  It is for this reason that Heidegger elsewhere places such 
importance on the hand, writing in What Is Called Thinking? that thinking is a handiwork (to be 
distinguished from the useful activity which cuts the hand from the essential).11  A comparable 
                                                          
9 Polt, p. 137. 
10 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in Off the Beaten Track, p. 23; Gesamtausgabe, V, 31. 
11 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 16; Gesamtausgabe, VIII, 18.  Jacques Derrida notes that an implicit 
but nonetheless clear hierarchy is evident in Heidegger’s thinking of Handwerk [the work of the hand, 
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hierarchy is evident in the opening pages of ‘The Origin on the Work of Art’ which are dedicated to a 
consideration of the distinction between mere thing and a piece of equipment.  Equipment ‘frames’ its 
material as ready for use, reducing material to its usefulness.  Something different happens in the 
work of art: the ‘thingliness’ of the thing is re-presented in the work in a way that does not reduce the 
thing to equipment and materiality to usefulness.  Heidegger writes that the depiction of a pair of 
unworn shoes in a painting by Van Gogh reveals the world of the peasant woman who owns them:  
 
[...] A pair of peasant’s shoes and nothing more.  And yet. 
From out of the dark opening of the well-worn insides of the shoes [Schuhzeuges] the toil of 
the worker’s tread stares forth.  In the crudely solid heaviness of the shoes accumulates the 
tenacity of the slow trudge through the far-stretching and ever-uniform furrows of the field 
swept by a raw wind.  On the leather lies the dampness and richness of the soil.  Under the soles 
slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls.  The shoes vibrate with the silent call of 
the earth, its silent gift [ihr stilles Verschenken] of the ripening grain, its unexplained self-
refusal in the wintry field.  This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the 
certainty of bread, wordless joy at having once more withstood want, trembling before the 
impending birth, and shivering at the surrounding menace of death.  The equipment belongs to 
the earth and finds protection in the world of the peasant woman.  From out of this protected 
belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself.12 
 
The closing lines reveal that earth is the foundation onto which world is built.  Earth is that elusive 
element into which the work sets itself back, allowing the materiality of the work to come forth and 
ensuring that the work cannot be objectified: ‘Earth is the coming-forth-concealing.  Earth is that 
                                                          
handiwork, handling].  The authentic carpenter, for instance, ‘s’accorde à la plénitude cachée de l’essence du 
bois et non pas à l’outil et à la valeur d’usage.’  ‘La méditation sur le Hand-Werk authentique a aussi le sens 
d’une protestation artisanaliste contre l’effacement ou l’abaissement de la main dans l’automatisation 
industrielle du machinisme moderne.’  Jacques Derrida, ‘La Main de Heidegger’, in Heidegger et la question, 
pp. 173-222 (pp. 188, 190).  The final section of this chapter considers unruly hands in Blanchot as examples of 
precisely such automaticity. 
12 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in Off the Beaten Track, p. 14; Gesamtausgabe, V, 19. 
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which cannot be forced, that which is effortless and untiring.  On and in the earth, historical man 
founds his dwelling in the world.  In setting up a world, the work sets forth the earth.’13  Truth 
happens in Van Gogh’s painting not because this is a representation of some being that was once 
present, but because the equipmentality of the equipment, which is to say the Being of beings, is 
opened up.  This essay demonstrates that truth is more than revealing [alētheia], it is also 
concealment.  The eventfulness of the work and its otherness which cannot be objectified reflect the 
mode of revealing and concealing that is truth according to Heidegger.14    
The painting by Van Gogh discussed in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ is the subject of 
correspondence between Heidegger and Meyer Schapiro, who contests the claim that these are the 
shoes of a peasant woman, using Van Gogh’s correspondence to argue that the shoes depicted in the 
particular painting he determines to be the subject of Heidegger’s essay (it is ambiguous in ‘The 
Origin of the Work of Art’) are those of the painter from the time when he had moved to the city.15  
Derrida contests such identification in his analysis, prioritizing the double over the single he refutes 
the assumption made by both that the shoes form a pair and can be attributed to a subject.  In binding 
the shoes together as a pair, Heidegger and Schapiro bind them to the law of normal usage: ‘Condition 
pour rendre justice à la vérité qu’ils croyaient devoir en peinture.’16  Detached from one another these 
shoes are then doubly detached on two further levels: on one level detached because defunct (unworn) 
and non-functioning (they are painted objects out-of-work because in a work); on another level 
detached in themselves (they are unlaced) and detached from the feet (the owner is absent).17  Such 
excessive doubling cannot be reduced to ‘mimetologism’, nor can it be thought in terms of the conflict 
between earth and world — an opposition which ‘sutures’.  This doubling is an interlacing that moves 
in and out of the frame like the laces threading the eyelets of the shoes, in so doing it defies the 
                                                          
13 Ibid., p. 24; p. 32. 
14 For a discussion of the rift between earth and world which results in the happening of truth in the work, see 
Gerald L. Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements: Language, Truth and Poetry in the Later Writings (New Haven, 
C.T.: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 27-51. 
15 See Meyer Schapiro, ‘Still Life as Personal Object: a Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh’, in Theory and 
Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist and Society: Selected Papers (New York: George Braziller, 1994), pp. 135-42. 
16 Jacques Derrida, ‘Restitutions: de la vérité en pointure’, in La Vérité en peinture (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), 
pp. 291-436 (p. 381). 
17 Ibid., p. 323. 
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distinction between the real shoes and the shoes of the painting, so that we are tempted to tie the laces 
tightly around the ankle of a subject such as Van Gogh (Schapiro) or the peasant woman (Heidegger).  
‘Tout ce système de bordures entrelaçantes détache l’être-produit de sa portée subjective tout en 
amorçant (en induisant et en appâtant) le rattachement de ladite portée subjective.’18  The distinction 
between reality and the painting is not effaced by this lacing, but defied and doubled.  Consequently 
the painted shoes are spectral; they are never self-identical (my ghost is always other than ‘I’), but 
always doubled and open to the other.19  Derrida challenges the claim that truth happens in the work 
of art by thinking these shoes, and the feet onto which they fit, in the plural.   
 The discussion of reliability [Verlässlichkeit] in Derrida’s essay contests the pre-originary 
ground of Heideggerian thought, revealing that the product presupposes this condition of its 
possibility, which suggests that the tool is always already implicated in the pre-originary.  The 
foundation of Heidegger’s existential analysis, Dasein and then later Being, is therefore always 
already contaminated by the technical.  Derrida writes of this presupposition: ‘Ce qui est verlässig 
mérite confiance, foi ou crédit.  Dans ce cas, le crédit est antérieur à tout contrat symbolique faisant 
l’objet d’un engagement signé (explicitement ou non) par un sujet nommable.  Il n’est pas culturel ni 
davantage naturel.’20  The doubling of the shoes shows that one cannot claim a pure nature because 
there is only ever différance.  Later in this chapter, we will see how Blanchot similarly contests what 
Heidegger’s thought takes for granted, namely the possibility of an authentic relation to death, and 
how his fiction and criticism is haunted by hands which, in their doubled state, signal the 
contamination of nature by the originary involvement of an automatic technology. 
In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger refers to several art forms (sculpture, painting 
and poetry) but privileges poetry as the essence of all art, because it is in language that beings are for 
the first time brought into the open: ‘Building and plastic creation [Bauen und Bilden] [...] are an 
always unique poeticizing within the clearing of beings which has already happened, unnoticed, in the 
language.’21  Proof of this statement relies on the presumed worldly poverty or worldlessness of the 
                                                          
18 Ibid., pp. 387-88. 
19 ‘Les chaussures sont toujours ouvertes à l’inconscient de l’autre’ (Ibid., p. 435). 
20 Ibid., p. 398. 
21 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in Off the Beaten Track, pp. 46-47; Gesamtausgabe, V, 62. 
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inhuman: ‘Where language is not present, as in the being of stones, plants, or animals, there is also no 
openness of beings, and consequently no openness either of that which is not a being [des 
Nichtseienden] or of emptiness.’22  Blanchot and Derrida will both later contest this dogmatic division 
which privileges the human over all other beings.  For Heidegger, however, writing after the turn, the 
human is the privileged being who has access to Being because they have language: ‘Language [Die 
Sprache] is the house of Being.  In its home human beings dwell.  Those who think and those who 
create with words are the guardians of this home.  Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation 
of Being insofar as they bring this manifestation to language and preserve it in language through their 
saying [Sagen].’23  Saying [Sagen] is a showing that is prior to language [die Sprache] and speaking 
[sprechen].  Being is brought into language and held or preserved there by saying, which is also to say 
that language withdraws in this saying. 
In the early 1940s, Blanchot takes from Heidegger the idea of poetry as foundation (‘[le 
langage] se montre dans son essence qui est de fonder un monde’); of truth as the revealing which 
conceals (‘une ombre qui laisse voir le corps invisible’); and of language as the house of being in 
which man dwells (‘le dialogue authentique que nous sommes nous-mêmes’).24  In order to do so 
Blanchot did not need to rearticulate the German’s thought, but to translate this point into French and 
apply it in turn to Mallarmé, the French counterpart to Hölderlin.   
Hölderlin remains an important figure for Heidegger from 1934 to the end of his life — he 
selected verses from Hölderlin’s poetry to be read aloud at his burial.  The poetry of Hölderlin is of 
such significance because it fulfils the proper task of the work of art as it is understood by Heidegger: 
in his poetry, the poetic founding of Being is achieved, which involves the establishment of a time and 
space between the gods and humans, in which man can mourn the flight of the gods, endure their 
                                                          
22 Ibid., p. 46; p. 61.   
23 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi, in Pathmarks, ed. by William McNeill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 239-76 (p. 239); ‘Brief über den Humanismus’, in 
Gesamtausgabe, IX: Wegmarken (1976), 313-64 (p. 313).  This essay was originally a response to a letter from 
Jean Beaufret written in 1946.  It was later reworked by Heidegger and first published in 1947 as ‘Über den 
“Humanismus”. Brief an Jean Beaufret, Paris’.  The edition used in the translation quoted here is the seventh 
edition of the essay, published in 1974. 
24 Blanchot, ‘La Poésie de Mallarmé est-elle obscure?’, in Faux pas, pp. 128-29.  The last quotation is in fact a 
quotation from a poem by Hölderlin quoted by Heidegger.  See Hölderlin, ‘Versöhnender, der du 
nimmerglaubt…’ [Conciliator, you who never believed...], in Poems and Fragments, pp. 422-31 (pp. 428-29). 
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absence and prepare for the arrival of the new god.25  Modernity for Heidegger is a time of distress, 
the dying days of the age of metaphysics when the gods have fled, and Hölderlin’s poetry, more so 
than that of any other poet, offered the West the chance to turn away from this time, to found the 
inception of another history.26  According to Heidegger, metaphysics substitutes for a proper 
understanding of Being a concern with beings in general; in metaphysical representation everything is 
objectivised and consequently in the age of metaphysics Being has withdrawn.  It is through the event 
that is Hölderlin’s saying — a showing which conceals, holds something back, prevents the 
totalization which is rampant in metaphysical representation — that we can once again appropriate 
Being as our own in this other history. 
The poet in Heidegger’s account is associated not only with the poetic and philosophical 
overcoming of the age of metaphysics, but also with the happening of a political event: through 
Hölderlin’s mythic saying German Being comes to be constituted as such and the possibility of a new 
historical dwelling on earth is revealed.27  Since the end of the First World War Hölderlin had been 
seen by some as the German national poet and by the 1940s his poetry would be used by the Nazi 
party to inspire troops on the Eastern front.  In this period Hölderlin’s reputation was consequently 
transformed from that of ‘an incurable dreamer and romantic whose utter inability to cope with life’s 
demands might serve as a warning to impressionable young minds’, to a nationalist icon, proto-fascist 
and source of inspiration for German troops.28  Heidegger’s own turn to Hölderlin followed his 
resignation as Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1934, a position which he had acquired through 
his connection to the Nazi party.   
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe relates Heidegger’s turn to Hölderlin to the need to rectify his 
National Socialism (Heidegger attempts to differentiate between his own brand of Nazism and that of 
                                                          
25 Heidegger’s is a controversial reading of Hölderlin.  Paul de Man argues that Heidegger distorts the meaning 
of ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage...’, making Hölderlin say that reconciliation between the Sacred and the poetic is 
possible when his is in fact a ‘philosophy of separation’.  See Paul de Man, ‘Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin’, 
in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 1983), 
pp. 246-66. 
26 See Savage, pp. 32-95; and Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, pp. 77-91. 
27 For an overview of the significance of Hölderlin for Heidegger as ‘The Poet of the Germans’, see Miguel de 
Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 94-113. 
28 Savage, pp. 5-7. 
 80 
 
Hitler), but sees an essential affinity between the two positions: both inherit the Romantic project of 
establishing a new mythology which is connected to the founding of a people.29  For Heidegger, the 
inception of the other history is the task of the German people in the time of distress: through their 
unique affinity with ancient Greece this people can recollect the primal event and appropriate Being 
once again through the poet’s — Hölderlin’s — saying.  This recollection is patriotic or political in 
that it restores the German people to earth as their homeland.  Heidegger does not explicitly state that 
he is concerned with founding a new mythology; Lacoue-Labarthe nonetheless argues that the poem 
for Heidegger is theological — it is concerned with the gods even when they are absent — as well as 
foundational, rendering myth the only possible translation of Sage:  
 
Rien n’assure par conséquent que la Sage, compte toujours tenu à la fois de la stratégie retorse 
qui est celle de Heidegger à l’égard du nazisme et de l’apophasis ontologique-fondamentale, ne 
soit pas autre chose que le mythe, au sens le plus répandu de la ‘mythologie’.  Si le Poème est 
originaire, et comme langue et comme poésie, c’est en tant qu’il est immédiatement le mythe à 
partir duquel un peuple est ‘typé’ dans son existence historiale.  L’origine est proprement 
mythique ou, si l’on préfère, le commencement exige le surgissement d’un ‘mythe fondateur’.30 
 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s argument is both forceful and compelling, though some have found it 
controversial.  Why, it may be asked, should Heidegger employ Sage and not Mythos if indeed what 
he seeks to communicate here is the poem as myth?  One possible reason is that Heidegger seeks to 
distance himself from Alfred Rosenberg, one of the principal ideologues of the Nazi party and author 
of Der Mythos des 20 Jahrhunderts.  Mythos is closely associated with Nazi ideology and so 
Heidegger opts for a more Germanic word with its roots in Old Norse.  Sage thus conveys a 
mythological moment in Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin which Lacoue-Labarthe finds extremely 
                                                          
29 The primal scene binding Romanticism, myth, religion and philosophy for Lacoue-Labarthe, with implications 
for Heidegger’s reprise of Hölderlin, is the famous ‘Oldest Systematic Programme of German Idealism’ 
[1796/7] with its endorsement of a ‘new religion’ or ‘new mythology’.  Authorship of this fragment is 
uncertain, but it is known to originate from a conversation between Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin.  See 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger: la politique du poème (Paris: Galilée, 2002), pp. 62-64. 
30 Ibid., p. 38. 
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problematic, given its role as the founding moment of national identity and its subsequent connection 
to a ‘disastrous politics’.31 
 Sage is a bringing-forth that does not objectify, what Heidegger refers to in ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’ as techne.  There are two versions of techne at stake for Heidegger: techne as art and 
foundation, revealing while sheltering the mysterious [Dichtung]; and techne as modern technology 
and threat, commanding all into unconcealment and uprooting us from earth [Technik].  The former is 
more originary than the latter, rendering modern technology a form of art corrupted — the result of 
the unbridled totalization and objectivity of metaphysics [Gestell] which reduces the whole of nature 
to a stockpile of resources [Bestand].32  Techne as art and foundation is the saving power in the time 
of distress and the counterweight to modern technology; it provides the mode of dwelling for the 
German people who are able to resist the rootlessness attributed by Heidegger to the technical.  
Heidegger seeks to distinguish between these two modes of techne just as he tries to distinguish 
between his own politics and that of the Nazi party; however, as Lacoue-Labarthe argues, even if 
Sage is a more authentic and more originary version of techne, even if Hölderlin is more patriotic than 
Hitler, in the end the distinction does not survive scrutiny: modern technology and National Socialism 
are the logical extensions of this mythology.33 
When Blanchot is engaging with the idea of poetry as foundation, of truth as a mode of 
revealing which conceals and of language as the house of Being, drawn from his reading of Heidegger 
on Hölderlin, there are therefore underlying motifs, involving techne as Sage and politicised saving 
power, which are not explicitly discussed in essays from the early 1940s.  It is interesting to note that 
it is in his essays on Mallarmé that Blanchot regularly draws upon Heidegger on Hölderlin.  Just as 
Hölderlin remained a contentious figure in post-war Germany, fought over by right-wing and left-
wing critics such as Heidegger, Theodor Adorno and Bertolt Brecht, Mallarmé occupied a similar 
position in France: right-wing figures such as Maurras condemned him as the last and most 
dangerous, irrational, ‘barbarian’ romantic, while others on the right such as Brasillach struggled to 
                                                          
31 Ibid., pp. 43-77. 
32 See Heidegger’s 1953 lecture ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in Basic Writings, pp. 311-41; 
Gesamtausgabe, VII, 5-36.   
33 Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, pp. 159-74. 
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reconcile the poet who revived a national tradition with the writer who challenges the unity of the 
French language.34  Mallarmé and Hölderlin are both implicated in their own respective national 
traditions and so, although Blanchot does not explicitly demonstrate that he is aware, which he surely 
must have been,35 of Heidegger’s politics in the early 1940s, the use of Mallarmé as a parallel to 
Hölderlin in essays written for the pro-Vichy Journal des débats suggests that a nationalist agenda 
may have influenced Blanchot’s choice of preferred poet.  The nationalist status of Mallarmé for 
Blanchot is evident in an essay for the Journal des débats from 1941 where he is cited as a poet 
(belonging to a lineage running from Maurice Scève to Paul Eluard) who embodies what is most 
essential about the French literary tradition: ‘Il y a assurément peu de littératures où un poète, sans le 
moindre délire, par le simple effet d’une méditation rigoureuse des formes, ait pu envisager la 
rédaction d’un livre qui fût l’équivalent véritable de l’absolu.  Cette ambition, tourment et gloire de 
Stéphane Mallarmé, purifie les lettres françaises de beaucoup des petitesses que la vanité des écrivains 
leur a apportées.’36 
There is, on the other hand, an important distinction to be drawn between Heidegger and 
Blanchot that casts doubt over the above assertion.  The poetry of Hölderlin in Heidegger’s account 
represents foundation.  This is also the case for Blanchot reading Heidegger on Hölderlin in the 
1930s; but the selection of Mallarmé, the poet whose shipwreck hangs above the abyss in Un Coup de 
dés, undermines the possibility of poetic foundation and propels Blanchot’s view of poetry in the 
direction of the bottomless abyss and endless self-reflexivity.  There is, of course, a parallel between 
Heidegger’s use of Hölderlin and Blanchot’s use of Mallarmé, but there is also radical dissymmetry.  
                                                          
34 For Hölderlin’s post-war reception in Germany by those on the left and the right, see Savage, Hölderlin after 
the Catastrophe.  For Mallarmé’s reception in France and how those on the right struggled to accept him as 
the ‘national poet’, see David Carroll, French Literary Fascism: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and the Ideology of 
Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 80-81, 107-09. 
35 His close friend Emmanuel Levinas had written one of the earliest philosophical denunciations of Hitler in 
1934: ‘Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie de Hitlérisme’, in Les Imprévus de l’histoire (Paris: Livre de poche, 
2000), pp. 23-33 (first publ. in Esprit, 26 (November 1934), 199-208).  Levinas reinforces this point in 1947: ‘Si 
au début, nos réflexions s’inspirent dans une large mesure — pour la notion de l’ontologie et de la relation que 
l’homme entretient avec l’être — de la philosophie de Martin Heidegger, elles sont commandées par un 
besoin profond de quitter le climat de cette philosophie et par la conviction que l’on ne saurait en sortir vers 
une philosophie qu’on pourrait qualifier de pré-heideggerienne’ (Emmanuel Levinas, De l’existence au 
l’existant, 2nd edn (Paris: Vrin, 1986), p. 19). 
36 Blanchot, ‘La France et la civilisation contemporaine’, in Chroniques littéraires, pp. 32-33. 
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This stems from the important distinction between Heidegger as thinker and Blanchot as writer and 
critic.   
In the opening two chapters of Thomas l’obscur, as Thomas swims in the sea and then gropes 
his way into a dark cave, Blanchot depicts a language reflecting on itself and distanced or detached 
from a worldly horizon; the watery grave and black fissure in which Thomas finds himself in chapters 
one and two respectively become bottomless, fathomless, as the narrative develops into an experience 
of language itself in the absence of all worldly objects: ‘La nuit lui parut bientôt plus sombre, plus 
terrible que n’importe quelle autre nuit, comme si elle était réellement sortie d’une blessure de la 
pensée qui ne se pensait plus, de la pensée prise ironiquement comme objet par autre chose que la 
pensée.  C’était la nuit même.’37  The bottomless abyss which defines the literary experience is 
possible because language can refer to itself, undoing the certainty of the thinking subject and holding 
it, like Mallarmé’s shipwreck, above the abyss: ‘comme un bateau à la dérive, dans l’eau qui lui 
servait de corps pour nager.’38   
Heidegger’s Sage relies on language not becoming an object for itself.  As the house of 
Being, language brings beings forth in the poet’s saying in a way that preserves the otherness of 
Being, protecting it from the rampant totalization of metaphysical representation and providing 
foundation.  This understanding of language, with its emphasis on foundation, demonstrates a desire 
for comprehension and for the totality and unity of an absolute.  For Blanchot, as writer and critic 
putting literature into practice and intervening into philosophy from a place irreducible to it, the fact 
that language can refer to itself is what makes literature possible.39  Literature lies beyond this desire 
for comprehension and, in referring to itself, unworks itself into utter ambiguity, dispersing all 
meaning.  The absence of foundation highlights the dispersal at the heart of the literary project.   
                                                          
37 Blanchot, Thomas l’obscur [1941], p. 33. 
38 Ibid., p. 27. 
39 Derrida argues that philosophy constitutes itself by determining its own outside; it is therefore difficult to 
hold on to the opposition between what is inside and what is outside philosophy.  Blanchot’s neuter, which 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, ensures that his work resists classification and speaks from a 
place free of oppositions; it is neither inside nor outside philosophy: ‘Le neutre et non pas la neutralité, le 
neutre au-delà de la contradiction dialectique et de toute opposition, telle serait la possibilité d’un “récit” qui 
n’est plus simplement une forme, un genre ou un mode de littérature, et qui se porte au-delà du système des 
oppositions philosophiques.  Il ne se laisse dominer par aucun des termes pris dans une opposition à l’intérieur 
de la langue philosophique ou de la langue naturelle’ (‘Survivre’, in Parages, pp. 117-218 (pp. 151-52)). 
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The difference between these two perspectives is emphasised in a 1946 review of Heidegger’s 
commentary of ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage...’.  Here Blanchot contrasts his own reading of Hölderlin 
with that of Heidegger, who, Blanchot writes, interrogates each word and comma separately and 
demands a complete response from all of these isolated elements: ‘L’impression est souvent fort 
étrange.’  The richness and complexity of the language employed by Heidegger is contrasted with the 
simplicity of Hölderlin’s poetic language.  Blanchot hones in on the term das Offene.  In Hölderlin, it 
simply means ‘l’air libre’.40  The term takes on a more complex meaning in Heidegger’s commentary, 
where it is another name for the Greek word for nature: ‘Φύσις is that rising-up which goes-back-into-
itself; it names the coming to presence of that which dwells in the rising-up and thus comes to 
presence as open.’  The Open mediates the connections between all things, which are constituted 
thanks to such mediation: ‘What is mediated in that way only is by virtue of mediatedness.  The open 
itself, however, though it first gives the region for all belonging-to and -with each other, does not arise 
from any mediation.  The open itself is the immediate [das Unmittelbare].’41  Paul de Man 
underscores the difference between the poet and the thinker: Heidegger stakes his entire system on the 
possibility of living in the presence of Being, an experience which Hölderlin says is totally forbidden 
to, and impossible for, the human.  The poet prays for the immediacy of Being but does not establish 
this presence: ‘das Heilige sei mein Wort’ (the subjunctive here marks desire).42  Blanchot makes a 
similar point in his review, insisting on the impossibility of the mediation of that which mediates.  A 
later reference to an opening is significant: ‘Ruine, contestation, division pure, réellement jedem offen, 
comme il est dit, ouvert à tous, parce qu’il n’est plus qu’absence et déchirement, c’est comme tel qu’il 
parle, c’est alors qu’il est le jour, qu’il a la transparence du jour, denkender Tag, jour devenu 
pensée.’43  Rather than the presence and unity of Being, the poet experiences absence and rupture and 
this is pertinently related to the Open taken in its simple poetic meaning. 
                                                          
40 Blanchot, ‘La Parole “sacrée” de Hölderlin’, in La Part du feu, pp. 118-20.  Hill shows how Blanchot refuses 
the moment of reconciliation between Being and Dichtung, revealing Hölderlin’s poem to be the site of a 
fundamental aporia, in Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, pp. 81-91. 
41 Heidegger, ‘“As When On a Holiday... ”’, in Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, pp. 67-99 (pp. 79, 83); ‘Wie 
wenn am Feiertage...’, in Gesamtausgabe, IV, 49-77 (pp. 56, 61).   
42 De Man, ‘Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin’, in Blindness and Insight, pp. 255-59. 





Heidegger’s essays of the 1930s focussed on the foundational and redemptive nature of Hölderlin’s 
poetry; these ideas are developed in relation to broader views on writing and technology in ‘Wozu 
Dichter?’ [1946].  Hölderlin remains the figure around whom Heidegger constructs his view of poetry 
— the essay opens with a question posed in the elegy ‘Bread and Wine’ (‘... and why poets in a 
desolate time [dürftiger Zeit]?’)44 and a subsequent reading of Hölderlin prefaces an inquiry into the 
work of Rainer Maria Rilke.  ‘Why Poets?’ was ostensibly written to mark the twentieth anniversary 
of Rilke’s death and the ‘desolate time’ can be understood as modernity or the age of the fulfilment of 
metaphysics, repeatedly the focus of hostility in Heidegger’s essays since the mid-1930s.  Underlying 
the overt reasons for this essay is, however, its date of publication: 1946.  The recent defeat and 
destruction of Germany at the hands of the Allies and the powerful sense that something went wrong 
for National Socialism provide the backdrop for a discussion which develops an understanding of 
dwelling to counteract the rootlessness and nihilism of technology.  
In this desolate or needy time, the ground for world ceases to be grounding and the abyss 
opens up.  Heidegger’s Abgrund is to be understood as an abyss without [Ab-] bottom; it is the 
absence of any ground whatsoever: 
 
Abyss [Abgrund] originally means the soil and ground toward which, as the lowest level, 
something hangs down a declivity.  In what follows, however, let us understand the ‘Ab-’ as the 
total absence [völlige Abwesen] of ground.  Ground is the soil for taking root and standing.  The 
age for which ground fails to appear hangs in the abyss.45  
 
                                                          
44 Hölderlin provides a partial answer to this question in ‘Bread and Wine’: ‘They are, you say, like the wine-
god’s sacred priests, | Who roamed from land to land during the sacred night.’  The response ties together 
religion, myth, the sacred and poetry, fitting neatly into Heidegger’s description of Sage which will play a 
significant role in the essay to come.  Hölderlin quoted in Heidegger, ‘Why Poets?’, in Off the Beaten Track, pp. 
200-41 (p. 202); ‘Wozu Dichter?’, in Gesamtausgabe, V, 269-320 (pp. 271-72). 
45 Heidegger, ‘Why Poets?’, in Off the Beaten Track, p. 200; Gesamtausgabe, V, 269-70. 
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There is an urgent need to address the abyss because, without grounding, beings are revealed in their 
totality, all presencing is reduced to mere resource, and the rootlessness characteristic of modern 
technology takes hold.  Without grounding there is no shelter or dwelling for Being.  In order to 
prompt the turn, the poet must abandon himself to this groundless place and encounter the salutary 
trace of what has been lost: an indication of the god’s departure.  Heidegger quotes Hölderlin on this 
point: ‘Mortals first reach into the abyss. For so it turns | with them.’46  The abyss is the mark of the 
desolate time which offers redemption; Hölderlin’s poetry dwells most intimately here, opening up a 
place, dwelling, or homeland where there was previously total absence of ground.47  
 Decidedly inferior and anterior (‘in its course within the history of Being’) to Hölderlin’s 
poetry, the work of Rilke has more in common with Nietzsche, the last metaphysician who exhausts 
the possibilities of Western metaphysics, than the poet who offers salvation in Heidegger’s estimation.  
Rilke is accused of a fatal error: mistaking beings in their entirety for Being.  His poetry lacks the 
mystery — the earthliness which shelters Being and forges a dwelling in the abyss — of Hölderlin’s 
poetry and remains firmly trapped within a metaphysical view in which objectivity reigns and from 
which Being has withdrawn.  Heidegger will endeavour to prove this by looking at a ‘few basic words 
[Grundworte]’ of Rilke’s poetry.48  Much turns here on divergent interpretations of one of these 
words: das Offene.  
Rilke thinks the Open as completeness, or the unobstructed whole of all that is present or 
absent, in so doing he seeks to move beyond the limitations of subjectivity and objectivity.  In the 
eighth Elegy, he writes that only animals have access to this region because they see without looking; 
they live in a pure space without concepts, expectations and projections: ‘With all its eyes the 
creature-world [die Kreatur] beholds | the open [das Offene].  But our eyes, as though reversed 
[umgekehrt], | encircle it on every side, like traps | set round its unobstructed path to freedom.’  
Unconstrained by subjectivity, animals are dispossessed of their self, projected outwards and absorbed 
into the limitless Open: ‘[...] its own Being for it | is infinite, inapprehensible, | unintrospective, pure, 
                                                          
46 An extract from Hölderlin’s ‘Bread and Wine’ quoted in Heidegger, ‘Why Poets?’, in Off the Beaten Track, p. 
201; Gesamtausgabe, V, 270. 
47 Ibid., p. 203; p. 273. 
48 Ibid., pp. 205-06; pp. 275-76. 
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like its outgazing.’  Humans, on the other hand, at a very young age are turned away from this 
unseparated region by our sense of self and awareness of our mortality.  Consequently, we see 
everything as if in reverse from this final knowable limit: ‘We face always World | and never 
Nowhere without the No [Immer ist es Welt | und niemals Nirgends ohne Nicht].’49  Rilke thus 
reverses the traditional hierarchy between humans and animals, privileging the figure of the animal 
and unreflective perception over human subjectivity, a reversal which Heidegger staunchly contests in 
the Parmenides lectures delivered between 1942 and 1943.50 
 Heidegger objects to Rilke’s limitless and unobstructed region, thinking the Open instead in 
terms of alētheia: ‘We must never represent the globe of Being and the sphericality of the globe of 
Being objectively.  Therefore, non-objectively?  No, that would be merely to dodge behind a phrase.  
The sphericality must be thought in terms of the essence of original Being in the sense of 
unconcealing presencing [im Sinne des entbergenden Anwesens].’51  To see the Open as non-objective 
is simply to invert the metaphysical view and so to remain within it, states Heidegger in his criticism 
of Rilke.  What Rilke calls the unobstructedness or completeness of vision, from which man is 
excluded, is nothing other than beings in their entirety; this, along with the danger that is the 
animalization of man, is a view inherited from Nietzsche.52  In this false Open there is no earthly 
figure to shelter Being and thus no binding rift between earth and world; all beings are drawn together 
in undifferentiated uniformity by the play of forces which form the ‘unheard midst’.  In this sense 
Rilke does not think the Open as the clearing which allows beings to stand revealed in the structure of 
time, but totalises the realm of manifestation by portraying the Open as the ‘intact sphere of the 
unimpeded draw’.53   
                                                          
49 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies, trans. by Martyn Crucefix (London: Enitharmon, 2006), pp. 62-63. 
50 For the opposition to Rilke‘s inversion of the human-animal hierarchy, see Martin Heidegger, ‘Significance of 
Dis-Closure’, in Parmenides, trans. by André Schuwer and Richard Rojewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992), pp. 131-60; ‘Die vierte Weisung: das Offene, das Freie’, in Gesamtausgabe, LIV: Parmenides 
(1982), 195-240. 
51 Heidegger, ‘Why Poets?’, in Off the Beaten Track, p. 226; Gesamtausgabe, V, 301. 
52 Ibid., p. 214; p. 286.   




Rilke’s false, limitless and undifferentiated Open is the final consequence of the forgetting of 
Being and reign of spatiality characteristic of metaphysics.  In contrast, Heidegger defines the Open 
onto-historically as the rift caused in the conflict between earth and world; it forms as a result of the 
event which is the creation of the work of art and the happening of truth.  The Open is therefore the 
result of techne in the sense of Dichtung.  The abyss characteristic of modernity, rendered ever more 
pressing in 1946 by the recent destruction of Germany, can be transformed into the Open through the 
mythological moment that is Hölderlin’s saying; this saying creates a dwelling for Being where there 
previously was none.  It is man, not the figure of the animal, who, through language, can find his own 
stance within the Open and understand Being.54 
The distinguishing feature of these two conceptions of the Open is the mode of techne from 
which they emerge: Heidegger’s Open, understood in terms of alētheia as the clearing formed in the 
conflict between earth and world, is the abyss transformed through techne as Dichtung; Rilke’s Open 
is the consequence of techne as Technik.  According to the former will has been masquerading as the 
Being of beings in the age of metaphysics.55  This will is specifically human and has the character of 
an unconditional command, ensuring man’s domination of the earth; it demands that everything, earth 
and all of its beings, including man, is transformed into material to be exploited and derives from 
techne as Technik.56  By excluding man from the Open and placing this region, the entirety of beings, 
before man as material to be exploited, Rilke is working within the framework of Nietzschean will to 
power in Heidegger’s view: 
   
If Rilke experiences the Open as the unobjectiveness of full Nature, by contrast the world of 
willing men must stand out for him as correspondingly objective.  Conversely, to look out for 
the integral entirety of beings [das heile Ganze des Seienden] is to take a hint from the 
phenomena of advancing technology [der heraufkommenden Technik], a hint in the direction of 
                                                          
54 Michel Haar documents the differences between these two conceptions of the Open in Le Chant de la terre: 
Heidegger et les assises de l’histoire de l’être (Paris: Herne, 1985), pp. 71-79. 
55 Heidegger, ‘Why Poets?’, in Off the Beaten Track, p. 216; Gesamtausgabe, V, 289. 
56 Ibid., p. 217; p. 289. 
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those regions from where, perhaps, an originary, constructive overcoming of the technical 
[bildende Überwindung des Technischen] could come.57 
 
Heidegger’s critique of the Open in Rilke is closely associated with his critique of modern technology 
(and totalitarian political organisation).  This sets this essay apart from his previous work: ‘Why 
Poets?’ is probably one of the most explicit early denunciations of the deleterious effects of 
technological progress — ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ was published seven years later in 
1953.58  At the mid-way point of this essay, Heidegger states that technical domination threatens man 
in his essence.  He argues that the mastery which is a consequence of the essence of technology 
threatens to dehumanize the human in a world which is increasingly becoming a calculable resource 
to be exploited; man is exposed to the growing danger of becoming mere material.59  Nonetheless, 
suggested in the above extract is also the possibility that Rilke’s poetry, from its metaphysical 
viewpoint, may begin to show us the way back from the objectification of technical domination and 
help us to come by a way of thinking that moves beyond the self-accomplishment of metaphysics. 
Rilke proposes that by turning inward, toward the worldly inner space of the heart which he 
calls Weltinnenraum, we can experience a fusion between the inner world of feeling and the outer 
world of animals and thus overcome the objectification which prevents man from accessing the Open.  
This inner space is nonetheless, in Heidegger’s estimation, the sphere of subjectivity which continues 
to think Being as worldly presence; it does not move beyond metaphysics because it ‘remains 
attracted to representation in consciousness’.60  The poet’s saying needs to be spoken from the very 
limit of consciousness, where the poet no longer wills but allows language to speak through him or 
her: 
 
                                                          
57 Ibid., p. 217; p. 290. 
58 The basis for ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’ was therefore underway a few years before the paper was first 
given as a lecture on 18 November 1953.  Another key text in the development of Heidegger’s thinking on 
technology, although not published until much later, is ‘Das Ge-Stell’ [1949].  According to the 
Gesamtausgabe, ‘Das Ge-Stell’ is a preliminary version of ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’.  See Martin Heidegger, 
‘Das Ge-Stell’, in Gesamtausgabe, LXXIX: Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge (1994), 24-45. 
59 Heidegger, ‘Why Poets?’, in Off the Beaten Track, pp. 217-21; Gesamtausgabe, V, 290-95. 
60 Ibid., p. 233; p. 311. 
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Making statements [Das Aussagen] remains a way and a means.  In contrast, there is a saying 
[Sagen] that is specially engaged with what is said [das sich eigens in die Sage einläßt] without, 
however, reflecting on language and thereby turning it too into an object.  To enter into what is 
said characterises a saying that pursues what is to be said solely in order to say it.  What is to be 
said would then be that which, in accordance with its essence, belongs in the precinct of 
language.61  
 
It is the mythic saying [Sage] of Hölderlin’s poetry that offers the possibility of a redemptive turn 
back from representation and from the fulfilment of Western metaphysics.  This is a poetic language 
that articulates itself at the limits of the sayable, eschewing objectivity and self-reflexivity.  From out 
of the groundless abyss thus surges the Open; this binding difference between earth and world allows 
beings to stand revealed in time while sheltering Being, providing a dwelling for man and nation.   
Heidegger states that the more venturesome ones dare the saying.62  The poets are more 
daring because they risk an encounter with their own mortality, otherwise distanced in modernity by 
technology: ‘The self-assertion of technological objectification is the constant negation of death.  
Through this negation, death itself becomes something negative; it becomes the archetype of the 
inconstant and the void.’63  Authentic existence, in Heidegger’s account, involves facing up to our 
own mortality; mythic saying is the opportunity to do just that in this destitute time, taking the poet to 
the limit of consciousness, to the limit of the human, and enabling him or her to re-appropriate 
Being.64  The possibility of dying and the possibility of language constitute human existence and 
ensure that we, and not animals who do not ‘die’ in the true sense of the word, are the beings who 
may understand Being: ‘To die [sterben] means to be capable of death as death.  Only man dies 
[stirbt].  The animal drops dead [verendet].’65  
                                                          
61 Ibid., p. 237; pp. 315-16. 
62 Ibid., p. 237; p. 315. 
63 Ibid., p. 227; p. 303. 
64 On language and death as the limit of the human, see Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements, pp. 150-58. 
65 Heidegger, ‘Das Ding’, in Gesamtausgabe, VII, 165-87 (p. 180), my translation.  On the difference between 
perishing and properly dying according to Heidegger and how to translate these terms, see Jacques Derrida, 
Apories: mourir — s’attendre aux ‘limites de la vérité’ (Paris: Galilée, 1996), pp. 61-63. 
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 Véronique Fóti comments that Heidegger should have stopped his criticism of Rilke from the 
moment he identifies that the poet is trapped within metaphysical representation.  From there Fóti 
argues that Heidegger’s attempt to explore Sage as the possibility of a redemptive turn from 
representation is flawed: ‘In the end, Heidegger seeks to voice his own insights and his response to 
the destitution of the age in the poetic language he has exhaustively criticised, while also affirming the 
insurpassability of Hölderlin’s poetic thought which reaches across and beyond destitution into the 
futurity of the pure advent.’66  The purpose of the saying that Heidegger observes in Hölderlin’s 
poetry is that it remains beyond metaphysical representation so that language does not become an 
object.  However, as Fotí maintains, Heidegger constructs this argument from within the language that 
he so vehemently criticises and positions the coming of this redemption in the future.  It remains to be 
seen whether there is a language that can evade objectification.  Sage in this sense remains a mythic 
idea of myth. 
 This evasive form of poetic expression is the event that is yet to arrive.  It hinges on the idea 
of authenticity: without an authentic relation to his or her death, without confronting his or her 
mortality, the poet does not speak from the limits of consciousness where language escapes all 
metaphysical representation and it becomes possible once again to appropriate Being.  Any saving 
power in the desolate time relies on this authentic relationship to death which is, for Heidegger, 
rendered problematic in modernity by the development of modern technology.  The atomic bomb is 
not dangerous as a deadly machine with the capacity to kill thousands, but as a manifestation of the 
totalising will which demands that everything is transformed into raw material to be exploited.  Death 
withdraws itself in the face of technological objectification; the event that is the arrival of the poet’s 
saying is thus perpetually delayed.   
Rilke similarly likens death in modernity to a form of anonymous production in The 
Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, written while he was living in Paris and published twelve years 
before the Duino Elegies in 1910: 
 
                                                          
66 Fóti, p. 35. 
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This excellent hôtel is very ancient.  Even in King Clovis’ time people died in it in a number of 
beds.  Now they are dying there in 559 beds.  Factory-like, of course.  Where production is so 
enormous an individual death is not so nicely carried out; but then that doesn’t matter.  It is 
quantity that counts.  Who cares today for a finely finished death?  No one.67 
 
Unlike the hundreds dying anonymously in the death factory that is the modern hospital, Rilke’s 
protagonist wishes to confront his own death in the virile and authentic manner which he believes to 
have witnessed in the passing of the Chamberlain, who is said to have died ‘his own hard death [Er 
starb seinen schweren Tod]’, a ‘wicked, princely death’, one which he had ‘carried within him and 
nourished on himself his whole life long.’68  The narrator of the Notebooks suggests that language and 
death are intertwined and writing is the way out of this impersonal impasse: ‘I ought to have known 
that this third person who pervades all lives and literatures, this ghost of a third person [dieses 
Gespenst eines Dritten] who never was, has no significance and must be disavowed. [...] He is the 
noise at the threshold [am Eingang] of the voiceless silence of a real conflict.’69  Malte seeks to 
overcome this anonymous humming which drowns out a personal and authentic experience in 
language and dying, but repeatedly fails to do so.  In the next section I will demonstrate how Blanchot 
challenges the very notion of authenticity in his essay on Rilke: the anonymous hum, the noise of the 
impersonal third person resented by Malte, is the only possible-impossible experience of dying. 
 
Death: the Impossibility of Possibility 
Blanchot makes three explicit references to Heidegger in the essays collected in L’Espace littéraire 
under the broader title ‘L’Œuvre et l’espace de la mort’, where ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’ 
features.70  The first concerns the possibility of a personal — authentic — relation to one’s death (a 
                                                          
67 Rainer Maria Rilke, The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, trans. by M. D. Herter Norton (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, [1949] 1992), p. 17; Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge (Zurich: Niehmans & 
Rokitansky Verlag, 1948), p. 12. 
68 Ibid., pp. 22-23; pp. 19-20. 
69 Ibid., p. 27; p. 25. 
70 Blanchot, L’Espace littéraire, pp. 103-210 (first publ. as ‘La Mort possible’, in Critique, 66 (November 1952), 
915-33; ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, Critique, 71 (April 1953), 291-304; 72 (May 1953), 387-99; ‘L’Expérience 
 93 
 
key bone of contention with the Heidegger of Being and Time since ‘La Littérature et le droit à la 
mort’ [1947/8]): 
 
La décision d’être sans être est cette possibilité même de la mort.  Les trois pensées qui essaient 
de rendre compte de cette décision et qui, à cause de cela, semblent éclairer le mieux le destin 
de l’homme moderne, quels que soient les mouvements qui les opposent, celles de Hegel, de 
Nietzsche et de Heidegger, tendent toutes les trois à rendre la mort possible.71 
 
For all three names cited in this extract, death represents an extreme possibility.  Hegel’s death is 
productive; it is a moment in the progression of Spirit through different forms of consciousness to 
absolute knowing.  Nietzsche’s death is reserved for the Übermensch, the one who maintains the pure 
essence of the will and moves beyond nihilism.  And finally the possibility of an authentic relation to 
death in Heidegger’s philosophy would complete the existential analysis of Dasein;72 death must be 
confronted in a virile and authentic manner, resisting the anonymous relation to death pervasive in 
modernity. 
Blanchot demonstrates that death as the essential possibility is simultaneously impossible, 
undermining the hierarchy between an authentic and inauthentic relation to death.  The two later 
references to Heidegger concern authenticity.  The first of these considers the ambiguity of the 
German word ‘eigen’ as it is employed by Rilke and Heidegger, meaning both personal and authentic.  
The translation of ‘eigentlich’ as ‘authentic’ is problematic and has given way to many existentialist 
debates.73  Blanchot will later, in 1980, note that the word ‘authentic’ is anything but authentic: 
 
                                                          
d’Igitur’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 6 (June 1953), 1075-86; and extracts from ‘A toute extrémité’, 
La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 26 (February 1955), 285-93).   
71 Blanchot, ‘La Mort possible’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 105-34 (pp. 118-19).   
72 See Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 304-11; Gesamtausgabe, II, 345-54. 
73 Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 194-95.  Emmanuel Levinas notes that the 
connection to eigen was overlooked in France in the 1930s when eigentlich was translated as authentique, in 
La Mort et le temps (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1992), p. 29. 
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Il est certain qu’on affaiblit la pensée de Heidegger, lorsqu’on interprète ‘l’être-pour-la mort’ 
par la recherche d’une authenticité par la mort.  Vision d’un humanisme persévérant.  Déjà le 
terme ‘authenticité’ ne répond pas à l’‘Eigentlichkeit’ où s’annoncent les ambiguïtés plus 
tardives du mot eigen que détient l’Ereignis qui ne peut se penser par rapport à ‘être’.  
Cependant, même si nous quittons l’illusion de ‘la mort propre’ de Rilke, il reste que le mourir, 
dans cette perspective, ne se sépare pas du ‘personnel’, négligeant ce qu’il y a d’‘impersonnel’ 
dans la mort par rapport à quoi il faut dire non pas ‘je’ meurs, mais on meurt, mourant toujours 
autre.74   
 
Any thought of death must respect what is foreign to me in that death, which is therefore constituted 
at once by authenticity and inauthenticity.  The second reference to Heidegger in the essay from 1953 
concerns the origin of the Heideggerian term ‘Entschlossenheit’ in the language of Rilke’s poetry.  
‘Decision’ [Entschluss/résolution], pointedly connected by Blanchot to ‘disclosure’ 
[erschließen/s’ouvrir], is the origin of Heidegger’s ‘resoluteness’ [Entschlossenheit/acceptation 
résolue], defined in Being and Time as ‘authentic Being-one’s-Self’, the recognition of the possibility 
unique to oneself that cannot be shared by any other, which is to say the possibility of having no more 
possibilities, or death.75  This move through language, from disclosure to decision, reveals the 
historical task of the artist according to Heidegger; it underscores the work as disclosure, or an 
opening, and associates this origin with an authentic death: ‘ce qu’il [Heidegger] appelle point de 
départ est l’approche de ce point où rien ne commence, est “la tension d’un commencement infini” — 
l’art lui-même comme origine ou encore l’expérience de l’Ouvert, la recherche d’un mourir 
véritable.’76  Blanchot is folding Heidegger back to the fundamental ontology of Being and Time, 
because the historicising of Being endlessly keeps open the possibility that we can understand Being 
and have an authentic relation to death but this possibility never materializes: Hölderlin’s mythic 
                                                          
74 Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre, pp. 180-81. 
75 Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort‘, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 199-200.  See also Heidegger, Being and 
Time, p. 344; Gesamtausgabe, II, 395. 
76 Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 200. 
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saying remains the ‘pure advent’ to come.  The impossibility of this possibility is played out in 
Rilke’s work.77 
The essay on Rilke opens with a reference to Nietzsche, the last metaphysician in whose 
work, according to Heidegger, Being is reduced to a series of metaphysical representations.  Blanchot 
notes that Nietzsche sought to overcome the human and to die a death unique to him, two aims which 
are entwined.  Rilke shares a similar ambition: in The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge he seeks to 
overcome death by articulating an authentic relation to death, which is to say by portraying the death 
unique to Malte, an aim which goes unfulfilled because his writing is premised on impossibility.  
Written and set in Paris, the experience of writer and character overlap in Blanchot’s account, where 
both are described as coming face to face with the horror of an impersonal neutral death from which 
they continually turn.  
 
Mort en masse, mort en série et de confection, faite en gros pour tous et où chacun disparaît 
hâtivement, produit anonyme, objet sans valeur, à l’image des choses du monde moderne dont 
Rilke s’est toujours détourné: on voit déjà, par ces comparaisons, comment il glisse de la 
neutralité essentielle de la mort à l’idée que cette neutralité n’est qu’une forme historique et 
provisoire, la mort stérile de grandes villes.78 
 
Rilke attributes his failure to the brutality of the modern world and the anonymity of large cities.  
Blanchot does not overlook modernity and the modern city as a feature of Rilke’s writing, but 
presents this as a distraction from what is really at stake.  Rilke ought to confront the banality of 
death, which is not a historical condition.  Blanchot writes elsewhere in this section of L’Espace 
littéraire: ‘penser la mort, c’est introduire en la pensée le suprêmement douteux, l’effritement du non-
sûr, comme si nous devions, pour penser authentiquement la certitude de la mort, laisser la pensée 
s’abîmer dans le doute et l’inauthentique.’79  Rilke and Malte repeatedly return to the impossible 
                                                          
77 Notes made by Blanchot on Rilke and Hölderlin, and a translation of the latter’s poem beginning ‘Was ist 
Gott?’, are included in Blanchot, ed. by Hoppenot and Rabaté, pp. 53-54. 
78 Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 156. 
79 Blanchot, ‘La Mort possible’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 117. 
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moment of trying to capture what evades all consciousness because dying is constituted by both 
authenticity and inauthenticity.   
Repetition is therefore the mark of the impossible task of dying and writing.  The first of three 
subsections in this essay ends by noting Rilke’s comment that what made the existence of Malte 
impossible becomes the condition of possibility for life once again in the Duino Elegies, completed 
twelve years after the publication of The Notebooks in 1922.  The following section opens with an 
extract from a letter to his Polish translator, Witold von Hulewicz, where Rilke explains his view of 
death in the Elegies as the side of life which is turned away from us: death forms part of ‘la grande 
unité’ which is ‘la vraie forme de la vie’.80  Blanchot’s first move in this section is to criticise the 
desire evident in this letter to substitute the clarity of ideas for the obscurity of the poetic movement.  
Here we see, once again, Blanchot as writer and critic seeking to address what philosophy neglects, 
forgets, or represses: we should seek not the clarity and understanding of an absolute in literature, but 
the obscurity of the poetic movement which has ambiguity at its very core.  The movement of 
Blanchot’s own critical thought in the remaining two sections of ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’ 
further reinforces this view. 
Blanchot repeatedly returns to Rilke’s ‘failure’ to attain an authentic relationship to death in 
order to demonstrate that such failure is the condition of the possibility of dying.  In the Duino 
Elegies, we are turned away from death because we are limited beings who perceive things as objects; 
consciousness and representation ensure that we remain trapped within the everyday realm of doing, 
acting and possessing.  In order to access life and death as ‘la grande unité’, we must turn away from 
objectified worldly reality toward the imaginary space of literature.  The conversion proposed by 
Rilke toward a more interior consciousness is described as the transformation of the visible into the 
invisible, a movement of dispossession by which objects are no longer the tools of the everyday.  For 
both Blanchot and Rilke, this is the task of dying and the task of writing; the former, however, 
undermines the view that this task is achievable.  A few lines later, ‘transformation’ is placed in 
quotation marks and the past participle of the verb ‘transformer’ is repeated twice in italics.81  These 
                                                          
80 Rilke quoted in Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 169. 
81 Ibid., p. 182. 
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stylistic devices suspend the process of becoming or dying; they place its completion in doubt and 
tease out the uncertainty and ambiguity inherent to death and literature.  The movement of Blanchot’s 
criticism echoes what he sees in play in the literary experience: ‘[Rilke] a peu à peu dissous, au cours 
de l’expérience, la substance et la réalité de la mort.’82   
Throughout this essay Blanchot sets up the conditions for the possibility of dying, only to 
then demonstrate the impossible basis of such conditions.  In the third section of the essay, for 
instance, his argument shifts over the course of one paragraph from the recognition that the task of 
attaining an authentic relationship to death must begin with things, saving things by rendering them 
invisible, to the admission that things are only available to us as such when we are free of all limits: 
‘Il faut donc partir, non plus des choses pour rendre possible l’approche de la mort vraie, mais de la 
profondeur de la mort pour me tourner vers l’intimité des choses’.83  If Rilke thinks he has in some 
way grasped death, he has been fooled.  Death as the unattainable certainty, the elusive inevitable, 
gives us the impression of dying but only ever errs around its hidden and ambiguous centre: ‘[La 
mort] est bien ce qui n’arrive à personne, l’incertitude et l’indécision de ce qui n’arrive jamais, à quoi 
je ne puis penser avec sérieux, car elle n’est pas sérieuse, elle est sa propre imposture, l’effritement, la 
consumation vide, — non pas le terme, mais l’interminable, non pas la mort propre, mais la mort 
quelconque, non pas la mort vraie, mais, comme dit Kafka, “le ricanement de son erreur capitale”.’84  
The failure of Rilke is inevitable, because the poem is premised on a ruinous impossibility that cannot 
be overcome.  
Heidegger and Blanchot therefore agree that Rilke is thinking within the framework of the 
Nietzschean individual: restricted by the limitations of will and subjectivity, Rilke’s more interior 
consciousness is simply a more conscious consciousness.85  This failure is avoidable for Heidegger, 
writing in Being and Time, because death is the possibility of impossibility: 
 
                                                          
82 Ibid., p. 184. 
83 Ibid., p. 201. 
84 Ibid., p. 203.  A discussion of Blanchot on Kafka comes in Chapter Three. 
85 Ibid., pp. 178-79. 
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The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as possibility, is as far as 
possible from anything actual.  The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more 
purely does the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any 
existence at all.  Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized’, nothing which 
Dasein, as actual, could itself be.  It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of 
comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing.86  
 
In contrast, the failure of Rilke is necessary for Blanchot, who later describes death as the 
impossibility of all possibility:  
 
celui qui a été jusqu’au bout du désir de mort, invoquant son droit à la mort et exerçant sur lui-
même un pouvoir de mort — ouvrant, ainsi que l’a dit Heidegger, la possibilité de 
l’impossibilité — ou encore, croyant se rendre maître de la non-maîtrise, se laisse prendre à une 
sorte de piège et s’arrête éternellement — un instant, évidemment — là où, cessant d’être un 
sujet, perdant sa liberté entêtée, il se heurte, autre que lui-même, à la mort comme à ce qui 
n’arrive pas ou comme à ce qui se retourne (démentant, à la façon d’une démence, la 
dialectique en la faisant aboutir) en l’impossibilité de toute possibilité.87 
 
This is not a simple refusal or negation of Heidegger’s thought, but a radicalisation of his thinking 
which deconstructs the notion of authenticity by teasing out the paradox at the heart of this 
understanding of death.  Heidegger assumes a power or control over death which lures him into a trap: 
death can never be experienced as one’s own; it is only ever the death of an other (‘il se heurte, autre 
qui lui-même, à la mort comme à ce qui n’arrive pas ou comme à ce qui se retourne’).  Derrida echoes 
this point in his analysis of the aporia of dying in Heidegger: ‘Rien n’est plus substituable et rien ne 
l’est moins que le syntagme “ma mort”.’88 
                                                          
86 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 306-07; Gesamtausgabe, II, 348.   
87 Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre, pp. 114-15; (first publ., with other fragments from L’Écriture du désastre 
(pp. 108-17), as ‘On tue un enfant (fragmentaire)’, Le Nouveau Commerce, 33-34 (Spring 1976), 19-29). 
88 Derrida, Apories, p. 49.  
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 Derrida stresses that Heidegger’s existential analysis requires limits: a hierarchical order 
between Dasein and other entities is structured by impassable edges, most notably the limit separating 
the dropping dead of animals from the properly-dying of Dasein.  Death, as the most proper 
possibility of Dasein, is the limit which determines all subsequent distinctions drawn between human, 
animal, plant and stone:  
 
Qu’est-ce alors que franchir cette frontière de l’ultime?  Qu’est-ce que passer le terme d’une vie 
(terma tou biou).  Est-ce possible?  Qui l’a jamais fait?  Qui peut en témoigner?  Le ‘j’entre’, en 
passant le seuil, le ‘je passe’ (peraô) nous met ainsi, si je puis dire, sur la voie de l’aporos ou de 
l’aporia: le difficile ou l’impraticable, ici le passage impossible, refusé, dénié ou interdit, voire, 
ce qui peut être encore autre chose, le non-passage, un événement de venue ou d’avenir qui n’a 
plus la forme du mouvement consistant à passer, traverser, transiter, le ‘se passer’ d’un 
événement qui n’aurait plus la forme ou l’allure du pas: en somme une venue sans pas.89 
 
The aporia is the interminable experience of the limit, an impossible and necessary passage signalled 
by the word ‘pas’ in French, meaning both ‘step’ and ‘not’, on which Derrida writes elsewhere in 
relation to Blanchot.90  To experience the aporia is not necessarily a failure or simple paralysis, 
Derrida writes, neither is it a stopping at or an overcoming of the limit.  It touches on an event that is 
always arriving, that never arrives because always arriving, what Blanchot refers to above as that non-
arriving or returning death.  The arrivant is new and unexpected; it makes possible everything to 
which it cannot be reduced, simultaneously marking a limit and crossing that limit.91  This is the same 
logic of presupposition evident in the reliability of equipment in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’: 
‘Pour identifier les différentes manières de vivre (erleben) le décès (Ableben), autrement dit de vivre 
                                                          
89 Ibid., p. 25.  
90 ‘Toute transgression opère dès lors contre ou au-delà de la transgression en tant qu’elle serait le fait d’un 
pas, elle transgresse le pas même, franchit un pas au-delà du pas, et ce que nous appelions la digression de 
l‘éloignement déroute, dès Thomas l’obscur, toute logique de la limite, de l’opposition, de l’identité, de la 
contradiction, mais aussi bien libère, sous l’apparente normalité de sa langue (lexique et syntaxe), la 
contamination du nom (pas) et de l’adverbe (pas)’ (Derrida, ‘Pas’, in Parages, pp. 19-116 (p. 47)). 
91 Derrida, Apories, pp. 65-68.  
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comme tel le moment de “quitter la vie”, de passer comme vivant, dans le vécu (Erleben) du vivant, le 
passage hors de la vie (Ableben); pour parler avec compétence de ces modes de passage, du passant 
ou du passeur, il faut déjà savoir ce que mort veut dire, et à quoi reconnaître la mort proprement 
dite.’92  Possibility refers both to what is most proper to Dasein and to what I am capable of doing; the 
implication is that I can lay my hands on Dasein, as Blanchot also suggests in the extract quoted 
above.  Derrida shows that the only way to avoid confusion between Dasein and what is 
Vorhandensein or Zuhandensein is to come back to the ontological determination of the limit which 
he challenges, by doubling it, in his analysis.93   
 Derrida describes access to death for Heidegger as nonaccess to a nonborder.  Death in 
Blanchot, on the other hand, is a relentless turning on or around the threshold which undoes that very 
threshold.  Derrida is reluctant to draw an opposition between Heidegger and Blanchot: ‘Quand 
Blanchot dit sans cesse, et c’est alors une longue plainte et non un triomphe de la vie, l’impossible 
mourir, l’impossibilité, hélas, du mourir, il dit à la fois la même chose et tout autre chose que 
Heidegger.  Il s’agit de savoir seulement dans quel sens (au sens de la direction et du trajet) on lit 
l’expression “possibilité de l’impossibilité”.’94  Blanchot does indeed read this expression in reverse 
in the extract quoted above, but he is not arguing in opposition to Heidegger, because his writing, like 
the laces lacing those shoes in the painting by Van Gogh, is the experience of the endlessly repeated 
turning which complicates any distinction between inside and outside, which contests the ultimate 
limit of dying, with consequences, we shall see, for any claim to the purely natural or a hierarchy 
between human, animal and stone. 
The poem in Blanchot’s account is therefore not a disclosure of the time spoken from the 
limit of consciousness, as Heidegger would have us understand it, but an encounter with that which 
exceeds all consciousness and complicates all limits: ‘La découverte de Malte est celle de cette force 
trop grande pour nous qu’est la mort impersonnelle, qui est l’excès de notre force, ce qui l’excède et 
la rendrait prodigieuse, si nous réussissions à la faire nôtre à nouveau.  Découverte qu’il ne peut 
                                                          
92 Ibid., p. 85. 
93 Ibid., pp. 135-36.  See also Derrida, ‘La Main de Heidegger’, in Heidegger et la question, pp. 172-222. 
94 Derrida, Apories, p. 133.   
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maîtriser, dont il ne peut faire l’assise de son art.’95  The neutral, anonymous, impersonal death 
encountered by Malte forms the lack of foundation above which the poem hangs.  Blanchot teases 
Heidegger’s thinking out to its paradoxical conclusion: the Abgrund from ‘Why Poets?’, a bottomless 
pit where the poet can forge a dwelling, becomes the abîme which is not just absence of ground, it is 
truly bottomless.  Death is synonymous with this abyss; it is an endless void in which notions of 
foundation do not belong: ‘la mort comme abîme, non pas ce qui fonde, mais l’absence et la perte de 
tout fondement.’96   
 The association between death and the abyss is closely related to Blanchot’s reading of the 
Open as it is explored in the Duino Elegies.  For Heidegger, the non-objective nature of Rilke’s Open 
is simply an inversion of the traditional metaphysical view.  Blanchot agrees to a point: subject and 
object persist in the Open and so Rilke remains trapped within representation.  On the other hand, 
there is also something radical about Rilke’s Open which Heidegger overlooks — the Open as a 
mystical moment of confrontation with the outside. ‘Il l’appelle Weltinnenraum, l’espace intérieur du 
monde, lequel n’est pas moins l’intimité des choses que la nôtre et la libre communication de l’une et 
de l’autre, liberté puissante et sans retenue où s’affirme la force pure de l’indéterminé.’97  The Open is 
a fusion between the inner world of feeling and the outer world of animals; in this moment of 
confrontation subject and object merge and there is absolute uncertainty.  Where Heidegger sees an 
inversion of the hierarchy between man and animal and persistent subjectification, Blanchot sees an 
extreme limit-experience, one which leaves us teetering on the edge of the abyss.   
The affirmative endorsement of experience is evident throughout the chapter, where the term 
features in the opening paragraphs of all three essays and is particularly relevant to Blanchot’s reading 
of Rilke: ‘Dans le mouvement de Rilke, ce qui est, en outre, très frappant, c’est comment la force de 
l’expérience poétique l’a mené et presque à son insu, de la recherche d’une mort personnelle […] à 
une tout autre exigence.’98  The poetic experience is the movement, evident in Blanchot’s essay and 
Rilke’s work, which undermines the possibility of an authentic death; it is the experience of the 
                                                          
95 Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 166-67. 
96 Ibid., p. 202. 
97 Ibid., p. 174. 
98 Ibid., p. 203. 
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limitless affirmation of the limit — I cannot die so I am dying interminably.99  In a footnote, Blanchot 
notes Rilke’s comparison of existence to a vase which would be full of water if we were to have an 
authentic relationship to death, but which culminates in the void: 
 
Le désir de mourir exprimerait donc […] un certain besoin de plénitude, il serait l’aspiration 
vers l’extrême bord, l’élan du liquide qui veut remplir le vase.  Mais atteindre le bord, est-ce 
assez?  ‘Déborder’, c’est là la secrète passion liquide, celle qui ne connaît pas de mesure.  Et 
déborder ne signifie pas la plénitude, mais le vide, l’excès au regard duquel le plein est encore 
en défaut.100 
 
The experience of the Open is this exposure to the uncertainty of death, at once limitless excess and 
void, which is never authentic and can never be overcome.  The infinite void beyond this limit 
displaces Heidegger’s view of the abyss as ‘völlige Abwesen’, as plenitude, or of the Open as the 
entirety of beings mistaken for Being.  In neglecting Rilke’s poetic experience, Heidegger overlooks 
the conditions that undermine the possibility of foundation in literature.101  When the poet allows Sage 
to speak through him or her from the limit of consciousness, when death marks the completeness and 
authenticity of existence, when the vase is full of water, the poet experiences the limitless affirmation 
of the limit: the emptiness into which existence overflows, the absence of all foundation, the abyss as 
truly bottomless.  Any attempt to grasp and understand the Open, evident in Rilke’s letter to 
Hulewicz, risks transforming the boundless demand of the limit into an ordinary and mundane region.  
Blanchot shows that only the poetic peripheral experience of the Open maintains the movement which 
is the transformation of the visible into the invisible, the interminable task of dying and writing. 
                                                          
99 On the limitlessness of the limit in Blanchot, see Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, pp. 91-102. 
100 Blanchot, Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 165 n. 1. 
101 Paul de Man acknowledges Heidegger’s reading of Rilke, but argues that Rilke’s language puts into question 
what it seems to promise (‘a form of existential salvation that would take place in and by means of poetry’): 
‘The promise contained in Rilke’s poetry, which the commentators, in the eagerness of their belief, have 
described in all its severe complexity, is thus placed, by Rilke himself, within the dissolving perspective of the 
lie.  Rilke can only be understood if one realizes the urgency of this promise together with the equally urgent, 
and equally poetic, need of retracting it at the very instant he seems to be on the point of offering it to us.’  
Paul de Man, ‘Tropes (Rilke)’, in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and 





The Open, the rift caused in the conflict between earth and world, is the happening of truth in the 
work of art according to Heidegger.  The Open is defined onto-historically because it offers the West 
the chance to found the inception of another history through the mediation of Being.  In the turn to the 
Open the poet — Hölderlin — founds the inception of another history.  What sets Hölderlin apart is 
his ability, in the desolate time, to reach into the abyss and prepare the ground for the turning; he is 
the intermediary between the absent gods and man in modernity.   
Blanchot cites Hölderlin as the first to have expressed and celebrated the task of the poet as 
translator of the visible into the invisible which is the turn to the Open.102  As we have seen, this 
mediation is unachievable because premised on an impossible relation to death.  The poem cannot be 
described as an event by Blanchot, not even as an inauthentic event, because its accomplishment will 
never be realised.  On the other hand, Blanchot repeatedly refers to the poem as beginning, origin, 
source; this is, however, a dispersed origin which is never present: ‘Le poème véritable n’est plus 
alors la parole qui enferme en disant, l’espace clos de la parole, mais l’intimité respirante, par laquelle 
le poète se consume pour accroître l’espace et se dissipe rythmiquement: pure brûlure intérieure 
autour de rien.’103  The poem as origin is not finite and enclosed, but infinite and fluid, with sheer 
absence at its unobtainable centre.  The turn back to the Open in Blanchot’s account is therefore far 
from the singular and redemptive turn described by Heidegger.   
An essay focussed on Hölderlin and originally published as ‘Le Tournant’ is included in the 
appendix of L’Espace littéraire.  Blanchot begins by rehearsing the argument of Beda Allemann, who 
writes that the poet, in earlier work such as Hyperion and Empedocles, seeks reconciliation with 
nature, and the divine, through a desire for death.104  In later work such as the hymns — Blanchot 
                                                          
102 Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 185. 
103 Ibid., p. 186. 
104 See Beda Allemann, Hölderlin et Heidegger, trans. by François Fédier, 2nd edn (Paris: PUF, [1959] 1987).  
The text was published in German in 1954 and appeared in French translation five years later in 1959; 
Blanchot’s article appeared in January 1955 and is one of the last to be included in L’Espace littéraire.  Paul de 
Man is critical of Allemann, who proposes a homogeneity between Heidegger and Hölderlin which rests on the 
movement of reversal that occurs in both: ‘There is not to be found in Hölderlin a singular ontological reversal, 
but a lived philosophy of repeated reversal, that is nothing more than the notion of becoming.  Since there is 
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references ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage...’ as a well known example thanks to Heidegger’s commentary, 
which itself became known in France thanks to his review from 1946, ‘La Parole “sacrée” de 
Hölderlin’ — the poet’s task becomes one of mediation, as he stands in intimate relation with the 
gods.105  A reversal occurs in Hölderlin’s work, as he turns away from the gods and back towards the 
world, which is comparable to the Heideggerian turn beyond metaphysics — this is the contention of 
Allemann challenged by Blanchot.   
The section following this introduction begins by stressing the experience of Hölderlin.  
Blanchot had accused Heidegger of neglecting Hölderlin’s experience in 1946 and here, in 1955, the 
irresolvable tension of the poetic experience undermines the ‘rich conception’ of the turning offered 
by Heidegger: ‘Il y a là une énergique lucidité, une affirmation énergique des limites de l’expérience à 
laquelle tout devrait l’inviter à s’abandonner sans réserve: elle ne doit pas nous tourner vers 
l’immédiat, non seulement il y a risque de périr dans l’embrasement du feu, mais elle ne le peut pas, 
l’immédiat est impossible.’106  The more Hölderlin experiences the fire of the sky, the more he 
expresses the necessity not to deliver oneself to it excessively.  This limitless experience of the limit 
reflects a tension between the desire for the immediate and the law of mediation.  The turning for both 
Rilke and Hölderlin is not singular and redemptive but repeated and doubled because it endlessly 
encounters the impossible.  Blanchot writes that death is the side of life that is turned away 
[détourner] from us in Rilke’s Notebooks.  In order to turn back [retourner] to death and the Open, 
the poet must turn away [détourner] from the exterior world of objects toward a more interior 
consciousness; but it is our ability as human beings to will death that makes such an inward turn 
possible — the condition of impossibility is shown to be the condition of possibility.  Rilke recognises 
that we are turned away [se détourner] from the Open by our awareness of our mortality.  Death, in 
the essays on Rilke and Hölderlin, becomes the limit at which everything turns back [se renverser, se 
retourner].107   
                                                          
always reversal, there is never any effective reconciliation, not even in the early works’ (Blindness and Insight, 
p. 265).   
105 Blanchot, ‘L’Itinéraire de Hölderlin’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 363-74 (pp. 363-64) (first publ. as ‘Le 
Tournant’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 25 (January 1955), 110-20). 
106 Blanchot, ‘L’Itinéraire de Hölderlin’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 369-70. 
107 Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 190. 
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The suggestion, in the closing section of the essay on Hölderlin, is that the experience of 
repeated reversal is comparable to the experience of the Open in Rilke: ‘c’est le cœur de l’homme qui 
doit devenir le lieu où la lumière s’éprouve, l’intimité où l’écho de la profondeur vide devient parole, 
mais non pas par une simple et facile métamorphose.’108  The closing lines of the essay cite Hölderlin 
at a time of madness: 
 
Et quand nous lisons ces mots rayonnants de la folie: ‘Voudrais-je être une comète?  Oui.  Car 
elles ont la rapidité des oiseaux, elles fleurissent en feu et elles sont en pureté comme des 
enfants’, nous pressentons comme a pu se réaliser, pour le poète, dans la pureté que lui a 
assurée sa rectitude insigne, le désir de s’unir au feu, au jour, et nous ne sommes pas surpris de 
cette métamorphose qui, avec la rapidité silencieuse d’un vol d’oiseau, l’entraîne désormais par 
le ciel, fleur de lumière, astre qui brûle, mais qui s’épanouit innocemment en fleur.109 
 
Hölderlin suggests that the turn to the Sacred, the immediate, the Open, is achievable; perhaps his 
madness is evidence of this indifference.110  Blanchot’s rewriting of these lines, however, does not 
bear witness to the incineration of this comet but to its light which at once destroys and unveils.  
Figurative language becomes more literal in this rewriting as the comet transforms into blossoming 
flower, signalling not reconciliation between the human and the gods but multiple metamorphoses 
which result from this endless confrontation with the outside.111 
 The poetic experience is sketched as a hedgehog curled up on a road by Derrida when asked, 
by the Italian journal Poesia in November 1988, ‘Che cos’è la poesia?’  What is poetry?  ‘Pas le 
                                                          
108 Blanchot, ‘L’Itinéraire de Hölderlin’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 373. 
109 Ibid., p. 374. 
110 Blanchot will later write of madness in terms of indifference (in ‘L’Oubli, la déraison’, in L’Entretien infini, 
pp. 289-99) and equate madness in La Folie du jour to being blinded by light.  A discussion of both texts takes 
place in Chapter Four. 
111 Lacoue-Labarthe, breaking with the Romantic Hölderlin of Heidegger, points to the sober literalness of the 
poet: ‘le commentaire emphatique et pieux de Heidegger — pour ne rien dire de sa très pesante 
surdétermination politique —, qui se prête si mal à la diction propre de ce poème, toute de “sobriété”. […] il 
faut — il fallait — une singulière mauvaise foi, et des intentions très précises, pour dénier a priori ce que 
j’appellerai le sens, au reste désespéré, de la réalité dans le dernier Hölderlin.  Ou, si vous préférez, son 
“exigence de la vérité”’ (Heidegger, pp. 86-88). 
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phénix, pas l’aigle, le hérisson, très bas, tout bas, près de la terre.  Ni sublime, ni incorporel, angélique 
peut-être, et pour un temps.’112  This is not a meeting between the otherwise absent gods and the 
human, but a lowly nocturnal affair concerning the possibility of grounding.  Derrida’s response 
echoes Blanchot’s rewriting of Hölderlin through the sober selection of the hedgehog; the lack of any 
verb, any designation of existence, similarly stresses the suspension of world in this poetic experience.  
Perhaps we are here reminded of Schlegel’s hedgehog, that animal turned in on itself and detached 
from the surrounding world like the fragment which represents organic individuality and the work.  
The hedgehog of Derrida’s response is very different; in rolling itself up into a ball the hedgehog is 
not protected from the elements but all the more fragile and vulnerable, exposed to the (mechanical) 
dangers of the road.  It anticipates death, it is being-for-death in a way that Heidegger refuses to the 
animal, but remains open to the outside because, Derrida explains fifteen months later in an exchange 
with Maurizio Ferraris, the aporia of dying, death as the most proper possibility of Dasein, is never 
closed in Being and Time.113  In crossing and curling up on the road the hedgehog is the arrivant, the 
new and unexpected, which signals the coming of the event that never arrives (the poem); it 
simultaneously marks and crosses a limit, making possible everything to which it cannot be reduced.  
Central to the history of Being for Heidegger is our ability to recollect a primal relationship 
with Being, to live once again in the presence of Being, through the poetic saying of Hölderlin.  The 
opening lines of Derrida’s response underscore the aporia of forgetting which prevents the completion 
of this turning and the inception of another history: ‘Pour répondre à une telle question — en deux 
mots, n’est-ce pas? — on te demande de savoir renoncer au savoir.  Et de bien le savoir, sans jamais 
l’oublier: démobilise la culture mais ce que tu sacrifies en route, en traversant la route, ne l’oublie 
jamais dans ta docte ignorance.’114  We must forget in order to remember; but we can never renounce 
all knowledge.115  You would like, Derrida writes, to retain by heart a singular event; you desire 
                                                          
112 Jacques Derrida, ‘Chè cos’è la poesia?’, in Points de suspension: entretiens (Paris: Galilée, 1992), pp. 303-08 
(p. 307). 
113 Derrida, ‘Istrice 2: Ick bünn all hier’, in Points de suspension, pp. 309-36. 
114 Derrida, ‘Chè cos’è la poesia?’, in Points de suspension, p. 303. 
115 Blanchot writes elsewhere that we cannot know the limits of forgetting: ‘ Tu ne trouveras pas les limites 
de l’oubli, si loin que tu puisses oublier’ (Maurice Blanchot, L’Attente L’Oubli (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), p. 68).  
See Chapter Four for discussion of forgetting and exteriority in Blanchot.  
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absolute inseparation; but it is precisely this ‘by heart’ which is problematic because confided, ‘à une 
certaine extériorité de l’automate, aux lois de la mnémotechnique, à cette liturgie qui mime en surface 
la mécanique, à l’automobile qui surprend ta passion et vient sur toi comme du dehors: auswendig, 
“par cœur” en allemand.’116  The ‘by heart’ means automaticity or technicity, at the very least 
animality (and here there is an echo of Rilke who turns toward the worldly inner space of the heart to 
access the Open, which is otherwise reserved for animals).  In crossing the road we sacrifice the 
poetic to the automation of artificial memory, what Heidegger wants to maintain outside poeticising 
and thinking.  ‘By heart’ therefore reaches beyond organic bodily limits and signals an originary 
contamination by the inorganic: ‘il efface les bords, il échappe aux mains, tu l’entends à peine, mais il 
nous apprend le cœur.’117 
The turn for Heidegger is very much related to technology.  In the age of metaphysics the 
essence of technology threatens to transform everything into a calculable resource to be exploited.  
The turn back toward the Open offered by Sage is the event which marks the beginning of a new era.  
Blanchot borrows much from Heidegger’s ‘Why Poets?’ but remains carefully guarded in relation to 
Heidegger’s Seinsgeschichte and omits any discussion of technology from his essay.  The emphasis 
placed on experience and the movement of his own critical thought throughout ‘Rilke et l’exigence de 
la mort’ indicates why Blanchot does not follow Heidegger down this route.  Blanchot is attentive to 
the mobility of syntax, whereas Heidegger focuses on static words.  A footnote to an essay published 
in 1957 accuses Heidegger of abusing etymology:  
 
                                                          
116 Derrida, ‘Chè cos’è la poesia?’, in Points de suspension, p. 306. 
117 Ibid., p. 308.  Leslie Hill writes that, in refusing any explicit or implicit appeal to an ontology of the artwork 
and any reliance on the metaphysical category of the aesthetic or the supposed autonomy of poetic language 
or discourse, Derrida’s modest yet radical purpose in this response ‘was to reconsider the minimal conditions 
of possibility of what in the Western tradition has come to be known as literature.’  The name given to these 
conditions by Derrida was iterability, that paradoxical doubling which binds repetition to alterity and which 
marks a fundamental property of all language.  If there was something distinctive about literature in general 
for Derrida, it derived ‘from the remarkable diligence with which a literary work, radicalising a feature inherent 
in all inscription as such, could always point to itself, among others, as a so-called literary text.’  Hill 
demonstrates that the hedgehog of Derrida’s response marks not a retreat into the interiority of the self but 
an exposure to danger, an encounter with the outside which is the experience preceding and exceeding poetry 
or the poetic.  Leslie Hill, ‘On the Persistence of Hedgehogs’, in The Agon and its Agony: Twentieth-Century 




l’attention, portée au langage par Heidegger et qui est d’un caractère extrêmement pressant, est 
attention aux mots considérés à part, concentrés en eux-mêmes, à tels mots tenus pour 
fondamentaux et tourmentés jusqu’à ce que se fasse entendre, dans l’histoire de leur formation, 
l’histoire de l’être, — mais jamais aux rapports des mots, et moins encore à l’espace antérieur 
que supposent ces rapports et dont le mouvement originaire rend seul possible le langage 
comme déploiement.118 
 
This note goes some way to explaining why Blanchot was not convinced by Seinsgeschichte 
[l’histoire de l’être].  Heidegger presupposes finding in words the evidence of truth; in his 
philosophical desire for the unity and totality of truth, he tortures words, lifting them out of their 
context and considering them in isolation.  In ‘Why Poets?’, for instance, the term ‘das Offene’ is 
extracted and translated into numerous ‘synonyms’ which seem disjointed from the original context of 
the Duino Elegies: ‘The gravity of the pure forces, the unheard centre, the pure Bezug, the whole 
Bezug, full Nature, life, the risk are all the same.  All the names just offered name beings as such in 
their entirety.  The conventional idiom of metaphysics offers the name “Being” for them as well.’119  
Rather than focusing on single immobile words, Blanchot seeks to capture the incessant movement of 
Rilke’s syntax which signals the radical non-foundation of the neuter — that indeterminate element 
felt in death, the abyss, and once too hastily attributed by Rilke to the modern city.   
The possibility of an authentic death is repeatedly implied only to be crossed out by its 
impossible premise; the transformation of the visible into the invisible is implied and then suspended 
in quotation marks and italics; the turn to death and the Open plays a significant role throughout the 
essay but is annulled by the errant nature of the discussion.  Blanchot substitutes the experience of the 
limitless affirmation of the limit for Heidegger’s founding event.120  ‘Dernier témoin, fin de l’histoire, 
                                                          
118 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Une Entente nouvelle de l’espace littéraire’, in Le Livre à Venir (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), 
pp. 317-32 (p. 320 n. 1) (first publ. as ‘Le Livre à venir’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 59 (November 
1957), 917-31). 
119 Heidegger, ‘Why Poets?’, in Off the Beaten Track, p. 212; Gesamtausgabe, V, 283. 
120 See Jérôme de Gramont in Blanchot et la phénoménologie (Paris: Corlevour, 2011), pp. 57-80.  De Gramont 
distinguishes between the Heideggerian event and the experience of the limit in Blanchot, but risks reading 
the neuter as ontology by overlooking or underestimating the significance of the impossibility of an authentic 
relation to death and dying for Blanchot. 
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époque, tournant, crise — ou bien fin de la philosophie (métaphysique)’ — these terms, listed at the 
beginning of a fragment in L’Écriture du désastre, demonstrate the fundamental aporia affecting 
historicism.  The claim that everything is historical is based on a state of being which is anything but 
historical and so disproves itself; the idea that there might be an end to metaphysics is itself a 
metaphysical view.  In this fragment, writing bears the fluid traits which imply a turning only to leave 
it hanging above an abyss, simultaneously marking a change and suspending it: ‘Pourquoi écrire, 
entendu comme changement d’époque, entendu comme l’expérience (la non-expérience) du désastre, 
implique-t-il chaque fois les mots inscrits en tête de ce “fragment”, qu’il révoque cependant?  Qu’il 
révoque, même si ce qui  s’y annonce, s’y annonce comme un nouveau qui a toujours déjà eu lieu, 
changement radical dont tout présent s’exclut.’121  The fluidity of language here and in ‘Rilke et 
l’exigence de la mort’ challenges the identification of metaphysics with technology.  Blanchot moves 
beyond the historicising of death and technology alike, relating the inhuman, the mechanical, 
repetition, the impersonal, to the non-experience of dying.  
The technical, which plays a significant role in ‘Why Poets?’, is therefore omitted from ‘Rilke 
et l’exigence de la mort’ not because Blanchot has in some way misinterpreted Heidegger’s claims: 
the technical resonates from that unknowable outside in which all that is inhuman is located.  Again 
there is a significant divergence between these two readings of Rilke: while Heidegger disregards the 
notion that animals have access to the Open, Blanchot accepts that there is an inhuman aspect to this 
space of confrontation and merger: ‘L’horreur de la guerre éclaire sombrement ce qu’il y a 
d’inhumain pour l’homme dans cet abîme’.122  Indeed, Blanchot’s account of the flies in Malte’s 
bedroom seems to contain within it all of the complexities of his view of death as the impossibility of 
possibility, of the Open as the experience of the limitlessness of the limit, of the turn as mobile and 
yet suspended, as well as his rejection of the historicising of an authentic relation to death: 
 
                                                          
121 Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre, pp. 158-59.  
122 Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 164.  Elsewhere in the essay, Blanchot 
notes that Rilke had to admit that the literary experience had an inhuman aspect which he labelled the void (p. 
197 n. 1). 
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Parfois, quand la peur le saisit, il lui faut bien entendre le bourdonnement anonyme du ‘mourir’ 
qui n’est nullement par la faute des temps ni par la négligence des gens: en tout temps, tous, 
nous mourons comme des mouches que l’automne jette dans les chambres où elles tournoient 
aveuglément dans un vertige immobile, tapissant tout à coup les murs de leur sotte mort.123 
 
Human beings ‘die’ just as these flies ‘die’ (the quotation marks suspending this process in the extract 
above).  The extent to which Blanchot excludes any discussion of the animal in this essay is perhaps 
surprising, given that animals play a large role in the formulation of the Open in the eighth Elegy; 
however, contained within the above reference to flies in Rilke is Blanchot’s entire conception of the 
possible-impossible experience of dying which is not reserved for the human.  The experience of 
dying is a confrontation with an outside in which all that is inhuman errs — this is not outside thought 
in opposition to inside, but an outside which, like the other night, is irreducible to any such binary. 
 
Animals and Automation 
Animals, in their ignorance of their own mortality, gaze into the boundless Rilkean Open; humans, 
constrained by the knowledge of their approaching death, can only look backwards: ‘What is really 
out there [Was drauβen ist] we only know | by looking at the countenance of creatures. | For we take a 
young child and force it | to turn around, to see shapes and forms, | and not the Open that is so deep in 
the face | of an animal. Free from death.’124  Heidegger inverts the hierarchy constructed by Rilke; the 
human stands at the top of the clear and stable order which composes Dasein: ‘The stone is worldless, 
the animal is poor in world, the human forms a world [der Stein ist weltlos, das Tier ist weltarm, der 
Mensch ist weltbildend].’125  The animal is poor in world because it does not perceive being as Being; 
beings only appear to the animal as elements of its environment, consequently the animal is 
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124 Rilke, Duino Elegies, pp. 62-63. 
125 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. by William McNeill and Nicholas 
Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 176; Gesamtausgabe, XXIX-XXX: Die Grundbegriffe 
der Metaphysik: Welt — Endlichkeit — Einsamkeit (2004), 261.  Leslie Hill notes that it is unlikely that Blanchot 
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Fragmentation, Politics’, unpublished article. 
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surrounded by a circle of its urges rather than things.  Only man sees being in the light of Being.  The 
difference between man and animals is underscored by the animal’s lack of language; the animal is 
deprived of speech because it does not have access to the world as the struggle between concealment 
and disclosure.126  This account of the negativity of the animal’s worldly or spiritual poverty, from a 
lecture course from 1929 to 1930, led Derrida to argue that Heidegger’s characterisation of animal life 
perpetuates the humanistic and anthropocentric prejudices that have long dominated Western 
philosophy.  There is no animal Dasein, nor is the animal Vorhandensein or Zuhandensein; Heidegger 
thinks the animal only as a median between stone and man, and so his thesis remains, ‘foncièrement 
téléologique et traditionnelle, pour ne pas dire dialectique.’127  
References to animals by Blanchot may be easily overlooked because there are only ever 
fleeting glimpses or passing comparisons; the creatures which do appear are not majestic beasts, 
household pets, or farmyard animals, but almost always what we may consider unexceptional, perhaps 
even base or dirty, and alien: several rodents, numerous flies, a butterfly, a caterpillar, dragonflies, 
cuckoos, a magpie, a nightingale, a skylark, a stag beetle, a squirrel, woodlice, toads, fish, a lizard, a 
wolf.  These creatures, from fictional and critical work, tell us something significant about the 
experience of writing and dying when they appear.   
In 1943, Blanchot tentatively proposes a comparison between writer and animal, remarking 
that both live a lonely existence, only to then re-inscribe some sort of Heideggerian hierarchy: ‘Ces 
images, si naturelles qu’elles soient, ne sont pas convaincantes.  La bête muette, c’est au témoin 
intelligent qu’elle apparaît en proie à la solitude.’128  The implication here is that this witness is a 
human and it is only down to his or her presence that the animal can be deemed solitary; the mute 
beast lacks a sense of otherness because it lacks language.129  The solitude reserved for the writer is 
not a solipsistic refuge but an exposure to the outside; the anguish experienced by the solitary writer 
deprives him or her of the relation with another, estranges him or her from human reality, and likens 
                                                          
126 For an overview of Dasein and animality, see Haar, pp. 63-71. 
127 Derrida, ‘De l’esprit’, in Heidegger et la question, p. 71. 
128 Blanchot, ‘De l‘angoisse au langage’, in Faux pas, pp. 9-23 (p. 10). 
129 The writer has privileged access to this solitude or sense of anguish; it does not occur to us, Blanchot writes, 
to consider the anguish of the cobbler in the same way (Ibid., p. 11). 
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him or her (perhaps surprisingly following the previous quotation) to something inhuman, in this 
instance vermin: ‘ainsi depouillé, et prêt à s’enfoncer dans sa particularité monstrueuse, [l’angoisse] le 
rejette hors de soi et [...] elle le confond avec ce qu’il n’est pas’.130  From an early point in his career 
as a novelist and critic then, the difference between animals and humans proves to be extraordinarily 
fragile for Blanchot as he recognises the otherness reserved for the writer as the figure who 
experiences the frailty of world.  The elaboration of the inhuman in Blanchot’s writing demonstrates 
the extent to which he moves beyond an understanding of language as the sheltering ‘house of Being’, 
solely accessed by the human, toward a view of literature as the medium that dismantles the sovereign 
subject through exposure to the alterity of the outside.    
At the midway point of L’Arrêt de mort, a récit first published in 1948, a parallel is drawn 
between one of the female protagonists, Nathalie, and a squirrel.  Nathalie enters the narrator’s hotel 
room early one morning; she stands in the middle of the room like a statue, but is paralysed with fear 
rather than made of stone.  The narrator remarks that something irreversible has happened 
(‘l’irrémédiable était arrivé’), before recounting the time he witnessed a squirrel become trapped in a 
cage hanging from a tree:   
 
J’ai vu une fois un écureuil se faire prendre dans une cage pendue à un arbre: il franchissait le 
seuil avec tout l’élan de sa vie la plus gaie, mais à peine sur la planchette intérieure, le léger 
déclic ayant rabattu la porte, et bien qu’il n’eût aucun mal, qu’il fût encore libre, car la cage 
était vaste avec dedans un petit tas de coquilles, son sautillement s’était brisé net et il demeurait 
paralysé, frappé dans le dos par la certitude que maintenant le piège l’avait pris.131 
 
The vastness of the cage means that the squirrel remains free even once the trap has closed and the 
small pile of nuts inside ensures its survival: this is both a death sentence and the suspension of death, 
transforming the squirrel and Nathalie alike into living statues.  Neither are sovereign subjects in this 
debilitating experience which shakes the human-animal hierarchy to the core.  The irreversible is 
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131 Maurice Blanchot, L’Arrêt de mort, L’Imaginaire, 15 (Paris: Gallimard, [1948] 1977), pp. 65-66. 
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therefore a realisation that something other is in control, something beyond the limits of the cage 
which has always already preceded any account of Being.  Emmanuel Levinas calls this anonymous 
force the il y a, a sort of impersonal field which presents being and cannot itself be negated, since the 
necessity of affirmation always precedes the possibility of negation.  The il y a constitutes a radical 
challenge to dialectical thought and renders any origin or event, beginning or ending, impossible.132 
In a 1943 review of The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, Blanchot writes: ‘L’angoisse 
découvre à l’homme qu’il existe dans chaque parcelle de l’air un je ne sais quoi de terrible, et cette 
existence du terrible est l’épreuve même de l’existence.’133  The il y a is so terrible for Malte because 
he staunchly tries to remain faithful to himself, refusing to embrace what terrifies him in his death: its 
impossibility.  He clings on to the hope that he will die an authentic death; however, as his childhood 
fear, referred to in one episode as ‘das Große’ reminds him, death brings with it a radical 
transformation into something completely other: ‘Now it was there.  Now it grew out of me like a 
tumour, like a second head, and was a part of me, though it could not belong to me at all, because it 
was so big.  It was there like a huge, dead beast, that had once, when it was still alive, been my hand 
or my arm.’134  Limbs, distanced from any bodily identity, morph into strange animals in this 
anonymizing experience.  What emerges is nothing familiar, comforting, or natural, but an 
unrecognisable inhuman.  Rilke maintains in 1923 that animals are ignorant of their mortality in the 
Duino Elegies.  Significantly for Blanchot, by L’Arrêt de mort, this anguished revelation is not 
reserved for the human.  It is for this reason that we must reject Ulrich Baer’s passing comment that 
the ‘philosopher’ Maurice Blanchot, along with Martin Heidegger and Giorgio Agamben, has 
interpreted the eighth Elegy as ‘a treatise about the ontological difference between human and 
animal.’135  Blanchot’s concern is what precedes or gives ontology which itself has no origin and 
exceeds the distinction between human and animal. 
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To return to the ensnared squirrel of L’Arrêt de mort: within this cage it is free to move and to 
survive, but this is a limited freedom normally reserved for people.  Here the squirrel is exposed to the 
experience of death and so, like Nathalie, it is irreversibly altered, transformed into a moribund figure.  
One page later, Nathalie, her hair longer than usual, makes a bid for freedom having been reminded of 
the room’s limitations when she knocks into a table: 
 
A ce bruit elle répondit par un ricanement de peur, et fila comme une flèche.  Tout alors devient 
confus.  J’imagine qu’à partir de ce cri j’étais hors de moi.  La voyant bondir vers l’air libre, 
l’instinct de proie me saisit, je la rattrapai vers l’escalier, la pris à bras-le-corps et la ramenai en 
la traînant à terre jusque sur le lit où elle tomba tout à fait.  Ma colère, l’une des rares que j’aie 
eues depuis mon enfance si coléreuse, n’avait plus de borne.  Je ne sais d’où venait cette 
violence, j’aurais pu à un tel moment tout faire: lui casser le bras, lui écraser la tête ou 
m’enfoncer le front dans le mur, car cette force furieuse n’était pas, il me semble, dirigée 
particulièrement contre elle.  C’était une puissance sans but, pareille au souffle du tremblement 
de terre, qui secouait, renversait les êtres.  Ce souffle, moi-même, j’en ai été ébranlé, et ainsi je 
suis devenu une tempête qui a ouvert les montagnes et rendu la mer folle.136 
 
Both characters are overcome by their instincts in this passage.  Assuming the roles of predator and 
prey they behave like animals: Nathalie bounds for freedom sniggering fearfully; the narrator chases 
after her, dragging his prey along the floor in an uncontrollable and limitless rage, comparable to a 
natural disaster powerful enough to tear the ground from beneath them.  Neither the narrator nor 
Nathalie can be described as human in this brief moment; like the squirrel, both assume a disturbing 
otherness.  The possibility of an authentic death and language constitute human existence for 
Heidegger and ensure that we, and not animals, understand Being as such.  When the conditions of 
authenticity are shown to be impossible for man and animal alike, the distinction between the two is 
suspended and the response to this ‘tout autre exigence’ is a non-linguistic mode of expression 
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bearing some resemblance to animalistic cries and gestures, rather than any redemptive poetic 
language.  
 The fragility of the difference between human and animal in this récit has consequences 
beyond their responses to death and dying.  As beings that are partly inhuman, bearing animalistic or 
savage traits, the narrator, J. and Nathalie experience the solitude which occurs in the presence of an 
estranged and unhearing other.  Linguistic communication is consequently often ineffective and 
replaced by other forms of expression: touch evokes memories and ideas (‘Lentement, je posai ma 
main sur la sienne, ce contact était comme un souvenir amer, une idée, une vérité froide, implacable, 
contre laquelle la lutte n’avait qu’un sens mesquin’); facial expressions communicate strong emotions 
and demands (‘je m’aperçus que son humeur avait changé: sur son visage montait une sorte de 
froideur respectable, un de ces airs de moralité qui rendent ennuyeuse la plus belle figure, et celle-ci 
n’était qu’un peu jolie.  J’eus immédiatement envie de m’en aller’); and the silent gaze transforms the 
‘listener’ (‘Un regard est très différent de ce que l’on croit, il n’a ni lumière ni expression ni force ni 
mouvement, il est silencieux, mais, du sein de l’étrangeté, son silence traverse les mondes, et celui qui 
l’entend devient autre’).137  Michel Haar has criticised Heidegger’s view of the animal, arguing that he 
overlooks other forms of expression beyond language: ‘Malgré cette absence de langage articulé, on 
pourrait objecter à la phénoménologie heideggérienne qu’elle ne tient compte ni des cris, 
gémissements, ni des grimaces, mimiques, gestes, postures qui chez les mammifères par exemple sont 
irréfutablement des modes d’expression.’138  Haar’s criticism cannot be directed at Blanchot.  
Dialogues in this récit are brief and often unsuccessful, generally failing to communicate any decisive 
message: ‘Pour la première fois, je pris le parti de lui téléphoner.  C’était aux environs de midi.  [J.] 
était seule.  Je ne l’entendis presque pas, car dès les premiers mots elle fut prise d’un violent accès de 
toux et de suffocation.  J’écoutai quelques instants ce souffle déchiré, étouffé; puis elle réussit à me 
dire: “Allez-vous-en”, et je raccrochai.’139  The ability to reach out to the being that witnesses one’s 
solitude is what is at stake in this failed communication and in the indeterminate nature of the various 
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cries, howls, splutters and sneers that feature throughout the récit : ‘une sorte de souffle sortit de sa 
bouche encore serrée, un soupir qui peu à peu devint un léger, un faible cri’; ‘elle avait naturellement 
une voix qui surprenait, assez rauque, légèrement voilée, assombrie par le mal et cependant toujours 
très gaie ou très vive’; ‘elle dit avec une grande angoisse: “Vite, une rose par excellence”, tout en 
continuant à dormir mais maintenant avec un léger râle’; ‘Cela fut dit sur le ton le plus orageux, et 
comme un cri forcené que je n’aurais pas trouvé naturel chez la personne la plus violente’.140  The 
narrator endeavours to make himself understood but this moment of comprehension never takes place 
in the here and now.  
The question of an inhuman transformation in the face of impossible death again arises in a 
lengthy study of Lautréamont’s Les Chants de Maldoror, published one year after L’Arrêt de mort in 
1949.  Blanchot remarks that the creatures who populate the definitive edition of the first song — the 
octopus with the silken gaze, the horseshoe bat, the toad, the itch bite which causes scabies — have 
taken the place of the name Dazet, which appears in the first edition of the song published one year 
earlier.141  Georges Dazet is an old classmate, a relic from the author Isidore Ducasse’s past.  This is 
not some mere literary artifice, writes Blanchot; we have not caught Lautréamont in the act of 
replacing one name for another.  This interruption signals something far more radical: that the author 
has been transformed by the experience of writing this text.142  Dazet ceases to be Dazet and the 
inhuman emerges from the depths to take his place.  How does this happen?  Surely Ducasse is not 
complicit in his own transformation?  Blanchot has a theory: ‘La vérité est qu’en effet à ce moment 
Dazet meurt et si complètement que la main qui le rejette au néant, reviendra plus tard sur le passé 
pour effacer toutes les traces de son existence.’143  A second hand returns to the text to haunt the first: 
in doubling the hand in this way Blanchot contests the limit between nature and technology, because 
this second hand cannot be described as organic.   
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In ‘La Solitude essentielle’ [1953], an essay which would later be selected to open L’Espace 
littéraire, Blanchot considered solitude once again, attributing it here to the work rather than the 
figure of the writer.  The essay begins with a reference to Rilke, differentiating his meditative solitude 
from the radical solitude of the work.  The distinction between the two forms of solitude can be 
mapped onto the distinction between the book and the work: 
 
ce que l’écrivain a en vue, c’est l’œuvre, et ce qu’il écrit, c’est un livre.  Le livre, comme tel, 
peut devenir un événement agissant du monde (action cependant toujours réservée et 
insuffisante), mais ce n’est pas l’action que l’artiste a en vue, c’est l’œuvre, et ce qui fait du 
livre le substitut de l’œuvre suffit à en faire une chose qui, comme l’œuvre, ne relève pas de la 
vérité du monde.144 
 
The work is solitary because, unlike the book which is unreliable or insufficient action in the world, 
the work suspends the world of familiarity.  Blanchot portrays a writer in the process of being erased; 
the solitary work to which he or she belongs is not contained within itself, or within world, but is 
always open to the outside: ‘Le “Il” qui se substitue au “Je”, telle est la solitude qui arrive à l’écrivain 
de par l’œuvre.  “Il” ne désigne pas le désintéressement objectif, le détachement créateur.  “Il” ne 
glorifie pas la conscience en un autre qui moi, l’essor d’une vie humaine qui, dans l’espace imaginaire 
de l’œuvre d’art, garderait la liberté de dire “Je”.  “Il”, c’est moi-même devenu personne, autrui 
devenu l’autre’.145   
One section of this essay considers the role of hands in the composition of a solitary work: 
‘La Préhension persécutrice’.  Here Blanchot argues that there are always at least two hands involved 
in writing: one deals in the possible and looks to assert itself as master by bringing the writer’s task to 
an end and releasing the pencil; the other continues to write even when asked to stop by the first hand: 
‘La maîtrise de l’écrivain n’est pas dans la main qui écrit, cette main “malade” qui ne lâche jamais le 
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crayon, qui ne peut le lâcher, car ce qu’elle tient, elle ne le tient pas réellement’.146  While the first 
hand seeks to put an end to this task, the hand that makes writing possible undermines the conditions 
of this possibility by refusing to let go of the pencil, by never even having a real hold on that pencil.  
The other hand deals with something beyond the world in a time that is ‘barely human’.  The 
quotation marks suspending ‘malade’ highlight the uncertain status of this other hand as it hovers over 
the page, neither grasping nor letting go of the pencil it is impossible to tell whether it is dead or alive, 
singular or plural, animal or human.  The writer belongs to the work but only ever achieves the book; 
torn between action in the world and the désœuvrement of the outside, he or she is unable to put an 
end to this task.  This more radical solitude of the work reveals a fissure between writing and world: 
‘Écrire, c’est [...] retirer le langage du cours du monde, le dessaisir de ce qui fait de lui un pouvoir par 
lequel, si je parle, c’est le monde qui se parle, c’est le jour qui s’édifie par le travail, l’action et le 
temps.’147  The writer is exposed to the radical solitude of the work by the hand that withdraws 
language from world.   
Blanchot’s consideration of hands in this subsection bears some resemblance to a passage 
from The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge; it seems likely that he had this text in mind given the 
reference to Rilke in the opening paragraphs.  In this passage, a young Malte drops a crayon while 
drawing a picture of a solitary knight on horseback.  He kneels down under the table, his left hand 
supporting him, and gropes around in the dark with his right hand looking for the crayon.  He watches 
as this hand becomes distanced from him to the extent that it resembles ‘an aquatic animal, examining 
the ground’.  A ghostly disembodied hand suddenly emerges from the wall, a fur rug stretches 
between Malte and this wall: ‘I felt that one of the hands belonged to me, and that it was committing 
itself to something irreparable.  With all the authority I had over it, I checked it and drew it back flat 
and slowly, without taking my eyes off the other, which went on groping.  I realized that it would not 
leave off’.148   
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Malte’s left hand is engaged in work in the world; it resembles the first hand described by 
Blanchot in ‘La Solitude essentielle’.  Malte’s right hand reaches out, pulls away from bodily identity 
and transforms into an indeterminate animal.  The hand that reaches out to him is described as ‘a 
larger, extraordinarily thin hand, such as I had never seen before’.  This hand is also not necessarily a 
human hand; it certainly does not seem to bear any human characteristics and it seems at least 
noteworthy that a fur rug marks the region where this encounter takes place.  It is unclear whether this 
hand is a reflection of Malte’s own hand, the hand of another human, the hand of another animal, dead 
or alive.  It reaches out to grasp Malte’s hand but is refused.  Could it have grasped or touched him in 
the first place?  If it is like the hand that writes in ‘La Solitude essentielle’ it would have been able to 
neither grasp nor release.  One thing is, however, certain: what Malte has embarked upon cannot be 
undone.  This encounter with the other forever exposes him to the alterity of the outside and to the 
impossible and irreversible experience of dying and writing.   
Thinking is described by Heidegger as a craft [Hand-werk].149  The hand serves a purpose 
beyond its everyday use as a bodily organ; it is the means by which the human stretches out and 
receives itself in the other — Blanchot welcomes this aspect of Heidegger’s thought.  However, 
Heidegger restricts the hand to the human (paw, fin and claw are excluded from his thinking of the 
hand) and thinks the hand only in the singular; this is noted by Derrida who remarks that when both 
hands do appear they are folded together as one, for instance in prayer.150  The essence of the hand, 
according to Heidegger, does not let it be determined as an organic part of the body for grasping — 
apes have organs that can grasp — but as a thought that gives and is given; he denies the hand as first 
instrument.  Derrida reveals an aporetic logic governing Heidegger’s thinking of the hand (‘Le Dasein 
n’est ni vorhanden, ni zuhanden.  Son mode de présence est autre mais il faut bien qu’il ait la main 
pour se rapporter aux autres modes de présence’)151 and shows that a critique of modern technology is 
evident in the privileging of the singular hand of thinking and craftsmanship, threatened, in 
Heidegger’s account, by industrial automation and modern mechanization.   
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In stark contrast, hands in Blanchot are always plural, possibly animal, and disperse rather 
than gather.152  Hands surface in L’Arrêt de mort as characters perform mundane tasks (‘Elle avait à 
portée de la main le téléphone’), as they try to communicate (‘je reçus quelques lignes de la main de 
J., de sa main plutôt que de son écriture’), and as they reach out to others (‘je pris doucement la main, 
le poignet de J. (qui dormait), et à peine l’eus-je touchée, elle se redressa, les yeux ouverts, me 
regardant d’un air furibond, et me repoussa en disant: “Ne me touchez plus jamais”’).  These hands 
have a transformative, even destructive, effect on those they touch: ‘Je n’avais plus la moindre crainte 
pour moi, mais j’avais une crainte extrême pour elle, de l’effaroucher, de la transformer, par la peur, 
en une chose sauvage qui se briserait sous mes mains’.153  The plaster casts of the hands of J. and 
Nathalie in particular reflect the uncertain status of the hand which closes the text.  The survival of 
J.’s hands beyond her death in plaster form and the disunity that characterises the lines spreading 
across the palms incite wonder in the narrator toward the beginning of the text, while the infinite 
mortality of the cast produced from Nathalie’s hands horrifies the narrator in the closing pages: ‘Et 
que maintenant cette chose est là-bas, que vous l’avez dévoilée et, l’ayant vue, vous avez vu face à 
face ce qui est vivant pour l’éternité, pour la vôtre et pour la mienne!  Oui, je le sais, je le sais, je l’ai 
toujours su.’154  The hand is at once what is most human and most inhuman; the two versions of the 
plaster casts in this text reveal that hands transgress the presumed border between nature and 
technology.   
The sight of these inhuman hands, the acknowledgement of their finitude which traps the 
narrator and Nathalie, provokes the irreversible realisation that something other which cannot be 
negated, which precedes any account of Being, is in control.  The writing hand always intervenes and 
suspends this world.  A further passage from The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge echoes the 
experience of Blanchot’s protagonists. Rilke’s narrator speaks, in the second person, of exceeding 
your own boundaries: like a beetle that is trodden on you gush out of yourself, beyond your limits; 
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your hands cannot contain your ‘infinitely ramified being [deines zahlloszweigigen Daseins]’.155  The 
role of hands in both texts is not to gather existence into one unified and finite bodily identity which 
would represent some philosophical truth, but to reach beyond existence toward the outside, death, the 
inhuman, and a dispersion that precedes all gathering.  
The hand haunting the suppressed third section of L’Arrêt de mort stresses the significance of 
this motif to the text.  At the end of the first edition of this text, Blanchot’s narrator asks us to imagine 
the hand that once wrote and is still writing these pages: ‘Que cela soit donc rappelé à qui lirait ces 
pages en les croyant traversées par la pensée du malheur.  Et plus encore, qu’il essaie d’imaginer la 
main qui les écrit: s’il la voyait, peut-être lire lui deviendrait-il une tâche sérieuse.’156  The brief third 
section containing this plea would be deleted in the 1971 edition along with the subtitle ‘récit’ — the 
second edition of this text bears no acknowledgement of the fact that it is a later edition.157  The 
continued non-presence of the other hand ensures that the work never achieves completion and can 
always be copied, edited, rewritten — evidenced by the silent modifications to this text some 23 years 
after its initial publication.  Rilke’s Malte similarly recognises the power of the hand to continue in his 
absence: ‘For a while yet I can write all of this down and express it. But there will come a day when 
my hand will be far from me, and when I bid it write, it will write words I do not mean.’158  Blanchot 
and Rilke are in many ways anticipating Derrida’s understanding of iterability as already a kind of 
technology: ‘Écrire, c’est produire une marque qui constituera une sorte de machine à son tour 
productrice, que ma disparition future n’empêchera pas principiellement de fonctionner et de donner, 
de se donner à lire et à réécrire.’159  Iterability is that paradoxical doubling, not reliant on the authority 
of any author, which means that a text or a word can be repeated; as the condition of possibility of 
writing it simultaneously undermines the possibility of any ‘original’ copy.  Iterability is the logic 
linking repetition to alterity; it is the condition of writing which interrupts the self-identity of the 
                                                          
155 Rilke, The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, p. 69; Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, p. 82. 
156 Maurice Blanchot, L’Arrêt de mort [récit] (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), p. 149. 
157 Derrida considers the unacknowledged changes to L’Arrêt de mort in ‘Survivre’, in Parages, pp. 146-48. 
158 Rilke, The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, p. 52; Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, p. 58. 
159 Derrida, ‘Signature, événement, contexte’, in Marges de la philosophie, pp. 365-93 (p. 376). 
 122 
 
same.  There is a connection, for Blanchot as well as Derrida, between the mechanical and the 
inhuman. 
Nowhere is this clearer in Blanchot’s work than in the essay on Lautréamont.  ‘L’analyse est 
une machine qui ne s’arrête pas facilement’, writes Blanchot in a section entitled ‘Le Mouvement 
perpétuel de l’analyse’.160  Analysis is not easily stopped because any definitive interpretation of the 
work is shown to be illegitimate or insufficient, and so analysis is compelled to continue its 
‘underailable’ mechanical movement, producing differing interpretations of the work with each turn 
of the faulty wheel.  One such interpretation of Les Chants de Maldoror is that this text recounts the 
struggle between God and man; Blanchot cites H. R. Linder, who published Lautréamont: sein Werk 
und sein Weltbild in 1947, as an example of such criticism.  He continues: 
 
ce qui devient alors significatif, c’est qu’au cours d’une telle lutte, l’œuvre se laisse peu à peu 
envahir par une obscure confusion d’êtres métamorphosés, c’est qu’elle s’abandonne à des 
fantômes marécageux, amas de poulpes, de crapauds, de crabes, araignées qui bruissent, 
sangsues qui vampirisent, serpents innombrables.  La poésie de Lautréamont ne livre peut-être 
rien à qui l’interroge naïvement sur Dieu et sur le mal, mais elle se livre elle-même par sa 
tendance à ne pouvoir parler de Dieu que par le moyen de fantastiques figures animales — et 
non pas à nous en parler, mais à oublier de nous en parler, en se condensant autour d’épaisses 
substances vivantes, à la fois surabondamment actives et d’une traînante inertie.161 
 
‘God’ appears in this work not as one figure but as a differing fluid animal forms.  The work is 
constructed around these marshy phantoms which reveal the condition of its possibility, which is the 
absence of any creator beyond its limits, or iterability as its condition of possibility.  Blanchot is not 
here replacing faith in God with the faith in progress characteristic of modernity, because analysis is a 
faulty machine which never delivers any definitive interpretation or truth.  These strange animals are 
ominous, perhaps even terrifying (bloodsucking leeches, murmuring spiders, uncountable snakes), 
                                                          
160 Blanchot, ‘L’Expérience de Lautréamont’, in Lautréamont et Sade, p. 271. 
161 Ibid., p. 273. 
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because they signal danger as the work turns on itself and confronts its own impossibility, that 
enigmatic outside which can never be conceptualised and when it is, by critics such as Linder for 
instance, is only ever ‘une armature rudimentaire, maladroitement reconstruite du dehors’.162  The 
work as a result is as fluid and unstable as these amorphous creatures which Linder seeks to solidify 
by imposing a concrete meaning on the text.  Repetition, for Blanchot in 1949 as much as Derrida in 
1971, and this includes critical interpretations of the literary work, is bound to alterity because it 
interrupts the self-identity of the same.  Iterability is the condition of possibility of all language but its 
effect is heightened in the literary work by its ability to point to itself; it is such outward self-
reflection that ensures Les Chants de Maldoror is flooded by these haunting beasts. 
 The closing chapter of Thomas l’obscur, in which Thomas takes a springtime walk through 
the countryside, is perhaps the most sustained engagement with the ‘natural’ world in Blanchot’s 
entire work, but this is not nature as we know it.  This chapter demonstrates the extent to which 
Blanchot seeks to draw a parallel between the human and the animal as creatures inhabiting a world 
traversed by the outside.  The animals described in this chapter are deprived of world: there are 
dragonflies without wings, blind toads and deaf cuckoos.  Like the animals of the Rilkean Open, they 
live in ignorance of their mortality: the toads look to the future, the notion of perishing compels the 
pupa to become a butterfly, mayflies give the defiant impression that life will last forever.  The 
backdrop is no richer: the sky is transparent and empty, trees bear no fruit, birds fly through 
nothingness, and an immense sea stretches out beneath Thomas’ feet.  On first inspection, this scene 
could appear gloomy; but there is something overwhelmingly positive about Thomas’ walk through 
the countryside, where he exists harmoniously with these strange creatures: ‘Le printemps enveloppa 
Thomas comme une nuit étincelante et il se sentit doucement appelé par cette nature qui débordait de 
félicité.’163  Even the stone, the inanimate object that Heidegger once sentenced to worldlessness, 
gains a world of its own in this joyous scene: ‘Une pierre roulait, et elle glissait à travers une infinité 
de métamorphoses dont l’unité était celle du monde dans sa splendeur.  Au milieu de ces 
                                                          
162 Ibid., p. 274. 
163 Maurice Blanchot, Thomas l’obscur: nouvelle version (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), p.  131. 
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frémissements, la solitude éclata.’164  The weird and wonderful transformations of the stone and the 
animals mentioned above indicate the suspension of the familiar world and an exposure to something 
completely alien.  They affirm the impossibility of dying for both human and animal, neither of whom 
are able to address death as a personal or individual experience because they are erased in this 
process.  The concept of the subject, at least any sovereign subject, is here dismantled by Blanchot.  
The mood of the chapter shifts as Thomas enters the town and encounters the humans who 
have raised themselves to the top of the hierarchy of beings: ‘Ils s’élevaient comme des astres, 
ravageant par leurs cours fortuit l’arrangement universel.  Avec leurs mains aveugles, ils touchaient, 
pour les détruire, les mondes invisibles.’165  The hands which appear here are concerned with action in 
the world: they reach out, touch and destroy from within their finite world.  The hand that writes, 
conversely, never touches or grasps; it responds to the demand of the outside, reaches out to the other 
and suspends the world, opening up the abyss above which the poem hangs and creating a non-
hierarchical society which favours no people or being.  Thomas leads these ‘hommes-étoiles’ to the 
sea, in a literary experience comparable to his own in the first chapter, where they encounter the 
impossibility of dying: ‘se penchant sur la crypte, [ils] demeurèrent là, dans une profonde inertie, à 
attendre mystérieusement que la langue dont chaque prophète, au fond de sa gorge, a senti la 
naissance, sortît de la mer et leur poussât dans la bouche les mots impossibles.’166  Unlike the animals 
compelled to transform when confronted with the impossibility of dying, these people await the 
arrival of a redemptive poetic language, akin to Heidegger’s Sage, which will save them from their 
forlorn state.  This redemption never occurs; the impossible words never fill their mouths; and they do 
not die an authentic death.  Instead, they are called back to the sea where this récit began, lured there 
by the promise of an ending which Thomas recognises will never arrive.  The difference between 
animal and human is fragile in this closing chapter: both are condemned to interminably transform, to 
affirm the abyss above which they all hang when world is suspended.   
                                                          
164 Ibid., p. 132.  The later edition of Thomas l’obscur [1950] quoted here omits a few words from the earlier 
edition: ‘et bien qu’elle [la pierre] fût toujours comme une pierre’ (Thomas l’obscur [1941], p. 318).  This 
omission signals a shift toward a much more fragile world.  
165 Blanchot, Thomas l’obscur: nouvelle version, p. 134. 
166 Ibid., p. 136. 
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The opposition between techne and technology for Heidegger thus gives way in Blanchot’s 
fiction and criticism to a very different experience of language: the mechanical.  The experience of 
writing Thomas l’obscur, his first novel, prompted the evolution in Blanchot which sees him move 
away from a nationalist agenda and a Heideggerian understanding of literature as foundation and truth 
as revealing.  For Heidegger the possibility of a new historic dwelling on earth for the German people 
is revealed through Hölderlin’s mythic saying; Blanchot shifts from such a foundational view of 
literature through his engagement with Mallarmé, the poet of the abyss, and the recognition that 
literary language can take itself as object.  Literature is founded on a ruinous impossibility — the 
bottomless abyss, the outside, the neuter, the il y a — which cannot be overcome and so writing is 
condemned to repeat what it cannot articulate: the experience of dying.  There is no redemptive turn 
or event, only incessant exposure to the outside.  The appearance of hands and animals in Blanchot 
signals the suspension of world, exposing its frailty, shaking the hierarchy holding such an isolated 
system in place to its very core, and creating non-hierarchical differences as opposed to a single 
hierarchical distinction between writer and man, man and animal.  This mechanical, repetitive, 
impersonal, inhuman experience is therefore inseparable from the possibility of literature which does 
not reside in alētheia, but in radical errance.  Such nomadism explains why Thomas is depicted as 
shepherd at the end of Thomas l’obscur, guiding the lost beings back to the sea to start again at the 
beginning (or the end).   
What we encounter in Blanchot’s writing is a strange environment beyond human control or 
understanding into which we may reach and meet, at the limits of the human, an inhuman resistance 
that can only be affirmed.  Unlike Rilke, and subsequently Heidegger, Blanchot privileges neither 
animal nor human, but indicates a region where difference is maintained but released from an 
anthropocentric teleology.  For Blanchot, writing cannot be enclosed within anthropological or 
anthropocentric mastery, which it challenges in the name of the other to which it gives voice.  Perhaps 
at first, because of the urban climates which dominate his récits, Blanchot’s thought seems 
irreconcilable with ecological thinking.  His writing is almost bereft of references to landscapes of any 
sort: in his fictional work we occasionally glimpse the sea, a beach, a distant mountain range, but on 
the whole his characters are located within anonymous urban surroundings.  On his green credentials, 
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Timothy Clark writes: ‘Ultimately, Blanchot’s work may adumbrate a thinking that meets one of the 
most urgent demands of post-enlightenment thought, that is, resources towards a re-enchantment of 
the natural world that would not at the same time be a kind of mystification, evasion or deception.’167  
While Clark accurately highlights a thinking of world that destabilises our traditional view of the 
environment, the description of this work as a ‘re-enchantment of the natural world’ suggests a 
residual Romanticism.  This is not a work that seeks to captivate in its presentation of the natural 
world, but to expose the impossibility of any such ‘nature’ which is always already contaminated by 
the technical.  Earlier we saw that Heidegger is accused of presiding over the naturalisation of 
technology, where the tool or instrument exists simply for Dasein who alone discloses the world.168  
In Blanchot, hands transgress the presumed border between nature and technology, they are 
simultaneously what is most human and most inhuman.  These hands are evidence of an unruly 
technology that is not subordinate to pre-technological ontological questioning, because it precedes 
and exceeds the human subject.
                                                          
167 Timothy Clark, ‘A Green Blanchot: Impossible?’, in Blanchot’s Epoch, ed. by Leslie Hill and Michael Holland 
(= Paragraph, 30: 3 (November 2007)) pp. 121-40 (p. 123).  See also Timothy Clark, ‘Maurice Blanchot and the 
End of Nature’, Parallax, 16: 2 (April 2010), 20-30.   







The Neuter and Modern Technology 
 
The fluid animal forms in the fiction and criticism of the late 1940s, the recurring motif of hands, the 
impersonal and mechanical experience of language, the eternal repetition played out in his writing 
through the impossibility of dying, the silent reproduction of his texts: while Blanchot may not overtly 
discuss modes of ‘technique’ in his essay on Rilke, where Heidegger’s condemnation of technology 
looms in the background, or in other essays of this period, the traits listed above and explored in the 
previous chapter render his view of literature indissociable from an understanding of the complex 
relationship between the artwork and technology.  Almost twenty years earlier, in 1936, Walter 
Benjamin had suggested that technological innovations could create a new experience of art past, 
present and future.  Claiming that the ‘production’ of a unique work is but a special case in the 
reproducibility of works of art — imitation should not necessarily be considered in terms of an 
original and its replicas — Benjamin points to a new technological structure of experience:  
 
It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of reproduction detaches the 
reproduced object from the sphere of tradition.  By replicating the work many times over, it 
substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence.  And in permitting the reproduction to 
reach the recipient in his or her own situation, it actualizes that which is reproduced.  These 
two processes lead to a massive upheaval in the domain of objects handed down from the past 
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— a shattering of tradition which is the reverse side of the present crisis and renewal of 
humanity.1 
 
Technology offers the potential for constant innovation through infinite transformation: if the borders 
of the work of art are permeable and open, then technology enables this constant becoming other of 
the work.2  Technology may thus be considered an art of repetition.  Much of what Benjamin says in 
this essay resonates with the view of the work of art offered in Blanchot’s writing of the 1940s and 
early 1950s, yet Blanchot does not discuss in detail the technological, modes of technique, techne — 
however the somewhat ambiguous French term ‘technique’ should be translated or understood.   
Significant appearances of the term ‘technique’ in essays first published in the 1950s will be 
traced in this chapter, before a consideration of essays from the early- to mid-1960s in which there is 
an explicit discussion of modern technologies such as the atomic bomb, space travel and the printing 
press.  The neuter as a quasi-concept emerges in Blanchot’s writing in 1958 and, this chapter will 
demonstrate, it is no coincidence that this is also when a discussion of technique, the technical, or the 
technological takes precedence in several essays.3  The neuter is a mode of techne (different from, but 
always implicated in, technologies of the modern kind) that makes art possible: 
                                                          
1 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility’, trans. by Edmund Jephcott 
and Harry Zohn, in Selected Writings, ed. by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, 4 vols (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap, 2004-06), III: 1935-1938 (2006), 101-33 (p. 104).  This essay was first published in French in a 
translation by Klossowski in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 5 (1936), 40-68.  See Walter Benjamin, ‘L’Œuvre 
d’art à l’époque de sa reproduction mécanisée’, trans. by Pierre Klossowski, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by 
Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 7 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972-89), I 
(1974), 709-39.  It is unclear whether Blanchot ever read this essay by Benjamin, although we do know that he 
was aware of his work from at least 1959 when he publishes a review of a translation of his selected works by 
Maurice de Gandillac; this review was later published in L’Amitié as ‘Traduire’ (pp. 69-73).  This article was 
mainly concerned with Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator’ (a translation of which has been found in 
Blanchot’s personal archives and is included in Blanchot, ed. by Hoppenot and Rabaté, pp. 55-56), but the 
essay quoted here was included in the same volume of translations and so we may speculate that Blanchot 
was aware, at some point in his career, of this essay.  On Blanchot’s engagement with Benjamin, see Hill, 
Maurice Blanchot and Fragmentary Writing, pp. 429-30 n. 239. 
2 Howard Caygill provides a useful commentary of Benjamin’s essay in Walter Benjamin: The Colour of 
Experience (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 97-117. 
3 See Blanchot, ‘L’Étrange et l’étranger’, in La Condition critique, pp. 278-88 (p. 287 n. 1) (first publ. in La 
Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 70 (October 1958), 673-83).  Christophe Bident notes that this is the first 
use of Neutre as noun in Blanchot’s work in ‘The Movements of the Neuter’, in After Blanchot: Literature, 
Philosophy, Criticism, ed. by Leslie Hill, Brian Nelson and Dimitris Vardoulakis (Newark, NJ: University of 




Si l’art se définit et se constitue par sa distance à l’égard du monde, par l’absence de monde, il 
est naturel que tout ce qui met le monde en question, ce qu’on appelle d’un mot, devenu d’un 
usage si peu rigoureux, la transcendance, tout ce qui dépasse, nie, détruit, menace l’ensemble 
des relations stables, aisées, raisonnablement établies et soucieuses de durer, toutes ces 
puissances, qu’elles soient pures ou impures, proposées au ‘salut’ de l’homme ou à sa 
destruction, dans la mesure où elles font voler en éclats la validité du monde commun, 
travaillent pour l’art et lui ouvrent la voie, l’appellent.4 
 
The call is the seductive form that these powers take here and in other fictional and critical works by 
Blanchot from this period.  The origin and the destination of this call are the concern of Derrida in an 
analysis of the apocalyptic tone that has dominated Western philosophy since the time of Kant.  
Noting that apocalypse in the Hebrew Bible says discovery, disclosure, uncovering and unveiling, 
Derrida observes that any attempt to shed light on the apocalypse leads only to a further, brighter 
apocalypse which blinds; the apocalypse does not just destroy, it also unveils: ‘toute eschatologie 
apocalyptique se promet au nom [...] d’une lumière plus lumineuse que toutes les lumières qu’elle 
rend possibles.’5  A deconstruction of such discourse (Derrida names, among others, Heidegger on the 
history of metaphysics, the essence of science or technology) must fold to [se plier à] (in the sense of 
giving in to and doubling over) the finest diversity of apocalyptic ruses.6  Any discourse on the 
apocalyptic risks becoming apocalyptic, but there is the suggestion that through such a folding, or 
doubling, it might be possible to derail the apocalyptic tone — to interrupt the unity of the destination, 
                                                          
4 Blanchot, ‘Le Musée, l’art et le temps’, in L’Amitié, p. 33 (first publ. in Critique, 43 (December 1950), 195-208; 
44 (January 1951), 30-42). 
5 Jacques Derrida, D’un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie (Paris: Galilée, 1982), p. 63.  In this 
text Derrida refers, implicitly and explicitly, to L’Arrêt de mort (the ‘viens’ of the closing line), La Folie du jour, 
Le Dernier Homme and ‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’, which suggests that Blanchot is of considerable importance to his 
thinking of the apocalypse.  Derrida also recognises Blanchot’s place in the debates of the 1950s on the end of 
history, which happened in the context of the end of communism, and provides a commentary of ‘Les Trois 
Paroles de Marx’ in Spectres de Marx: l’état de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale (Paris: 
Galilée, 1993), pp. 39-69.  Also see Blanchot, ‘Les Trois Paroles de Marx’, in L’Amitié, pp. 115-17 (first publ. 
anonymously as ‘Lire Marx’, Comité, 1 (October 1968), 31). 
6 Derrida, D’un ton apocalyptique, p. 66. 
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the self-identity of the addressee or sender — and to hear the other tone, or the tone of the other.  ‘[I]l 
faudrait commencer par respecter cette démultiplication différentielle des voix et des tons qui les 
divise peut-être au-delà d’une pluralité distincte et calculable.’7  This chapter will endeavour to listen 
to the various apocalyptic tones in fiction and criticism of the 1950s and early 1960s to reveal a 
continuity between the experience of the technological and of the imaginary for Blanchot. 
The selection, in an essay written for La Part du feu [1949], of a moment from Franz Kafka’s 
The Castle to show how between everyday language and the simple prose of a récit there is an 
important change in the ‘nature’ of language, reveals the unarticulated significance of the technical to 
Blanchot’s understanding of narrative: ‘le chef du bureau a téléphoné’.8  This is not a precise citation 
from The Castle but a paraphrase of a moment in the opening chapter; it assumes the origin of the 
phone call to be the head of the department, whereas in Kafka’s narrative the words of this figure are 
reported indirectly.9  Blanchot does not dwell on the significance of the telephone, but one must 
question why he selects and adapts this particular phrase.  He explains that Kafka’s récit is symbolic, 
and not allegorical or mythical, because, in revealing our ignorance of this other world of The Castle 
                                                          
7 Ibid., p. 76. 
8 Blanchot here comes close to reinstating the opposition between the literary and the everyday, but the 
difference is one of degree and not of any essential nature.  He writes that the phrase read in an office and 
read in The Castle has the same effect: in both cases language destroys the world by reducing it to abstraction, 
revealing a void.  The difference is that everyday language encloses this absence within a presence (in the 
office: ‘Si novice que je sois, je suis pressé de toutes parts par la réalité et partout je l’atteins et la rencontre’ 
(pp. 80-81)), whereas literary language goes one step further by destroying this abstraction.  As we saw in 
Chapter One, the literary is a radicalisation of the everyday by 1949 and so there is no solid opposing 
relationship between the literary and the everyday and the simplest, most mundane of phrases can be literary.   
9 In the opening chapter the main character K. arrives in the village at the foot of the Castle and arranges to 
spend the night in the inn.  He is asked to produce a permit, which he does not have, to prove that the Count is 
expecting his visit.  The landlord rings the Castle.  K. notes with some surprise that they have a telephone: 
‘They had everything up to the mark’.  The landlord is told by an assistant that no Land Surveyor is expected 
and hangs up, accusing K. of deception.  ‘But the telephone rang again, and with a special insistence, it seemed 
to K.  Slowly he put out his head.  Although it was improbable that this message also concerned K. they all 
stopped short and Schwarzer took up the receiver once more.  He listened to a fairly long statement, and then 
said in a low voice: “A mistake, is it?  I’m sorry to hear that.  The head of the department himself said so?  Very 
queer, very queer.  How am I to explain it all to the Land Surveyor?”’  Franz Kafka, The Castle, trans. by Willa 
and Edwin Muir, additional material trans. by Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser, definitive edn (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1953), p. 15; Das Schloss, ed. by Max Brod (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, [1963] 
1983), p. 10.  Blanchot, writing in the 1940s and 1950s, would have been reading early versions of the text 
edited by Max Brod and it is for this reason that I refer, where possible, to older German and English editions 
throughout this chapter (while the English translation is a later ‘definitive’ edition, the publisher’s note states 
that the original translation by Willa and Edwin Muir, which dates from 1930 and works from the first German 
edition of the text, is largely unchanged).   
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and of the Castle, which is to say in signifying nothing, it lays bare the void as the milieu of all 
imagined form; it is the reversal of the world in its totality through the imagination.10  Blanchot here 
echoes the account of the telephone call given by the Superintendent in The Castle: ‘You [K.] haven’t 
once up till now come into contact with our authorities.  All those contacts of yours have been 
illusory, but owing to your ignorance of the circumstances you take them to be real.’11  The account of 
The Castle given by Blanchot is apocalyptic because it is related to everything that puts the world and 
human existence in its totality in question, but it also disrupts our perspective by refusing knowledge.   
 
La Technique 
In ‘Le Musée, l’art et le temps’ [1950], a review of André Malraux’s Le Musée imaginaire, the 
technological is very much side-lined — where the term ‘technique’ is used it is to refer simply to the 
means by which an artistic work is expressed or performed (‘La peinture d’un paysage serait-elle un 
paysage réduit, transformé par le recours à la technique, rendu ainsi au désintéressement de l’art?  
Nullement, car la fin de la peinture serait alors de chercher à réduire cette réduction, comme, il va de 
soi, beaucoup d’écoles l’ont tenté avec peu d’honneur’), when reproduction is mentioned it is done in 
passing as Blanchot indicates a more pressing aspect of Malraux’s argument (‘Malraux sans doute ne 
pense pas avoir fait une découverte, quand il montre que, grâce au progrès de nos connaissances, par 
suite aussi de nos moyens de reproduction — mais aussi pour des raisons plus profondes —, les 
artistes, chaque artiste, disposent pour la première fois de l’art universel’).12   
As with the essay responding in part to Heidegger’s reading of Rilke published just over two 
years later, the omission of the technical aspect to the discussion is perhaps surprising given that 
technology, the ability to reproduce and broadly disseminate works of art, is of some importance to 
Malraux’s Musée imaginaire: ‘Comme la lecture des drames en marge de leur représentation, comme 
l’audition des disques en marge du concert, s’offre en marge du musée le plus vaste domaine de 
                                                          
10 Blanchot, ‘Le Langage de la fiction’, in La Part du feu, pp. 80-91 (pp. 84-87) (this is one of the few essays not 
previously published elsewhere).  On the difference between allegory, myth and symbol for Blanchot, see 
Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot, pp. 74-79. 
11 Kafka, The Castle, p. 95; Das Schloss, p. 72. 
12 Blanchot, ‘Le Musée, l’art et le temps’, in L’Amitié, pp. 29, 22.   
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connaissances artistiques que l’homme ait connu.  Ce domaine — qui s’intellectualise tandis que 
l’inventaire et sa diffusion se poursuivent, et que les moyens de reproduction s’approchent de la 
fidélité — c’est, pour la première fois, l’héritage de toute l’histoire.’13  In this age of technological 
reproduction art is revealed for the first time as an autonomous whole in an eternal present; according 
to Malraux only recreated forms regain presence after death — artistic immortality.  But the very 
condition on which this eternal ‘presence’ is based, argues Blanchot, is the absence of the everyday 
world of work and action; an absence which means that nothing is realised, achieved, attained, but 
rather infinitely repeated.  This is the time not of eternity but of eternal recurrence, ‘ce temps-espace 
qui nous saisit quand le monde s’éloigne’.14  Radically outside history, not simply to be thought of as 
eternity or timelessness, this time of absence renders the realisation of the work impossible: 
 
Au sein de cette absence, les œuvres sont en perpétuelle dissolution et en perpétuel mouvement, 
n’étant chacune qu’un repère du temps, un moment du tout, moment qui cependant voudrait, et 
désespérément, être à lui seul ce tout en quoi seulement l’absence se repose sans repos.  Et 
comme ce vœu est impossible, l’œuvre elle-même, prenant de plus en plus conscience de cette 
impossibilité, tend toujours plus à s’affirmer comme un signe pathétique, une flèche indicatrice 
fascinante, pointée vers l’impossible.15 
 
Repetition is a characteristic of the work of art not because of the technological developments of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but because the work of art is premised on a ruinous absence.  If 
repetition were not inherent in all artworks, it would be impossible to reproduce them — the 
possibility to reproduce precedes all reproduction.16  One may argue that Blanchot does not discuss 
                                                          
13 André Malraux, ‘Le Musée imaginaire’, in Œuvres complètes, 6 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1989-2010), IV: Écrits 
sur l’art I, ed. by Jean-Yves Tadié (2004), 201-332 (p. 240).  
14 Blanchot, ‘Le Musée, l’art et le temps’, in L’Amitié, p. 46. 
15 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
16 The idea that there is no origin to repetition, that there is never a first time and that everything is therefore 
always a replica, is evident in essays collected in L’Espace littéraire which were also first published in the early 
1950s: ‘De ce qui est sans présent, de ce qui n’est même pas là comme ayant été, le caractère irrémédiable dit: 
cela n’a jamais eu lieu, jamais une première fois, et pourtant cela recommence, à nouveau, à nouveau, 
infiniment’ (‘La Solitude essentielle’, in L’Espace littéraire, p. 26).  
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technology or methods of reproduction in this essay because to do so would be to suggest that there is 
something unique about the age of mechanical reproduction, to agree with Malraux that the Musée 
imaginaire emerges ‘for the first time’ in this age when in fact, in Blanchot’s account, the Museum is 
this nowhere beyond world which is always already there, which precedes and traverses the whole of 
history, work, world. 
When art is understood as nothing historical, when its essence is perceived radically outside 
time, Malraux’s understanding of the artist as master comes undone.  In Malraux’s account the 
drawings of a child or a madman cannot be art because these people are not masters of the craft; this 
mastery is steeped in history and artistic tradition: ‘Comment se développe toute vocation?  Par 
l’imitation, la copie, jusqu’au moment où, à travers cette imitation passionnée des formes magistrales, 
l’artiste naissant se rend maître du secret plastique des œuvres et peu à peu […] éprouve, crée, 
distingue son propre secret plastique, ce que Malraux appelle les “schèmes initiaux” de son art.’17 
Malraux regards artistic development and mastery as a highly technical process, involving imitation 
and reproduction, through which the artist seeks the power to transform art through a certain style or 
technique.  For Blanchot, on the other hand, for whom the repetition identified by Malraux is not the 
consequence of artistic endeavour or mastery but of the abyssal non-foundation of art, the child can be 
artist because of their ignorance of the world and the madman can be artist because he has lost the 
world.  The Museum reveals the essence of artistic creation through the painter who transforms 
disordered colours on the palette into a great work, but also through the fortuitous sketch drawn by a 
hand of an unintentional artist.   
Some sort of power is implied in this Museum — and some sort of technology as an 
anonymous hand (une main and not la main) hovers over the work, retaining a ghostly presence in 
Blanchot’s discussion — but this ‘power’ is other-worldly: not the power [pouvoir] of conquest, 
mastery, technology, but the impersonal force [puissance exemplaire] emanating from the abyss (the 
use of ‘exemplaire’ [‘exemplary’ but also ‘copy’ or ‘specimen’] implies that this power is the source 
of  the reproduction or repetition that enables Malraux’s Museum).18 
                                                          
17 Blanchot, ‘Le Musée, l’art et le temps’, in L’Amitié, p. 30. 




L’absence de temps que désignerait l’art fait seulement allusion à ce pouvoir que nous avons de 
mettre fin au monde, de nous tenir avant ou après le monde […], pouvoir qui est peut-être une 
souveraineté, mais qui s’affirme aussi dans toutes les situations où l’homme renonce à se 
maîtriser, accepte de ne pas se ressaisir.  C’est pourquoi l’art est lié à tout ce qui met l’homme 
en danger, à tout ce qui le place violemment hors du monde, hors de la sécurité et de 
l’intelligence du monde auquel seul l’avenir appartient.19 
 
The power of man to end the world is affirmed in those moments when man is powerless; it is 
affirmed in the Musée imaginaire where man has conquered the world through art but equally where 
the individual artist now relinquishes all power to this impersonal Museum standing outside of the 
relationship between conquest and the work. 
It may seem unusual that a figure such as Malraux, the first and only Minister for Culture 
during De Gaulle’s presidency, appears in a book entitled L’Amitié published years after Blanchot’s 
transition from right-wing nationalist to left-wing radical.  The political paths of Blanchot and 
Malraux cross and diverge as they head in different directions following the Second World War — 
Malraux moves from his pre-war pro-communist stance towards a nationalism that would see him 
become a key figure in De Gaulle’s government as Blanchot moves in the opposite direction, the 
latter’s shift being most clearly signalled in a 1946 article on Malraux’s Spanish Civil War novel 
L’Espoir [1937], in which he praises the Republican Popular Front forces he had once criticized.20  
While there are radical differences between the two writers, what they share and what explains the 
presence of Malraux’s name here and at the end of L’Instant de ma mort is an experience of the 
imminence but impossibility of death: both narrowly escaped execution during the war as recounted 
by Blanchot in the aforementioned text and by Malraux in Antimémoires.21 
                                                          
19 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
20 Blanchot, ‘L’Espoir d’André Malraux’, in La Condition critique, pp. 45-53 (first publ. in L’Espagne libre, ed. by 
Georges Bataille (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1946), pp. 106-11).   
21 See Maurice Blanchot, L’Instant de ma mort (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1994; Paris: Gallimard, 2002); and 
André Malraux, Œuvres complètes, III, ed. by Marius-François Guyard (1996), pp. 11-12, 160-62.  Leslie Hill 
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What emerges from this ‘staged execution’ for Malraux is the notion of the imaginary 
museum (around this time, just as Blanchot had a manuscript confiscated in 1944, Malraux lost the 
beginnings of what would later become Les Voix du silence), that domain of artistic immortality in 
which the work overcomes death and time.  The end of art, for Malraux, is myth and its purpose is the 
salvation of man, civilisation and history.  Malraux’s imaginary museum, tied up as it is with his near-
death experience, appeals in some respects to Blanchot, who nonetheless diverges from the view that 
death and time can ever be overcome.22  The impossibility of dying means that for Blanchot the 
imaginary museum can never be present or subject to any teleology.  Blanchot and Malraux therefore 
share an encounter with death, but head in different directions as a result both literarily and politically.  
Leslie Hill explores how the divergence between these two writers is used by Godard at the 
end of Histoire(s) du cinéma — who quotes (with some alterations) from ‘Le Musée, l’art et le temps’ 
— to explore the relationship between cinema and death: ‘Like death, [the image] makes clear; but 
like death it also brings the human world to a realisation of its endless, unmasterable impotence.’23  
The darkness that precedes the image renders the completion of the imaginary museum and the 
history of cinema impossible because it affirms the excess of textuality, image, or sound which makes 
the repetition or reproduction of artworks, and so these two projects, possible in the first place.  The 
impersonal force felt through Malraux’s imaginary museum is thus impossible death, enabling 
reproduction but denying any finality: ‘[En l’image] s’avance cette sombre impuissance privée de 
maître, qui est celle de la mort comme recommencement.’24 
Three years later, in 1953, Blanchot summarises our view of art in the technological world [le 
monde de la technique] of the Museum and libraries: ‘Apparemment, l’art n’est rien s’il n’est 
                                                          
notes the ‘oddly chiastic relationship’ between the political paths of Blanchot and Malraux, in Bataille, 
Blanchot, Klossowski: Writing at the Limit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 189-91 n. 17. 
22 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, while noting the convergence between these two figures, argues that in citing 
Malraux’s name at the end of L’Instant de ma mort Blanchot is attempting to free himself from the mythical 
with all of its political associations, in Agonie terminée, agonie interminable: sur Maurice Blanchot (Paris: 
Galilée, 2011), pp. 63-90. 
23 Leslie Hill, ‘“A Form that Thinks”: Godard, Blanchot, Citation’, in Forever Godard, ed. by Michael Temple, 
James S. Williams and Michael Witt (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2004), pp. 396-415 (pp. 410-15). 
24 Blanchot, ‘Le Musée, l’art et le temps’, in L’Amitié, p. 51. 
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souverain.’25  Blanchot notes that it was around 1850 that the work of art is seen to have assumed this 
autonomy.  Perhaps this date marks the beginning of the technological era — it roughly coincides 
with Baudelaire’s essay ‘La Modernité’ in Le Peintre de la vie moderne [1863], which was so 
important for Benjamin, and it is the moment too when photography is invented — but Blanchot does 
not say as much.  He notes that there were writers and artists who fought against the perceived 
autonomy of the artwork, attempting to ensure their own status as creators.  Mallarmé and Cézanne, 
on the other hand, did not frivolously react to historical tasks and goals in an attempt to save art from 
some technological onslaught, understanding that art precedes all history: ‘l’art ne nie pas le monde 
moderne, ni celui de la technique, ni l’effort de libération et de transformation qui prend appui sur 
cette technique, mais il exprime et peut-être accomplit des rapports qui précèdent tout 
accomplissement objectif et technique.’26  The result is not the complete disappearance of the artist in 
exchange for a sovereign art: the artwork stands radically outside history but is not aesthetically 
autonomous because, rather than giving itself its own rule, it challenges the rule.  Art — literature — 
becomes a question and the artist is the powerless conqueror whose task it is to respond to the 
impossible. 
The relationship between Ulysses and the Sirens in ‘Le Chant des Sirènes’ [1954], later 
included as the opening essay of Le Livre à venir with the title ‘La Rencontre de l’imaginaire’, 
provides an oblique insight into the power relationship between the technical and the work of art for 
Blanchot.  Of Homer’s narration of the encounter between Ulysses and the Sirens — Ulysses who 
ordered his men to tie him to the boat’s mast and not to release him under any circumstance so that he 
may hear the Sirens without succumbing to their call, which results in the Sirens throwing themselves 
                                                          
25 Blanchot, ‘La Disparition de la littérature’, in Le Livre à venir, pp. 265-74 (p. 266) (first publ. as ‘Où va la 
littérature?’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 7 (July 1953), 98-103). 
26 Blanchot, ‘La Disparition de la littérature’, in Le Livre à venir, p. 268, Blanchot’s emphasis.  A similar point is 
made in the essay which follows this when collected in Le Livre à venir (originally published two months later in 
September 1953): ‘bien avant les inventions de la technique, l’usage des ondes et l’appel des images, il eût 
suffi d’entendre les affirmations de Hölderlin, de Mallarmé, pour découvrir la direction et l’étendue de ces 
changements dont nous nous persuadons aujourd’hui sans surprise.  La poésie, l’art, pour en venir à eux-
mêmes, ont, par un mouvement auquel les temps ne sont pas étrangers, mais par des exigences propres qui 
ont donné forme à ce mouvement, projeté et affirmé des bouleversements bien plus considérables que ceux 
dont, sur un autre plan, nous percevons maintenant, dans la commodité quotidienne, les formes 
impressionnantes’ (‘La Recherche du point zéro’, pp. 275-76).  I discuss both of these essays again in Chapter 
Four.   
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into the depths in grief and despair — Blanchot writes: ‘Les Sirènes vaincues par le pouvoir de la 
technique qui toujours prétendra jouer sans péril avec les puissances irréelles (inspirées), Ulysse n’en 
fut cependant pas quitte.’27  Ulysses and his tools may foretell the dominion of modern technology,28 
but worldly technical power [pouvoir] does not overcome the other-worldly call [puissance] in this 
encounter as the struggle endures beyond the Sirens’ disappearance.  From their tomb the Sirens 
continue to call out to Ulysses.  Blanchot states that the novel is born from this struggle between the 
récit and the encounter with the Sirens; the récit become novel is an exploration whose destination is 
never articulated. 
The novel mediates what was once immediate; although this is itself misleading because the 
encounter with the Sirens never takes place in the here and now.29  The récit is the event that, because 
always arriving, never arrives, simultaneously marking and crossing a limit.  A similar failed 
experience is recounted in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick (Blanchot writes that both encounters 
represent a metaphysical struggle) but this is a different sort of failure, one that does not deny the 
impossibility of the limit.  Ulysses claims to restrict his power [pouvoir], ‘de rechercher froidement et 
avec calcul ce qu’il peut encore, face à l’autre puissance.  Il sera tout, s’il maintient une limite et cet 
intervalle entre le réel et l’imaginaire que précisément le Chant des Sirènes l’invite à parcourir.’30  He 
is comparable to those artists discussed in ‘La Disparition de la littérature’ who succumb to the 
demands of their age; he stamps his cold and technical authority on the narrative and, by maintaining 
                                                          
27 Blanchot, ‘La Rencontre de l’imaginaire’, in Le Livre à venir, pp. 9-18 (p. 11) (first publ. as ‘Le Chant des 
Sirènes’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 19 (July 1954), 95-104).   
28 Vivian Liska makes this point in a comparison of the accounts of the Sirens given by Blanchot and Adorno.  
Liska’s claim that the transformation of the song into prose is the triumph of the Sirens according to Blanchot, 
as the Odyssey becomes the space in which the world is swallowed up by the récit that it contains, is 
questionable, because implied in this interpretation is a view of literature as autonomous, suggested 
elsewhere in the essay by references to the temporality of myth.  Liska is reading Blanchot from the 
perspective of Adorno, for whom literature in modernity was autonomous as a protest against capitalism and a 
retreat from history.  See Vivian Liska, ‘Two Sirens Singing: Literature as Contestation in Maurice Blanchot and 
Theodor W. Adorno’, in The Power of Contestation: Perspectives on Maurice Blanchot, ed. by Kevin Hart and 
Geoffrey H. Hartman (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp. 80-100.  Ahab was described by 
Blanchot in 1941 as bearing witness to an invisible order (myth), but by 1954 what matters is the endless 
confrontation between the real and the imaginary.  The récit is possible only as an impossible effort.  
29 Ian Maclachlan presents the encounter of the Sirens provided by Blanchot as a ‘temporal quandary’ in 
Marking Time: Derrida, Blanchot, Beckett, des Forêts, Klossowski, Laporte (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012), pp. 73-
79.  
30 Blanchot, ‘La Rencontre de l’imaginaire’, in Le Livre à venir, p. 16. 
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his distance from this ‘autre puissance’, he makes the world firmer, surer, but poorer.  Ahab, in 
contrast, the captain of the ship dragged into the depths by the lure of the whale at the end of Moby 
Dick, is lost in the image of this encounter: ‘Achab ne se retrouve pas et, pour Melville lui-même, le 
monde menace sans cesse de s’enfoncer dans cet espace sans monde vers lequel l’attire la fascination 
d’une seule image.’31  Moby Dick, once described by Blanchot in 1941 in mythical terms as the 
written equivalent of the universe, a description which now evokes Malraux’s version of the 
imaginary museum, is seen thirteen years later as a space of confrontation and merger between the 
real and the imaginary.32  The contestation of this limit is felt by Melville, for whom, Blanchot writes, 
the world ceaselessly threatens to sink into this worldless space.  The difference between these two 
experiences may be attributed to the role of the technical: ‘Mais il est clair que le roman, s’il manque 
aujourd’hui à ce rôle, c’est que la technique a transformé le temps des hommes et leurs moyens d’en 
être divertis.’33   
It is thanks to ‘la technique’ that Ulysses is deprived of the rich possibilities of Melville’s 
Moby Dick and Homer remains entrenched in the world where the artist is master.  Is Blanchot setting 
art and technology in opposition to one another in this essay?  The two descriptions given of the 
Sirens’ song indicate that art and technology are mutually implicated: 
 
De quelle nature était le chant des Sirènes?  en quoi consistait son défaut?  pourquoi ce défaut 
le rendait-il si puissant?  Les uns ont toujours répondu: c’était un chant inhumain — un bruit 
naturel sans doute (y en a-t-il d’autres?), mais en marge de la nature, de toute manière étranger 
à l’homme, très bas et éveillant en lui ce plaisir extrême de tomber qu’il ne peut satisfaire dans 
les conditions normales de la vie.  Mais, disent les autres, plus étrange était l’enchantement: il 
ne faisait que reproduire le chant habituel des hommes, et parce que les Sirènes qui n’étaient 
que des bêtes, fort belles à cause du reflet de la beauté féminine, pouvaient chanter comme 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
32 See Chapter One where I discuss Blanchot’s mythical reading of Moby Dick in ‘Le Secret de Melville’, an 
essay originally published in the Journal des débats in 1941 and later collected in Faux pas. 
33 Blanchot, ‘La Rencontre de l’imaginaire’, in Le Livre à venir, p. 13. 
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chantent les hommes, elles rendaient le chant si insolite qu’elles faisaient naître en celui qui 
l’entendait le soupçon de l’inhumanité de tout chant humain.34 
 
The difference between these two interpretations is fragile.  The point is that the song is both natural 
and technical, a reproduction of an always forgotten original, and simultaneously what is most human 
and most inhuman.  Blanchot is perhaps reflecting on Heidegger’s famous claim that the essence of 
technology is nothing technological, made at the beginning of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ 
[1953] and repeated in What is Called Thinking? [1954], where it is added that nor is this essence 
anything human: 
 
For the essence of technology is not anything human [ist nichts Menschliches].  The essence of 
technology is above all not anything technological [ist vor allem nichts Technisches].  The 
essence of technology lies in what from the beginning and before all else gives food for thought 
[was einsther und vor allem anderen zu denken gibt].  It might then be advisable, at least for the 
time being, to talk and write less about technology, and give more thought to where its essence 
lies, so that we might find a way to it.  The essence of technology pervades our existence [unser 
Dasein] in a way which we have barely noticed so far.  This is why in the preceding lecture, 
precisely at a juncture which almost demanded a reference to the technological world, we kept 
silent about technology.35 
 
Blanchot, also writing in 1954, may be suggesting something similar: the essence of technology, 
which enables the repetition or the reproduction of the artwork and the retelling of this story, is 
located in the abyss from which the call of the Sirens and the whale emanates.  To listen carefully to 
this call is to hear a tone that differs from the usual apocalyptic foretelling of technology.  The 
technical as writing, the technical thought in its relation to writing, is no longer monotonal; in it we 
hear a shifting multiplicity. 
                                                          
34 Ibid., pp. 9-10.  
35 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, pp. 22-23; Gesamtausgabe, VIII, 25. 
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Two years later in 1956, there is a shift to a more explicit discussion of technology in 
Blanchot’s essay on Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes tropiques.  This self-consciously literary and 
autobiographical text considers the para-philosophical status of anthropology and ethnography as a 
key ‘science humaine’.  It is the status of Lévi-Strauss’s writing as a self-reflexive questioning of 
human knowledge, straddling the scientific and the non-scientific, which appeals to Blanchot, who 
argues that the ethnographer’s project is more interesting than the scientific technicity of Einstein and 
Oppenheimer.36  
The precarious status of technology is evident throughout Tristes tropiques, as Lévi-Strauss 
recognises that the tools and technological advancements that have enabled ethnographers to access 
their objects of study have simultaneously wiped-out these people.  This is a condition he sees 
repeated throughout civilization: ‘[l’homme] apparaît lui-même comme une machine, peut-être plus 
perfectionnée que les autres, travaillant à la désagrégation d’un ordre originel et précipitant une 
matière puissamment organisée vers une inertie toujours plus grande et qui sera un jour définitive.’37  
The paradoxical position of the ethnographer and the uncertain status of technology is stressed early 
in Blanchot’s discussion as he notes that the successes of the modern world carry the ethnographer to 
the limits of the earth [jusqu’aux confins de la terre] where the object of study is promptly 
transformed or destroyed: ‘L’ethnographe est le trouble compagnon de l’impérialisme qui lui donne 
d’une main et, de l’autre, lui retire sa science et l’objet de sa science.’38  The hands of the 
ethnographer are comparable to the hands of the writer: one hand accepts the gift of imperialism and 
reaches worldly limitations thanks to technical prowess, like the hands of those humans at the end of 
Thomas l’obscur it destroys invisible worlds; the other hand can never grasp the object of study, like 
the hand hanging over the suppressed third section of L’Arrêt de mort unable to either hold or put 
down the pen it is assigned an impossible task.39  The ethnography of Lévi-Strauss undoubtedly bears 
                                                          
36 Blanchot, ‘L’Homme au point zéro’, in L’Amitié, pp. 87-97 (pp. 87-89) (first publ. in La Nouvelle Nouvelle 
Revue française, 40 (April 1956), 683-94). 
37 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes tropiques (Paris: Plon, 1955), p. 478. 
38 Blanchot, ‘L’Homme au point zéro’, in L’Amitié, p. 89. 
39 I discussed the role of hands in Thomas l’obscur, L’Arrêt de mort and L’Espace littéraire in the final section of 
the previous chapter.  In ‘L’Homme au point zéro’ Blanchot comments that it is naive to believe that ‘le 
développement de la technique suffira à nous mettre en main la solution de toutes les difficultés qu’elle 
suscite’ (pp. 96-97).  The hand left wanting, forever waiting for a solution or an end, is the hand that writes. 
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literary traits for Blanchot as his work leads to the imaginary in its search for the impossible origin; 
but implied here is also a technicity which Blanchot recognises and cautiously praises, noting that 
Lévi-Strauss’s ambition to return to the source of the human is not merely a nostalgia for a more 
natural and simple humanity which would avoid ‘cette dénaturation que la puissance technique 
poursuivrait inlassablement.’40 
In Lévi-Strauss’s account there is a universal human logic found everywhere, what may be 
thought of as a technology of sorts running through all societies.  This is clearly argued in his 
conclusion quoted above and is evidenced specifically in his discussion of the art of so-called 
‘primitive’ societies.  Take, for instance, his consideration of the face-paintings of the Caduveo: ‘Les 
peintures de visage confère d’abord à l’individu sa dignité d’être humain; elles opèrent le passage de 
la nature à la culture, de l’animal “stupide” à l’homme civilisé.  Ensuite, différentes quant au style et à 
la composition selon les castes, elles expriment dans une société complexe la hiérarchie des statuts.  
Elles possèdent ainsi une fonction sociologique.’41  These face-paintings have a meaning and 
therefore function as a form of writing.  When Blanchot comments that a nostalgic view of these 
peoples is to some extent avoided in Tristes tropiques, it is because Lévi-Strauss recognises that 
technology is not something belated or reserved for the modern world but is already there in 
‘primitive’ societies as a form of writing.  This is the point on which Blanchot’s essay focuses in the 
concluding paragraph:  
 
C’est donc en quelque sorte l’indigence du monde de la technique qui en fait la vérité, et sa 
grande vertu — intellectuelle — n’est pas de nous enrichir, mais de nous dépouiller.  Monde 
barbare, sans respect, sans humanité.  Il nous vide atrocement de tout ce que nous aimons et 
aimons être, nous chasse du bonheur de nos refuges, du faux-semblant de nos vérités, détruit ce 
à quoi nous appartenons et parfois détruit lui-même.  Effrayante épreuve.  Mais cette 
contestation, précisément parce qu’elle nous laisse pauvres de tout, sauf de la puissance, nous 
donne peut-être aussi la chance qui accompagne toute rupture: quand on est contraint de 
                                                          
40 Ibid., p. 94. 
41 Lévi-Strauss, Tristes tropiques, p. 220. 
 142 
 
renoncer à soi, il faut périr ou commencer, périr afin de recommencer.  Tel serait alors le sens 
de la tâche que représente le mythe de l’homme sans mythe: l’espoir, l’angoisse et l’illusion de 
l’homme au point zéro.42 
  
When led beyond our shelter and exposed to an inhuman and barbaric new place by technology, it 
becomes evident that the human subject is universally constituted by a different mode of technique 
(‘elle nous laisse pauvres de tout, sauf de la puissance’), expressed here as an aimless and impersonal 
power which succeeds only in reproduction: writing.  The achievement of Tristes tropiques, according 
to Blanchot, is the laying bare of techne as art.   
Originally published six years after ‘Le Musée, l’art et le temps’, ‘Le Mal du musée’ [1957] 
begins by placing clear emphasis on the technological aspect of the debate surrounding Malraux’s 
Musée imaginaire, ‘que le perfectionnement de la technique de la reproduction enrichit sans cesse 
avec une générosité prodigieuse’.43  The names of other writers, critics, thinkers also figure 
prominently in the opening pages of this essay: the famous German literary scholar Ernst Robert 
Curtius, the art historian Georges Duthuit, Plato, Heidegger and Socrates.  Each of these names 
represents a desire to link writing or art to presence, either in the ‘eternal present’ of Malraux, in the 
wholly accessible and reproducible literature of Curtius,44 in the reality of a past conceived by 
Duthuit, or as the spoken language with its living and breathing source extolled by Plato, Socrates and 
Heidegger.  Over the course of this essay Blanchot builds a rebuttal to all of these views through an 
understanding of art as techne.  ‘Ce n’est pas par hasard que ce qui se donne pour “pure présence”, se 
fige aussitôt et se stabilise dans une permanence sans vie et dans l’éternité pourrissante d’un vide 
solennel et indifférent.’45  This sentence (quoted above as it appears in L’Amitié [1971]) read in the 
first version of the essay published in 1957: ‘Ce n’est pas par hasard que ce qui est pure présence, 
                                                          
42 Blanchot, ‘L’Homme au point zéro’, in L’Amitié, p. 97. 
43 Blanchot, ‘Le Mal du musée’, in L’Amitié, pp. 52-61 (p. 52) (first publ. in La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue 
française, 52 (April 1957), 687-96). 
44 See the first chapter of Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. by 
Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 3-16. 
45 Blanchot, ‘Le Mal du musée’, in L’Amitié, p. 61. 
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rigoureuse lumière, se fige aussitôt [...].’46  Displaced by inverted commas in an instance of 
typographical technique, the words ‘pure présence’ are withdrawn as Blanchot denies presence more 
radically in the amended version of the essay, suggesting that art was never present in the first place.  
There are two further notable changes made to the essay for publication in L’Amitié: ‘Privées du 
monde, les œuvres du Musée?  livrées à l’insécurité d’une absence pure’, had previously read, ‘[...] 
livrées à l’insécurité d’une présence pure’; and the phrase ‘à l’interrogation de l’art’, had previously 
read, ‘à la vérité de l’art’.47   Presence becomes absence and the status of art is obscured as truth 
becomes questioning.  At work here is the neuter as a neutralizing and displacing technique; while 
more pronounced in 1971, its effect is still palpable in the original version of the essay as Blanchot 
recognises that techniques of reproduction have indeed enriched the imaginary museum, but only in a 
way that serves to create an ungraspable, unachievable, uncontrollable excess that is never present — 
the possibility of reproduction precedes all world and the machine functions ‘comme hors de la 
durée’.48  
The precarious status of technology as both destructive and enabling power is central to 
Blanchot’s 1957 critique of the imaginary museum: ‘La technique nous donne l’art, comme elle nous 
donne la terre, la possession de tout et l’accès à tout, par un pouvoir de domination qui effraie les uns, 
anime les autres, mais ne peut être arrêté par personne.’49  What technology gives with one hand it 
withdraws with the other: we do not experience works in the time or setting in which they were 
produced, for which they were intended, and the imaginary museum therefore achieves only the 
illusion of presence, the experience of the ‘non-present presence’ of art.  For the first time, Blanchot 
writes, all works become available to us, no longer sheltered within our world, but without shelter and 
as if without world.50  A subtle shift has occurred in Blanchot’s thinking since he first wrote about the 
imaginary museum in 1951: the impact of technology is more palpable by 1957 and closely related to 
the work of art.  Technology as a power belonging to the human becomes disobedient techne beyond 
                                                          
46 Blanchot, ‘Le Mal du musée’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, p. 696. 
47 Blanchot, ‘Le Mal du musée’, in L’Amitié, p. 60; La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, pp. 695-96. 
48 Blanchot, ‘Le Mal du musée’, in L’Amitié, p. 54. 
49 Ibid., p. 52. 
50 Ibid., p. 60, my emphasis. 
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our control which allows the possibility of art, literature, language.  Blanchot, unusually, refers to one 
of his earlier essays in a footnote: ‘La Bête de Lascaux’ [1953].   
This essay is a pre-Derridean attempt, against Plato, to link the disobedience of writing to the 
possibility of the artwork.51  ‘Le savoir impersonnel du livre’, Blanchot writes, ‘[…] est lié au 
développement de la technique sous toutes les formes et il fait de la parole, de l’écriture, une 
technique.’52  This impersonal knowledge linking all techniques is impossible death: that force 
enabling reproduction but denying any finality.  All techniques reveal an end void of significance.  
What distinguishes writing from other techniques is that it harnesses this side of power beyond human 
control: 
 
Toute parole commençante, bien qu’elle soit le mouvement le plus doux et le plus secret, est, 
parce qu’elle nous devance infiniment, celle qui ébranle et qui exige le plus: tel le plus tendre 
lever du jour en qui se déclare toute la violence d’une première clarté, et telle la parole 
oraculaire qui ne dicte rien, qui n’oblige en rien, qui ne parle même pas, mais fait de ce silence 
le doigt impérieusement fixé vers l’inconnu.53 
 
Blanchot glosses Heraclitus in this extract to argue that this language does not reveal and conceal, it is 
not bound to the visible and the invisible, and therefore is not subject to Heideggerian aletheia.  This 
language does not dictate future events, nor does it not rely on any truth, pre-existent language, or 
indeed anything which already is: ‘Il annonce parce qu’il commence.  Il indique l’avenir, parce qu’il 
ne parle pas encore, langage du futur, en cela qu’il est lui-même comme un langage futur, qui toujours 
se devance, n’ayant son sens et sa légitimité qu’en avant de soi, c’est-à-dire foncièrement injustifié.’54  
Suggested here is the possibility that, by listening to that other tone, to the silence which accompanies 
the violence of the first speech, we may hear that radical otherness announced in this forever deferred 
                                                          
51 See Derrida, ‘La Pharmacie de Platon’, in La Dissémination, pp. 69-197. 
52 Blanchot, ‘La Bête de Lascaux’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, p. 684. 
53 Ibid., p. 690. 
54 Ibid., p. 687. 
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beginning.  The next section of this chapter will consider what writing as techne may have to say to 
technology of the modern kind. 
 
Writing as techne and Modern Technology 
The 1950s was a tumultuous decade for France: not only was the Cold War building beyond its 
borders, driving France to make the decision to arm itself with nuclear weapons in 1954 with the first 
French tests taking place in 1961, there was the crisis and subsequent collapse of the Fourth Republic 
in 1958, caused in large part by the intensification of the Algerian War, which prompted De Gaulle’s 
controversial return to power.  Blanchot did not distance himself from such events; he moved back to 
Paris from Èze in 1958 and resumed an active interest in politics no longer as a right-wing nationalist, 
as had been the case in the 1930s, but alongside Dionys Mascolo as a member of the radical non-
communist left.  He openly contested De Gaulle’s government in publications such as Le 14 Juillet,55 
and fiercely opposed the Algerian War, being one of the principal authors and signatories of what 
became known as the ‘Manifeste des 121’.56   
Beyond such political upheavals, great social change was also taking place in France with the 
growth of mass culture, as Roland Barthes documents in Mythologies [1957].  The Livre de poche 
collection was launched by the Librairie Génerale Française, releasing its first title in 1953; this 
collection made popular novels available to the masses at a low cost by reproducing them in small 
paperback format.  Mass culture and the impact of technology on the work of art had already been 
scrutinized in Walter Benjamin’s seminal essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’ [1936]; however, the publication of Mythologies and the appearance and subsequent 
translation into French of Heidegger’s ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ [1953], What is Called 
Thinking? [1954] and Off the Beaten Track [1950], containing ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ and 
                                                          
55 See, for instance, ‘Le Refus’ and ‘La Perversion essentielle’, in Écrits politiques, pp. 27-29, 31-41 (first publ. 
respectively in Le 14 Juillet, 2 (25 October 1958), 3; 3 (18 June 1959), 18-20).  
56 Bident provides an overview of Blanchot’s response in 1958 to De Gaulle’s return to power and his 
contribution to the ‘Manifeste des 121’ in 1960 in Maurice Blanchot: partenaire invisible, pp. 376-87, 391-402.  
The manifesto is included in Blanchot, Écrits politiques, pp. 49-54. 
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‘Why Poets?’, in 1958, 1959 and 1962 respectively ensured that technological developments 
remained a concern of philosophical and literary circles of the period. 
 The implications of paperback publishing in mid-twentieth-century France were questioned in 
1964 by the art-historian Hubert Damisch who denounced the format, arguing that rather than offering 
cultural democratization it transformed the contestatory book into an everyday consumer commodity 
and therefore neutralized its revolutionary potential.  The inclusion in the original article of an 
epigraph from Heidegger’s ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ left Damisch’s position open to 
the accusation that he was simply taking up a traditional stance against writing and the dangers of 
technology.57  In the midst of the wide-ranging debate which ensued and citing Damisch’s article in 
his own essay, Blanchot explicitly welcomed the new paperback format58 whilst recognising that the 
potential for the wider diffusion of works and the cultural change that this implied was in fact not 
realised: those who bought paperbacks were often the relatively well-off middle classes, not all texts 
were available in paperback form, and the driving motivation for the publishing industry was profit.59   
According to Blanchot, the ideology of progress seemingly represented by the affordable 
paperback and advancing technology masks a capitalist ideology which seeks the appeasement of the 
people; the mass production and diffusion of the scandalous works of Trotsky and Sade helps to 
normalize and institutionalize what was revolutionary about their writing while giving the general 
public the false impression that access to culture is universal and unlimited. 
 
Il n’y a rien à dire contre la technique.  Mais ce qui frappe dans son emploi, c’est à nouveau 
l’idéologie qu’il recouvre et qui fournit au livre de poche sa signification de base, sa moralité: 
la technique règle tous les problèmes, le problème de la culture et de sa diffusion, comme tous 
                                                          
57 See Hubert Damisch, ‘La Culture de poche’, in Ruptures/Cultures (Paris: Minuit, 1976), pp. 57-73 (first publ. 
in Mercure de France, 1213 (November 1964), 482-98).  Douglas Smith compares the positions of Blanchot and 
Damisch in ‘The Burning Library: Hubert Damisch, Maurice Blanchot, and the “Paperback Revolution”’, 
unpublished article. 
58 ‘Et, bien sûr, il faut se réjouir d’un tel succès.  Comment ne pas souhaiter ce qui développe la diffusion des 
grandes (et des petites) œuvres? […] Donc, réjouissons-nous, mais ne soyons pas tout à fait naïfs.  La 
littérature de poche fonctionne comme un mythe, un petit mythe tapageur et avantageux’ (Blanchot then goes 
on to cite Barthes’ Mythologies).  Blanchot, ‘Les Grands Réducteurs’, in L’Amitié, pp. 74-86 (p. 81) (first publ. in 
La Nouvelle Revue française, 148 (April 1965), 676-86). 
59 Blanchot, ‘Les Grands Réducteurs’, in L’Amitié, pp. 81-82. 
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les autres, nul besoin de bouleversements politiques, encore moins de changements dans les 
structures sociales; il suffit de reproduire les œuvres, d’une manière flatteuse et à un prix 
apparemment modeste, pour qu’elles aient libre cours (cependant dans les limites bien 
déterminées du marché capitaliste) pour que tous puissent les assimiler, se les approprier dans 
ce qu’elles ont d’unique […].60 
 
Modern technology is not going to solve any problems; it is not the enabler of progress but the servant 
of capitalist ideology.  In stark contrast, literature is essentially contestatory power: ‘contestation du 
pouvoir établi, contestation de ce qui est (et du fait d’être), contestation du langage et des formes du 
langage littéraire, enfin contestation d’elle-même comme pouvoir.’61  While cultural forces may 
attempt to pacify turbulent works by incorporating them into the whole, transforming them into mere 
entertaining morsels through the printing press and the television, a structure of exclusion always 
persists and it is the changeable outside ensured by this structure which we experience through 
literature. 
 The contrast between technology and literature that emerges in this essay is, however, not as 
unambiguous as it may first appear.  ‘Comment ne pas se rendre compte que, s’il y a dans la culture 
humaniste une puissance de conformité et une proposition d’accommodement […], ce n’est pas à 
coups de revolver qu’on la limitera, mais au contraire en la développant, en la précipitant, de manière 
à transformer en un processus explosif le système de freinage et d’arrêt qui la constitue?’62  Blanchot 
does not condemn the paperback or indeed the technology which has driven this so-called revolution 
(‘Il n’y a rien à dire contre la technique’).  His argument is that we should not limit the power behind 
cultural assimilation but that we should push it to the extreme limit, to the point of explosion where 
the system cannot maintain the limits it has imposed.  There seems to be a convergence of technology 
at the very limits of its power and literature as contestation in this essay, although the relation is not 
wholly elucidated here.  Writing laid bare as techne reveals that side of technology which is not about 
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capitalist progress; to this other side of technology beyond human control Blanchot gives the name the 
neuter.  The remainder of this chapter will explore how the relationship between these two modes of 
technique, stemming from the same abyssal source, is played out in Blanchot’s writing.  
The worldly tremors which had induced Blanchot’s return to Paris and politics at the end of 
the 1950s coincide with the emergence of the neuter as a noun in his writing in 1958 and a sustained 
rejection of the idea of the artwork as an autonomous whole entirely subject to aesthetic rules and 
norms.  In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the limits of human knowledge were facing unprecedented 
challenges as the atomic bomb threatened devastation, as Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space, 
as the mass reproduction of the artwork through the printing press and photography intensified with 
the launch of the Livre de poche collection.  An essay of 1960 heralds the arrival of a new era — that 
of la technique moderne — in which total human destruction seems possible.   
In this essay, ‘Entretien sur un changement d’époque’, Blanchot demonstrates how cultural 
forces attempt to rein in the significance of modern technology: while some argue that the power of 
the bomb can be used for peaceful purposes such as nuclear energy, many scientists see this as a mere 
alibi and are quick to highlight the infinite possibilities awarded to the human through atomic energy 
and the impending catastrophe that this implies. 
 
La bombe est un avertissement visible de la menace invisible que toute la technique moderne 
dirige contre les façons de l’homme.  Un chimiste américain, Stanley, un Prix Nobel (cela 
s’entend), a fait cette déclaration: ‘Le moment est proche où la vie ne sera plus dans la main de 
Dieu, mais dans celle du chimiste qui à son gré modifiera, édifiera ou détruira toute substance 
vivante.’  De telles déclarations, faites par des hommes de responsabilité, on en lit tous les 
jours, on les lit parmi les autres nouvelles du journal, avec négligence, avec amusement, sans 
voir que par la puissance de la technique moderne se prépare une attaque en comparaison de 
laquelle l’explosion des bombes signifie peu de chose.63 
 
                                                          
63 Blanchot, ‘Sur un changement d’époque: l’exigence du retour’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 394-418 (p. 403) (first 
publ. as ‘Entretien sur un changement d’époque’, La Nouvelle Revue française, 88 (April 1960), 724-34). 
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Wendell Stanley’s statement may once have been terrifying, but today this warning has been defused 
by cultural forces; regularly disseminated far and wide by the press, the threat posed by nuclear 
energy is reduced to a mere diversion.  The idea, however, that nuclear power represents infinite 
human possibility, whether exploited for peaceful or belligerent purposes, is a mystification.  The 
explosion of the bombs pales in comparison to the real threat posed through modern technology: 
‘Qu’il y ait Dieu ou qu’il y ait atome, tout ne dépend pas de l’homme précisément.’64  The human is 
not master of his or her destiny: this is what the change of epoch indicates through the atomic bomb.  
Perhaps Stanley’s error was formulating the danger of the bomb in terms of the singular hand of God 
and man: hands are always plural and not necessarily human, L’Arrêt de mort taught us as much, and 
the boundless possibilities offered by modern technology cannot be contained by the single human 
hand. 
 Although not foreseeing worldly catastrophe, Blanchot is hardly optimistic about the 
unlimited technological possibilities of the age.  One interlocutor persistently rejects the romantic 
faith in technology advocated by writers such as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Ernst Jünger.  The 
latter, in An der Zeitmauer [1959], argues that in a world threatened by atomic destruction humanity is 
able to think its relation to earth differently and move, via technological means, beyond nihilism into 
a new age.65  ‘J’ai entendu dire que nous étions en train de franchir le mur du temps’, remarks 
Blanchot’s unconvinced interlocutor.66  One can perhaps detect the odour of atomic explosion, sense 
the imminence of this possibility, but one can never be certain of the end of history: 
 
Je me demande si tout au contraire vos auteurs n’ont pas pour l’avenir une sorte de répugnance, 
puisqu’ils refusent d’accueillir l’inachèvement qu’il recèle nécessairement en lui.  On dirait 
qu’ils font tout pour se détourner de la simple vérité de notre mort qui est d’être toujours 
                                                          
64 Blanchot, ‘Sur un changement d’époque: l’exigence du retour’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 402.   
65 See Ernst Jünger, An der Zeitmauer, in Sämtliche Werke, 22 vols (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978-1983), VIII: Der 
Arbeiter (1981), 397-645. 
66 Blanchot, ‘Sur un changement d’époque: l’exigence du retour’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 397. 
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prématurée et avant terme.  De là, cette hâte avec laquelle ils affirment: l’époque est achevée, 
un temps a pris fin.67 
 
By regarding technology as the means by which the human exerts total control over the earth, writers 
such as Jünger and Teilhard de Chardin overlook the excessive inhuman possibilities of the atomic 
bomb and disregard futural uncertainty.  They turn away from the banality of a death that will never 
be authentic.  Responding to the assertion that the decline of the mythic hero and the rise of the cult of 
the unknown soldier signal the beginning of a new age, the sceptical interlocutor states: ‘Vous lui 
préférez le mythe de la fin des temps, cette peur d’une catastrophe mondiale avec laquelle on secoue 
jour et nuit les imaginations des hommes.’68  Fear of a mystified end is more comforting than facing 
up to the banal uncertainty of the future for Jünger and Teilhard de Chardin.  Blanchot, in contrast, is 
undoubtedly recalling Nietzsche’s admission of faith in an unknowable future which his friend 
Georges Bataille had quoted at least twice elsewhere and which he will cite nine years later in the 
fragmentary additions to the end of the essay when published in L’Entretien infini [1969]: ‘My 
thoughts [...] should show me where I stand, but they should not betray to me where I am going.  I 
love ignorance of the future [Ich liebe die Unwissenheit um die Zukunft] and do not want to perish of 
impatience and premature tasting of things promised.’69  
 Nietzsche is an important reference for Blanchot when thinking the impact of technology.  In 
1958 Blanchot wrote two essays on Nietzsche: ‘Nietzsche, aujourd’hui’ [August 1958] and ‘Passage 
de la ligne’ [September 1958].  In the first of these essays, having outlined the falsification of his 
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work by his sister and her husband and the subsequent appropriation of his thought for anti-Semitic 
and fascist purposes by the Nazi party, Blanchot stresses the paradoxical and decentred nature of 
Nietzsche’s thought which contests all certainties:   
 
Parmi les contradictions, maintenir l’exigence du tout qui est constamment présent, bien que 
constamment dissous par les contradictions.  Ne jamais concevoir ce tout — le tout non-unitaire 
— comme un système, mais comme une question et comme la passion de la recherche dans 
l’élan du vrai, unie à la critique de tout ce qui a pu être acquis au cours de la recherche.70 
 
Blanchot asks that any interpretation of Nietzsche remain faithful to the above principles.  The 
disjointed totality that emerges through such a reading challenges the limits of systematic thought; 
here, the volatility of the contested whole echoes the impact of the printing press pushing culture to 
the point of explosion in ‘Les Grands Réducteurs’.  The aside ‘le tout non-unitaire’ is a later addition 
to the essay for its publication in L’Entretien infini; this and other small edits to the essay highlight 
that Blanchot is keen to further stress the impossibility of any such totality in 1969, which will always 
be challenged by the work of the neuter.  For instance, Blanchot writes in 1958 that something 
fundamental seeks to be expressed in Nietzsche’s work, ‘une constante pensée et comme l’appel d’un 
centre unique, d’un tout, lequel n’est jamais atteint, mais sans cesse supposé et interrogé, parfois 
exigé’.  In 1969 this reads, ‘[…] comme l’appel d’un centre non centré, d’un tout au-delà de tout’.  In 
1958 Blanchot writes: ‘tout ce qui s’y apparente semble affluer de tous côtés pour y ressembler’.  
Eleven years later this becomes: ‘tout ce qui s’y apparente semble se presser de tous côtés afin d’y 
ressembler en en différant’.71   
The essay ends with Blanchot considering words from Heidegger, who claimed that what was 
a cry threatens to become chatter [bavardage] in Nietzsche.  Of this cry, Blanchot writes: ‘on ne l’a 
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pas entendu, on l’a trop entendu; le nihilisme est devenu le lieu commun de la pensée et de la 
littérature.’72  At stake here is the difference between the interpretation of nihilism offered by 
Heidegger and that offered by Blanchot, or the difference between what we might call philosophical 
and literary nihilism.  Heidegger recognises the exceptional nature of Nietzsche’s work, Blanchot 
writes, but only insofar as he declares it to be the final, perhaps unending, phase of the metaphysical 
tradition, consequently overlooking what is marginal, incommunicable and fragmentary in his 
writing.73  The suggestion is that nihilism as contested totality offers a way out of this impasse if we 
listen with greater care to this chatter.  
In ‘Nietzsche’s Word: “God is Dead”’ [1943], Heidegger had considered how Nietzsche 
remains trapped within nihilistic thought.  Picking out the various, sometimes contradictory, meanings 
associated with nihilism for Nietzsche, Heidegger links them closely to technology as a form of 
mastery of the earth: representational metaphysical thinking is the origin of modern technology and 
nihilism.  Nietzsche attempts to move beyond nihilism (the process of the devaluation of the highest 
values), but achieves only a more complete nihilism (the revaluation of all values): ‘The no to the 
former values is derived from the yes to the new dispensation of value.’74  The conclusion to 
Heidegger’s essay considers how we are to begin to think beyond metaphysical representation: ‘If we 
hear in the name nihilism that other note [Ton], in which there sounds the essence of what it names, 
then we also hear differently into the language of the metaphysical thinking that has experienced 
something of nihilism but without being able to think its essence.’75  This ‘other note’ within nihilism 
signals that Being is nothing: ‘Provided that every “is” is the responsibility of Being, then the essence 
of nihilism consists in the fact that there is nothing going on with Being itself [daβ mit dem Sein selbst 
nichts ist].’76  By emphasizing that ‘nothing is going on with Being’, Heidegger gestures to a 
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dispensation of Sein beyond the positing of values which allows the possibility of thinking more 
originally (beyond reason or logic).  
There is perhaps a clearer sense from Heidegger of how to respond to nihilism in his later 
exchange with Ernst Jünger.  The latter’s contribution to the Festschrift celebrating Heidegger’s 
sixtieth birthday was an essay entitled ‘Über die Linie’ [1949], in which he considers whether we live 
in the age of fulfilled nihilism and, if so, whether such nihilism can be overcome.  Heidegger 
responded to this essay six years later in 1955 with an open letter, later published as ‘Zur Seinsfrage’ 
[On the Question of Being].  While noting that his description of the technical era in Der Arbeiter was 
influential to ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger argues against Jünger, insisting on 
the prior question about the essence of nihilism and focussing on the line itself as opposed to what lies 
beyond: ‘In the title of your essay Über die Linie means as much as: across, trans, μετά.  By contrast, 
the following remarks understand the über only in the sense of de, περί.  They deal “with” the line 
itself, with the zone of self-consummating nihilism.’77  His argument is that a thinking of the essence 
of nihilism leads to a thinking of Being as the unthought ground of metaphysics.  Representational 
language is the barrier to crossing the line and overcoming nihilism and so, in an attempt to retrieve a 
more original sense of Sein unsullied by metaphysics, Heidegger crosses out the word in ‘On the 
Question of Being’: ‘A thoughtful forward glance into the realm of “Being” can only be written in the 
following way: Being.’78  
The dialogue between Heidegger and Jünger informs Blanchot’s reading of Nietzsche in the 
second essay of 1958, ‘Passage de la ligne’.  Here Blanchot remarks that Heidegger’s treatment of the 
line is more rigorous because sensitive to the movement of nihilism which renders any such line 
indecipherable; like the end of history, there is an unknowable or impossible element to nihilistic 
achievement.79  While Heidegger is praised for questioning the possibility of this line, the subsequent 
deferral of a thinking that goes beyond metaphysical representation is criticised.  Heidegger’s waiting 
                                                          
77 Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Question of Being’, trans. by William McNeill, in Pathmarks, pp. 291-322 (p. 292); 
‘Zur Seinsfrage’, in Gesamtausgabe, XI, 385-426 (p. 386). 
78 Ibid., p. 310; pp. 410-11.  Critchley provides a summary of ‘Nietzsche’s Word: “God is Dead”’ and Heidegger’s 
response to Jünger in the opening chapter of Very Little… Almost Nothing, pp. 13-18.  
79 Blanchot, ‘Passage de la ligne’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 215-27 (p. 225) (first publ. in La Nouvelle Nouvelle 
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game is irresponsible, even dangerous, according to Blanchot, for whom the writer and critic break 
with values via the endless détours of abyssal self-reflexive language.   
A few months later — in an essay that would become the preface to a revised edition of 
Lautréamont et Sade published in 1963 — Blanchot writes that literature and criticism are associated 
with one of the most difficult and important tasks of our time: ‘la tâche de préserver et de libérer la 
pensée de la notion de valeur, par conséquent aussi d’ouvrir l’histoire à ce qui en elle se dégage déjà 
de toutes les formes de valeurs et se prépare à une toute autre sorte — encore imprévisible — 
d’affirmation.’80  Traditionally, criticism is thought to assert the value of the literary work; but in this 
essay, by contesting the line demarcating literature from criticism, Blanchot suggests how we are to 
move beyond the positing of value.  Why, Blanchot asks, would the critic be necessary to the work?  
Why can the work not speak for itself?  Why between the reader and the work, between history and 
the work, is this strange hybrid figure, itself between reader and writer, imposed?  Criticism, having 
no reality of its own, disappears in the affirmation of what is otherwise silent in the work; the 
accomplishment of criticism is signalled by its disappearance as the mediated becomes the immediate.  
But any such relation to the immediate is impossible and so the work of criticism and the work of 
literature are perpetually turned outwards:  
 
cette sorte de subite distance dans laquelle l’œuvre faite se réfléchit et dont le critique est 
appelé à donner la mesure, n’est que la dernière métamorphose de cette ouverture qu’est 
l’œuvre en sa genèse, ce qu’on pourrait appeler sa non-coïncidence essentielle avec elle-même, 
tout ce qui ne cesse de la rendre possible-impossible.  La critique ne fait donc que représenter et 
poursuivre au dehors ce qui, du dedans, comme affirmation déchirée, comme inquiétude infinie, 
comme conflit (ou sous de tout autres formes), n’a cessé d’être présent à la manière d’une 
réserve vivante de vide, d’espace ou d’erreur ou, pour mieux dire, comme le pouvoir propre à la 
littérature de se faire en se maintenant perpétuellement en défaut.81   
                                                          
80 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Qu’en est-il de la critique?’, in Lautréamont et Sade, pp. 9-14 (p. 14) (first publ. in 
Arguments, 12-13 (January-March 1959), 34-37). 




The domain of literature cannot be stabilised because there is no outside point from which to delimit 
the parameters of the work.  This lack which allows the work and criticism to proliferate offers the 
possibility of moving beyond metaphysical representation toward this torn affirmation, torn because 
erring between the yes and the no, between the inside and the outside, contesting all limits, including 
those of literature.   
This is an affirmation freed from historical constraints.  By thinking the possibility of the end 
of metaphysics, of the turning that will initiate a new history, Heidegger remains committed to 
traditional values.  A text entitled ‘L’Attente’, published only a few months after those two essays on 
nihilism in 1959, is a critique of such a teleological perspective: ‘Dès qu’on attendait quelque chose, 
on attendait un peu moins.’82  This contribution, which can be categorised neither as fiction nor 
criticism but assumes an ambiguous status between the two and which is one of the first examples of 
Blanchot adopting the fragmentary idiom that would dominate later works, stresses that to move 
beyond value, to liberate thinking from history, an indirect or oblique approach to the unknowable 
that allows it to remain unknown is required.  The two male and female figures of ‘L’Attente’ 
repeatedly comment on or adopt such indirectness.  For instance, the female figure is described as 
having the impression of an error that she could not situate and, everything turning before her eyes, 
she has lost the centre of the room and of the discussion; the male character feels linked to her by 
failure and watches her surreptitiously.83  ‘L’attention, accueil de ce qui échappe à l’attention, 
ouverture sur l’inattendu, attente qui est l’inattendu de toute attente.’84 
This oblique approach characterises the discussion of nihilism in 1958 in ‘Passage de la 
ligne’.  Nihilism is a trap if confronted, because this becomes merely an attempt to overcome nihilism 
which is in itself nihilistic.  Eternal return, on the other hand, is the nihilistic thought par excellence: 
                                                          
82 Maurice Blanchot, ‘L’Attente’, Botteghe oscure, 22 (1958), 22-33 (p. 26).  This would later be split up and 
included in L’Attente L’Oubli (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), pp. 7-13, 16-18, 19-21, 26-27, 31-34, 38, 44-45, 47-48, 49, 
50-51, 52-53.   
83 Blanchot, ‘L’Attente’, Botteghe Oscure, 22, pp. 22-24.   
84 Ibid., p. 31.   
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‘celle où le nihilisme se dépasse absolument en se rendant définitivement indépassable.’85  Eternal 
return offers that radical shift in perspective which is other than the positing of values: 
 
Mais le retour en arrière du temps est ce qui échappe au possible, impossibilité qui a ici le plus 
grand sens: elle signifie l’échec du surhomme en tant que volonté de puissance.  Le surhomme 
ne pourra jamais l’extrême.  L’éternel retour n’est pas de l’ordre du pouvoir.  L’expérience de 
l’éternel retour entraîne un renversement de toutes les perspectives.  Le vouloir qui veut le 
néant devient la volonté voulant l’éternité et en laquelle l’éternité sans vouloir et sans but 
retourne à elle-même.  La toute-puissance personnelle et subjective se transforme dans 
l’impersonnelle nécessité de ‘l’être’.  La transvaluation ne nous donne pas une nouvelle échelle 
des valeurs à partir de la négation de toute valeur absolue, elle nous fait atteindre un ordre 
auquel la notion de valeur cesse de s’appliquer.86 
 
Eternal Return for Nietzsche is an attempt to overcome the transient nature of time.  In Heidegger’s 
analysis Eternal Return is an attempt to abolish time.  Blanchot reads Eternal Return as the détour of 
all thought which turns with history; it is announced with fear and hesitation by Zarathustra, unlike 
the categorical announcement of the Übermensch, prompting Blanchot to ask: ‘Pourquoi cette 
différence de ton?’87  This thought experiment is a deconstruction of the will that slackens the 
philosophical tone, enabling us to hear obliquely or indirectly the other note which points toward the 
impersonal necessity of ‘Being’, which is to say to the impossibility of being done with Being: 
                                                          
85 Blanchot, ‘Passage de la ligne’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 223.  Michael Holland considers those essays published 
between 1954 and 1958 with a focus on nihilism in Avant dire, pp. 249-79. 
86 Blanchot, ‘Passage de la ligne’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 224.  This is a fairly brutal refutation of Heidegger on 
Nietzsche, for whom the Übermensch, the will to power and eternal return say exactly the same: the 
subjection of Being (or Time) to the subjective (representational) will.  See, for instance, Martin Heidegger, 
‘Who Is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?’, in Nietzsche, trans. by David Farrell Krell, 4 vols (San Francisco: Harper & 
Row, 1979-87), II: Eternal Recurrence of the Same (1984), 211-33 (pp. 227-28); ‘Wer ist Nietzsches 
Zarathustra?’, in Gesamtausgabe, VII, 99-126 (pp. 118-19).  I discuss Blanchot’s engagement with Eternal 
Return in more detail in Chapter Four.   
87 Blanchot, ‘Passage de la ligne’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 222.  Compare: ‘Behold, I teach to you the 
Overhuman!’ [repeated three times] with Zarathustra’s reflection after announcing Eternal Return: ‘Thus was I 
talking, and ever more softly: for I was afraid of my own thoughts and the motives behind them’ (Friedrich 




‘Jusqu’ici, nous avons cru le nihilisme lié au néant.  Comme c’était léger: le nihilisme est lié à l’être.  
Il est l’impossibilité d’en finir et de trouver une issue même dans cette fin.  Il dit l’impuissance du 
néant, le faux éclat de ses victoires, il dit que, lorsque nous pensons le néant, c’est encore l’être que 
nous pensons.’88   
This nihilistic thought is abyssal and discontinuous; it is founded on this movement of infinite 
reversal as it encounters the insurmountable which it bears within itself: death.  It is nihilism’s 
continual association with Being (and also with the denunciation of the modern world and nostalgia 
for a bygone time) that eventually leads Blanchot to argue in 1963 that we should renounce this term 
because ‘il a cessé de résonner en direction de ce qu’il ne peut atteindre.’89  In 1958, Blanchot notes 
that by crossing out only Sein, Heidegger privileges Being because this is possible with any word — 
Blanchot crosses out both être and néant in the later version of his essay.  This simple strikethrough is 
how the neuter works; constantly intervening in language it highlights the possibility of displacement 
within all words.  ‘Soyons donc circonspects, manions avec prudence ces notions provocantes, ne 
laissons pas parler les mots selon l’efficacité réaliste qu’ils ont acquise et reconduisons-les  
doucement vers le silence d’où ils viennent.’90  The neuter as this technical intervention allows 
Blanchot to silently respond to the view that Heidegger has been seduced by words and to approach 
that other tone which, in ‘La Bête de Lascaux’, is so despised by Socrates: ‘silence majestueux, 
mutisme en lui-même inhumain et qui fait passer dans l’art le frisson des forces sacrées, ces forces 
qui, par l’horreur et la terreur, ouvrent l’homme à des régions étrangères’.91   
Heidegger once famously declared, ‘Only another God can save us now [Nur noch ein Gott 
kann uns retten].’92  The experience of modern technology leads Heidegger to conclude that the 
human no longer has any agency in this hopeless world; Blanchot will reach a similar conclusion, but 
there is something to be celebrated about this shift beyond the sovereign subject, which does not entail 
                                                          
88 Blanchot, ‘Passage de la ligne’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 224.   
89 Blanchot, ‘La Littérature encore une fois’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 583-95 (pp. 591-92) (first publ. in La 
Nouvelle Revue Française, 120 (December 1962), 1055-61; 121 (January 1963), 102-07).   
90 Blanchot, ‘Passage de la ligne’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 226. 
91 Blanchot, ‘La Bête de Lascaux’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, pp. 685-86. 
92 ‘“Only a God Can Save Us”: Der Spiegel’s interview with Martin Heidegger’, trans. by Maria P. Alter and John 
D. Caputo, in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. by Richard Wolin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1993), pp. 91-116 (p. 107). 
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the complete destruction of the human.  Four years before ‘Passage de la ligne’, this time in relation to 
the work of Albert Camus, Blanchot had written that we enter nihilism by questioning vermin.93  A 
strange statement perhaps, one which has proved troubling for some,94 but it communicates the idea 
that nihilism cannot be overcome and again emphasises an indirect approach to this line or region 
through exposure to what is alien to the human.  A lengthy passage from the original essay is omitted 
when the essay is collected fifteen years later in L’Entretien infini:  
 
Comme on le voit, la question, sinon la réponse, se concentre sur le mot impossibilité, mot 
nécessairement ambigu, puisqu’il ne s’offre à nous que dans la rigueur de la négation — 
absence de pouvoir, privation de la possibilité, l’impuissance absolue — et que cependant il 
cherche à dégager une affirmation qui échapperait à la fois à l’être (entendu au sens où l’entend 
l’ontologie: non pas seulement les êtres, mais l’être qui est à l’œuvre sous les existences réelles 
ou possibles) et à la négation de l’être.95 
 
This is an affirmation that precedes ontology and this is perhaps why the above extract was replaced 
in L’Entretien infini with: ‘Espace où ce qu’on appelle l’homme a comme par avance toujours déjà 
disparu.’96  The power of man in modernity to destroy the world is limited because, exposed to the 
limit, this negation goes hand-in-hand with an affirmation of the unknowable region beyond this limit.  
Roger Laporte calls this, ‘une nouvelle dimension, celle du Neutre, qui n’est pas [...] un troisième 
terme se situant entre l’affirmation et la négation, mais bien plutôt un tout autre terme, car établissant 
un rapport avec l’essentiellement autre.’97  The human, although exposed to something completely 
alien, persists in this response which is not some masterful overcoming, but a helpless abandoning of 
                                                          
93 Blanchot, ‘Tu peux tuer cet homme’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 271-80 (p. 272) (first publ. in La Nouvelle 
Nouvelle Revue Française, 18 (June 1954), 1059-69; this essay was heavily amended for its publication in 
L’Entretien infini).  
94 See, for instance, Holland, Avant dire, p. 271. 
95 Blanchot, ‘Tu peux tuer cet homme’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue Française, p. 1061. 
96 Blanchot, ‘Tu peux tuer cet homme’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 273.   
97 Roger Laporte, ‘Le Oui, le Non, le Neutre’, Critique, 229: Maurice Blanchot (June 1966), 579-90 (p. 587). 
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oneself to nihilism.  The neuter is that impossible and silent puissance, of neither human nor animal 
origin, which responds to human pouvoir, possibility, speech. 
Cautious regarding our prospects in the age of modern technology and aware that these 
powers are easily and often abused for political or ideological purposes, Blanchot seeks to demystify 
the apocalypse and expose its impossibility, banality, insignificance.  These essays carry warnings 
against complaisance but do not endorse a fear of technology.  Blanchot’s position on modern 
technology thus seems very remote from that of Heidegger, who in 1966 spoke of the terror induced 
by the technological world: 
 
Everything is functioning.  This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is functioning 
and that the functioning drives us more and more to even further functioning, and that 
technology tears men loose from the earth and uproots them.  I do not know whether you were 
frightened, but I at any rate was frightened when I saw pictures coming from the moon to the 
earth.  We do not need any atom bomb.  The uprooting of man has already taken place.  The 
only thing we have left is purely technical relationships.  This is no longer the earth on which 
man lives.98 
 
The date of this interview suggests that Heidegger could be referring to the first images transmitted to 
the earth from the moon by Lunar Orbiter 1.  That ‘everything is functioning’ within technology need 
not be something to be feared for Blanchot, who sees in this power an appeal beyond the human.99  
Two years prior to Heidegger’s interview with Der Spiegel, Blanchot had considered the responses of 
                                                          
98 ‘“Only a God Can Save Us”’, in The Heidegger Controversy, ed. by Wolin, pp. 105-06. 
99 In a study of the shifting patterns of ‘linguistic negativism’ across Blanchot’s work, particularly negative 
affixes and negative modifiers to words (or ‘unwords’) such as ‘inhumain’, ‘inquiétude’ and ‘immobile’, Shane 
Weller argues that Blanchot belongs to a late modernism that ‘develops such forms of linguistic negativism as 
what it takes to be the only aesthetically and ethically justifiable response to a modernity increasingly 
perceived as both socially and politically catastrophic.’  Shane Weller, ‘Voidance: Linguistic Negativism in 
Maurice Blanchot’s Fiction’, French Studies, 69: 1 (2015), 30-45 (pp. 44-45).  Blanchot in fact rarely uses the 
term modernity and, as these essays on technology demonstrate, he is not fearful of technology.  Moreover, 
there is an affirmative tone to be heard in any such catastrophe that precedes and outstrips such negation 
which is overlooked in Weller’s analysis. 
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various heads of state — Khrushchev, Kennedy and De Gaulle — to the first cosmonaut and the real 
significance of Yuri Gagarin’s experience: 
 
tous des héritiers prêts à proclamer pour leur prestige les bienfaits de la technique, mais 
incapables d’accepter, d’accueillir la conséquence, qui est de ruiner toute appartenance et de 
mettre en tous lieux, le lieu en question. 
 — Admettons-le.  Mais ne doit-on pas dire que l’exploit de Gagarine, d’un côté, n’a rien fait 
d’autre, par ses développements politiques et mythiques, que de permettre aux Russes d’habiter 
plus solidement la terre russe, et, d’autre part, ne peut nullement apparaître comme 
physiquement modifié, d’une manière radicale, le rapport avec le Dehors?100 
 
The second half of this quotation demonstrates how Gagarin was going to be recuperated by political 
powers; but the real import of this spaceflight, unable to be embraced by the heads of state because it 
exposes and challenges the limits of culture, is the experience of dislocation and dispersion and the 
shift in our relationship to the outside which results.  The instance of typographical technology, the 
em dash, included in the version of the essay quoted above but omitted from the original publication 
of the essay in Italian translation in 1964, serves to remind us that there is always something outside 
of the text enabling it to take place (and to be repeated).101  This silent inscription is a form of writing 
which cannot be put into speech: the neuter as a neutralizing and displacing technique which 
challenges the limit of world, history, culture and subtly shifts our perspective. 
It is interesting that ‘La Conquête de l’espace’ was Blanchot’s contribution to the ill-fated 
project for La Revue internationale — the intention of which was to publish anonymous fragments 
                                                          
100 Blanchot, ‘La Conquête de l’espace’, in Écrits politiques, pp. 125-28 (p. 127) (first publ. in Italian translation 
as ‘La Conquista dello spazio’, trans. by Guido [Davide] Neri, Il Menabò, 7 (1964), 10-13).  This is in part a 
response to an essay by Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Heidegger, Gagarine et nous’, in Difficile liberté: essais sur le 
judaïsme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1963), pp. 299-303 (first publ. in Information juive, 13 (1961), 1-2). 
101 Michael Holland comments on the significance of the insertion of such a dash in ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la 
mort’ for its publication in L’Espace littéraire; here the dash precedes the words ‘notre fin’.  Holland argues 
that this is Blanchot interrupting his argument at the point where his analysis is face to face with what defies it 
utterly, thus introducing a difference into the work.  Michael Holland, ‘Towards a New Literary Idiom: the 
Fiction and Criticism of Maurice Blanchot from 1941 to 1955’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of 
Oxford, 1981) p. 305. 
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from a community of international writers which would form a contemporary response to radical 
historical change.102  The project — reliant on modern technologies of communication, production, 
and distribution — sought to question place and to break more explicitly from the organic form as the 
expression of a single authorial intent through the collective, fragmented, anonymous, and 
international nature of the pieces published.  The selection of an essay which considers the power of 
technology to overcome international boundaries is therefore perhaps not surprising.   
While trying to establish this ambitious project, Blanchot wrote that the translator was its 
most important figure, ‘le véritable écrivain de la revue.’103  Other comments made about the 
significance of the translator are lifted from an earlier essay on Walter Benjamin: ‘[Le traducteur] est 
le maître secret de la différence des langues, non pas pour l’abolir, mais pour l’utiliser, afin d’éveiller, 
dans la sienne, par les changements violents ou subtils qu’il lui apporte, une présence de ce qu’il y a 
de différent, originellement, dans l’original.’104  Translation, Blanchot argues in agreement with 
Benjamin, rather than bringing languages together in one harmonious and superior unity, is founded 
on the difference between languages and accentuates this original difference.  The translator is 
portrayed by Blanchot as a linguistic technician who brings the otherness of the work to the fore 
through its reproduction — the proximity to Benjamin’s position in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility’ and ‘Task of the Translator’ is evident here.  It is this otherness, this 
original difference, which enables the repetition of the artwork and is indicated in ‘La Conquête de 
l’espace’ by the insertion of the em dash.  The Revue internationale therefore represented a sort of 
harnessing of modern technology (printing presses, translation, fragmentation, the questioning of 
place, the anonymity of texts) for the purposes of the neuter. 
                                                          
102 Blanchot outlined his plans for La Revue internationale in a set of papers published posthumously under the 
title ‘[La Gravité du projet]’, in Écrits politiques, pp. 101-17.  See also Christophe Bident’s chapter on the Revue 
internationale in Maurice Blanchot: partenaire invisible, pp. 403-17; and Christopher Fynsk, ‘Blanchot in The 
International Review’, in Blanchot’s Epoch, ed. by Hill and Holland, pp. 104-20.  
103 Blanchot, ‘[La Gravité du projet]’, in Écrits politiques, p. 111.  
104 Blanchot, ‘Traduire’, in L’Amitié, pp. 69-73 (p. 71) (first publ. as the first section of ‘Reprises’, La Nouvelle 
Revue française, 93 (September 1960), 475-83).  On the significance of translation for Blanchot, see Leslie Hill, 
‘“A Fine Madness”: Translation, Quotation, the Fragmentary’, in Blanchot Romantique, ed. by McKeane and 
Opelz, pp. 211-31. 
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 The problem for those listening to the garbled speech of Yuri Gagarin and the interlocutors of 
‘Entretien sur un changement d’époque’ is how to formulate a response to what lies beyond traditional 
structures of expression.  Blanchot is able to set aside the metaphysical menace of technological 
dominance, so feared by Heidegger, and move beyond metaphysical representation, the point at which 
Heidegger faltered, by looking to a more originary sense of techne which harnesses the power of 
modern technology: the neuter.  In ‘Entretien sur un changement d’époque’, the change of epoch is 
considered in terms of the shift in our relation to world which has become a building that we can 
burn.105  Do not burn the scientists, do not wipe out the contemporary world to which we happily 
belong, pleads one interlocutor, but burn the structures to expose something other than the regularity 
of the concept.106  Announced in this oscillating dialogue is the neuter as a response to what always 
surpasses meaning (the worldly, historical, cultural limit demarcating the boundaries of human 
knowledge), which (as a more originary form of techne) is also essential to the production of this 
meaning or the demarcation of this limit in the first place.   
The motif of the street indicates the neuter in ‘La Conquête de l’espace’ (only the man of the 
street grasps the significance of Gagarin’s experience) and ‘Entretien sur un changement d’époque’: 
‘J’admets qu’en marchant dans la rue, on respire de telles pensées; mais on les respire, on ne les pense 
pas; dès qu’on les formule, elles perdent leur gentillesse de conte.’  The other interlocutor replies: ‘La 
rue est donc bien plus sage que les penseurs soigneux qui attendent d’avoir de nouvelles catégories 
pour penser ce qui arrive.’107  The human participates in the anonymous and collective flow, hum, 
movement of the street, but is not subject in this errant and unrestricted space.  Blanchot refers to this 
hum elsewhere as ‘la parole bavarde’ or ‘le bavardage’: 
 
J’ai toujours été frappé par l’approbation empressée et enchantée, donnée universellement à 
Heidegger, lorsque celui-ci, sous prétexte d’analyse et avec la vigueur sobre qui lui est propre, a 
condamné la parole inauthentique.  Parole méprisée, qui n’est jamais celle du ‘Je’ résolu, 
                                                          
105 Blanchot, ‘Sur un changement d’époque: l’exigence du retour’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 402. 
106 Ibid., p. 403. 
107 Ibid., p. 397. 
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laconique et héroïque, mais la non-parole du ‘On’ irresponsable.  On parle.  Cela veut dire: 
personne ne parle.  Cela veut dire: nous vivons dans un monde où il y a de la parole sans un 
sujet qui la parle, civilisation de parleurs sans parole, bavards aphasiques, rapporteurs qui 
relatent et ne se prononcent pas, techniciens sans nom et sans décision.108 
 
This bavardage, rather than being degraded or inauthentic as the German pronoun man is for 
Heidegger, points toward the unknowable future for Blanchot precisely because it belongs to no 
one.109  Blanchot in 1958 notes Heidegger’s concern that the myth surrounding Nietzsche threatens to 
reduce the cry of his suffering to mere ‘bavardage’.110  The cry for Heidegger reflects authentic death, 
something akin to that experienced by the Chamberlain in Rilke’s Notebooks.  Any cry will 
unavoidably be reduced to mere chatter in Blanchot’s account, but this is not something to be 
deplored.  Anonymous and nomadic, these technicians are a vehicle for the neuter and the street in 
which they roam is the region of nihilism.  Modern technologies — the printing press, the atom bomb, 
the spacecraft — provide the conditions for contesting cultural limits and recognising this excessive 
background force.  We are exposed to an outside, to an unknowable future, to a new place and to 
human impossibility in these essays on modern technology which subtly shift our perspective and 
encourage us to abandon ourselves to the nomadic movement without determination that is the chatter 
of the street. 
                                                          
108 Blanchot, ‘La Parole vaine’, in L’Amitié, pp. 137-49 (p. 145) (first publ. in Louis-René des Forêts, Le Bavard 
(Paris: U.G.E., 1963), pp. 163-84). 
109 Blanchot would locate a force for revolutionary change in the street in May 1968: ‘Depuis Mai, la rue s’est 
réveillée: elle parle.  C’est là l’un des changements décisifs.  Elle est redevenue vivante, puissante, souveraine: 
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été mis en place le plus dangereux dispositif de répression sournoise et de force brutale’ (Blanchot ‘La Rue’, in 
Écrits politiques, pp. 180-81 (first publ. as an anonymous pamphlet [attributed to Blanchot by Dionys Mascolo, 
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Sheringham acknowledges the contestatory power of the neuter but does not think it radically enough when 
he writes that this chatter ‘epitomises the ontology of the everyday’, because the neuter also contests the 
limits of being.  Michael Sheringham, Everyday Life: Theories and Practices from Surrealism to the Present 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 21; see also Michael Sheringham, ‘Attending to the Everyday: 
Blanchot Lefebvre, Certeau, Perec’, French Studies, 54: 2 (2000), 187-99. 
110 Blanchot, ‘Nietzsche, aujourd’hui’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 215. 
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‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’ [1964] reads like a culmination of Blanchot’s writing on nihilism, 
modern technology, the inhuman and the unknown.  This essay is a response to Atombombe und die 
Zukunft des Menschen [1958], published in French translation in 1963, in which Karl Jaspers argues 
that humanity’s newly acquired capacity for self-destruction signals the dawning of a new age.111  The 
choice presented to us by Jaspers is underscored by Blanchot: ‘Ou bien l’homme disparaîtra ou bien il 
se transformera.’112  Blanchot criticises Jaspers for continuing to think the atomic bomb in terms of 
values; the theme of his work is change, but there is nothing new about his language, thought or 
political formulations.  ‘Si la pensée retombe dans ses affirmations traditionnelles, c’est qu’elle ne 
veut rien risquer d’elle-même en présence d’un événement ambigu dont elle ne réussit pas à décider 
ce qu’il signifie, avec sa face terrible, avec son apparence d’absolu — événement démesuré, mais 
démesurément vide, dont elle ne peut rien dire, sinon cette banalité: qu’il vaudrait mieux 
l’empêcher.’113   The apocalypse always disappoints; it is that ambiguous and excessive event that 
does not reveal the truth of the end because it encounters death as the insurmountable impossibility 
which we are incapable of dominating or wanting.  ‘L’entendement nous a placés auprès d’un horizon 
mortel qui est celui de la compréhension et, par là, il nous aide à concevoir à quoi nous sommes 
exposés: non pas à mourir universellement, mais à éluder le savoir de cette mort universelle pour 
échouer dans la platitude d’une fin dénuée d’importance.’114  Blanchot exposes the difference between 
the future treated as an object by totalising scientific knowledge and the future as what cannot be 
negated, as what remains unknowable and uncertain.  The latter is why the apocalypse always 
disappoints; apocalyptic foretelling exposes us to the banality of an end that will never have any 
meaning for us as subjects.   
Michael Holland, one of the few to have considered a thinking of technology in Blanchot, 
argues that the question of the bomb is radically separated from the question of technology in both 
                                                          
111 See Karl Jaspers, Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen (Munich: R. Piper, 1958); The Future of 
Mankind, trans. by E. B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); La Bombe atomique et l’avenir de 
l’homme: conscience politique de notre temps, trans. by Edmond Saget (Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1963). 
112 Blanchot, ‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’, in L’Amitié, pp. 118-27 (p. 118) (first publ. in La Nouvelle Revue française, 
135 (March 1964), 488-96). 
113 Blanchot, ‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’, in L’Amitié, p. 122. 
114 Ibid., p. 125. 
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essays on nuclear weapons: the latter is a question of language with the potential to indicate a new 
departure for man because it is associated with his being; the former remains engaged in that nihilistic 
or catastrophic situation.  Holland writes that for Blanchot (and Levinas) it is the image of Gagarin in 
space, not the total annihilation threatened by the bomb, which is the event that marks ‘le vrai 
tournant devant lequel la technique met l’homme’.115  The distinction made between spaceflight and 
the atom bomb seems arbitrary and overlooks the implication of the neuter in modern technologies: all 
modes of technique expose the human to a turning because all relate us to the unknowable and expose 
us to a profound impuissance.  (Elsewhere Blanchot directly compares the pen to a weapon: ‘Elle 
devait éprouver une sorte de trouble devant cette plume qu’elle lui voyait entre les mains.  C’était une 
arme redoutable devant laquelle elle était désarmée.’)116  As evidence Holland argues that the account 
of spaceflight in Blanchot is a clearer rejection of the stance of Heidegger, because engaging in 
notions of rootedness; but the essays on the bomb engage with the question of our relation to the 
future in a way that similarly disrupts our worldly perspective.  Furthermore, Holland, reading 
Blanchot alongside Levinas, assumes that there is a ‘subjectivity’ and a ‘humanity’ that is capable of 
the new language offered in the change encapsulated by the term technique.  The terms ‘humanity’ 
and ‘capable’ seem strange when reading Blanchot, for whom all possibility is conditioned by the 
impossible and for whom this new perspective, this new language, which is always already technical, 
exposes the human to something completely alien.   
Noted at the start of this chapter was Derrida’s analysis which claimed that any attempt to 
shed light on the apocalypse leads only to a brighter apocalyptic tone; Derrida suggests that by 
listening to the multiplicity of apocalyptic tones, by recognising that there is more than one tone, we 
may allow the possibility for the other tone, or the tone of the other, to be heard.  Toward the end of 
‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’ Blanchot is doing just this when he argues that Jaspers, ‘[écarte] comme s’il 
s’agissait d’une mouche importune, l’ombre abstraite de cette apocalypse et [s’obstine] dans les 
habitudes d’une tradition et d’un langage auxquels on ne voit rien à changer’.117  The essay concludes 
                                                          
115 Holland, Avant Dire, pp. 297-306 (p. 302). 
116 Blanchot, ‘L’Attente’, Botteghe Oscure, p. 24. 
117 Blanchot, ‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’, in L’Amitié, p. 126. 
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by stressing that the choice between all or nothing, between transformation or destruction, is not the 
one and only truth of our situation.  We should note this fly out of the corner of our eye; we should 
risk a surreptitious glance in its direction.   
 
The Neuter: Kafka and Le Dernier Homme 
At the height of his involvement with the Revue internationale, Blanchot published two essays on 
Kafka in 1964: ‘La Voix narrative (le “il”, le neutre)’ and ‘Le Pont de bois (la répétition, le 
neutre)’.118  The first of these essays begins by quoting from Kafka’s The Castle: ‘Les forces de la vie 
ne suffisent que jusqu’à un certain point.’119  The meaning of life is limited by fatigue; but in order to 
draw this limit there must be something other than ‘les forces de la vie’.  Limitlessness haunts the 
limit as the condition of its possibility.  In the essays concerning modern technologies we have seen 
how the limits of history, world and culture are contested by an impersonal force which the human 
cannot master: the neuter as a sort of disobedient techne continuing where other modes of technique 
have left off.  For this reason the neuter is not spoken by one single authoritative voice in Kafka’s 
texts.  Blanchot is naming not the narrator when he refers to the ‘voix narrative’, but the neuter as the 
condition of possibility of narration.   
As a non-concept which perpetually evades location, working at the limit to destroy all limit, 
the neuter is experienced as a sort of emptiness within the work.  It has profound consequences for 
how the author and the reader relate to the work as well as the work’s relation to the world; 
consequences which are experienced in Kafka’s writing but are elsewhere eroded or clouded by the 
misuse of the narrative voice.  This ‘il’ is described as the unlit event that unfolds within the space or 
distance [étendue] of the narration, here referred to as a song: ‘c’est dans le chant qu’Orphée descend 
réellement aux enfers: ce que l’on traduit en ajoutant qu’il y descend par le pouvoir de chanter, mais 
                                                          
118 Blanchot, ‘La Voix narrative (le “il”, le neutre)’ and ‘Le Pont de bois (la répétition, le neutre)’, in L’Entretien 
infini, pp. 556-67, 568-82; and in De Kafka à Kafka, pp. 171-84, 185-201 (first publ. as ‘La Voix narrative’, La 
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(January 1964), 90-103).  ‘La Conquête de l’espace’ and ‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’ appeared the same year; ‘Les 
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119 Blanchot, ‘La Voix narrative (le “il”, le neutre)’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 556.  
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ce chant déjà instrumental signifie une altération de l’institution narrative.’120  Blanchot signals the 
corruption of the narrative voice which is subsequently played out in the novelistic tradition.  Rather 
than experiencing the neuter as a technique beyond the control of Orpheus, which creates this melodic 
distance and so enables narration, we understand the song as nothing more than an instrument 
mastered by Orpheus.  Consequently, we take the narrative voice, the ‘il’, to be the expression of an 
objective reality or of multiple and personalised subjectivities.121  Here we are reminded of Ulysses 
tied to the ship’s mast in ‘La Rencontre de l’imaginaire’: through what are described as ‘technical’ 
means he maintains a cold and calculated distance from the Sirens in order to hear their call without 
becoming implicated in this imaginary space.  This controlled distance resurfaces in ‘La Conquête de 
l’espace’ where the heavens are merely transformed into another absolute, ‘celui de l’espace des 
savants qui n’est rien qu’une possibilité calculable.’122  The impersonal narration employed by 
Flaubert is cited as the modern outcome of such corruption in ‘La Voix narrative (le “il”, le neutre)’.  
Such aesthetic distance treats the artwork as an autonomous whole and ensures a clear division 
between spectacle and spectator: ‘L’idéal reste la représentation du théâtre classique: le narrateur n’est 
là que pour lever le rideau; la pièce se joue, dans le fond, de toute éternité et comme sans lui; il ne 
raconte pas, il montre, et le lecteur ne lit pas, il regarde, assistant, prenant part sans participer.’123 
An altogether different sort of distance is evident in Kafka’s writing.  The contemplative 
enjoyment of a detached author and reader is no longer possible when the space between spectator 
and spectacle is restored to its Orphic origins as the very milieu of the narrative.  The stability of the 
measurable, controllable, calculable distance (which was only ever an illusion) between Flaubert or 
his narrator and the work, between Ulysses and the Sirens, between Gagarin and the earth, is shaken 
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by a volatile distance which cannot be pinned down or controlled because, the limits of the work 
challenged, there is no external perspective by which to judge the work.  The work is decentred by an 
indeterminate and undetectable distance which subtly alters our perspective and draws us into this 
space; it is now no longer a distant object upon which we gaze from afar.  ‘Ce que Kafka nous 
apprend [...], c’est que raconter met en jeu le neutre.’124  The parentheses added to the titles of both of 
these essays for their publication in L’Entretien infini echo the work of the neuter: there is a difference 
between the main body of the title and what is marginalised within these typographical marks, but this 
difference is unstable because while ‘named’ in parentheses the neuter is also implied in the narrative 
voice and on the wooden bridge.   
The narrative voice is neuter, writes Blanchot; it says nothing but is felt everywhere in the 
narration and, at the limit, it prevents the work from having a limit.125  It precedes and exceeds the 
omniscient narrator of Flaubert’s novels (the narrative voice as it is formulated by Gérard Genette),126 
who is only ever a stand-in, an actor obscuring the stage.  This ‘il’ cannot be pinned down to what we 
traditionally understand by ‘place’ or attributed to any one subject:  
 
le ‘il’, se dispersant à la façon d’un manque dans la pluralité simultanée — la répétition — 
d’une place mouvante et diversement inoccupée, désigne ‘sa’ place à la fois comme celle à 
laquelle il ferait toujours défaut et qui ainsi resterait vide, mais aussi comme un surplus de 
place, une place toujours en trop: hypertopie.127 
 
Blanchot here indicates a new place and new perspective opened up by the neuter; a region that 
nonetheless resists location or identification and so it seems fitting that it is discussed in a footnote in 
the margins of the essay which, via an interruption, refers beyond the limits of this essay to ‘Le Pont 
de bois (la répétition, le neutre)’.  K., the main character in Kafka’s The Castle, bears the traits of a 
figure exposed to such instability according to Blanchot, because he is foreign to the foreignness of 
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125 Ibid., pp. 565-66. 
126 See Gérard Genette, Figures III (Paris: Seuil, 1972), pp. 225-67. 
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the Castle, foreign to the village, foreign even to himself as he inexplicably breaks with his own 
familiarity to move toward this new place.128  ‘“I can’t go away [Auswandern kann ich nicht],” replied 
K.  “I came here to stay.  I’ll stay here.”  And giving utterance to a self-contradiction which he made 
no effort to explain he added to himself: “What could have enticed me to this desolate country except 
the wish to stay here?”’129  K. is a nomad constantly threatened with homelessness in this new place; 
moving between inns, the school, and the homes of the villagers, he experiences that profound lack of 
belonging felt by Gagarin at the limits of the earth.  
One of the shortcomings of the rhetoric surrounding modern technology is the widespread 
assumption that an individual can say, define, negate, or destroy the world; similar difficulties are 
encountered in those narratives with an omniscient authorial or narrative figure.  ‘[La parole neutre] 
ouvre dans le langage un pouvoir autre, étranger au pouvoir d’éclairement (ou d’obscurcissement), de 
compréhension (ou de méprise).’130  The neuter is that unconquerable power which opens up an 
unsayable emptiness within the work.  Yuri Gagarin, dislocated and exposed as technological man, 
was momentarily a vehicle for this limitless force: ‘Toutefois, dans ce bavardage, il y a quelque chose 
qui effraie et qui émeut: c’est qu’il ne cesse pas, qu’il ne doit pas cesser; le moindre trou dans la 
rumeur signifie déjà le vide à jamais; toute lacune, toute interruption introduit bien plus que la mort, 
mais le néant extérieur même dans le discours.’131  The anonymous speech of the cosmonaut invites 
the outside into language, testing worldly limits it incites a fearful reaction in those listening within 
the parameters of culture, but enables a more liberated perspective for the attentive listener.  
Marthe Robert is an example of a critic working within the prism of culture to fill similar gaps 
and inconsistencies in The Castle.  She argues that The Castle is not only the unique work of a solitary 
writer, but the palimpsest where we can read a thousand years of literature: Kafka’s attempt to classify 
the monstrous archives of Western culture from which he could not exclude his own work.132  There 
are similarities between Robert and Gagarin; both are ‘scapegoats’ sent to the very edge of literary 
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space with an impossible task: to say the world in its totality, to complete the authentic work.133  In 
contrast, Blanchot points to the wandering structure of the narrative which situates Kafka’s writing in 
the Jewish tradition; he describes K. erring from interpretation to interpretation until the narrative 
opens out onto the possibility of writing, which invites endless commentary.134  Blanchot suggests that 
the opening lines of The Castle are perhaps where the ‘meaning’ of the work is to be found: ‘K. 
demeura longtemps, les regards levés vers l’apparence vide.’135  The original German reads ‘die 
scheinbare Leere’ [apparent emptiness].  Blanchot, in his own translation, subtly alters our perception 
of the text so that K. now observes ‘empty appearance’, a move which nudges Kafka’s writing closer 
to the neuter.  Suggested in the conditional tense and placed in a footnote in the margins of his essay, 
Blanchot does not propose that this is the definitive meaning of the text; such a concrete interpretation 
is impossible.  His argument is that, the limits of the work challenged by the neuter, ‘internal’ 
commentaries on the Castle and ‘external’ commentaries on The Castle are equally justifiable and 
equally powerless. 
The work derives its power from the non-difference between inside and outside: 
‘(l’ambiguïté: la différence de l’identique, la non-identité du même)’.136  The parentheses again signal 
the trembling of the difference between what can no longer be described as subject and object; they 
expose the empty relationality which founds the work and is most palpable on the wooden bridge, that 
crossing between places.  The critic of The Castle is comparable to the translator of the Revue 
internationale; the work is founded on this original difference between languages and criticism 
accentuates this further, testing the limits of our cultural perspective.  Blanchot later writes in 
L’Écriture du désastre: ‘  Dans la nuit, l’insomnie est dis-cussion, non pas travail d’arguments se 
heurtant à des arguments, mais l’extrême secousse sans pensées, l’ébranlement cassé jusqu’au calme 
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(les exégèses qui vont et viennent dans “Le Château”, récit de l’insomnie).’137  The stress is not on the 
value of individual interpretations but on the trembling relationality between the work and its 
commentary, which is the condition of possibility for both.  Later in the same text Blanchot writes: 
 
  Il est étrange que K., à la fin du Château, ait été par certains commentateurs promis à la 
folie.  Dès le début, il est hors du débat raison-déraison, dans la mesure où tout ce qu’il fait est 
sans rapport avec le raisonnable, cependant absolument nécessaire, c’est-à-dire juste ou justifié.  
De même, il ne paraît pas possible qu’il meure (damné ou sauvé, c’est presque sans 
importance), non seulement parce que son combat ne s’inscrit pas dans les termes de vivre et de 
mourir, mais parce qu’il est trop fatigué (sa fatigue, seul trait qui s’accentue avec le récit) pour 
pouvoir mourir: pour que l’avènement de sa mort ne se change en inavènement interminable.138 
 
His growing fatigue is the only indication we have of a sense of progression in this récit; it signals 
that there is another power beyond the limits of life and the narrative.  This is the same power that 
allows the subtle shift in the title (from ‘Le Château’ to Le Château) between the two fragments 
quoted here, which ensures that the interpretation of the work can never be stabilised.  Labelling K. 
mad is a strange exercise because he has never worked within the laws determined in the Castle and 
enforced in the Village; he belongs to neither place and his condition mirrors that of the writer.139 
When external and internal commentary become almost interchangeable, when the non-
identical difference of the same is the source of the power of the work, of the neuter, then it becomes 
impossible to attach a value to work and to commentary, to the Castle and to the Village.  The 
concluding footnote to the second of these essays on Kafka reads: ‘L’un des traits essentiels du neutre 
est, en effet, de ne se laisser ressaisir ni en termes d’immanence ni en termes de transcendance et de 
nous attirer dans une tout autre sorte de rapport.’140  The neuter does not command from above, but 
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nor does it exist in itself as something self-identical; between immanence and transcendence, it 
dismantles that age-old philosophical distinction.  This is why readings of The Castle vary according 
to whether the castle is seen as transcendent (divine) or as immanent social entity.141  The neuter is 
founded on that shifting relationship and so offers a means of moving beyond metaphysical 
representation.  Ending the narrative would allow the relationship to stabilise and we could draw a 
meaning or value from this text; but K., Blanchot argues, will never die a personal and heroic death, it 
would only ever be general, bureaucratic, and thus an interpretation of death.  This neutral death is a 
liquidation, writes Blanchot in ‘La Fin du héros’ [1965], referring to the hero of Der Prozess who 
declares that when we die, we do so ‘[c]omme un chien’.142   
Suspended between life and death, between subject and object, between human and animal, 
characters, authors and readers are like the Hunter Gracchus in Kafka’s short story: ‘“I am forever.” 
replied the Hunter, “on the great stair that leads up to it [the other world].  On that infinitely wide and 
spacious stair I clamber about, sometimes up, sometimes down, sometimes on the right, sometimes on 
the left, always in motion.  The Hunter has been turned into a butterfly.  Do not laugh.”’143  The theme 
of this short story is recognisably Blanchotian: the impossibility of death.  Blanchot, however, objects 
to its allegorical status in 1949: ‘il y a une contradiction entre la nature du récit qui est achevé et 
précis et un contenu qui exige l’ambiguïté absolue de la négation.’  Rather than allegory, which 
presents us with a neatly packaged idea, The Castle, it was noted at the beginning of this chapter, is 
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symbolic because it places the world in parentheses and exposes us to the void which is the milieu of 
all imagined form.  Blanchot writes later in this essay: ‘Le passage du oui au non, du non au oui, est 
ici la règle, et toute interprétation qui s’y dérobe, y compris celle qui fonde cette alternance, contredit 
le mouvement qui la rend possible.’144  The rule is one of ambiguity, one that contests everything, 
including itself, in this movement between affirmation and negation.  The pressing question is how we 
are to begin to respond to a récit that resists all interpretation?  It is a question of how we are to 
respond to this call that lies both beyond the boundaries of the text and within the text itself, the récit 
as the condition of possibility of all narrative: ‘K. a été appelé, et il est bien vrai que la mort semble 
un appel; mais il est vrai aussi que répondre à cet appel, c’est le trahir, faire de la mort quelque chose 
de réel et de vrai.’145   
Kafka wrote his own version of the encounter between Ulysses and the Sirens, published 
seven years after his death in 1931.  In this retelling of the episode, the Sirens are silent and it is his 
own ears, rather those of his boatmen, which Ulysses plugs with wax.  Ulysses conjures up their song 
in his imagination and controls these creatures with his gaze: ‘Soon, however, all this faded from his 
sight as he fixed his gaze on the distance, the Sirens literally vanished before his resolution 
[Entschlossenheit], and at the very moment when they were nearest to him he knew of them no 
longer.’146  Elizabeth Boa describes Ulysses as following ‘his own inner visionary journey.  Intent on 
the figures in his mind, he does not see the Sirens.’147  But there is a third twist to this retelling of the 
encounter: ‘Ulysses, it is said, was so full of guile [listenreich], was such a fox, that not even the 
goddess of fate could pierce his armour [nicht in sein Innerstes dringen konnte].  Perhaps he had 
really noticed, although here the human understanding is beyond its depths, that the Sirens were 
silent, and held up to them and to the gods the aforementioned pretence [Scheinvorgang] merely as a 
sort of shield.’148  Without the addition, we might consider this a mythical representation of the Sirens 
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(‘En nous engageant dans l’histoire mythique, nous nous mettons à vivre son sens, nous en sommes 
imprégnés, nous le “pensons” vraiment et dans sa pureté, car sa pure vérité ne peut être saisie que 
dans les choses où elle se réalise comme action et sentiment’);149 however, the third and final twist, in 
which Ulysses, hearing the silence of the Sirens, affirms their unknowable presence, introduces an 
ambiguity that allows an other sort of affirmation which is not of the order of knowing and which 
opens the human up to that other place. 
This is that unforeseeable affirmation for which Blanchot had called in 1959 in what would 
become the preface to Lautréamont et Sade.  Within and without the text, it is both the call that makes 
the text possible and its response: the neuter.  When K. puts his ear to the telephone in the inn, a rare 
instance locating The Castle in the twentieth century, the noise he hears through the receiver is the 
hum of the neuter: 
 
The receiver gave out a buzz [Summen] of a kind that K. had never before heard on a telephone.  
It was like the hum [Summen] of countless children’s voices — but yet not a hum, the echo 
rather of voices singing at an infinite distance [aber auch dieses Summen war keines, sondern 
war Gesang fernster, allerfernster Stimmen] — blended by sheer impossibility into one high 
but resonant sound which vibrated on the ear [an das Ohr schlug] as if it were trying to 
penetrate beyond mere hearing.  K. listened without attempting to telephone, leaning his left 
arm on the telephone shelf.150 
 
This is not an original noise from a present and visible source; it is the echo of some already repeated 
sound, signalling withdrawn presence and the impossibility of knowing this inhuman other — a 
reworking of the Sirens who, in Blanchot’s retelling of the episode, continue to call from their tomb.  
It is the distant call which lured K. to this place; calling from beyond the confines of the text it is the 
condition of possibility of the narrative.  The distance between unknown sender and receiver is 
distorted by this technical device.  The neuter cannot be located, represented, signified (‘nommer le 
                                                          
149 Blanchot, ‘Le Langage de la fiction’, in La Part du feu, p. 84. 
150 Kafka, The Castle, p. 33; Das Schloss, p. 24. 
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neutre, c’est peut-être, c’est sûrement le dissiper; mais nécessairement au bénéfice encore du 
neutre’),151 but the telephone allows us to hear its echo.   
 Later, the Superintendent warns K. that any contact he has had with the Castle has been 
illusory; his attention turns to the telephone: ‘Now this humming [Rauschen] and singing transmitted 
by our telephones is the only real and reliable thing you’ll hear, everything else is deceptive.  There’s 
no fixed connection with the Castle, no central exchange which transmits our calls further.’152  This 
récit, it has already been noted, refuses knowledge, indicates the void and deals in the imaginary.  The 
humming heard down the telephone is, however, different: real and reliable, the implication is that it 
reaches beyond the imaginary boundaries of the text.  The Superintendent goes on to explain that a 
‘stranger’ calling the Castle cannot expect to be put through to a particular person.  Any exchange 
across the telephone is anonymous and meaningless; what matters is this background noise.  Derrida 
writes that anonymity is the mark of the apocalyptic text: 
 
Et il n’est pas assuré que l’homme soit le central de ces lignes téléphoniques ou le terminal de 
cet ordinateur sans fin.  On ne sait plus très bien qui prête sa voix et son ton à l’autre dans 
l’Apocalypse, on ne sait plus très bien qui adresse quoi à qui.  Mais par un renversement 
catastrophique ici plus nécessaire que jamais, on peut aussi bien penser ceci: dès qu’on ne sait 
plus qui parle ou qui écrit, le texte devient apocalyptique.153 
 
Between the neuter, this anonymous force heard down the telephone, and those modern technologies 
promising the apocalypse and enabling us to hear this noise, there is undoubtedly an unstable relation.  
The neuter is not a self-identical concept; it means that there is always a different tone and it allows us 
to hear this in technology.   
First published in 1957, Le Dernier Homme is a fundamental moment of engagement which 
gives rise to the neuter as a non-concept and allows Blanchot to return to Kafka, in whose writing he 
                                                          
151 Blanchot, ‘Le Pont de bois (la répétition, le neutre)’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 580. 
152 Kafka, The Castle, p. 95; Das Schloss, p. 72. 
153 Derrida, D’un ton apocalyptique, p. 77.  
 176 
 
senses the neuter tangibly in play.  Set chiefly within the walls of a hospital, the first section of the 
text tells of the suffering and weakness of the last man in the face of his impending death; it explores 
the relationships between characters when exposed to this heightened sense of mortality.  The first 
section ends with a moment of transition as the narrator follows in the footsteps of the last man and 
moves, with the technical assistance of an elevator, into a corridor.  This corridor is comparable to the 
wooden bridge in Kafka’s The Castle: it is a transitional space suspended between life and death, a 
void which promises eternity and leads to the intrusion of the inhuman other in the disorientating 
second section of the text: 
 
J’aimais ce couloir.  J’y passais avec le sentiment de sa vie calme, profonde, indifférente, 
sachant que là pour moi était l’avenir, et je n’aurais plus d’autre paysage que cette solitude 
propre et blanche, que là s’élèveraient mes arbres, là s’étendrait l’immense bruissement des 
champs, la mer, le ciel changeant avec ses nuages, là, dans ce tunnel, l’éternité de mes 
rencontres et de mes désirs.154 
 
This corridor is the extreme limit at which nihilism is turned back on itself in this apocalyptic text; it 
signals the relinquishing of power and identity to this region and a shift toward an experience where 
the self is exposed to a more radical contestation.  What follows is expressed from a new place where 
the distinction between the narrator of the first section and the last man has collapsed; they belong to 
an anonymous and fluctuating bavardage which is here exposed to a muffled but insistent inhuman 
murmuring.  
The last man sits in an arm chair toward the beginning of the récit, his large tired hands 
hanging at the end of his arms.155  Around this weak and suffering man other characters acquire a 
                                                          
154 Blanchot, Le Dernier Homme: nouvelle version, L’Imaginaire, 283 (Paris: Gallimard [1957] 1992), p. 104.  In 
the two years leading to the publication of this text, sections of the narrative were published in several 
journals: ‘Le Calme’, Botteghe Oscure, 16 (1955), 28-36 [Le Dernier Homme, pp. 106-21]; ‘Le Dernier Homme’, 
La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 46 (October 1956), 653-63 [Le Dernier Homme, pp. 1-23]; ‘Comme un 
jour de neige’, Botteghe Oscure, 18 (1956), 11-19 [Le Dernier Homme, pp. 125-27, 134-47]; and ‘L’Hiver’, 
Monde nouveau (January 1957), pp. 43-52  [Le Dernier Homme, pp. 26-28, 44-46, 47-56, 58-61]. 
155 Blanchot, Le Dernier Homme, pp. 15-16. 
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heightened sense of existence, making them stronger, crueller, more dangerous, and on the brink of a 
dream of extreme power.  This power, the narrator remarks, remains a perverse dream; a will to 
dominate or a sense of superiority felt at a moment when the future looks bleak.156  The excessive 
force is only felt in relation to this weak figure; it cannot be appropriated by an individual but draws 
its energy from the relation between them on which the first section of this text focuses.  The 
apocalyptic tone of this narrative is, of course, misleading, because the last man will not be the last; 
his experience is universal and will be repeated in the lives of all the individuals who form the 
surrounding ‘community’.  In ‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’ Blanchot writes in relation to the atom bomb: 
‘D’un côté, un pouvoir qui ne se peut pas, de l’autre, une existence — la communauté humaine — 
qu’on peut supprimer, mais non pas affirmer ou qu’on ne pourrait affirmer en quelque sorte qu’après 
sa disparition et par le vide, impossible à ressaisir, de cette disparition, par conséquent quelque chose 
qu’on ne peut pas même détruire, puisque cela n’existe pas.’157  Le Dernier Homme is the narration of 
this nihilistic situation.  The last man bears the traits of the human in the technological age; exhausted 
and powerless now that the possibilities of modern technology are not contained within his large 
hands, he is the momentary (not the last) vehicle for an impossible power.  Around him an impossible 
community forms, drawn together by the experience of dying which will mark each individual 
existence but will never be achieved as the separate egos dissolve into the chatter of the second 
section of the text.   
In 1951 Heidegger wrote in relation to Nietzsche that the ‘last man — the final and definitive 
type of man so far — fixes himself, and generally all that is, by a specific way of representing 
ideas.’158  The last man is closely associated with metaphysical representation for Heidegger, who 
goes on to write that, ‘[t]his well made-up and well staged manner of forming ideas, of representation, 
with its constantly more refined mechanism, dissimulates and blocks from view what really is [was 
eigentlich ist].’159  The last man in Blanchot’s text is at points associated with representational 
thinking: speaking ‘in the style of books’ he depicts his hometown, a city in the East whose buildings 
                                                          
156 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
157 Blanchot, ‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’, in L’Amitié, p. 124. 
158 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 62; Gesamtausgabe, VIII, 66. 
159 Ibid. pp. 72-73; p. 77. 
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he describes in such detail as if to construct them before his listeners.  The narrator is initially 
disappointed by this representation, the last man describes a town very similar to ‘our’ own, but is 
then struck by the strange character of this town, crossed by a dried-up river, where huge crowds 
incessantly flow through the streets.  ‘Plus qu’étrange: familière et trompeuse et rendant fausses — 
pas exactement fausses, sans fondement, sans fondation — les images du monde qui nous était le plus 
proche.’160  This is not the representation of a knowable reality but a symbol as it is defined in that 
essay on Kafka from 1949, exposing us to the void which is the milieu of the imaginary and rendering 
the familiar world unreal.   
 Observations of the last man are occasionally made from across the card table, which 
provides the only reference point (other than doors and walls) within the building in which this 
narrative unfolds.  We have seen that narrating puts the neuter into play for Blanchot.  The game 
occupying the narrator of Le Dernier Homme allows an oblique exposure to the last man; observations 
made across the card table read as if the narrator is peering at this figure out of the corner of his eye: 
‘Et pourtant, je les laissais, l’un et l’autre.  Je jouais, tandis qu’elle s’enfonçait dans son recoin.  Je me 
dissimulais moi-même derrière le jeu, oubliant volontairement à quelle épreuve l’exposait le tête-à-
tête dans la solitude’; ‘J’étais à la table de jeu et lui, dans le fauteuil, son grand corps un peu effondré, 
mais dans une attitude où il y avait une certaine élégance.’161  Blanchot writes in 1965 that the indirect 
is the medium of literature: ‘D’étranges tableaux imaginaires ou, à défaut, des scènes qui sont comme 
arrêtées dans leur immobilité visible, constituent les moments essentiels d’une intrigue obéissant à un 
jeu nécessaire de multiplication.’162  Le Dernier Homme obeys this necessary game of multiplication: 
suspended scenes and strange immobile images abound in a work which refuses to pin any one 
description down to straightforward representation.   
In What is Called Thinking? [1954] Heidegger writes of the multiple possible interpretations 
to be drawn from the work of Plato and Nietzsche (in the same lecture where he associates the last 
man with metaphysical representation): 
                                                          
160 Blanchot, Le Dernier Homme, p. 63. 
161 Ibid., pp. 40, 84. 
162 Blanchot, ‘Le Rire des Dieux’, in L’Amitié, pp. 192-207 (p. 194) (first publ. in La Nouvelle Revue française, 151 




multiplicity of meanings is the element in which all thought must move in order to be strict 
thought.  To use an image [Im Bild gesprochen]: to a fish, the depths and expanses of its waters, 
the currents and quiet pools, warm and cold layers are the element of its multiple mobility.  If 
the fish is deprived of the fullness of its element, if it is dragged on the dry sand, then it can 
only wriggle, twitch, and die [verenden].  Therefore we must always seek out thinking, and its 
burden of thought, in the element of its multiple meanings, else everything will remain closed 
to us.163 
 
The narrator of Le Dernier Homme speaks of the ‘spectre d’une douleur infinie’ which the last man 
perhaps represents.  He acknowledges that the female character may once have alluded to this burden.  
What follows is a scene, impossible to know whether this is a dream or a memory, in which she 
requests that they go for a walk one night in the hospital grounds.  ‘Il y avait déjà un peu de neige, 
mais le ciel n’était pas un ciel de neige, c’est là que je vis combien l’espace pouvait être sombre, 
resserré, comme fuyant vers un lointain infini et pourtant se rapprochant aussi infiniment de nous. 
“Regardez comme le ciel est noir”.’164  The characters are located in what may at first appear a more 
recognisable surrounding when compared to some of those scenes which take place within the walls 
of the disorientating hospital, but there is something strange about this wintery environment.  The 
black sky, disjointed from the scene on the ground, provides a vanishing perspective which is at once 
vast and infinitesimal.  At the sight of this sky, the female character is overcome with dizziness.  Its 
uneven quality, the dissymmetrical distance which she experiences here, exposes her to the emptiness 
which is both within her and beyond world and creates an excess that overwhelms her.  This is an 
experience of the neuter as both transcendence and immanence.  The narrator leads her to the edge of 
the pond which serves as a breeding pool for the nearby kitchens: ‘Tout était tranquille et nous 
n’entendions que le bruit d’eau, un bruit mystérieux et vivant où l’on pressentait l’agitation confuse 
                                                          
163 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, p. 71; Gesamtausgabe, VIII, 75-76. 
164 Blanchot, Le Dernier Homme, pp. 90-91. 
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des poissons troublés par notre présence.’165  The fishpond is almost overflowing with life and 
‘meaning’; it neatly contains a world which exists solely for the purposes of nourishing the human.  
Blanchot is perhaps drawing on Heidegger’s image of the fish moving within ‘the element of its 
multiple mobility’.  In contrast to the excess or incalculable distance of the sky, this image composed 
of living material is reassuringly finite and provides the female character with a reference point which 
positions her within the element of human possibility, values and limits, enabling her to dismiss the 
abstract shadow of the sky.   
In contrast to the female character whose relationship with the inhuman, in its captured and 
restricted state, is marked by human possibility, the last man is exposed to human impossibility: he 
cries like a wolf on more than one occasion and, while sitting in the armchair struggling for breath, his 
fur hat casts a moving shadow over his face.166  He grows ever weaker as his death approaches; he 
joins the other patients to eat,167 an act which Blanchot refers to elsewhere, in relation to Robert 
Antelme’s account of life in a concentration camp, as the experience of, ‘l’homme réduit à 
l’irréductible, c’est le besoin radical, qui ne me rapporte plus à moi-même, à la satisfaction de moi-
même, mais à l’existence humaine pure et simple, vécue comme manque au niveau du besoin.’168  No 
longer a sovereign subject, he is barely human in the first section of the text and, once at the threshold 
and dispersed in the bavardage of the second section, he and the narrator, perhaps they are the same 
non-identical figure, are surrendered to impossibility:  
 
Réponse mystérieuse, murmure étrange qui nous trouble: la voix est faible, grêle comme un 
crissement de lézard.  La nôtre a l’ampleur et la force de mondes ajoutés aux mondes, mais elle 
est silencieuse aussi.  L’autre a quelque chose d’animal, de trop physique.  Imperceptible, elle 
                                                          
165 Ibid., p. 91. 
166 Ibid., pp. 10, 36, 84-85.  Christophe Bident has argued that this may be a reference to Hermann Hesse, on 
whose work Blanchot wrote in 1956 (see ‘H.H. 1. La Poursuite de soi-même’ in Le Livre à venir, pp. 227-38; first 
publ. in La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 41 (May 1956), 872-83) in Maurice Blanchot: partenaire 
invisible, p. 360 n. 3. In any case, this pack animal may not be such an unusual reference for Blanchot when 
one considers the importance of that anonymous movement represented by the chatter of the street, le 
bavardage.   
167 Blanchot, Le Dernier Homme, pp. 29-31. 
168 Blanchot, ‘L’Indestructible. 2. L’Espèce humaine’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 191-200 (p. 196) (part of this essay 
first publ. as ‘L’Indestructible’, La Nouvelle Revue française, 112 (April 1962), 671-80). 
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nous ébranle.  Bien qu’elle soit comme rituelle, l’entendre est une inquiétante, une sublime 
surprise.169 
 
Hailing down on us like the screech of a lizard, this strange murmuring, in spite of its weakness, 
demands that we pay it attention.  It marks the arrival of something new and unexpected and indicates 
something profoundly affirmative in the second section of this text: that with danger also comes 
chance.  ‘C’est une voix étrange, un murmure étouffé qui sort de la terre, un cri sec, aride; cela nous 
trouble, nous oblige à entendre, et qui le dit?’170  No one, no thing, says this strange murmuring.  It 
echoes the song of the Sirens and the troublesome fly of ‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’ and it also takes the 
form of the inhuman.  It is the trace of the impossible which interrupts all possibility, including the 
possibility of destruction, at a moment in the text when the narrator and the last man seem close to 
death.   
The choice of disappearance or transformation seemingly posed by modern technologies such 
as the atom bomb, according to thinkers such as Jaspers, is not really a choice at all.  Man both 
disappears and transforms in this turning, so that only a residue of the human persists.  The limit (the 
end of history, culture and world) is contested but never wholly erased.  Of course it is possible that 
the world could be destroyed, Blanchot admits as much, but we would never experience this 
destruction as subjects.  The neuter allows a step, which is not a step, over this line; it allows a 
disjointed perspective which is other than human, an inhuman transformation in which a residual trace 
of the human persists.  Blanchot is not a humanist, as some have claimed,171 but open to something 
                                                          
169 Blanchot, Le Dernier Homme, p. 113. 
170 Ibid., p. 128. 
171 See, for instance, Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone 
Books, 2002).  Misquoting Blanchot (Agamben: ‘man is the indestructible that can be infinitely destroyed’; 
Blanchot: ‘l’homme est l’indestructible qui peut etre détruit’ (L’Entretien infini, p. 192)), Agamben writes: ‘The 
human being can survive the human being, the human being is what remains after the destruction of the 
human being, not because somewhere there is a human essence to be destroyed or saved, but because the 
place of the human is divided, because the human exists in the fracture between the living being and the 
speaking being, the inhuman and the human.  That is: the human being exists in the human being’s non-place, 
in the missing articulation between the living being and logos.  The human being is the being that is lacking to 
itself and consists solely in this lack and in the errancy it opens’ (p. 134).  Agamben frames his discussion of the 
concentration camps in terms of human possibility; but for Blanchot the experience of death is premised on 
impossibility and, as Leslie Hill has noted, the indestructible names ‘the impersonal, always other trace of 
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other than the human, that inhuman interruption heard at the end of ‘L’Apocalypse déçoit’ and Le 
Dernier Homme.
                                                          
impossibility that interrupts all possibility, including that of absolute destruction’ (Maurice Blanchot and 









When ‘Le Passage de la ligne’ [1958] was revised for publication in L’Entretien infini [1969], the 
following line was omitted: ‘la conception de la technique considérée comme le retour du même en sa 
constante rotation: l’être comme recommencement’.  It was replaced with: ‘l’absence d’être comme 
recommencement’.1  We can speculate that the association of a thinking of technology with the name 
Heidegger led Blanchot to subsume ‘la technique’ into the neuter from 1965 onwards.  He suggests in 
1958 that Sein is ‘un Neutre un peu honteux’ and continues: ‘La philosophie de Heidegger n’est pas 
une philosophie du déracinement, mais l’enracinement.  Levinas écrit ceci, qui est pénétrant: “Il s’agit 
d’une existence qui s’accepte comme naturelle, pour qui sa place au soleil, son sol, son lieu orientant 
toute signification.  Il s’agit d’un exister païen.  L’Être l’ordonne bâtisseur et cultivateur, au sein d’un 
paysage familier, sur une terre maternelle…”’2  We have seen that in Blanchot pure nature is always 
traversed or contaminated by something unnatural; the suppression of ‘la technique’ in work from 
1965 onwards suggests a more radical refusal of any such thinking of nature in opposition to 
technology.  Indeed, from the late 1960s onwards the emergence of fragmentary writing and the 
substitution of nonliving, but not necessarily inert, stones for those animals and insects which 
populate earlier work signal a more radical contestation of the limits of the human.  Focussing on a 
selection of fragments from Le Pas au-delà and L’Écriture du désastre, we will see that ‘la technique’ 
is everywhere implied once the term disappears from Blanchot’s idiom and that the fragmentary is a 
                                                          
1 Blanchot, ‘Le Passage de la ligne’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, p. 477; L’Entretien infini, p. 223.  
2 Blanchot, ‘L’Étrange et l’étranger’, in La Condition critique, p. 287 n. 1. 
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more inclusive writing, radically open to the other, offering the possibility of transgression through a 
wayward ‘unnatural’ proliferation that extends beyond the subject.  
 
Fragmentary writing and technology 
In 1953 Blanchot had gone as far as to claim that writing was one, albeit privileged, mode of 
technique among others and several essays from the 1950s and early 1960s had explored the 
dislocation, dispersion, suspension, and futural uncertainty which result from encounters with various 
forms of modern technology.3  But just as Blanchot proposes that we abandon the term ‘nihilisme’ in 
1963, ‘technique’ disappears from his writing from 1965 onwards.  The term does not appear at all in 
Le Pas au-delà [1973] and emerges twice in the closing pages of L’Écriture du désastre [1980], but 
only to refer to that sort of technology associated with mastery, knowledge, possibility.  The second of 
these references to technology in the closing pages of L’Écriture du désastre reveals a rethinking of 
technology since the mid-1960s. 
  
  Les lois — le prosaïque des lois — libèrent peut-être de la Loi en substituant à la majesté 
invisible du temps la contrainte multipliée de l’espace; de même, le réglementaire supprime ce 
qu’évoque le pouvoir, toujours premier, du nom de loi, ainsi que les droits qui la doublent, mais 
établit le règne de la technique, laquelle, affirmation du pur savoir, investit tout, contrôle tout, 
soumet tout geste à sa gestion, de sorte qu’il n’y a plus de possibilité de libération, puisque l’on 
ne peut plus parler d’oppression.4 
 
This sentence ends (the fragment continues, I quote the concluding half below) with a Foucauldian 
emphasis: there can be no liberation when there is no oppression.  In other words, there is no natural 
                                                          
3 ‘Le savoir impersonnel du livre […] est lié au développement de la technique sous toutes les formes et il fait 
de la parole, de l’écriture, une technique’ (‘La Bête de Lascaux’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, p. 684).  
I discuss this quotation in Chapter Three. 
4 Maurice Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre, p. 218.  The first reference to technology comes one page earlier: 
‘La substitution des règles à la loi semble, dans les temps modernes, une tentative non seulement pour 
démystifier le pouvoir lié à l’interdit, mais pour libérer la pensée de l’Un en proposant à la coutume la 
multiplicité des possibilités non liées de la technique’ (p. 217). 
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order which one can invoke; nature is just as much a product of techne as technology (in the restricted 
sense).  In modern times multiple and dispersed laws have replaced the Law of time.  Techniques of 
‘pure knowledge’, spread throughout a network of social institutions, exert a more comprehensive, but 
also more subtle, control over the individual than brute sovereign force.5 
The disciplinary power of which Foucault wrote in 1975 is fragmented and dispersed; unlike 
the sovereign power which is exercised by one individual over many others, disciplinary power is 
thought in terms of a complex arrangement of forces in society without reference to sources or agents 
of power.  This is a power built from the bottom up rather than wielded repressively from the top 
down; it concerns individuals as effects of discipline, moulded or generated by techniques which 
target the body with the aim of rendering it useful and docile.  The language employed by Foucault to 
describe the traits of this individuality implies the natural — individuals are cellular, organic and 
genetic —, but this is a constructed ‘nature’ and these individuals combine to form a machine which 
attains a greater efficiency than the sum of its parts.6  Foucault’s point is that there is no origin or 
essence, rather any knowledge of a natural state that we have is a construct of the techniques of 
disciplinary power: ‘Le corps, requis d’être docile jusque dans ses moindres opérations, oppose et 
montre les conditions de fonctionnement propres à un organisme.  Le pouvoir disciplinaire a pour 
corrélatif une individualité non seulement analytique et “cellulaire” mais naturelle et “organique”.’7  
Disciplinary power is, then, productive rather than oppressive, generating identities, knowledges and 
discourses by meticulously and extensively distributing, controlling, organising and combining the 
forces of bodies.  The chance of rebellion against this power which permeates every aspect of our 
lives and every level of society seems slim.   
There is, nonetheless, room for resistance in Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power, 
because without resistance there would be no power relation.  He clarifies this position in Histoire de 
                                                          
5 See the transition traced by Foucault from the sovereign power exercised in the spectacle of execution to a 
more subtle and dispersed disciplinary power in the opening chapter of Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: 
naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), pp. 9-40.  
6 Foucault outlines how the distribution of individuals, the control of activities, the organising of geneses and 
the composing of forces produce a cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individuality respectively (Ibid., 
pp. 159-99).  Marcello Hoffman provides a useful introduction to disciplinary power in Michel Foucault: Key 
Concepts, ed. by Diana Taylor (Durham: Acumen, 2011), pp. 27-40. 
7 Foucault, Surveiller et punir, p. 183. 
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la sexualité: ‘là où il y a pouvoir, il y a résistance, et [...] pourtant, ou plutôt par là même, celle-ci 
n’est jamais en position d’extériorité par rapport au pouvoir.  Faut-il dire qu’on est nécessairement 
“dans” le pouvoir, qu’on ne lui “échappe” pas, qu’il n’y a pas, par rapport à lui, d’extérieur absolu, 
parce qu’on serait immanquablement soumis à la loi?’8  A tame form of resistance is certainly 
possible; but Foucault also gestures, via Blanchot, a figure for whom he would express profound 
admiration,9 to a more radical uprising in a short tribute to the writer and journalist Maurice Clavel 
published shortly after his death in 1979.  Here Foucault, writing in fragments, tries to integrate 
Clavel (‘impatient, sursautant au moindre bruit, clamant dans la pénombre, appelant l’orage’) and 
Blanchot (‘diaphane, immobile, guettant un jour plus transparent que le jour, attentif aux signes qui ne 
font signe que dans le mouvement qui les efface’).  Two very different men, writes Foucault, both of 
whom introduced into the world the tension that rends apart the fabric of time.10  There is no further 
mention of Blanchot in the five short fragments which follow, but Foucault surely has him in mind 
when he writes: 
 
Ce qui échappe à l’histoire, c’est l’instant, la fracture, le déchirement, l’interruption.  À la grâce 
correspond (et répond peut-être), du côté des hommes, le soulèvement.  La révolution 
s’organise selon toute une économie intérieure au temps: des conditions, des promesses, des 
nécessités; elle loge donc dans l’histoire, y fait son lit et finalement s’y couche.  Le 
soulèvement, lui, coupant le temps, dresse les hommes à la verticale de leur terre et de leur 
humanité.11 
 
It is worth noting that Foucault’s is a genealogical study of power; his concept of power is entrenched 
within history.  The sort of uprising envisaged here, conversely, is something like the change of epoch 
                                                          
8 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité, 3 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1976-1984), I: La Volonté de savoir (1976), 
125-26. 
9 Reminiscing about the 1950s with his friend Paul Veyne, Foucault is reported to have said: ‘A cette époque, je 
rêvais d’être Blanchot’.  See Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault: 1926-1984 (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), p. 79. 
10 Michel Foucault, ‘Vivre autrement le temps’, in Dits et écrits: 1954-1988, ed. by Daniel Defert and François 
Ewald, 4 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), III: 1976-1979, 788-90 (p. 788).   
11 Ibid., p. 790. 
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which for Blanchot both inscribes and suspends world, fracturing the present and positioning itself 
beyond historical parameters.12  Blanchot attributes this rebellious possibility to literature; the 
fragment quoted above continues:  
 
Le procès de Kafka peut être interprété comme un enchevêtrement des trois règnes (la Loi, les 
lois, les règles): interprétation cependant insuffisante, dans la mesure où il faudrait, pour la faire 
admettre, supposer un quatrième règne ne relevant pas des trois autres — celui du surplomb de 
la littérature même, alors que celle-ci refuse ce point de vue privilégié, tout en ne se laissant pas 
dépendre d’un autre ordre ou de quelque ordre que ce soit (pure intelligibilité) au nom duquel 
on pourrait la symboliser.13 
 
One law cannot contain all laws, because it would then have to contain itself in an infinite regress.  
The Law to which Blanchot refers in the opening sentence of this fragment, quoted above, is the Law 
of time or death, that impossible necessity which incorporates its own transgression — I can die but I 
cannot die.  Faced with this intractable thought the Law is, in modern times, replaced with the sort of 
laws or disciplinary techniques discussed by Foucault which seek to control or to regulate life.  The 
literary cornice, however, offers the possibility of transgression from within the Law; this is an 
alternative non-hierarchical and rootless perspective which hangs beyond the limits of knowledge, 
representation and history.  Blanchot’s writing occupies that interval identified by Foucault from 
which it challenges the ruling powers in the same fragmented and dispersed mode as the technologies 
of disciplinary power.  It seems, therefore, that there is more to Blanchot’s rethinking of ‘technique’ 
from the mid-1960s onwards than a simple rejection.  
 This is confirmed by two essays from 1953 (the same year that Blanchot claimed that writing 
was one ‘technique’ among others) which, when collected in Le Livre à venir in 1959, open the final 
                                                          
12 ‘  Dernier témoin, fin de l’histoire, époque, tournant, crise — ou bien fin de la philosophie (métaphysique). 
[…] Pourquoi écrire, entendu comme changement d’époque, entendu comme l’expérience (la non-expérience) 
du désastre, implique-t-il chaque fois les mots inscrits en tête de ce “fragment”, qu’il révoque cependant?  
Qu’il révoque, même si ce qui s’y annonce, s’y annonce comme un nouveau qui a toujours déjà eu lieu, 
changement radical dont tout présent s’exclut’ (Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre, pp. 158-59). 
13 Ibid., pp. 218-19. 
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section entitled ‘Où va littérature?’: ‘La Disparition de la littérature’ and ‘La Recherche du point 
zéro’.  In both essays Blanchot considers the status of art in the modern technological world.  In the 
first he writes: ‘l’art ne nie pas le monde moderne, ni celui de la technique, ni l’effort de libération et 
de transformation qui prend appui sur cette technique, mais il exprime et peut-être accomplit des 
rapports qui précèdent tout accomplissement objectif et technique.’14  A similar point is made in the 
second essay: ‘bien avant les inventions de la technique, l’usage des ondes et l’appel des images, il eût 
suffi d’entendre les affirmations de Hölderlin, de Mallarmé, pour découvrir la direction et l’étendue 
de ces changements dont nous nous persuadons aujourd’hui sans surprise.’15  Literature and 
technology may belong to the same tradition, but the work of Mallarmé and Hölderlin, whose names 
appear in both essays alongside others, anticipates and outstrips radio and cinema.  The second of 
these essays, a review of Roland Barthes’ Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, culminates in a discussion of 
that ‘impersonal neutrality’ (also mentioned in the first essay)16 experienced through modes of 
technology but more significantly through literature: 
 
En nous orientant, par une réflexion importante, vers ce qu’il a appelé le [degré] zéro de 
l’écriture, Roland Barthes a peut-être désigné aussi le moment où la littérature pourrait se saisir.  
Mais c’est qu’en ce point elle ne serait pas seulement une écriture blanche, absente et neutre, 
elle serait l’expérience même de la ‘neutralité’, que jamais l’on n’entend car quand la neutralité 
parle, seul celui qui lui impose silence prépare les conditions de l’entente, et cependant ce qu’il 
y a à entendre, c’est cette parole neutre, ce qui a toujours été dit, ne peut cesser de se dire et ne 
peut être entendu, tourment dont les pages de Samuel Beckett rapprochent de nous le 
pressentiment.17  
 
                                                          
14 Blanchot, ‘La Disparition de la littérature’, in Le Livre à venir, p. 268, Blanchot’s emphasis.  
15 Blanchot, ‘La Recherche du point zéro’, in Le Livre à venir, pp. 275-85 (pp. 275-76) (first publ. as ‘Plus loin 
que le degré zero’,  La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, 9 (September 1953), 485-94).   
16 Blanchot, ‘La Disparition de la littérature’, in Le Livre à venir, p. 272. 
17 Blanchot, ‘La Recherche du point zéro’, in Le Livre à venir, p. 285. 
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The repetition and lack of origin readily associated with radio and screen is also captured in this 
inhuman murmuring of language; the reference to Samuel Beckett calls to mind the rambling voice of 
L’Innommable and one is also reminded of the strange noise heard down the telephone in Kafka’s The 
Castle.  The disembodied voice tirelessly repeating words in the above extract does not indicate a 
grey, undifferentiated and pure neuter — ‘une écriture blanche, absente et neutre’ are the words of 
Roland Barthes18 — but an infinitely contested and vibrant neutrality which cannot be grasped or set 
in stone and which is not restricted to a traditional notion of ‘literature’.  Literature cannot be reduced 
to a question of language and it is impossible, Blanchot argues in both of these essays, to define the 
limits of literature: ‘l’expérience de la littérature est l’épreuve même de la dispersion, elle est 
l’approche de ce qui échappe à l’unité, expérience de ce qui est sans entente, sans accord, sans droit 
— l’erreur et le dehors, l’insaisissable et l’irrégulier.’19  Already in 1953 the influence of the 
fragmentary is evident as ‘literature’ becomes associated with dispersion and disunity.  The impact of 
modern technology reverberates with this experience, but the relationship is simultaneously 
underscored by discontinuity and difference as ‘literature’ exceeds and precedes the historical 
parameters within which technology functions.   
 The previous chapter demonstrated that Blanchot’s engagement with questions surrounding 
modern technology peaks in the 1950s and early 1960s.  During this time he begins to develop the 
fragmentary idiom which he will employ in L’Attente L’Oubli [1962], Le Pas au-delà [1973], 
L’Écriture du désastre [1980] and in those parenthetic additions to essays collected in L’Entretien 
infini [1969].  One of the earliest explicit engagements with this mode of writing is a 1960 review of 
                                                          
18 Promising a brief history of writing in the introduction to Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, Barthes argues that 
literature went through a process of solidification during the nineteenth century as it became the object of a 
gaze, then of creative action, and finally of murder in the work of Mallarmé.  In our time, Barthes contends, 
writing has become absence: ‘dans ces écriture neutres, appelées ici “le degré zéro de l’écriture”, on peut 
facilement discerner le mouvement même d’une négation, et l’impuissance à l’accomplir dans une durée, 
comme si la Littérature, tendant depuis un siècle à transmuer sa surface dans une forme sans hérédité, ne 
trouvait plus de pureté que dans l’absence de tout signe, proposant enfin l’accomplissement de ce rêve 
orphéen: un écrivain sans Littérature.  L’écriture blanche, celle de Camus, celle de Blanchot ou de Cayrol par 
exemple, ou l’écriture parlée de Queneau, c’est le dernier épisode d’une Passion de l’écriture, qui suit pas à 
pas le déchirement de la conscience bourgeoise’ (Barthes, Œuvres complètes, I: 1942-1961, 173).  On the 
dialogue between Blanchot and Barthes and the question of the neuter, see Christophe Bident, ‘R/M, 1953’, in 
Blanchot’s Epoch, ed. by Hill and Holland, pp. 67-83. 
19 Blanchot, ‘La Recherche du point zéro’, in Le Livre à venir, p. 279. 
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Clémence Ramnoux’s doctoral thesis on Heraclitus, where Blanchot wonders in a footnote whether 
cutting up things and words had a precise technical meaning for Heraclitus at a time when Greek was 
written without spacing or punctuation.20  This is a somewhat enigmatic comment coming at the end 
of a footnote without any further deliberation or explanation.  The work in question was written and 
left by Heraclitus in the temple for his readers, Ramnoux stresses, and it was the separation of words 
which enabled it to be read.  Translations vary significantly depending on where one chooses to 
separate the signs which make up these fragments.   
Dedicating a chapter to the first fragment, Ramnoux arranges two of the three given 
translations in tables; her suggested translation that follows is presented in a numbered list, each point 
indicating where she has chosen to separate the words which compose the fragment.21  This technical 
manner of presenting translation may call to mind Foucault’s discussion of the use of tables as a 
disciplinary technique to organise the multiple, to impose order, to partition space and to create 
‘cellular’ individuals.22  Separation in this account of fragmentary writing, however, encourages 
proliferation rather than imposing order.  What matters is not that there is one definitive translation, 
but that the separation between words is never established because always mobile, simultaneously 
placing every translation in doubt while affirming an excess which cannot be contained within any 
one interpretation: ‘lorsque s’affirme l’irréductible séparation du mot et de la chose, cette séparation 
n’arrête pas et ne sépare pas, mais au contraire rassemble, car elle fait sens, se signifiant elle-même et 
faisant signe à ce qui autrement n’apparaîtrait pas’.23   
The fragmentary form of Heraclitus’ writing is crucial for Blanchot, because it ensures that the 
double movement which is this dispersion that gathers is never stabilised.  This reading of Heraclitus 
diverges significantly from that offered by Heidegger in an essay of 1951, taken from a lecture course 
from the summer of 1944, where he writes: ‘In the thinking of Heraclitus, the Being (presencing) of 
                                                          
20 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Héraclite’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 119-31 (p. 125 n. 1) (first publ. in La Nouvelle Revue 
française, 85 (January 1960), 93-106).  
21 Clémence Ramnoux, Héraclite ou l’homme entre les choses et les mots (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1959), pp. 
308-16. 
22 See Foucault, Surveiller et punir, pp. 173-75. 
23 Blanchot, ‘Héraclite’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 129. 
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beings appears as ό Λόγσς, as the Laying that gathers.’24  He will publish a second essay in 1954 
drawing on the same lecture content and entitled ‘Aletheia’. Blanchot, in contrast, does not approach 
the work of Heraclitus in terms of truth and gathering, but emphasises that the play of words ensured 
by fragmentation exposes the original discontinuity that makes language possible: 
 
Au fond, ce qui est langage, ce qui parle essentiellement pour Héraclite, dans les choses et dans 
les mots et dans le passage, contrarié ou harmonieux, des uns aux autres, enfin dans tout ce qui 
se montre et dans tout ce qui se cache, c’est la Différence elle-même, mystérieuse, parce que 
toujours différente de ce qui l’exprime et telle qu’il n’est rien qui ne la dise et ne se rapporte à 
elle en disant, mais telle aussi que tout parle à cause d’elle qui reste indicible.25  
 
Ramnoux stresses in her thesis that we only have access to the thought of Heraclitus in quotation.26  
The problem of the origin is therefore extremely pertinent and Blanchot is keen to demonstrate that 
this separation, or this dispersion which gathers, indicates an originary void.  What speaks through 
these fragments is not Heraclitus as supreme thinker of Being but that original difference or separation 
which enables us to distinguish between words and things, between differents, but which never 
appears as or for itself: the neuter.27 
 The disembodied rambling which is the focus of the conclusion to the 1953 review of Barthes 
finds an echo in the fragmentary writing of Heraclitus: both indicate this difference which is 
everywhere present but never presents itself as such.  This is not Heideggerian ontico-ontological 
                                                          
24 Martin Heidegger, ‘Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment 50)’, in Early Greek Thinking, trans. by David Farrell Krell 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 59-78 (p. 76). ‘Alétheia (Heraclitus, Fragment 6)’ is also collected in 
translation in Early Greek Thinking, pp. 102-23; both in Gesamtausgabe, VII, 211-34, 263-88.  For a comparison 
of these two readings of Heraclitus, see Hill, Maurice Blanchot and Fragmentary Writing, pp. 116-23.   
25 Blanchot, ‘Héraclite’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 129. 
26 Ramnoux, p. 220.  
27 Lars Iyer misinterprets the neuter in a confused reading of Blanchot on Heraclitus, in ‘Logos and Difference: 
Blanchot, Heidegger, Heraclitus’, Parallax, 11: 2 (2005), 14-24.  Iyer thinks words in the neutral gender 
(mentioned by Blanchot in this essay) as the mark of the immediate in language, which stands for the 
materiality of the whole; this is, according to Lyer, a form of resistance to the ‘great liquefaction of reality in 
the streaming of language’ (p. 22).  But the neuter as a sort of non-concept, an impersonal force, cannot be 
located within any one term, concept, or text; nor is it the pure indifference which Iyer suggests above, but a 
difference always differing from itself. 
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difference because Blanchot thinks difference (rather like the il y a) prior to ontology as a writing that 
precedes all being and nonbeing; while Heidegger privileges difference as a fundamental event in 
Being, for Blanchot (and Derrida) this difference is multiple and there is no privilege.28  The neuter is 
specifically directed at something in the absence of all origin.  The content of these Heraclitean 
fragments is a discourse on nature which, according to Ramnoux and Blanchot, represented a 
significant departure in the sixth century from those first interrogations of the origin by Hesiod which 
focussed on the sacred.29  One of the sections of the first fragment, as it is translated by Ramnoux, 
reads: ‘découpant chaque chose selon sa nature, et arrangeant les signes pour dire la chose comme elle 
est’.30  Blanchot may have this particular fragment in mind when he wonders about the technical 
meaning of cutting up things and words in the earlier footnote. Each Heraclitian sentence is a 
carefully calculated cosmos, he writes elsewhere in the essay.31  Technical separation has always 
already contaminated the natural and fragmentary writing exposes that unstable and reversible 
difference which occurs between nature and technology. 
A year later Blanchot reviewed Foucault’s doctoral thesis Histoire de la folie à l’âge 
classique and considered madness in similar terms to those Heraclitian fragments: an unspeakable 
difference also defines the experience of madness which cannot be classified as ‘natural’.  Foucault 
sets out a history of madness from the Renaissance through to the beginning of the nineteenth century 
and practices that are recognisable in modern times.  During the Renaissance, in Foucault’s account, 
the mad were perceived to be bearers of an otherwise hidden truth able to move beyond the 
boundaries of the known.  This changes with the emergence of houses of confinement in the 
seventeenth century, which expressed the emerging normative order of modern society; those who did 
not conform to norms were imprisoned and exposed to the public gaze: paupers, prostitutes, the mad, 
                                                          
28 Derrida thinks Difference prior to ontology in ‘La Différance’, in Marges de la philosophie, pp. 3-29.  It was 
shown in the previous chapter, through Blanchot’s strikethrough of néant as well as être, that not just Being 
but potentially all words and all language can be put under erasure.  Some critics misread the neuter as 
ontology in disguise; see, for instance, Anne-Lise Schulte Nordholt, Maurice Blanchot: l’écriture comme 
expérience du dehors (Geneva: Droz, 1995), pp. 199-204, 358-62: ‘cette région ontologique de l’élémentaire, là 
où tout est absent mais par là même infiniment présent, c’est précisément ce que Blanchot appelle le neutre’ 
(p. 203). 
29 Ramnoux, pp. 1-5; Blanchot, ‘Héraclite’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 120-21.  
30 Ramnoux, p. 314. 
31 Blanchot, ‘Héraclite’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 123. 
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criminals, orphans, invalids, the old, beggars.  It was not until the end of the eighteenth and start of 
the nineteenth centuries, following the reforms of Tuke and Pinel, that those judged insane were 
imprisoned in asylums and madness came to be seen as something to be separated from various forms 
of unreason and studied and understood in isolation.32  In modern times, madness and unreason are 
therefore distinguished by reason: if one is mad one cannot tell the difference between things, one 
does not question on waking whether one is still dreaming.  Madness is the call of indifference, but 
lurking in the depths of unreason is similarly this inability to make distinctions: ‘Est originaire la 
césure qui établit la distance entre raison et non-raison; quant à la prise que la raison exerce sur la 
non-raison pour lui arracher sa vérité de folie, de faute ou de maladie, elle en dérive, et de loin.’33  
Blanchot questions how one writes a thesis, a reasoned argument, on unreason when the distinction 
between the two is always on the brink of collapse: ‘jusqu’à quel point la pensée peut-elle se 
maintenir dans la différence de la déraison et de la folie, si ce qui se manifeste dans la profondeur de 
la déraison, c’est l’appel de l’indifférence: le neutre qui est aussi la différence même, ce qui (ne) se 
différencie en rien?’34  The neuter differentiates, but the mobile difference that it establishes (prior to 
identity or opposition) creates indifference as much as difference.  There are implications for 
Foucault’s thesis: Blanchot had praised the vigilance of Heraclitus to whom is entrusted knowledge of 
what is double and care of what is reversible; he had praised Clémence Ramnoux for responding to 
the Heraclitian fragments in a similarly doubled movement;35 Foucault, writing a history of madness, 
must take care to sustain this reversible mobility between reason and unreason, not to fall into the 
same trap as those psychoanalysts who, ‘hésitent à abandonner quelques-unes des exigences de la 
connaissance dite scientifique, laquelle veut situer la folie d’une manière toujours plus précise dans la 
solidité d’une nature et dans un cadre temporel, historique et social (en réalité, il ne s’agit pas encore 
                                                          
32 See Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (Paris: Plon, 1961; Paris: Gallimard, 1972).  
33 Michel Foucault, ‘Préface’, in Dits et écrits, I: 1954-1969, 159-67 (p. 159).  This is the preface to the original 
1961 edition of Histoire de la folie which is omitted in later editions. 
34 Maurice Blanchot, ‘L’Oubli, la déraison’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 289-99 (p. 297) (first publ. in La Nouvelle 
Revue française, 106 (October 1961), 676-86; partially reproduced in L’Attente L’Oubli, p. 87).  Derrida similarly 
argues that Histoire de la folie is an impossible project in ‘Cogito et histoire de la folie’, in L’Écriture et la 
différence (Paris: Seuil, 1967), pp. 51-97. 
35 Blanchot, ‘Héraclite’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 128, 119-20 n. 1. 
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de science).’36  Reason tries to locate madness within the confines of an understandable nature but 
risks itself in this engagement.   
Madness, situated beyond historical limits and eluding classification, is that sort of resistance 
or uprising envisioned by Foucault and Blanchot in those extracts quoted above from 1979 and 1980 
respectively.  The fragility of the difference established by the neuter between reason and unreason, 
and between unreason and madness, ensures that something always eludes the System.  In La Folie du 
jour [1973], originally published in 1949 as ‘Un Récit[?]’, this excess appears as a sort of inhuman 
resistance.  Largely set in an asylum, the narrative is centred on the moment someone crushes glass 
into the narrator’s eyes.  Now blinded by light, he cannot return the unremitting studious gaze of the 
ophthalmologist and psychiatrist to whom, we learn at the end of the text, this narrative has been 
recounted.  But behind these figures of authority embodying the laws of this panoptic society37 lurks 
that other Law discussed at the beginning of this chapter: ‘Derrière leur dos, j’apercevais la silhouette 
de la loi.  Non pas la loi que l’on connaît, qui est rigoureuse et peu agréable: celle-ci était autre.  Loin 
de tomber sous sa menace, c’est moi qui semblais l’effrayer.’38  Leslie Hill has written that this is the 
text’s transgressive moment, revealing the double bind and fragility of the Law which is always both 
inescapable and unanswerable.39  Madness responds to the demand of this Law in a double movement: 
the day is mad because its light, which enables sight, blinds us when we look at it.  Such reversible 
mobility ensures that madness cannot be confined to the limits of reason.  Consequently, when the 
narrator as ‘madman’ is imprisoned and studied in an attempt to render him an object of knowledge, a 
trace evades the scrutiny of the experts: ‘Sous leurs yeux en rien étonnés, je devenais une goutte 
d’eau, une tache d’encre.  Je me réduisais à eux-mêmes, je passais tout entier sous leur vue, et quand 
enfin, n’ayant plus présente que ma parfaite nullité et n’ayant plus rien à voir, ils cessaient aussi de 
                                                          
36 Blanchot, ‘L’Oubli, la déraison’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 298. 
37 Jeffrey Mehlman makes the connection between La Folie du jour and Foucault’s analysis of panoptic society 
in ‘Blanchot at Combat: Of Literature and Terror’, MLN, 95: 4 (May 1980), 808-29. 
38 Maurice Blanchot, La Folie du jour (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1973; Paris: Gallimard, 2003), p. 24.  This was 
first published in a literary journal bearing the name of the eponymous hero of Hölderlin’s unfinished tragedy 
of 1797-99; the title of Blanchot’s contribution was given as ‘Un récit?’ on the front cover of the journal, but 
appeared simply as ‘Un récit’ on the inner contents page of Empédocle, 2 (May 1949), 13-22.  For a discussion 
of the significance of the connection to Hölderlin, see Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, pp. 94-102. 
39 Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, pp. 100-01. 
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me voir, très irrités, ils se levaient en criant: Eh bien, où êtes-vous?  Où vous cachez-vous?  Se cacher 
est interdit, c’est une faute, etc.’40   
This unknowable trace is a resistance to the Law and is signalled elsewhere in the text by a 
stag beetle, once the narrator, scuttling around the basement of the library.  This alien transformation 
occurs after the first of two references to a telephone in La Folie du jour: ‘Un jour, je me trouvai 
enfermé dans la ville: voyager n’était plus qu’une fable.  Le téléphone cessa de répondre.  Mes 
vêtements s’usaient.  Je souffrais du froid; le printemps, vite.’  There are echoes here of the situation 
of K. in Kafka’s The Castle: trapped in a town, unable to travel further and sinking into poverty, K. 
attempts to ring the Castle but hears only a strange background hum likened to the sound of children 
singing.  The second reference to a telephone indicates the, otherwise unknown, destination of this 
call: ‘Dans l’établissement, on me donna une petite situation.  Je répondais au téléphone.’41  The 
telephone call is an externalised monologue between the two non-identical figures of the narrator: one 
a ‘madman’ imprisoned within the asylum and working for the System, the other a delinquent 
roaming the city streets.  But this exchange is one-sided, the telephone having refused to respond in 
the first instance.  Christopher Fynsk has written of the closing line of La Folie du jour (‘Un récit?  
Non, pas de récit, plus jamais’) in terms of a refusal that ‘seems to issue from a space and time other 
than that of the incarceration described in the lines that precede it.  It speaks to the law and to the 
sovereignty of reason, to be sure, but it now draws a line in relation to the latter’s demand.’42  This 
analysis could perhaps be more persuasively applied to the telephone, which similarly refuses an 
exchange with reason, represented paradoxically by the narrator’s non-identical double within the 
asylum.   
The telephone establishes and annuls a distance which precedes and enables language.  It 
interrupts oral presence and reveals the intervention of techne in what seems most human.  Writing of 
the telephone in James Joyce’s Ulysses, Derrida argues that in the beginning there must have been a 
telephone call.  He continues: ‘avant tout dispositif portant ce nom dans la modernité, la tekhnè 
                                                          
40 Blanchot, La Folie du jour, p. 23. 
41 Ibid., pp. 15, 20. 




téléphonique est à l’œuvre au-dedans de la voix, multipliant l’écriture des voix sans instruments, dirait 
Mallarmé, téléphonie mentale qui, inscrivant le lointain, la distance, la différance et l’espacement 
dans la phonè, à la fois institue, interdit et brouille le soi-disant monologue.43  There is no 
consequence for the narrator who answers the telephone within the asylum, committed as he is to an 
exchange within the limits of reason; but the narrator wandering the city, for whom the telephone 
refuses to respond, is exposed to that rupture which triggers an identity crisis: ‘il me vit tel que j’étais, 
un insecte, une bête à mandibules venue des régions obscures de la misère.  Qui étais-je?  Répondre à 
cette question m’aurait jeté dans de grands soucis.’44  Left waiting on the telephone, the narrator 
refuses in turn to respond to this question; when refusal ceases to be subjective will, it becomes 
dehumanized in a positive sense.  Nine years later, in the context of De Gaulle’s return to power, 
Blanchot writes of the political dimension of refusal: 
 
Quand nous refusons, nous refusons par un mouvement sans mépris, sans exaltation, et 
anonyme, autant qu’il se peut, car le pouvoir de refuser ne s’accomplit pas à partir de nous-
mêmes, ni en notre seul nom, mais à partir d’un commencement très pauvre qui appartient 
d’abord à ceux qui ne peuvent pas parler.  On dira qu’aujourd’hui il est facile de refuser, que 
l’exercice de ce pouvoir comporte peu de risques.  C’est sans doute vrai pour la plupart  d’entre 
nous.  Je crois cependant que refuser n’est jamais facile, et que nous devons apprendre à refuser 
et à maintenir intact, par la rigueur de la pensée et la modestie de l’expression, le pouvoir de 
refus que désormais chacune de nos affirmations devrait vérifier.45 
 
Refusal is an act of resistance, not one which pits counter-power against power, but one which is 
affirmed through something other than power.  The telephone in La Folie du jour is precisely that sort 
of powerless power which is simultaneously this refusal and what precedes it.  In this sense the 
telephone call is fragmentary because, as Leslie Hill has remarked evoking Moses’ broken tablets, it is 
                                                          
43 Jacques Derrida, ‘Ulysse gramophone: ouï-dire de Joyce’, in Ulysse gramophone: deux mots pour Joyce 
(Paris: Galilée, 1987), pp. 55-143 (p. 82); see in particular the second section of this essay (pp. 73-88). 
44 Blanchot, La Folie du jour, p. 16.  
45 Blanchot, ‘Le Refus’, in Écrits politiques, p. 29. 
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not dependent on any prior law but is itself that abyssal law of interruption that forcibly interrupts all 
laws, including itself.46 
How, then, is techne implied in Blanchot’s review of Foucault’s Histoire de la folie and what 
is the relationship between technology and the fragmentary, which is beginning to take precedence in 
Blanchot’s writing and features in the introduction to this review subtitled ‘Sur L’Oubli’?   This 
introduction — not taking Foucault’s text as its object and falling under the category of neither fiction 
nor essay because partially reproduced in L’Attente L’Oubli and included in full in L’Entretien infini 
— is more radical than the main body of the review.  Here Blanchot identifies the double movement 
of oubli [forgetting, oversight, oblivion], thinking forgetting in the same terms as death or that 
original impossibility.  Forgetting is the condition of possibility because we can only remember since 
there is forgetting, but it is also the condition of impossibility because we can never know the limits of 
forgetting, as he notes in L’Attente L’Oubli: ‘ Tu ne trouveras pas les limites de l’oubli, si loin que 
tu puisses oublier.’47  At stake here is the exteriority of fragmentary writing, about which Blanchot is 
able to be more specific in the review itself where he begins by describing forgetting as what is 
inscribed beyond memory, forming an outside that is never articulated and whose inarticulation by 
society consequently interns this dangerous and unknowable region.48   
Thinking the exteriority of writing without enclosing it within knowable limits is a difficult 
task: how can a certain type of language speak from, and welcome, the outside while working within 
the parameters of the Law?  This is the focus of an essay by Foucault on Blanchot from 1966, ‘La 
Pensée du dehors’. What is required is a sort of reflexive language; not reflexive in the sense that it is 
turned inward toward an internal confirmation or central certitude, writes Foucault, but toward an 
                                                          
46 Leslie Hill, ‘From Deconstruction to Disaster (Derrida, Blanchot, Hegel)’, Paragraph, 39: 2 (July 2016), 187-
201 (p. 198). 
47 Blanchot, L’Attente L’Oubli, p. 68.   
48 Blanchot, ‘L’Oubli, la déraison’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 291-92.  Foucault similarly demonstrates that 
madness exceeds the limits of society and that, from the seventeenth century onwards, society endeavours to 
protect itself from this unapproachable truth by locking madness away, by making it possible and knowable, by 
interning and silencing the outside.  See, for instance, the chapters ‘“Stultifera navis”’ and ‘Le Grand 
Renfermement’, in Foucault, Histoire de la folie, pp. 15-109. 
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extremity where it contests and is contested to the point that it is effaced.49  Foucault looks to 
Blanchot’s fiction to indicate what this language might look like: 
 
[Le langage de la fiction] ne doit plus être le pouvoir qui inlassablement produit et fait briller 
les images, mais la puissance qui au contraire les dénoue, les allège de toutes leurs surcharges, 
les habite d’une transparence intérieure qui peu à peu les illumine jusqu’à les faire éclater et les 
égaille dans la légèreté de l’inimaginable.  Les fictions chez Blanchot seront, plutôt que des 
images, la transformation, le déplacement, l’intermédiaire neutre, l’interstice des images.50 
 
This writing is not the sort of power [pouvoir] which produces, here we are perhaps reminded of 
productive disciplinary power, but that power [puissance] which undoes, lightens words of their 
burden of meaning and scatters. ‘Pas de réflexion, mais l’oubli’, writes Foucault of this outward-
looking language.51  Blanchot had considered forgetting in similar terms five years earlier in the 
introduction to the review of Histoire de la folie: ‘En même temps que nous nous servons de l’oubli 
comme d’un pouvoir, le pouvoir d’oublier nous remet à l’oubli sans pouvoir, au mouvement de ce qui 
dérobe et se dérobe, le détour même.’52  Forgetting is power turned outside-in; it is that affirmative 
dimension to technology which is something other than power and which is also captured in the 
movement of fragmentary writing.  Modern technology furthers the forgetting of Being for 
Heidegger; there is something deeply nostalgic in this identification of technology with 
representational calculating reason, which Blanchot here rejects.  This view of techne is only further 
confirmed when ‘technique’ gets subsumed into the neuter from 1965 onwards, as the difference 
between the fragmentary and broader technology, like any difference established by the neuter, proves 
to be extremely fragile.   
                                                          
49 Foucault, ‘La Pensée du dehors’, in Dits et écrits, I, 518-39 (pp. 522-23) (first publ. in Critique, 229: Maurice 
Blanchot (June 1966), 523-46). 
50 Foucault, ‘La Pensée du dehors’, in Dits et écrits, I, 524. 
51 Ibid., p. 523.  
52 Blanchot, ‘L’Oubli, la déraison’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 290. 
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In 1964 Blanchot turned his attention to the version of the fragment put forward by the Jena 
Romantics in the Athenaeum, the influential journal edited by August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel 
between 1798 and 1800.  The latter wrote of the form chosen for some of the contributions to this 
journal: ‘A dialogue is a chain or garland of fragments.  An exchange of letters is a dialogue on a 
larger scale, and memoirs constitute a system of fragments.  But as yet no genre exists that is 
fragmentary, both in form and in content, simultaneously completely subjective and individual, and 
completely objective and like a necessary part in a system of all the sciences.’  And also: ‘A fragment, 
like a work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and complete in itself like a 
hedgehog.’53  Schlegel thinks the fragment as an ideal inclusive totality which promises the all-
inclusive work as a theoretical horizon or endpoint.  Blanchot, while noting the revolutionary action 
implied in this project and its potential to open an epoch,54 is critical of this aphoristic fragment:  
 
Altération peut-être inévitable et qui revient: 1) à considérer le fragment comme un texte 
concentré, ayant son centre en lui-même et non pas dans le champ que constituent avec lui les 
autres fragments; 2) à négliger l’intervalle (attente et pause) qui sépare les fragments et fait de 
cette séparation le principe rythmique de l’œuvre en sa structure; 3) à oublier que cette manière 
d’écrire ne tend pas à rendre plus difficile une vue d’ensemble ou plus lâches des relations 
d’unité, mais à rendre possibles des rapports nouveaux qui s’exceptent de l’unité, comme ils 
excèdent l’ensemble.55 
 
The exteriority and the originary caesura characteristic of the fragmentary were already evident in the 
earlier essay on Heraclitus and Blanchot’s engagement with forgetting and madness; but it is this third 
excessive characteristic which Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe underestimate in their 
mock dialogue of 1982, where they argue that the fragment in Blanchot’s account remains dialectical.  
                                                          
53 ‘Athenaeum Fragments’, trans. by P. Firchow, in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. by J. M. 
Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 246-60 (pp. 248, 251). 
54 Blanchot, ‘L’Athenaeum’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 522. 
55 Ibid., p. 527. 
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They quote the following passage from L’Ecriture du désastre, omitting what follows ‘énergie de 
disparaître’: 
 
  Le fragment, en tant que fragments, tend à dissoudre la totalité qu’il suppose et qu’il 
emporte vers la dissolution d’où il ne se forme pas (à proprement parler), à laquelle il s’expose 
pour, disparaissant, et, avec lui, toute identité, se maintenir comme énergie de disparaître, 
énergie répétitive, limite de l’infini mortel — ou œuvre de l’absence d’œuvre (pour le redire et 
le taire en le redisant).  De là que l’imposture du Système — le Système élevé par l’ironie à un 
absolu d’absolu — est une façon pour le Système de s’imposer encore par le discrédit dont le 
crédite l’exigence fragmentaire.56 
 
Noting that the Greek origin of ‘énergie’ can be translated as work, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe argue 
that Blanchot’s fragment has the all-inclusive work as its horizon and is therefore no different from 
the Romantic aphorism.57  However, read further through this passage and the relationship between 
fragment and totality becomes more complicated than a simple opposition: ‘énergie répétitive’ 
suggests worklessness rather than work and the insertion of a quotation from an earlier essay on the 
Jena Romantics, ‘ou œuvre de l’absence de l’œuvre’,58 and the subsequent response placed within 
parentheses silences and exceeds this aphorism.  The ‘œuvre de l’absence de l’œuvre’ associated with 
Romanticism is not the worklessness at stake in the fragmentary, which is the effect of an 
uncontrollable repetition or dissemination.  The Romantic irony to which Blanchot refers in this 
passage is, like reflexivity in the conventional sense, a means of further reinforcing the dialectic: the 
system pretends to be unsystematic only to have a better grip on itself, to include its own opposite in 
                                                          
56 Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre, pp. 99-100.   
57 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Noli me frangere’, Revue des sciences humaines, 185 (1982), 
83-92 (p. 87). 
58 The ‘original’ passage from which this quotation is taken: ‘Et certes [le romantisme] est souvent sans œuvre, 
mais c’est qu’il est l’œuvre de l’absence de l’œuvre, poésie affirmée dans la pureté de l’acte poétique, 
affirmation sans durée, liberté sans réalisation, puissance qui s’exalte en disparaissant, nullement discréditée 
si elle ne laisse pas de traces, car c’était là son but: faire briller la poésie, non pas comme nature, ni même 




an authoritarian way.59  But the dialectic can go in either direction and there is another kind of irony 
which is reflexive in the sense that it is turned toward an extremity — the sort of reflexivity discussed 
by Foucault in ‘La Pensée du dehors’ — so that writing and other modes of technology are unleashed 
in a disseminating and uncontrollable manner which escapes the system.  
Blanchot’s return to Schlegel in 1980 was probably prompted by the publication of Nancy 
and Lacoue-Labarthe’s L’Absolu littéraire in 1978.  Other critics have also overstated the connection 
between Blanchot and Romanticism.  J. M. Bernstein, for instance, argues that the primary context in 
which one should read Blanchot is Romanticism.60  One source of confusion is the opposition between 
transitive and intransitive language and the subsequent view of literature as autonomous, associated 
with Romanticism and often mistakenly with Blanchot.61  In addition, the distinction is sometimes 
blurred between désœuvrement as Blanchot employs the term (explicitly not a dialectical negativity) 
and désœuvrement as œuvre in the Romantics, but Blanchot never articulates the idea of the work as 
worklessness in his own name.  For instance, he writes specifically of the Jena Romantics in 
‘L’Athenaeum’: ‘qu’écrire, c’est faire œuvre de parole, mais que cette œuvre est désœuvrement’.62  
There is also the question of subjectivity in Romanticism which is broached in the following 
paragraph of the essay: ‘Le “je” du poète, voilà donc ce qui finalement importerait seul, non plus 
l’œuvre poétique, mais l’activité, toujours supérieure à l’ouvrage réel, et seulement créatrice 
lorsqu’elle se sait capable à la fois d’évoquer et de révoquer l’œuvre dans le jeu souverain de 
l’ironie.’63  There is a vast difference between what Blanchot says of Romantic subjectivity and that 
                                                          
59 Blanchot makes a similar point in relation to Maurice Clavel (the writer alongside whom Blanchot is 
considered by Foucault in 1979) and Socratic irony in L’Écriture du désastre: ‘  Quelqu’un (Clavel) a écrit de 
Socrate que nous l’avons tous tué.  Voilà qui n’est guère socratique.  Socrate n’aurait pas aimé nous rendre 
coupables de rien, ni même responsables d’un événement que son ironie avait par avance rendu insignifiant, 
voire bénéfique, en nous priant de ne pas le prendre au sérieux.  Mais, bien sûr, Socrate n’a oublié qu’une 
chose.  C’est que plus personne après lui ne pouvait être Socrate et que sa mort a tué l’ironie.  C’est à l’ironie 
que ses juges en avaient tous; c’est à l’ironie que nous autres, ses justes pleureurs, nous continuons d’en avoir 
tous’ (p. 103).  On Blanchot and irony, and how Blanchot may misread Schlegel, see Hector Kollias, ‘Unworking 
Irony’s Work: Blanchot and de Man Reading Schlegel’, in Blanchot Romantique, ed. by McKeane and Opelz, pp. 
191-207. 
60 J. M. Bernstein, ‘Poesy and the Arbitrariness of the Sign: Notes for a Critique of Jena Romanticism’, in 
Philosophical Romanticism, ed. by Nikolas Kompridis (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 143-72 (p. 164-68).    
61 This was discussed in Chapter One in relation to Bruns’ reading of Blanchot as ‘last Romantic’ in Maurice 
Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosophy. 




non-subjective refusal seen in La Folie du jour and ‘Le Refus’.  Care should therefore be taken when 
reading Blanchot in the context of early German Romanticism.     
 The force of repetition takes over from the subject in fragmentary writing.  It is the repetition 
enabled by modern technology, the printing press, which drives the logic behind the paperback to the 
point of explosion in ‘Les Grands Réducteurs’ [1965], which is (when reading essays in chronological 
order) Blanchot’s last explicit engagement with ‘la technique’ for fifteen years.  The ‘système de 
freinage et d’arrêt’ associated with modern technology and culture is transformed in this essay into 
‘un processus explosif’.64  Works are so readily available in the age of the Livre de poche that it is as 
if time were abolished by this mass reproduction: ‘La durée tend ainsi à s’abolir, ce temps de la 
maturation et de la patience que, jusqu’ici, à raison ou à tort, on tenait pour nécessaire à toute 
transmission culturelle.’65  The printing press allows that interruption or fracture of which Foucault 
writes in 1979, outplaying the cultural limits within which it functions.  In this essay it is argued that 
one consequence of the mass reproduction of texts is that we may now better understand the reductive 
power associated with culture, a power which degrades works to mere values and ensures that the 
incalculable and enigmatic distance of the work becomes familiar, knowable and sayable.  Culture is 
here defined by plenitude; existing within a continuous and homogenous space without weakness or 
digression an all-encompassing unity and identity are its ideals.66  Literature is displaced through 
cultural appropriation; but ‘literature’, questioning not only the limits of this cultural unity but also 
itself, challenges this continuity.  Quoting Trotsky in the footnote which concludes the essay, 
Blanchot compares literature and art in the era of the Livre de poche to the Revolution which turns 
life into a sort of bivouac, rendering everything — but itself more than anything else — strange, 
transitory and precarious: ‘“Prise dans la diversité de ses épisodes, la Révolution apparaît soudain 
dénuée de signification.  Où est donc la Révolution?  Voilà la difficulté.”  Texte plus énigmatique 
qu’il ne semble, et la question qu’il pose, je crois qu’elle ne se pose pas moins aux manifestations les 
plus assurées de la littérature et de l’art.’67   
                                                          
64 Blanchot, ‘Les Grands Réducteurs’, in L’Amitié, p. 81. 
65 Ibid., p. 83. 
66 Ibid., p. 84. 
67 Ibid., p. 85 n. 1. 
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Returning to ‘Nietzsche, aujourd’hui’ [1958] for publication in L’Entretien infini [1969] 
Blanchot replaces ‘aphorisme’ with ‘fragment’ to further distance fragmentary writing from the 
Schlegelian fragment which suppresses repetitive energy and shores up the absolute self.  In the last of 
the three essays on Nietzsche collected in L’Entretien infini, ‘Nietzsche et l’écriture fragmentaire’, 
originally published in two parts in 1966/7, some eight years after ‘Nietzsche, aujourd’hui’ and 
‘Passage de la ligne’, Blanchot no longer appeals to nihilism, but turns to the fragment as a means of 
responding to that affirmation which demands separation.  ‘Mais qu’en est-il d’elle, la pensée, lorsque 
l’être —  l’unité, l’identité de l’être — s’est retiré sans faire place au néant, ce refuge trop facile? […] 
Langage: l’affirmation même, celle qui ne s’affirme plus en raison ni en vue de l’Unité.  Affirmation 
de la différence, mais toutefois jamais différente.  Parole plurielle.’68  The account of the neuter given 
in ‘L’Oubli, la déraison’ echoes this unstable relationship between language and affirmation, where 
madness: (un)reason.  And just as the telephone call in La Folie du jour establishes and annuls a 
distance within the doubled narrator and exposes ‘him’ not caught up within the exchange to an 
unwilled refusal, the colon equates language to an affirmation of (in)difference which it 
simultaneously destabilises.  This is not an isolated instance where Blanchot uses punctuation as a 
destabilising strategy, or ‘technique’; elsewhere in the same essay he writes: ‘Nous savons seulement 
que la pensée du surhomme signifie: l’homme disparaît, affirmation qui est poussée au plus loin, 
lorsqu’elle se redouble en question: l’homme disparaît-il?’; ‘Le monde: un texte; le monde, “jeu divin 
par-delà le Bien et le Mal”’; ‘+ +  Interpréter: l’infini: le monde.  Le monde?  Un texte?  Le texte: le 
mouvement d’écrire dans sa neutralité’; ‘+ +  Différence: la non-identité du même, le mouvement de 
distance, ce qui porte en déportant, le devenir d’interruption.’69  The colons suggests a clear and stable 
relationship between two, sometimes three, terms; however, the relation is no sooner asserted than it 
is under erasure through the introduction of semi-colons or question marks in a sort of typographical 
                                                          
68 Blanchot, ‘Nietzsche et l’écriture fragmentaire’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 227-55 (p. 234) (first publ. in La 
Nouvelle Revue française, 168 (December 1966), 967-83; 169 (January 1967), 19-32).  
69 Blanchot, ‘Nietzsche et l’écriture fragmentaire’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 236-37, 248, 252, 254.  Derrida 
makes a similar point about Blanchot’s use of the colon in Michel Foucault tel que je l’imagine: ‘Aura-t-on 
jamais ponctué avec plus de rigueur, d’économie, de réserve, laissant même ouverte l’hypothèse, mais ne 
nous y arrêtons pas, que là, peut-être, personne n’est plus là pour personne, et c’est bien la mort, ce mourir 
dont Blanchot s’est plaint, si souvent, si profondément, non qu’il fût fatal mais qu’il restât impossible?’  
Jacques Derrida, Politiques de l’amitié (Paris: Galilée, 1994), pp. 334-35. 
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re-enactment of the movement of distance and the becoming of interruption described in that last line 
quoted.   
What better emblem for this formulation than the plus-minus sign (+ +), a mathematical 
symbol that indicates a choice of two possible values, each of which is the suspension or deferral of 
the other, and precedes each of the twenty-eight fragments of ‘Nietzsche et l’écriture fragmentaire’?  
This symbol points to that original separation, allowing Difference to speak (because what matters is 
the unstable answer or reversible movement between the two values) and an incalculable excess to 
escape this mathematical system.  Blanchot notes the importance of typographical marks in the 
penultimate fragment of the essay:  
 
+ +  […] Articuler le vide par le vide, le structurer en tant que vide en dégageant de lui 
l’étrange irrégularité qui toujours dès l’abord le spécifie comme vide, c’est par là que les signes 
d’espace — ponctuation, accent, scansion, rythme (configuration) —, préliminaire de toute 
écriture, font le jeu de la différence et sont engagés dans son jeu.  Non pas qu’ils servent à 
traduire ce vide ou à le rendre visible, à la manière d’une notation musicale: au contraire, loin 
de retenir l’écrit au niveau des traces que celui-ci laisse ou des formes qu’il concrétise, leur 
propriété est d’indiquer en lui la déchirure, la rupture incisive (le tracé invisible d’un trait) par 
laquelle le dedans retourne éternellement au dehors, tandis que s’y désigne au pouvoir de 
donner sens, et comme son origine, l’écart qui toujours l’en écarte.70 
 
These interrupting signs do not translate the void but indicate a rupture.  Of course, this distance is 
never stable and is continually distanced from itself in a double movement of external reflection — 
one is here reminded of the discussion of revolution and literature at the end of ‘Les Grands 
Réducteurs’ similarly enabled by the printing press.  The Nietzschean fragment, Blanchot had written 
in his notes for the Revue internationale, is linked to that roving thought which is accomplished in 
                                                          
70 Blanchot, ‘Nietzsche et l’écriture fragmentaire’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 254.   
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separate affirmations.71  These signs place this discourse in relation to the fragmentary which lies 
outside the totality and coherence of language, enabling each fragment to think the impossible. 
Blanchot returned to Nietzsche after a new edition of his work edited by Giorgio Colli and 
Mazzino Montinari started to appear in German in 1967.  The first volume to appear, which was in 
fact the fifth volume of the edition, included Le Gai Savoir and fragments from the summer of 1881 to 
the summer of 1882, which are those quoted by Blanchot in ‘Nietzsche et l’écriture fragmentaire’.  
That same year also saw the publication of the important Nietzsche Cahiers de Royaumont, an 
account of a conference organised by Deleuze in 1964, to which Foucault, Deleuze and Klossowski 
had contributed among others.  A further text on Nietzsche by Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle 
vicieux, appeared in 1969 and would be hugely influential to Blanchot’s reading of Eternal Return.   
Heidegger thinks Eternal Return as the sum of the will: by dint of the will, Nietzsche is able to 
overcome time and Eternal Return is the last ditch statement of metaphysics.  Blanchot, on the other 
hand, following Klossowski, sees a total loss of will in Eternal Return.  Klossowski reads Eternal 
Return on two levels: the direct experience or revelation that Nietzsche underwent at Sils-Maria and 
the presentation of the doctrine of the vicious circle.72  Eternal Return as revelation represents an 
apprehension of the self as what it really is — a fortuitous moment — through a process of passing 
through previous instances of the self.  The past is irretrievable and so to will the past is to will 
necessity or to will what is beyond will.  In this account, the self is nothing other than a discontinuous 
series of non-identical and fortuitous instances and Eternal Return is a forgetting of the current self 
and a remembering of the others each in turn until one returns to the inactive self which first 
underwent the revelation of Return.73  Eternal Return is therefore a sort of deconstruction of the will, 
which brings us back to the machine.  Blanchot writes in 1970:  
 
                                                          
71 Blanchot, ‘[La Gravité du projet…]’, in Écrits politiques, p. 112. 
72 See Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux, rev. edn (Paris: Mercure de France, 1969), especially the 
chapter ‘L’Expérience de l’Éternel Retour’, pp. 89-112. 
73 On Klossowski’s reading of Eternal Return, see Ian James, Pierre Klossowski: The Persistence of a Name 
(Oxford: Legenda, 2000), pp. 129-41. 
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  Admettons que les événements ne soient ‘réels’ qu’au passé, machine fonctionnant de telle 
sorte que nous puissions nous remémorer, par une mémoire bien agencée, quoique  avec un 
léger doute, tout ce que le futur pourrait nous promettre ou nous faire redouter.  Mais le passé 
n’est-il pas toujours moins riche que l’avenir et toujours autre?  Assurément, sauf si, le passé 
étant l’infiniment vide et l’avenir l’infiniment vide, l’un et l’autre n’étaient que la manière 
oblique (l’écran différemment incliné) dont le vide se donne, simulant tantôt le possible-
impossible, tantôt l’irrévocable-révolu; sauf encore si la loi de l’Éternel Retour ne laissait 
jamais d’autre choix que de vivre au passé l’avenir et à venir le passé, sans cependant que 
passé, avenir soient appelés à s’échanger selon la circulation du Même, puisque, entre eux, 
l’interruption, le défaut de présence, empêcherait toute communication autrement que par 
l’interruption: interruption vécue soit comme le révolu du passé ou le possible de l’avenir, soit 
précisément comme l’utopie incroyable de l’Éternel Retour.  On ne peut croire à l’Éternel 
Retour.  C’est sa seule garantie, sa ‘vérification’.  Telle est, là-bas, l’exigence de la Loi.74   
 
The future belongs as much to yesterday as to tomorrow when it is experienced as repetition of an 
irretrievable past.  This is a messianic futurity void of any past or future Messiah which, rather than 
hastening the end, is the patient deferral of all ending.  This messianic structure is eternally open to a 
future which is never limited by the horizons of meaning and which allows for the passage toward the 
other.75  At every point in Eternal Return the present is eclipsed; interrupted, a void is opened between 
past and future in which what matters, like those two values indicated by the plus-minus sign in 
‘Nietzsche et l’écriture fragmentaire’, is that difference which always risks slipping into indifference.  
But the only proof we have of Eternal Return is that we cannot believe in it: what Klossowski calls the 
presentation of the doctrine of the vicious circle is parodic because always describing something that 
escapes that description.  The law of interruption interrupts itself; returning to the self that first 
                                                          
74 Maurice Blanchot, Le Pas au-delà, p. 25 (this and a number of fragments in the opening pages of Le Pas au-
delà (pp. 7, 10-15, 21-27, 33-36, 73) first publ. as ‘L’Exigence du retour’, L’Arc, 43 (Winter 1970), 48-53).  
75 The text by Blanchot which most obviously sets in play this self-deconstructive movement of the messianic 
(the promise that can never realise itself and in affirming itself resists the possibility of its realisation and in so 
doing simultaneously maintains and suspends itself) is L’Ecriture du désastre, pp 214-16.  For the messianic in 
Blanchot, see Hill, Maurice Blanchot and Fragmentary Writing, pp. 368-91. 
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underwent the revelation of Eternal Return, the will that wills this experience is undone and Eternal 
return, dehumanized, becomes an uncontrollable mechanism.  In the final section of this chapter I will 
consider how the shift toward a broader more inclusive techne following the suppression of 
‘technique’ in 1965 results in a sort of inorganic writing, what we may think of as a cancerous 
machine or nature gone haywire. 
 
 
The Cancerous Machine 
The suppression of ‘technique’ from 1965 to 1980 betrays a rethinking of technology which coincides 
with the development of a fragmentary mode of writing.  The description of Eternal Return as a 
forgetting machine in Le Pas au-delà reveals the otherwise unarticulated role of techne in the 
privation of subjectivity.  Eternal Return, preventing all communication other than by interruption, is 
a sort of radicalised telephone call exposing the self to its own fortuity at all moments in time.  
Fragmentary writing similarly disobeys all rule of identity to outplay the human; it is when 
‘technique’ disappears from Blanchot’s idiom that technology becomes everywhere implied and the 
humans, animals and insects which once populated Blanchot’s writing give way to piles of rubble in 
Le Pas au-delà.76 
 A short contribution to a special issue of Cahiers Confrontation in 1984 entitled ‘Après le 
sujet qui vient’ provides no answer to the interrogative pronoun ‘Qui?’ which it takes as its title, but is 
an unwilled refusal to respond between the one who writes and a spectral figure hanging over his or 
her shoulder: ‘Quelqu’un regardant par-dessus mon épaule (moi peut-être) dit, lisant la question: Qui 
vient après le sujet?: “Vous voilà revenu à l’époque lointaine où vous passiez votre baccalauréat.”  
— “C’est juste, mais cette fois j’irai à l’échec.”’77  What comes after the subject is a non-identical 
                                                          
76 Gerald L. Bruns — reading Blanchot alongside thinkers such as Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault — notes that 
the neuter is absolutely refractory to normalization and to the rule of identity.  Bruns rightly notes that the loss 
of self for Blanchot is equal to the loss of subordination, but Blanchot remains a marginal figure in this study 
and the shift that occurs in his writing in the 1960s, which sees the substitution of stones for animals and 
insects, such as the stag beetle of La Folie du jour, is overlooked. Gerald L. Bruns, On Ceasing to Be Human 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 1-3, 56-57. 
77 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Qui?’, in La Condition Critique, pp. 440-43 (p. 440) (first publ. in Cahiers Confrontation, 20 
(February 1989), 49-51). 
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past; there can be no facsimile when the self is destitute and the repetitive energy of fragmentary 
writing takes over, undoing all presence.  The who? does not belong to an ordinary temporality — 
always arriving its arrival is perpetually deferred — but to the temporality of a suspended afterwards.  
In this sense the who? is nonliving and the unending dialogue that forms the bulk of this ‘response’ 
gives way to a mechanistic, because uprooted, mode of writing — some of the closing lines of ‘Qui?’ 
are a quotation from Claude Morali who is in fact quoting from Le Pas au-delà.78   
Eternal Return as doctrine, a thought void of any content, places the entirety of individual 
experience under the law of repetition, non-identity and discontinuity according to Klossowski.79  The 
interrogative pronoun, having evacuated the subject of all identity, persists unanswered so that the 
only thing left to question is itself.  The only possible response to this self-reflexive question is the 
unwilled refusal of all response.  The result is therefore the echoed repetition of the who? which is 
forever differing from itself like that spectral figure reading over the shoulder of the one who writes.  
Interrogating the neuter is analogous to posing the question: ‘Qui?’  
 
  Nous pouvons nous interroger sur le neutre, sachant que l’interrogation ne va pas au-delà de 
l’interrogation; celle-ci serait déjà neutralisée, et ‘qu’est-ce que?’ ne peut être sa forme, même 
si elle laisse ainsi vide la place du questionné en ne questionnant que cette place vide; peut-être 
parce que le neutre vient toujours dans la question hors question.  Nous pouvons nous 
interroger sur le neutre, sans que le neutre entre dans l’interrogation.  Quant à la réponse, l’écho 
répété du neutre, elle n’est même pas pure tautologie, puisqu’elle disperse la parole du même.  
Le neutre, le neutre: est-ce une répétition, ou quelque chose comme les ricochets qui, à l’infini, 
par le glissement de ce qui glisse, déclinent des séries multiples: le galet, la propulsion, la 
surface qui porte, la surface qui se dérobe, le temps, la droite qui se courbe et fait retour jusqu’à 
la chute qui résulte, sans leur appartenir, de tous ces moments et ainsi ne peut s’isoler, tout en 
                                                          
78 This is quoted later in this chapter.  The fragment in question is found in Blanchot, Le Pas au-delà, p. 16.  
Claude Morali quotes this fragment in Qui est moi aujourd’hui? (Paris: Fayard, 1984). 
79 Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux, pp. 94-95. 
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ayant lieu à part, en sorte que le point singulier qui la marquerait, reste, dans sa singularité, hors 
de la réalité de l’ensemble: irréel et irréalisé?80 
 
‘Le neutre, le neutre’, Blanchot writes in this extract, leaving the unspoken difference suspended over 
the clause that follows.  This ricochet produces differing unforeseen effects with each impact.  Like a 
skimmed stone travelling across the water, the subject becomes impoverished, weakened with each 
glance off the water’s surface, and is revealed to be nothing other than a discontinuous series of non-
identical and fortuitous instances.  There are echoes here of the description of Eternal Return as 
forgetting machine; ‘galet’ may refer to a pebble but also to the tensioner or pulley within an engine 
which keeps the belt taut and the engine running smoothly; here the pulley is faulty and introduces 
play into the mechanism.81  Derrida, in his analysis of the apocalyptic tone, remarks that ‘tonos’ [ton, 
tone] first signified everything subject to stricture: the tight ligament, cord, the braided rope, cable, 
strap (we could also add to this list the shoelaces in the painting by Van Gogh).82  Changes in tone or 
a multiplicity of tones leads to a slackening or unravelling of the philosophical tone, a derailment that 
interrupts the unity of the destination, the self-identity of the addressee or sender.  Fragmentary 
writing allows such a multiplicity of tones and proposes radical change; the neuter renders everything 
non-identical with itself, but this cannot take place in the here and now — the neuter can never be the 
object of an interrogation — and once advanced like the skimmed stone this radical change collapses 
and everything remains the same. 
What would a space caught up in this temporality of a suspended afterwards look like?  The 
fragments of Le Pas au-delà emanate from a depopulated world in which nonliving figures await a 
forever deferred future.  There is almost nothing in this text which can be identified as natural or 
organic: those fragments that seem to narrate a fiction are set in a cityscape littered, indoors and out, 
with rubble.  Other than a fleeting reference to the dove of Noah’s ark and a passing simile in which 
                                                          
80 Blanchot, Le Pas au-delà, pp. 149-50 (this and a series of other fragments from Le Pas au-delà (pp. 121-36, 
156, 137-52) were first publ. as ‘Fragmentaires’, L’Éphémère, 16 (Winter 1970), 376-99). 
81 Galet is also a homophone of ‘galée’, which refers to galley proofs used in printing. 
82 Derrida, D’un ton apocalyptique, pp. 25-27.  See also Derrida’s discussion of those loose shoelaces in the 
painting by Van Gogh, in ‘Restitutions: la vérité en pointure’, in La Vérité en peinture. 
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our relationship to death is described as rodent-like, there are no animals of any kind in this text.83  
Compare this with earlier works such as Thomas l’obscur and Le Dernier homme which include 
references to what we might traditionally call nature: the beach, the sea, caves, a distant mountain 
range, a fish pond, dragonflies, birds and so on.  What remains in Le Pas au-delà is a strange 
depopulated world.  
 
  Les paroles échangées par-dessus la lourde table de marbre, allant de l’immobilité à 
l’immobilité.  Il s’écarterait de quelques pas, écoutant le jeune murmure là-bas des jours et des 
années.  Tout autour, il y avait des hommes apparemment endormis, couchés à même le sol, des 
couvertures jetées sur eux comme on jette de la terre en talus, et ces petits monticules 
innombrables, pensées de la ville émiettée, s’égalisaient jusqu’à devenir le plancher nu de la 
pièce.84 
 
The stones scattered across the floor of this room signal a radical non-identity which is open to the 
other because it is difference itself — the doubled figure of ‘Qui?’ and the ricocheted movement of 
the skimming stone and of the neuter in the previous extract also indicate this difference.  Neither 
dead nor alive but suspended in nonliving repetition, the difference that speaks from these stones is 
also the difference that renders the subject destitute.  Blankets are thrown over these figures as if they 
were throwing earth on a rampart: these piles of rubble are a defence or resistance.  Refusal, Blanchot 
had written in connection to De Gaulle’s return to power in 1958, is not accomplished by an 
individual but from, ‘un commencement très pauvre qui appartient d’abord à ceux qui ne peuvent pas 
parler’.  It is in this sense that the stones are open to the other which could be human, animal, insect or 
thing.   
What is depicted in this fragment is the echo of a politically significant event, most likely the 
student occupations of May 1968 in which Blanchot was heavily involved.85  A debate takes place 
                                                          
83 Blanchot, Le Pas au-delà, pp. 123, 134. 
84 Ibid., p. 153. 
85 On Blanchot’s involvement in May ’68, see Bident, Maurice Blanchot: partenaire invisible, pp. 469-83. 
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across the table while on the floor tired figures lying down to rest are exposed to a persistent youthful 
murmuring coming from days and years to come and those already gone.  The echo of May 1968 is 
also heard in the children’s song in that displaced quotation at the end of ‘Qui ?’ (Blanchot quoting 
Morali quoting Blanchot): ‘Comme si avait retenti, d’une manière étouffée, cet appel, un appel 
cependant joyeux, le cri d’enfants jouant dans le jardin: “qui est moi aujourd’hui?” — “qui tient lieu 
de moi?”  Et la réponse joyeuse, infinie: lui, lui, lui.’86  Only children can give an account that is open 
to impossibility, Blanchot continues in ‘Qui?’, and only children can sing it joyously: ‘Soyons, fût-ce 
dans l’angoisse et la pesanteur de l’incertitude, de temps en temps, ces enfants.’87  The first-person 
plural imperative commands or asserts the presence of these children which is then suspended by the 
third-person imperfect subjunctive that follows, introducing uncertainty and discontinuity and 
eclipsing this presence.  The song of the children playing in the garden simultaneously rings out and is 
stifled; the stress is on their presence and identity as subjects but the response is inconclusive and the 
repeated impersonal pronoun indicates a ricochet, an unspoken difference, which has undone and will 
undo the subject.  That the undoing of the subject has already begun is more apparent in the version 
quoted in ‘Qui?’ in 1984 where an em dash is inserted which does not appear in Le Pas au-delà in 
1973.  This typographical interruption suggests a doubling of ‘moi’.  The response to these 
discontinuous questions is a joyful one that does not pit counter-power against power but is a sort of 
powerless power.  
 The unwilled refusal to respond to the impossible question put to Blanchot by Jean-Luc 
Nancy and René Major, the editors of Cahiers Confrontation, in 1984 reveals a destitute subject 
evacuated of all identity and suspended in the temporality of nonliving repetition.  The subject, 
interrupted, gives way to an uncontrollable mechanism: fragmentary writing.  The fragment behaves 
like a cancerous cell, proliferating beyond its own borders and undermining the stability of 
(Blanchot’s) original text: 
 
                                                          
86 Blanchot, ‘Qui?’, in La Condition critique, p. 443.  The extract quoted, without the em dash, is an 
unacknowledged citation of a fragment in Le Pas au-delà, p. 16  
87 Blanchot, ‘Qui?’, in La Condition critique, p. 443. 
 212 
 
  Du ‘cancer’ mythique ou hyperbolique: pourquoi nous effraie-t-il par son nom, comme si 
par là l’innommable se désignait?  C’est qu’il prétend mettre en échec le système de code sous 
l’autorité duquel, vivant et acceptant de vivre, nous sommes dans la sécurité d’une existence 
purement formelle, obéissant à un signe modèle d’après un programme dont le processus serait 
de bout en bout normatif.  Le ‘cancer’ symboliserait (et ‘réaliserait’) le refus de répondre: voilà 
une cellule qui n’entend pas l’ordre, se développe hors loi, d’une manière qu’on dit anarchique 
— elle fait plus: elle détruit l’idée de programme, rendant douteux l’échange et le message, la 
possibilité de tout réduire à des simulations de signes.  Le cancer, sous cette vue, est un 
phénomène politique, une des rare manières de disloquer le système, de désarticuler par 
prolifération et désordre la puissance programmante et signifiante universelle — tâche jadis 
accomplie par la lèpre, puis par la peste.  Quelque chose que nous ne comprenons pas neutralise 
malicieusement l’autorité d’un savoir-maître.  Ce n’est donc pas par la simple mort au travail 
que le cancer serait une menace singulière: c’est comme dérèglement mortel, dérèglement plus 
menaçant que le fait de mourir et rendant à celui-ci son trait de ne pas se laisser compter ni 
entrer en ligne de compte, de même que le suicide disparaît des statistiques où l’on prétend le 
dénombrer.  [Si la cellule dite cancéreuse, se reproduisant indéfiniment, est éternelle, celui qui 
en meurt pense, et c’est l’ironie de sa mort: ‘Je meurs de mon éternité.’]88  
 
The final sentence of the fragment quoted here does not appear in the first edition of the text; it is a 
later addition which does not change the pagination of the text, which bears no acknowledgement that 
it is anything other than a first edition.89  Through a sort of wayward proliferation, an uncontrollable 
dissemination that escapes the system, the cancerous cell works outside the law of the programme and 
destroys all idea of a programme.  The cancerous cell is perhaps a Foucauldian resistance to the 
biopolitical forces that regulate and manage our lives.  Foucault writes in the first volume of Histoire 
                                                          
88 Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre, p. 137, Blanchot’s emphasis. 
89 Blanchot says this in a letter to Pierre Madaule dated 2 March 1981: ‘Je puis vous confier ceci: la première 
édition de L’Écriture du désastre se trouvant épuisée (comment? je ne sais, presque personne n’en ayant 
parlé), je n’y ai ajouté qu’une seule phrase qui se termine par ces mots “Je meurs de mon éternité”.’  Maurice 
Blanchot and Pierre Madaule, Correspondance: 1953-2002, ed. by Pierre Madaule (Paris: Gallimard, 2012), p. 
29.  That this is the only change he made to the text makes it all the more significant.   
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de la sexualité [1976] that suicide was once a crime, because the right to death was the power 
possessed by the sovereign over his people, but now it is a unique and individual act of resistance 
against forms of administering life: ‘Cette obstination à mourir, si étrange et pourtant si régulière, si 
constant dans ses manifestations, si peu explicable par conséquent par des particularités ou accidents 
individuels, fut un des premiers étonnements d’une société où le pouvoir politique venait de se donner 
pour tâche de gérer la vie.’90  The influence of Foucault is certainly evident in this fragment (the 
reference to disease and leprosy is perhaps a nod to Histoire de la folie and Surveiller et punir), but 
Blanchot goes further than Foucault: cancer is mortal debauchery, not simply death at work.  The 
significance of this difference is clarified in the cancerous proliferation of the fragment: the irony of 
this death is that it eludes the subject.  Blanchot is suggesting that Foucault’s account of resistance is 
reliant on the will of a subject (we saw earlier that Blanchot understands Romantic irony as an 
expression of poetic subjectivity); this cancerous proliferation is a different sort of incomprehensible 
and infinitely reflexive irony which exceeds and contests subjectivity. 
 A Blanchotian reflexivity marks the proliferation of the cancerous cell: turning outward it 
contests and is contested to the point that it is effaced.  The fragment echoes this cancerous 
proliferation.  The fragmentary has a complicated relationship with the organic which is one of excess 
rather than a simple opposition.  In its excess the fragmentary is that techne which outplays the 
human; it is an inorganic writing which does not abide by the cellular, genetic, organic and 
combinatory programmes defined by those technicians of disciplinary power.
                                                          









This thesis began by noting that Blanchot is a thinker deeply engaged in the events and debates of his 
time.  Some have drawn parallels between Blanchot and Heidegger, for whom the identification of 
technology with representational calculating reason reflects a desire to return to a more originary 
experience of Nature or Being.  Heidegger is an important and persistent interlocutor, but his thought 
is increasingly challenged and displaced by Blanchot, who is far from subscribing to any sort of 
technophobia but equally does not share the faith in the machine characteristic of modernity.  This 
thesis has shown that the natural or Being is always traversed or interrupted by the technical for 
Blanchot and that this was already evident in the work of, for instance, Heraclitus, Hölderlin and 
Mallarmé — an assertion which casts some doubt over claims that we are experiencing something 
new in the age recently labelled the Anthropocene.1  Blanchot remains relevant today because, at a 
time when we face an onslaught of narratives concerning the end of the world, his work hears 
something other than destruction in this ending and indicates a way of thinking other than the 
anthropos. 
Roger Laporte recognises the prophetic nature of Blanchot’s writing, which looks toward and 
welcomes an uncertain future: ‘Blanchot, contrairement à ce que certains ont pu penser, n’ouvre 
                                                          
1 For instance: ‘The Anthropocene represents, for the first time, the demand made upon a species consciously 
to consider its impact, as a whole and as a natural/physical force, upon the whole planet — the advent of a 
kind of new, totalizing reflexivity as a species. [...] Above all, considered at this planetary scale, the 
Anthropocene undermines the nature/culture distinction itself, the difference between natural history and 
human history.’  Timothy Clark, ‘Nature, Post Nature’, in The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the 
Environment ed. by Louise Westling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 75-89 (p. 86). 
 215 
 
aucun nouvel espace religieux: non seulement il n’éprouve aucune nostalgie pour un arrière-monde, 
mais il annonce, voire prophétise, une époque où l’athéisme serait chose passée, car aurait enfin 
disparu et le souci de Dieu et celui de l’absence de Dieu.’2  In rejecting the binary between theism and 
atheism Blanchot recognises something profoundly affirmative in a future where nothing is 
predetermined, neither by an all-powerful God nor by the teleological progress of history.  Those 
often italicised fragments in Le Pas au-delà, situated in the temporality of a suspended afterwards, 
reveal the patient deferral of the possibility of ending in Blanchot, or the impossibility of dying, 
marking the step beyond belief and disbelief which is precisely never a step because ‘pas’, in its 
double meaning, suspends or withdraws itself.  The emphasis placed by Derrida on the à-venir — 
unlike the futur, which is predictable, programmable, foreseeable and will be at a later date, the à-
venir is the totally unpredictable coming of the other — was no doubt prompted by Blanchot’s 
invocation of the future.3  Derrida insists on how far Blanchot is still ahead of us: ‘S’il y avait, ce que 
je ne crois pas, quelque pertinence à lui en faire l’éloge, s’il n’y avait là grossière attribution de 
maîtrise et si Le Pas au-delà ne périmait d’avance telle métaphore, je dirais que jamais, autant 
qu’aujourd’hui, je ne l’ai imaginé si loin devant nous.’4  It is as though this thought resonates from an 
unknowable future and our response to it can only ever be inadequate.   
One telling instance of how Blanchot has set the agenda for later thinkers is the use of his 
work by Bernard Stiegler, perhaps currently the most influential thinker of techne.  Stiegler quotes 
from or refers to Blanchot in all three volumes of the work,5 and a quotation from the first of 
                                                          
2 Roger Laporte, ‘L’Ancien, l’effroyablement ancien’, in Études (Paris: P.O.L., 1990), pp. 9-50 (p. 12).  
3 Derrida’s analysis of the viens that features in what would become, once the third section was suppressed, 
the closing line of L’Arrêt de mort signals his indebtedness to Blanchot.  See Derrida, ‘Pas’, in Parages, pp. 9-
115).  
4 Ibid., p. 55. 
5 See Bernard Stiegler, La Technique et le temps, I, 15, 29, 101-02, 120, 123 n. 1, 209 n. 1, 257, 268-70; II: 
Désorientation (1996), 43-45, 212-13; III: Le Temps du cinéma et la question du mal-être, 48 [this is an 
unacknowledged reference to L’Instant de ma mort].  The engagement with Blanchot continues in some of his 
most recent work; a quotation from ‘Le Grand Refus’ is one of three given as the epigraph to Bernard Stiegler, 
La Société automatique (Paris: Fayard, 2015- ), I: L’Avenir du travail, 7: ‘Inlassablement, nous édifions le 
monde, afin que la secrète dissolution, l’universelle corruption qui régit ce qui “est”, soit oubliée au profit de 
cette cohérence de notions et d’objets, de rapports et de formes, claire, définie, ouvrage de l’homme 
tranquille, où le néant ne saurait s’infiltrer et où de beaux noms — tous noms sont beaux — suffisent à nous 
rendre heureux.’  See Blanchot, ‘Le Grand Refus’, in L’Entretien infini, pp. 46-69 (p. 46) (first publ. in La 
Nouvelle Revue française, 82 (October 1959), 678-89).  
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Blanchot’s two essays on nuclear weapons is the epigraph to the general introduction to La Technique 
et le temps: 
 
Admettez-vous cette certitude: que nous sommes à un tournant?  
— Si c’est une certitude, ce n’est pas un tournant.  Le fait d’appartenir à ce moment où 
s’accomplit un changement d’époque (s’il y en a), s’empare aussi du savoir certain qui voudrait 
le déterminer, rendant inappropriée la certitude comme l’incertitude.  Nous ne pouvons jamais 
moins nous contourner qu’en un tel moment: c’est cela d’abord, la force discrète du tournant.6 
 
This quotation is significant because Stiegler wants to specify the way technics constitutes our 
experience of time differently in different epochs; he sees in Blanchot a writer engaging with similar 
concerns and undoubtedly recognises a conception of writing as techne in his work.  Stiegler takes up, 
albeit discreetly, many of the key emphases of Blanchot’s thought, but he does so without grasping 
their full measure. 
The relation between writing and modern technology as it is articulated by Stiegler clarifies 
his interpretation of the above quotation from Blanchot.  Stiegler argues that historical epochs and the 
collective forms of time consciousness which define these epochs are constituted in and through 
technical systems and prostheses.  There are three different layers of memory according to Stiegler: 
genetic or biological memory, which is programmed into our DNA; epigenetic memory, which refers 
to the experience acquired over a lifetime stored in the central nervous system; and epiphylogenetic, 
or tertiary, memory, which is where genetic and epigenetic memories come to be deposited in 
technical systems or artefacts.  Only human beings have access to this third sort of memory, which 
transforms not only our understanding of the human but also our understanding of technics.  Stiegler 
thinks the human in terms of an originary lack and thinks technics according to a logic of 
supplementarity which responds to that lack: the first volume takes its name from the myth of 
Epimetheus, the Greek god who forgot to bestow the human with any positive trait or skill, which 
                                                          
6 Blanchot, ‘Sur un changement d’époque: l’exigence du retour’, in L’Entretien infini, p. 394. 
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meant that his brother Prometheus then stole the gift of the arts or craft (techne) and fire from the gods 
to give to the human.  This sort of (epiphylogenetic or tertiary) memory is what distinguishes the 
human from other living creatures; Stiegler contends that philosophy has repressed the technical 
dimension of the human and accorded technicity only secondary instrumental status when it is in fact 
constitutive of the human.  The latter half of the twentieth century, he argues in the second volume of 
La Technique et le temps, marks the end of the historical culture rooted in the linearity of writing, in 
which the retention of the past and collective apprehension of the present passes through the technical 
system of the written word, and the emergence of a new historical epoch of media such as 
photography and cinema.  These new technologies are changing, or reprogramming, our experience of 
time so that we become ‘deterritorialised’, as real time digital communication annihilates 
geographical situatedness and temporal delays.7    
The danger is that we remain ignorant of these changes; this is the problem Stiegler is 
contemplating when he writes that technics is evolving quicker than culture.  He refers to Blanchot on 
Ernst Jünger when making this point: 
 
Tout se passe alors comme si le temps sautait hors de lui: non seulement parce que les 
processus de prise de décision et d’anticipation (dans le domaine de ce qui Heidegger nomme la 
‘préoccupation’) passent irrésistiblement du côté de la ‘machine’ ou du complexe technique, 
mais parce que en quelque sorte, comme l’écrit Blanchot reprenant un titre de Jünger, l’époque 
passe le mur du temps.8 
 
What is important for Stiegler is not to look back nostalgically to the previous epoch of linear writing, 
because writing and modern technology produce a similar effect of disorientation.  He quotes from 
‘La Bête de Lascaux’ (‘le savoir impersonnel du livre qui ne demande pas à être garanti par la pensée 
d’un seul, laquelle n’est jamais vraie, car elle ne peut se faire vérité que dans le monde de tous et par 
                                                          
7 For an overview of La Technique et le temps, see Ian James, The New French Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 
2012), pp. 61-82. 
8 Stiegler, La Technique et le temps, I, 29. 
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l’avènement même de ce monde.  Un tel savoir est lié au développement de la technique sous toutes 
les formes et il fait de la parole, de l’écriture, une technique’)9 to argue that an impersonal knowledge, 
an authority without author, also inheres in writing as technics [l’écriture comme technique]: 
 
Il s’agit ici de l’écriture orthographique du livre ouvert par Hérodote inaugurant une époque 
dont on pressent, ‘lisant dans nos années’, la clôture — une autre impersonnalité, une autre 
entente de l’impersonnel advenant, où le ‘plus considérable’ changement est inscrit dans 
l’avènement des ‘puissances impersonnelles’ de la technique moderne.10 
 
Stiegler is fearful that in the age of real time media we risk losing individual liberty, freedom and 
choice in a society governed by a sort of Foucauldian biopower.11  In the third volume he considers 
how we risk the synchronisation of our time consciousness in the service of mass markets and 
economic productivity, which renders it impossible for individuals to differentiate themselves and 
become distinctly singular and unique.  This impersonal knowledge associated with technics is 
evident in writing, which means that rather than looking back we need to engage critically with the 
impact on our time consciousness of these new media.  Stiegler calls for a new consideration of 
technicity.  Blanchot, on the other hand, is sceptical of the Heideggerian claim, which Stiegler seems 
to be adopting, that there are different epochs of Being that can be identified and addressed as such; 
his objection is that to do so with any certainty it is necessary to withdraw from Being, which then 
implies that the epoch cannot be delimited with any certainty.   
Stiegler sees in Blanchot a thinker of writing as techne and, as well as the use of ‘La Bête de 
Lascaux’, he quotes extensively from ‘La Littérature et le droit à la mort’ to argue that there is 
continuity between the written word and technical objects: writing exemplifies the question of 
invention as paradox, which is to say the constitution of time as technics.12  He quotes Blanchot on the 
                                                          
9 Blanchot, ‘La Bête de Lascaux’, La Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue française, p. 684. 
10 Stiegler, La Technique et le temps, II, 43-44.  In the first volume, Stiegler quotes Blanchot on Herodotus as an 
example of a prior change of epoch, the beginning of the epoch of writing (La Technique et le temps, I, 101). 
11 James, The New French Philosophy, p. 79. 
12 Stiegler, La Technique et le temps, I, 268-70. 
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maker of the stove and the writer and argues that for both to work [œuvrer] is to forget the self and to 
let one’s other be.  This is a materialization or solidification of consciousness in the technical artefact.  
Stiegler clarifies this point:  
 
Cela dit, la lecture de Blanchot signifie aussi une ‘conversion’ — mais qui n’oublie jamais 
l’hors-de-soi: elle n’est pas retour au soi, mais aller en effets (d’écriture) au dehors, au ‘monde’.  
Chez Blanchot, l’écriture (et tout ce qu’elle désigne: le dehors comme instrumentalité, la 
tekhnè) est l’horizon originaire, c’est-à-dire constitutif, de la temporalité en tant que telle.  Et la 
publicité est essentielle à cette ‘conversion’ — car tel est le sens de toute écriture.13 
 
There are hints that Stiegler is a thoughtful and attentive reader of Blanchot: the suspension of world 
in quotation marks, the bracketing off of writing from outside and then vice-versa, the recognition that 
this is an outward-facing reflexivity and the designation of writing as techne.  On the other hand, the 
characterisation of the outside as instrumentality and the claim that writing is the originary horizon 
indicates a further misreading of Blanchot.14  Stiegler argues that writing gives time and as such is the 
origin of the human; but for Blanchot it is writing without horizon that traces, but also exceeds, the 
horizon.   
Drawing influence from Blanchot, Stiegler does not always think the implications of his 
thought through to their logical conclusion.  From a Blanchotian perspective Stiegler’s suggestion that 
welcoming the other is a process of work is problematic.  A footnote after ‘conversion’ in the extract 
quoted above directs us to those texts in L’Espace littéraire ‘sur l’usage’.  We can speculate that 
Stiegler has in mind the following passage on conversion in the real and in the imaginary: 
 
Nous voyons ainsi que la conversion, ce mouvement pour aller vers le plus intérieur, œuvre où 
nous nous transformons en transformant tout, a quelque chose à voir avec notre fin —, et cette 
                                                          
13 Ibid., p. 270. 
14 Watt contests the use of Blanchot by Stiegler on the grounds that the latter wants writing to be more useful, 
or more technical, than Blanchot’s text permits in ‘Uses of Maurice Blanchot in Bernard Stiegler’s La Technique 
et le temps’, p. 316.   
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transformation, cet accomplissement du visible en l’invisible dont nous avons la charge, est la 
tâche même de mourir qu’il nous a été jusqu’ici si difficile de reconnaître, qui est un travail, 
mais assurément bien différent du travail par lequel nous faisons des objets et projetons des 
résultats.  Nous voyons même à présent qu’il lui est opposé, s’il lui ressemble toutefois en un 
point, car, dans les deux cas, il s’agit bien d’une ‘transformation’: dans le monde, les choses 
sont transformées en objets afin d’être saisies, utilisées, rendues plus sûres, dans la fermeté 
distincte de leurs limites et l’affirmation d’un espace homogène et divisible — mais, dans 
l’espace imaginaire, transformées en l’insaisissable, hors d’usage et de l’usure, non pas notre 
possession, mais le mouvement de la dépossession, qui nous dessaisit et d’elles et de nous, non 
pas sûres: unies à l’intimité du risque, là où elles ni nous ne sommes plus abrités, mais 
introduits sans réserve en un lieu où rien ne nous retient.15 
 
For Stiegler the conversion is an exteriorisation of the self in the technical artefact; it marks the 
inauguration of the human.  This understanding of technics as constitutive of time and of the human is 
premised on the possibility of death; it is only through technics that we retain the past and anticipate 
the future.  Blanchot writes in the above extract that this conversion has something to do with our end, 
but the em dash following this statement indicates something that cannot be articulated or recalled.  In 
the imaginary the conversion acts on both the thing and the subject: withdrawn from ourselves as 
subjects we no longer face the thing as object.  The metamorphosis described by Blanchot is not a 
simple change of form, the concretization of consciousness in the technical artefact, but a 
deconstruction of the will which allows us to step aside from the sovereign subject and welcome the 
other.  In his analysis of Lautréamont’s Les Chants de Maldoror from 1949, metamorphosis results in 
a proliferation of strange creatures16 and in the extract above the homogeneity, which Stiegler fears to 
be the consequence of the contemporary synthesis of time consciousness via real time media, is 
associated with the world of the sovereign subject rather than the impersonal knowledge of the book.  
It is through not work but worklessness — an exteriorization that is never complete, the bracketing off 
                                                          
15 Blanchot, ‘Rilke et l’exigence de la mort’, in L’Espace littéraire, pp. 181-82. 
16 See, for instance, Blanchot, ‘L’Expérience de Lautréamont’, in Lautréamont et Sade, p. 273. 
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of world in the phenomenological epoché that does not refound or rediscover the ego (as in Husserl), 
but dramatises a moment of absolute uncertainty which leaves us teetering over the edge of the abyss 
— that the hierarchy between human, animal and stone collapses in Blanchot’s writing.    
 Stiegler frames his project in terms of remembering what has long been forgotten in 
metaphysics — technics — and looks to challenge the limit between the organic and inorganic.  
Richard Beardsworth has argued that in claiming that only the human has access to this memory 
stored in technical artefacts Stiegler implies the prior existence of a pure nature that precedes this 
rupture.17  This is problematic because there is an uncontested or unexamined foundation which could 
provide the grounding for a dogmatic politics.  Blanchot, on the other hand, conceives writing as a 
forgetting, or an interruption of the present.  The distinction between the two conceptions of writing 
as a tool for memory and as a means of contesting our historical assumptions is important.  Stiegler 
asks for a greater understanding of the impact on our consciousness of time and limits his analysis to 
the human; writing that it is a question of knowing if we can predict the evolution of technics as 
impersonal  ‘puissance’ and if we can determine what sort of ‘pouvoir’ we may have over technics, he 
pits power against counter-power.18  Blanchot, by refusing to think in terms of different epochs of 
Being, welcomes the uncertainty of an unknowable future and foretells neither devastation nor 
salvation.  The technical is irreducible to history which it contests, thus allowing Blanchot to 
recognise in writing and also in recently developed technologies (radio, cinema, the telephone, the 
atom bomb, the printing press and spaceflight) the potential to challenge our worldly perspective.  
Fear felt in the face of an uncertain future does not translate into simple technophobia for Blanchot, 
but responsibility for the other: ‘  La peur, nous l’appelons mortelle, alors qu’elle nous dérobe la 
mort où elle nous attire, mais toujours la peur excédant le moi où elle se retranche, absent de celui qui 
la porte, comme du langage qui la prononce, nous rendant étrangers à nous-mêmes, est la peur pour 
quelqu’un qui ne se laisse pas aborder et que la mort détourne déjà de notre secours pourtant appelé, 
attendu.’19 
                                                          
17 Richard Beardsworth, ‘Thinking Technicity’, Cultural Values, 2 (1998), 70-86 (p. 81). 
18 Stiegler, La Technique et le temps, I, p. 35. 
19 Blanchot, Le Pas au-delà, p. 83. 
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The uncertainty that undermines any claim that we are undergoing a change of epoch signals 
not that writing has fallen into timeless eternity, but a withdrawal from presence which is 
simultaneously a radical interruption of the present, demanding a new perspective.  It resonates with 
recent work in eco-criticism,20 but denies that there is anything new about our current situation.  In the 
twenty-first century there is undeniably a sense of entrapment, unpredictability and fragility, reflected 
in daily reporting of extreme weather events, worsening air quality and species extinction; but the 
same irreversible realisation is shared by the squirrel trapped in the cage in L’Arrêt de mort: 
something else is in control.  Blanchot’s priority is to insist how, with danger, comes also a chance.  
This is his version of what Hölderlin says in ‘Patmos’: ‘Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst | Das Rettende 
auch’.21  The chance for something other than destruction is heard in the call of the impossible which 
insistently appears throughout Blanchot’s work in the form of the inhuman and which encourages an 
outward self-reflection (this is perhaps what Blanchot is naming in the letter to Roger Laporte from 
1984 when he writes of ‘[l]a chose publique’).  The end does not always imply a new beginning, as 
was Heidegger’s belief [ein neuer Anfang], but a suspended moment where nothing is final: ‘la fin 
commence’.22 
                                                          
20 See, for instance, Timothy Morton’s call for us to think ecology without (Heideggerian) world in ‘Coexistants 
and Coexistence: Ecology without a World’, in Ecocritical Theory: New European Approaches, ed. by Axel 
Goodbody and Kate Rigby (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), pp. 168-80. 
21 Hölderlin, Poems and Fragments, p. 462. 
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